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This thesis examines the influence of Romanticism on a selection of seven films 
from four contemporary American filmmakers: Sofia Coppola, Wes Anderson, 
Charlie Kaufman, and Spike Jonze.  
 
The research questions are as follows: How do particular Romantic ideas, either 
canonical ones or those located on the more critical fringes of Romanticism, relate to 
the work of the filmmakers I consider? What Romantic features do these films 
regularly exhibit, both aesthetically and in terms of narrative? How do these features 
inform their overall point of view? Finally, how do such Romantic ideas and 
aesthetics relate to the current cultural milieu in which the films were created?   
 
There are many familiar and more obscure Romantic strains running through the 
films. These include a preoccupation with personal history and memory; an 
undercurrent of deeply felt emotion and reliance upon mood and tone to convey it; a 
foregrounding of the creative process and the imagination; and an ambivalent 
relationship to both the natural world and civilised society.  
In terms of aesthetics, the films in question depend on qualities of the beautiful, 
picturesque, and sublime to represent the complex emotional states of their 
characters and to elicit emotional responses in their audiences. Above all, these films 
represent a preoccupation with subjectivity and self-consciousness: specifically, the 
coming to personal self-consciousness that creates a rift between the individual 
subject and a greater sense of society.  
By utilising the work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romantic authors and 
philosophers such as Friedrich Schlegel, William Wordsworth, Henry David 
Thoreau, John Keats and others, combined with twentieth- and twenty-first century
readings of these works via literary and cultural theorists and critics such as Harold 
Bloom, M.H. Abrams, Leo Marx and Anne Mellor, I emphasise the historical 
trajectory of general Romantic concepts. Taking established cinematic theories 
(“quirky” cinema, “smart” film, the “new sincerity”) as a point of entry, I explore 
the underlying stylistic and narrative connections between the films I discuss. I 
argue these films share a fundamentally Romantic form and vision specific to their 
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This thesis examines the influence of Romanticism on a selection of seven films 
from four contemporary American filmmakers: Sofia Coppola, Wes Anderson, 
Charlie Kaufman, and Spike Jonze. My research questions were as follows: How do 
particular Romantic ideas, either canonical ones or those located on the more critical 
fringes of Romanticism, relate to the work of the filmmakers I consider? What 
Romantic features do these films regularly exhibit, both aesthetically and in terms of 
narrative? How do these features inform their overall ideology? Here I draw on 
Robert Phillip Kolker’s definition of film ideology as the way a film “speaks” to and 
is read by an audience in the context of “the larger social, cultural, psychological, 
and political structure” that informs it (Kolker 13). Finally, what does the possible 
turn to so-called “neoromanticism” (Vermeulen and van den Akker) in these films 
say both about the works themselves and the contemporary age in which they were 
created? The filmmakers I consider offer varied approaches to questions of 
intersubjectivity, self-consciousness, sympathetic emotional engagement, and 
imaginative creation, but all approach them in what can be defined as Romantic 
terms.  
 
What Is “Romantic”? 
 
The term “Romantic” is often utilised and just as often misunderstood. What exactly 
does it mean to say something is “Romantic”, specifically in terms of a canon of 
Romantic artistic works? Typically the Romantic age has been defined as a 
historically bound movement stretching from 1789 (the year of the French 
Revolution) to 1832 (the year of the Reform Act in Britain) or 1834 (Bainbridge 6). 
Some scholars, such as Albert Joseph George and Maurice Shroder, contend the 
period lasted until the mid-nineteenth century (George xi). Romanticism was not 
simply one movement, but a collection of them, from the Jena School German 
Romanticism of the 1790s (Millan-Zaibert 2) to the French Romantic novelists of 
the 1820s and beyond (Shroder vii). The heterogeneous nature of Romanticism leads 
Seamus Perry to define it as a “posthumous invention” (Perry 4). Use of the term 
“Romantic” to describe a particular style or outlook did not become popular until the 
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later nineteenth century in Britain (Bainbridge 4) and was not cemented until the 
critical reappraisals of the twentieth century (4). 
 
In the 1940s, René Wellek influentially characterised British Romantic literature as 
employing “imagination for the view of poetry, nature for the view of the world, and 
symbol and myth for poetic style” (Bainbridge 4). Wellek’s proposed corpus was 
notoriously narrow, which helped solidify the Romantic canon as a handful of 
British poets—William Wordsworth (b.1770–d.1850), Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
(b.1772–d. 1834), Lord Byron (b.1788–d. 1824), Percy Bysshe Shelley (b.1792–
d.1822), John Keats (b.1795–d.1821), and William Blake (b.1757–d.1827)—and 
neglected scores of other poets and writers of the era (4).  
 
Wellek’s definition, while a good starting point, is vague, and the body of work he 
cites fails to include non-British Romantic works entirely. Arthur Lovejoy famously 
proposes that instead of “Romanticism”, we should speak in terms of a “plurality of 
Romanticisms” (5). Similarly, Jerome McGann acknowledges that “a systemic or 
comprehensive accounting of Romanticism—of its works or ideology—is an 
impossibility: indeed, it is a contradiction in terms” (McGann 47). For McGann and 
other critics, that contradiction lies in Romanticism’s aspiration toward 
completeness and its simultaneous acknowledgement of the impossibility of 
perfection (47). German Romantic poet and philosopher Novalis’s definition of 
Romanticism is more descriptive: 
 
By endowing the commonplace with a higher meaning, the 
ordinary with mysterious respect, the known with the dignity of 
the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I am 
making it Romantic (Novalis 60). 
 
Fundamentally, the qualities of Romantic works represent a “cataclysmic coming-
into-being of the world” (Abrams 93). The Romantic, it follows, is located within 
the “mysterious” experience of a phenomenological becoming—a constant hoping, 
striving, and doing related to a steadfast Romantic longing—rather than in the 
impossible completion of such a quest. 
 
There are many familiar and more obscure Romantic strains running through the 
films I consider, which I dissect in the course of five chapters. These include a 
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preoccupation with personal history and memory (see Jackson Bate, McGann, and 
Pottle on how memory and history shape Romantic identity); a deep undercurrent of 
emotion and a reliance upon mood and tone to convey it (see Bate and Pfau for an 
exploration of mood in Romantic works, and Sinnerbrink and Laine for its 
application in filmmaking); a foregrounding of the creative process and the all-
important imagination (McGann, Rzpeka, and Bloom apply these concepts to the 
British Romantics); and an ambivalent relationship to both the natural world and 
civilised society (see Bloom, Marx, McGann, and Hartman for an exploration of the 
often simplified notion of the Romantic in relation to nature).  
In terms of aesthetics, they depend on qualities of the beautiful, picturesque, and 
sublime to elicit complex emotional responses in their characters and their audiences 
(see Shaw’s work on the sublime, Mohr for an exploration of the picturesque, and 
Jarvis on beauty). Above all, these films represent a preoccupation with subjectivity 
and self-consciousness (see Bloom, Henderson, and McGann for discussions of 
Romantic subjectivity), the latter not necessarily in the sense of meta-textual and 
reflexive analysis (although there is plenty of that evident in these films—see 
Mayshark, MacDowell, and Sconce for a discussion of their reflexivity) but in the 
more Romantic sense: the coming to personal self-consciousness that creates a rift 
between the individual subject and the greater sense of a social self (Bloom 6).  
Harold Bloom considers subjectivity, or self-consciousness, “the salient problem of 
Romanticism” (Bloom 1). Similarly, when Geoffrey Hartman writes that 
“Wordsworth cannot find his theme because he already has it: himself” 
(“Romanticism and Anti-Self-Consciousness” 53), he highlights the problematic 
solipsism shadowing the subjectivity of Romantic thought. Echoing both Bloom’s 
and Hartman’s sentiments, Philip Shaw writes, “the Wordsworthian mind is self-
contained, serving no other purpose than itself” (102). While the Romantic 
movement is one from nature to the “imagination’s freedom”—the unleashing of 
visionary subjectivity beyond and above that of nature—that freedom also represents 





The quest is to widen consciousness as well as intensify it, but the 
quest is shadowed by a spirit that tends to narrow consciousness 
to an acute preoccupation with self. This shadow of the 
imagination is solipsism, what Shelley calls the Spirit of Solitude 
(Bloom 6). 
 
The resulting realisation of such self-consciousness entails giving up a feeling of 
totality, a connection with the external world (a world that includes other 
consciousness—that is, other people). How does one negotiate between such an all-
important visionary self and a social self? This divide between self and other results 
in fractured selves, or spirits, left to the solitude of their own subjective 
consciousness. 
 
The “spirit” of my title does not refer to a core essential being or “soul” in the divine 
sense, but the principle of this self-consciousness and the fissures it potentially 
creates between self and world. I argue that this Romantic principle, and the 
perpetual desire to establish intersubjective connection that this self-consciousness 
can impede, forms the implicit Romantic theme in the films that I discuss. 
Methodology 
 
For the purposes of this study, I consider the term “Romantic” as both an artistic 
mode of expression(s) as well as a historically situated age where such expressions 
were principally fomented. (Because it is defined principally by its epoch, I have 
chosen to capitalise the term except when used in its most vague, generic sense.) 
While the filmmakers I consider are all American, their cultural and artistic 
influences are much more global in outlook, one of the reasons I have chosen to 
correlate them with the Romantic movements of other nations as well. This also 
allows for a greater understanding of the pluralities of Romanticism Lovejoy 
references. I draw not only from the work of the famous English poets Wellek 
discusses, but also German Romantics such as Schlegel and Novalis, writers of 
Gothic fiction such as Anne Radcliffe and Mary Shelley, American Romantics such 
as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, and British women authors 
such as Felicia Hemens and Charlotte Smith.  
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Some (the German Romantics) predate the British canon, while others (the 
Americans) follow it; still others, such as Smith and Mary Shelley, were more or 
less contemporaries and often critically engaged with the work of their 
(posthumously, at least) more celebrated counterparts. I use Romantic philosophy, 
texts, and critical theory as a foundation for engagement with the films I discuss. I 
combine this with a larger theoretical framework utilising medium-specific analysis 
of the films. I have chosen to focus on films at least co-written by their directors 
because the idea of “authenticity of origins”, directly linked to filmic auteur theory, 
is in essence a fundamentally Romantic principle. While this is not an auteurist 
study per se, it relies upon the Romantic idea of origins and intentions of a more or 
less singular consciousness—a somewhat absurd notion given the collaborative 
nature of filmmaking, but one inextricable with the theories of authorship and 
romanticised notions of artistic practice that these filmmakers often embrace. 
 
This thesis does not involve dissecting conceptions of romance as they relate to 
generic conventions like the “love story” (although Romantic love does play a role). 
Rather, I engage with twentieth- and twenty-first century critical interpretations of 
European and American Romantic artworks, principally poetry and literature. I have 
chosen, for practical purposes, not to engage with the differences between factions 
of Romantic criticism, neither in discourse nor in method of approach (for example, 
New Historicism versus formalism) (Bainbridge 12, 18). More important is my 
selection of films—this is not a thesis on Romanticism or artists from the Romantic 
period, but rather one about how those artists’ conceptions of Romanticism are 
expressed in contemporary American “art-house” film. (The oldest film I discuss is 
Sofia Coppola’s 1999 debut The Virgin Suicides, while the most recent is Spike 
Jonze’s Her, released in 2013.) 
 
By utilising the work of theorists and critics such as Harold Bloom, M.H. Abrams, 
Anne Mellor, Geoffrey Hartman, Jerome McGann, and other major and minor 
scholars of the past and present century, I hope to emphasise the historical trajectory 
of Romantic thought—one that has endured to the twenty-first century as presented 
in the work of the filmmakers I have chosen to write about. Just as I am looking 
back to the past in order to analyse the present state of film, Romantic artists 
themselves were in part inspired by looking back to the mythmaking past of 
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medieval and chivalric romances (Snell 1) and were preoccupied by personal and 
cultural history in general (Milnes and Sinanan 4). Present realities are, of course, 
just as important. The Romanticism of these filmmakers is shaped as much by the 
historical and cultural realities in which they operate as Wordsworth or Keats or 
Mary Shelley were shaped by their own time (McGann 19), so much of my project 
focuses on how these filmmakers have adapted, altered, affirmed or challenged such 
thought, however unwittingly.  
 
There has yet to be an in-depth academic analysis of the specific Romantic attributes 
of contemporary American film, especially as they relate to original Romantic works 
and the critical responses to those works. There have been multiple book-length 
studies of Romanticism in British film, but these do not necessarily delve into 
Romantic ideology in a methodical way. In Romanticists and Modernists in British 
Cinema (2010), John Orr discusses the relation of Romanticism and modernism to 
British film, delineating two separate strains in the work of filmmakers such as 
Michael Powell, Alfred Hitchcock, and Terence Davies. Richard Allen’s 2007 book, 
Hitchcock’s Romantic Irony, argues that the legendary director’s British and 
Hollywood films adopt the perspective of the Romantic ironist.  
 
Much of the writing on Romanticism and film is very recent, which situates my 
work in an emerging field of cinematic study. Stella Hockenhull’s 2013 monograph 
Aesthetics and Neoromanticism in Film: Landscapes in Contemporary British 
Cinema offers an analysis of formal components in British film in relation to 
Romanticism, specifically in terms of the natural landscape and the sublime. In 
Forgotten Dreams (2016), Laurie Ruth Johnson explores the Romanticism of 
German filmmaker Werner Herzog. Also from 2016, Richard I. Suchenski’s 
Projections of Memory connects twentieth-century avant-garde film to Romantic 
traditions, particularly via the “epic” film. My intent is to examine the Romantic 
influence on what is perhaps a less obvious body of work: a particular brand of 
contemporary American cinema that positions itself in the liminal territory between 





Summary of Argument 
 
I am not suggesting that the filmmakers I study have consciously chosen to engage 
with Romantic aesthetics and philosophy; rather, just as Romanticism was in part a 
“conversation with […] the unconscious”1 (Snell 7), I argue that Romantic concepts 
form the very fabric of these works in an almost unconscious sense.2 The work of 
Coppola, Jonze, Anderson, and Kaufman is steeped in a Romantic tradition that 
follows from many of their filmic and larger artistic influences, including European 
New Wave cinema, New Hollywood Romanticism and filmic surrealism, as well as 
twentieth-century literature and photography. These traditions permeate the general 
landscape of European and American culture and have had an enduring role in 
shaping art beyond the Romantic era. 
 
These earlier artists’ Romantic tendencies engage in a dialogue with modernism, as 
an aesthetic movement, and modernity, as the historical reality of their time.3 To a 
large extent, the films I discuss express similar preoccupations. However, they are 
generally less political and experimental and more personal, even solipsistic, a trend 
that continues the “personal politics” of what Jeffrey Sconce refers to as American 
1990s “smart cinema” (Sconce 352).  
 
Unlike their cinematic forebears of the late 1960s and 1970s, who focused on the 
“social politics of power, institutions, representations and subjectivity”, the 
filmmakers I discuss shift attention to the interpersonal relations of “power, 
communication, emotional dysfunction and identity in white middle-class culture” 
(352). They are all fundamentally concerned with the matter of the alienated self and 
its relation to the external world, and that sense of alienation expresses itself in the 
																																																								
1 While Snell is specifically referencing psychoanalysis’ Romantic influences, I am using the term in 
its most everyday sense here, suggesting that the filmmakers in question are not completely aware of 
the source of many of their preoccupations, although my thesis does engage with some 
psychoanalytic theory.  
2 It should be noted that sometimes these choices are indeed conscious, such as Coppola’s decision to 
shoot with 35mm film rather than digital for her 2003 feature Lost in Translation. The filmmaker 
says the choice was due to her desire for a “fragmented, dislocated, melancholic, romantic feeling”, 
invoking	 not just Romantic longing for a past “enchanted few days” but also a sense of the fractured 
indeterminacy of the self in the present (Thompson).	
3
	For arguments connecting Romanticism to surrealism and other modern art movements see Abel, 
Adamowicz, O’Pray, Cunningham, Larson and Wiedmann; for Romanticism’s links to the French 
New Wave see Andrew and Caughie.	
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various emotional states their films convey: melancholy, restlessness, confusion, 
despair. But they also often express a sense of hope: bursts of joyous naiveté or 
intersubjective expressions of deep feeling, just as “[t]he Romantics glimpsed the 
darkness to come, yet a principle of hope prevailed” (Trilling, Scars of the Spirit 
167–68). Their characters may act blasé or disaffected, but they all fundamentally 
care, even as they remain isolated within the solitude of their self-consciousness and 
occasional solipsism (Mayshark 188).  
 
The Romantic conception of the power of individual imagination to expand social 
imagination explains these filmmakers’ imaginative, often fantastical 
“redescriptions” (Rorty 72) of reality, and it also speaks to their qualified hopeful 
spirit. Far from cynical or nihilistic stabs in the dark at an uncaring universe, these 
films and their characters “rarely succumb to hopelessness” (Mayshark 12). They 
engage on a deeply moral and ethical level, mostly through problems of the 
alienated individual’s relation to their personal social network (usually the family) 
and society as a whole (5).  
 
Fundamentally these films exhibit a preoccupation with self-identity: the notion of 
self and its definition in relation to other selves, and even to what constitutes a self. 
Since the Romantic era, the idea of an “authentic” self has become degraded, a 
casualty of postmodernism and poststructuralism (Jameson 62). This “post-
structuralist attack” (Henderson 2)—that such self-identity is simply an illusion and 
there is no “core” self—in many ways spurs a certain conservative, consoling mode 
in the films I consider. Characters often personify a more reactionary strain of 
Romanticism in their evocation of Wordsworth’s “anxiety of hope” (Prelude, book 
XII), a longing to return to the harmony present in pre-self-consciousness—or the 
belief that “the idea of unity has to be recovered or reborn” (McGann 40). 
Characters incessantly search for the means by which to reassert and reiterate their 
own identities as a way to protect themselves from a sense of inauthenticity, even as 
the very notions of the authentic now seems moot. They re-enact their own growth 
personally or through others (especially children), or they engage in a continual 
process of reinvention in order to stumble upon their “real” selves. This generally 
amounts to a series of false starts and failed attempts. 
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The films themselves often appear as imaginative recreations of impossible pasts as 
a protection against uncertain futures. From Caden Cotard’s relentless desire to 
embalm his entire life through his art; to Richie, Margot, and Chas Tenenbaum’s 
attempts to recapture the faded glory of their childhoods, which were miserable in 
the first place; to The Virgin Suicides’ nameless boys’ quest to forensically recreate 
the magical allure of their objects of affection, who they never even really knew, 
characters continually plumb their histories with the intention of self-discovery. 
Often they are just as deeply mired in self-delusion, and seem incapable of 
meaningfully engaging in their day-to-day lives.  
 
Despite their obsession with the past, the films’ Romantic inclinations are grounded 
in their own idealised historical time and place. Many of their stories seem to take 
place in a nebulous, transhistorical otherworld that does not quite correspond to our 
own. Leo Marx terms such a place “moral geography”, an ideal, mythic landscape 
used to work through subjective fascinations (Marx 245). Grappling with the anxiety 
of indeterminacy and “weakening of historicity” that signifies the postmodern 
condition (Jameson 58), these filmmakers, through their art, exhibit a yearning for a 
past acknowledged as imaginary. While utilising irony, they take aim at that irony’s 
“tyranny” by injecting their narratives with sincere sympathy (Mayshark 5, 7). Their 
films are overly concerned with reconstruction (6), even as they recognise that these 
attempted reconstructions are bound to fail, because they are reconstructions of 
imaginative illusions.   
 
According to Jesse Mayshark, “If there is a defining dialectic [in the films] it is 
between the self and the world” (11). In many ways that is the way their characters 
prefer things, but the status quo of solitude has intense and unasked for 
repercussions. Ultimately, the characters in these films reflect the filmmakers’, and 
our own, grappling with this sense of alienation and estrangement: alone even in a 
crowd, they are solitary figures, strangers not only to family, friends, partners, and 
co-workers, but also to themselves. While they represent a partially conservative 
turn (King 7) toward a past modernism—with its utopian vision, a “standstill” of life 
perfected through utility (Benjamin 170)—they embrace many of the seemingly 
inescapable tenets of postmodernism, such as fragmented subjectivity, irony, and 
self-consciousness (Waugh 5). That turn toward the past is a turn toward renewed 
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meaning. Ironically, it represents a desire for progress, even as the notion itself is 
called into question. It is this very oscillation between the poles of modernism and 
postmodernism that defines their particular historically based brand of Romanticism 
(Vermeulen and van den Akker). In the following pages I will elucidate the 
twentieth- and twenty-first century critical responses to several major components of 
Romantic philosophy and art works in order to form an initial theoretical framework 
for my corpus. I start with one of the most important ideas: the concept of the 
Romantic Imagination. 
 
Imagination and the Romantic Sensibility 
 
In his 1841 essay “Circles”, Ralph Waldo Emerson writes that a Romantic view of 
individual life, and human history, is of a cyclical, unending progression akin to an 
ever-turning wheel powered by individual imagination: 
 
The life of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring 
imperceptibly small, rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger 
circles, and that without end. The extent to which this generation of 
circles, wheel without wheel, will go, depends on the force or truth of 
the individual soul (Emerson 10:5). 
 
This passage speaks to the Romantic belief in the endless inquiry of the human 
imagination and its limitless potential, that “[e]very ultimate fact is only the first of a 
new series” (10:6). Such a belief encompasses the idea that “[w]e shall never find 
descriptions so perfect that imaginative redescription will become pointless” (Rorty 
71). It describes a perpetual motion machine of inspiration and hopeful renewal, but, 
unlike Enlightenment conceptions of progress, it denies ultimate knowledge, instead 
affirming an unending epistemological quest (71).  
Critically, it also expresses the idea that imagination is the key to human 
advancement; it is the “principle vehicle of human progress” (Rorty 71). This 
emphasis on individual imaginative power was evidenced by a “growing self-
consciousness in art” in the late-eighteenth century (Bate, “The English Romantic 
Compromise” 169). Fundamentally, it is indicative of the emphasis on the “cult of 
individual genius” (Hamilton 18): an acknowledgment that poets are, as Shelley 
wrote, “the unacknowledged legislators of the world” (Defence of Poetry 48), who 
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share a special visionary access to hidden fundamental truths that ordinary people do 
not (McGann 114). Genius is the ingredient that “arrests the moving fantasms, the 
material and images of beggardly day dreaming, the corrupting movements of 
romance delirium” and renders the Romantic imagination’s “evident light and truth” 
in its place (Botting 108)—it expands fanciful illusion to a sublime state of reason. 
Such poetic genius was only accessible through a combination of lived experience, 
deep feeling, and patient reflection (Bate 164). 
If theories of the Enlightenment considered imagination merely as a “function of 
memory, the recollection of decaying sensory data that was to be brought forth to 
mind after its objects were gone” (Wolf 20), the Romantic artist sought to 
reintroduce the power of the “active mind” in an attempt to break the bonds of 
materialism (20). For the Romantic, the imagination was the source of sympathy for 
others (Bate 162) and a “touchstone of stability and order” for the self (McGann 68). 
It was even cast in quasi-divine terms, as in Coleridge and Wordsworth’s conviction 
that it would “transcend historical divisions” and see “into the life of things in a 
secular age” (98, 101). Both writers “wished to make imagination not merely 
creative but a power for apprehending truth” (Pottle 283). Blake went so far as to 
align the poet’s imaginative power with the “creative power of God” (Frye 130). In 
accordance with such a project, the Romantics embraced myth and mythmaking as 
protection against the rationality they thought inhibited true vision (Bate 151). 
Artistic mythmaking becomes “a means to resist the intelligence intelligently” 
(Hartman, “Romanticism and ‘Anti-Self-Consciousness’” 50), a higher calling than 
the mere functionalism of intellect. Through imaginative power, the artist resists 
spiritually deadening rationality to arrive at something greater and more exultant. 
Under this rubric, fiction, not the objective scientific enquiry of Enlightenment, 
holds the key to enlightened truth. While Romantic thought is rooted in hope, that 
hope “has been shifted from the history of mankind” to “the mind of the single 
individual” (Abrams 111). It is, in some ways, an emancipatory attitude that focuses 
on the power of the individual through creative freedom.  
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While imagination, along with emotion, “began to destroy the perfect balance and 
the harmony which neo-classic4 art had sought” (Monk 28), it also unbalanced (or 
perhaps simply brought into stark relief) the separation between self and world. 
Geoffrey Hartman contends that the Romantic poet harnessed the “sympathetic 
imagination” within in order to counteract solipsism and “entice the brooding soul 
out of itself, toward nature first, then toward humanity” (55). This is related to 
Harold Bloom’s conception of the “quest romance”, comprising a series of stages in 
which immature and wild creative impulses are channelled into the pointedly self-
actualising imagination of the Romantic poet (Bloom 3). The first phase requires a 
“radical withdrawal of self” that can result in “visionary solipsism” (Rzepka 9), but 
such solipsism is eventually overcome in favour of the “Real Man” or “Imagination” 
stage Bloom characterises as “the outward turning of the triumphant Imagination” 
toward a larger humanity (17).  
 
Charles Rzepka, however, refers to the Romantic imagination as “the self as mind” 
(5); enraptured by his own power, “The Romantic poet turned away, not from 
society to nature, but from nature to what was more integral than nature, within 
himself” (16). The traditional Romantic view of sublimity, sometimes called the 
“Wordsworthian” or “egotistical” sublime, exemplifies this notion. Developed from 
ideas of sublimity espoused by both Edmund Burke (in relation to the physical 
nature of sublime objects) and Immanuel Kant (in relation to imagination’s role in 
sublimity), the Romantic sublime is based on the subjective perception of the 
individual, in a fundamental shift “from world to mind” (Shaw 73). “It is not the 
object itself” that now possesses the characteristics of sublimity, “but the manner in 
which that mind apprehends that object” (79). For Wordsworth the imagination itself 
becomes sublime—its power is “awful” and has the capacity to obliterate both 
noumenon (or external reality) and phenomenon (the mind’s experience of that 
reality), but it is also the source of poetic vision (101). As such, the imagination 
must be contained in order to protect a sense of self (102). 
 
																																																								
4 Featuring the main aesthetic hallmarks of symmetry, clarity, and regularity, the mid-eigtheenth 
century neoclassical period was largely inspired by the art and architecture of ancient Greece and 
Rome, as well as the revival of antiquity during the Renaissance (Palmer 24). 
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Because subjectivity is so central to Romantic thought, the self is tasked with living 
“authentically” above all else: the Romantic was “a person of true sensibility, 
possessed of a passionate and impetuous nature which would simply not permit 
dissembling or hypocrisy” (Campbell 177). In the Romantic age, ideas of sincerity 
and authenticity were being re-evaluated and reconstructed in enduring ways, ways 
integral to the realisation of the Romantic identity. 
 
Romanticism, Sincerity, and Authenticity: A Problem of Identity 
 
The idea of the “authentic” versus “in-authentic” self (Sinanan and Miles 6) is 
another key “problem” of Romanticism. Much engagement with canonical Romantic 
writing presumes a model of psychological depth—the presumption that a 
fundamental core of being exists (Henderson 4). That idea of the core self had a 
profound influence on new notions of authenticity in the Romantic era. Authenticity 
became a matter of a moral strength not based on any external authority, but on that 
of personal subjectivity: “authority moves indoors” and “being oneself” takes on 
primary significance (Milnes and Sinanan 5). This is the birth of the modern 
conception of authenticity—and by relation, sincerity—one that finds its source in 
the “authorizing origins” of the subject (5). Authenticity is no longer related to a 
realistic depiction of the world, but instead to the “truth” of the mind’s eye, 
“something that really proceeds from its origin” (6). Sincerity relates to the outward 
expression of such an authenticity; it becomes essentially the social practice of 
authenticity (4).  
 
The critical function of sincerity now becomes the “burden” of bridging the 
widening gap between an authentic self and the world (6). Autobiography becomes a 
key mode of expression in this “Age of Feeling” (Richardson, “Romanticism and the 
Colonization of the Feminine” 13), allowing a correspondence between the artist and 
audience that becomes a signature of sincerity (Milnes and Sinanan 13). In Walden, 
Thoreau expresses a desire for a “simple and sincere account of his own life” 
(Thoreau 5–6). When in his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth claims, “all 
good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” (Wordsworth 6) 
which should be delivered in the unfettered, naturalistic language of ordinary life, he 
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relates the idea of authenticity as integrally an intuitive and direct quality (Milnes 
and Sinanan 19). 
 
In much the same way as the filmmakers I discuss have been branded as socially 
disengaged and self-absorbed (see Moats, Mayshark), the Romantics have often 
been accused of celebrating modes of escapism (see Abrams, McGann). But M.H. 
Abrams insists they “were obsessed with the realities of their era” (110). With the 
burgeoning economic realities of capitalism taking hold, and Europe embroiled in a 
series of Napoleonic wars, in the beginning of the nineteenth century the social and 
political realms were undoubtedly unstable (see Lefort, Shaw, and Marx). Caught up 
in the sublime political upheaval of revolution in America and, especially, France, 
Romantic writers embraced its potential and “unbounded and hence impossible 
hopes” (Abrams 110). While they were ultimately disappointed by the revolution’s 
unfulfilled promises, they turned their hope and desire for change toward 
themselves, making it personal. 
 
There were, of course, political differences between nations and even within them—
Hazlitt, Hunt, Shelley, and Byron reportedly admired Napoleon (Nemoianu 188), 
and Emerson, unlike most, embraced the technological advances that came with the 
machine age (Marx 231). But all were a product of an age of new frontiers. 
Wordsworth, especially, shifted focus from this uncertain and foreboding societal 
future to what Abrams calls “egalitarian revolution of the spirit […] of the 
equivalence of souls, the heroic dimensions of common life, and the grandeur of the 
ordinary and the trivial in Nature” (Abrams 117). In a sense, Romanticism embraced 
the inverse of the adage “the personal is political”, popularised by mid-twentieth 
century identity politics activists (Hanisch). For Wordsworth and others, the political 
became personal. This “spiritual quietism” eschewed “overt political action” in 
favour of passivity and acts of imagination (Abrams 110, 111). It was, in a sense, a 
revolution from within. 
 
Charles Rzepka considers that publication of the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads 
marks a fundamental shift from “the world as an object of knowledge […] to the 
thinking subject’s point of view on the world” (Rzepka 10). Personal feeling and 
sympathy replace objectivity in a quest for truth, and both are linked to expressions 
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of authenticity. Thomas Pfau suggests that these expressions were “attempts to trace 
political, economic, and spiritual history back to its manifestation as emotional 
experience” (Pfau 2), that is, to source the feelings that lead to the facts. If “sincere 
feeling is in the language before it is produced by reflecting on it” (Sinanan and 
Miles 11, their emphasis), the author’s emotional sincerity is expressed by 
“contagion” (Pfau 3), a sympathetic communion that starts with the direct 
expression of feeling in the writing itself, leading to a similar emotional experience 
in the perceiver. 
 
Whereas the previous “age of sensibility” (Abrams 98) was attuned to the standards 
of societal convention and feigned emotion, the Romantic age associates “emotional 
susceptibility” with goodness and “make[s] custom and etiquette the source of all 
that is undesirable […] leading to the contrasting of ‘self’ and ‘society’” (Campbell 
177). Sympathy becomes an expression of individual sensibility, removed from the 
inauthentic organising principles of socially proscribed norms and rules (7). In 
contrast to the social constrictions of civilisation, nature was often viewed, in the 
fashion of proto-Romantic Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as an “authentic voice” (Grayson 
81) removed from society’s hypocrisy. Childhood was linked to authentic nature, as 
it exists in a state of “sensation unmediated by intellect” (85). In a sense, the very 
idea of whether a “social self” can even be authentic is thrown into question 
(Sinanan and Miles 10).  
 
Just as Jerome McGann sees different “phases” of English Romanticism, moving 
from a “visionary” mode to one focused on revision and self-critique (McGann 108, 
109), Angela Esterhammer posits that some Romantic works actually “interpret 
sincerity as a code or convention” (104) by emphasising its performative 
dimensions. She contrasts Wordsworth’s “spontaneous outpouring as the fiat of 
‘authentic’ selfhood” with Byron’s later “tireless performance of selfhood” 
(Esterhammer 3, 4). Far from being a simple expression of inner authenticity, in this 
later mode, sincerity becomes “fictional, imaginary or even downright false” (110). 
If sincerity is something that needs to be “embodied”—that is, expressed physically 
by verbal and other physical signs—its experience is unavoidably both spontaneous 
and theatrical: “This paradoxical notion of sincerity as a socially accessible and 
	 16	
physically engaged performance of interior emotion is paradigmatic for late-
Romantic poetry” (Esterhammer 113, her emphasis).  
 
The progression from the “essential” sincerity of Wordsworth to the “constructed” 
sincerity of later Romantic works reveals that newly redefined notions of sincerity 
and authenticity in the Romantic period were already being problematized by the 
early nineteenth century (105). Letitia Landon’s poem “History of the Lyre” (1829) 
reveals “whether sincere or insincere, the mental states of others are unknowable 
except by the indirect evidence of appearance, language, and other external or 
publicly shared conventions” (116). (I discuss this “problem of other minds” in 
chapter three.) This newfound reflexivity within the text engages in an uneasy 
dialectic of performance and sincerity, which is the case in many of the films I 
discuss. The films’ characters often suffer from extreme crises of identity, 
exemplifying this Romantic grappling with the idea of authentic selfhood.  
 
If expressions of sincerity, which were being called into question, were “fused” with 
ideas of authenticity in the Romantic era (Milnes and Sinanan 2), it now seemed a 
possibility that the “depth model” of authenticity was itself questionable, and one’s 
“own ‘likeness’ or image is all […] there ever is to lose” (Esterhammer 114). 
Perhaps, it was entertained, there is no “core” self at all. As Tim Milnes and Kerry 
Sinanan show, the “desire to discover a holistic self at the heart of writing” was a 
key Romantic project, but “authentic selfhood remain[ed] elusive, disappearing even 
as it is grasped” (Milnes and Sinanan 2). Geoffrey Hartman considers that the “ethos 
of self-fashioning”, defined by Coleridge via Shakespeare, might lead to “a restless 
identity search” (Hartman, Scars of the Spirit 33). For some later Romantics, 
especially Keats, what Hartman calls “anti-self-consciousness” (“Romanticism and 
‘Anti-Self-Consciousness’” 188) offers an alternative to such a crisis. For Keats, the 
authentic poet “has no Identity […] he has no self” (Keats, Letters 157). Instead, a 
celebration of physical phenomena results in what he calls the “material sublime” 
(Keats, Poems 237), an overabundance of sensation leading to vertiginous bliss that 
goes “beyond” individual subjectivity (Gigante 441). 
 
Internal conflict is endemic in much of Romantic thought and its attendant works, 
especially in terms of its key tenets of imagination, authenticity, and subjectivity. In 
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many ways, “Romanticism […] initiates the conflict between modernity’s homesick 
longing for authenticity and its dogged pursuit of critique” (Milnes and Sinanan 17). 
The films discussed in this thesis exemplify many of these struggles with identity 
and the alienation between self and world. The paradoxical state between 
unmediated authenticity and self-criticism can best be delineated via a discussion of 
Romantic irony. In contemporary terms, it is evident in what has been termed the 
“metamodernist” sensibility of the twenty-first century.   
 
“Metamodernism” and Romantic Irony 
 
Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker’s 2010 essay “Notes on 
Metamodernism” outlines the key traits of what they consider “the romantic turn in 
contemporary aesthetics”. Just as in many ways modernism was a reaction to 
Romanticism 5  (Whitworth 63), postmodernism offers a rebuke of the holistic 
utopian philosophies of modernism, resulting in a sense of “indeterminacy” which 
can “allow for an exemplary respect for the particular” (Hamilton 19). But 
Vermeulen and van den Akker claim that postmodernism’s “years of plenty, 
pastiche, and parataxis”—its reliance on ironic detachment, knowing reflexivity, and 
fragmented subjectivity—has reached an epistemological dead end, with seemingly 
nothing able or willing to take its place. Such postmodernism describes a feeling that 
Jean-François Lyotard describes as the condition of “and what now?” (“Sublime and 
the Avant-garde” 246).  
 
Pointing to the effects of a degraded ecosystem, geo-political turmoil, and the 
financial chaos of neoliberal globalisation, Vermeulen and van den Akker argue that 
postmodernism’s “death” has seen the emergence of what they call 
“metamodernism”. Metamodernism oscillates between the poles of modernism and 
postmodernism without ever achieving any form of “balance” between the two: 
																																																								
5
	Broadly, the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century philosophical and aesthetic movement of 
modernism encompassed a reverence for “utilitarian forms and undecorated surfaces” in art and 
design (Crouch 619) and a similar “hard and solid imagery” in literature and poetry (Whitworth 65). 
Modernism married the unadorned functionalism of classical forms to an emerging sense of utopian 
possibility found within the now fully-fledged industrialism of modernity, thus “shaking off the 
legacy of traditional historical styles” (Crouch 619). To do so, it embraced the marriage of art and 
technology in realising its vision (620). In essence, modernism relegated history to the margins in 
favour of looking forward to a boundless future of technological progress, rejecting Romanticism’s 
emphasis on the personal, particular, and emotional (Whitworth 65).	
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[Metamodernism] oscillates between a modern enthusiasm and a 
postmodern irony, between hope and melancholy, between 
naiveté and knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and 
plurality, totality and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity 
(Vermeulen and van den Akker). 
 
These oscillations that Vermeulen and van den Akker describe attribute a profound 
sense of anxiety caused by “unyielding tension”—the metamodernist work operates 
within a framework of desire for meaning and acknowledgement that meaning, 
reason, and rationality are elusive at best, and absent at worst (Vermeulen and van 
den Akker). The authors are quick to make a link between metamodernism and 
Romanticism; this tension or conflict is fundamentally Romantic.  
They highlight the “general idea of the Romantic as oscillating between attempt and 
failure (Vermeulen and van den Akker) and argue that Friedrich Schlegel’s 
definition of Romantic irony includes such an oscillation between “enthusiasm and 
irony” (Vermeulen and van den Akker)—it is irony that contains its obverse, 
sincerity, within its very mode of expression. According to Ernst Behler, such irony 
is an integral part of the self-consciousness that Romanticism implies, which creates 
endless shifts between experience and reflection.  
For Behler, Romantic irony comprises “an infinite mental spiral in which the 
individual mental ego hovers between naïve experiences and critical reflections on 
its experiences while viewing its own passions with disillusioned detachment” (43). 
Such an “intellectual attitude” allows the “vulnerable personality” a way to distance 
herself from immersive negative feelings of “melancholy, loneliness and profound 
suffering” while still acknowledging their reality (43). However, for Schlegel, 
Romantic irony is not a detriment, but a “propelling force”, similar to Emerson’s 
imaginative circles, that allows for a continual becoming and renewal (Behler 62). 
Still, the Romantic ironist partly resides outside of her own experiences, not wholly 
engaging in the immediacy of action and emotion, which signals a fragmented 
subject partially alienated from personal experience.  
According to Fredric Jameson, this “fragmentation of the subject” is characteristic of 
postmodernism (Jameson 63). Indeed, in this sense postmodernism can be 
considered a “remoulding of Romanticism [...] a mutation of the original stock” 
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(Larrissy 1). If, as Lyotard does, we take postmodernism to be not an “epoch” as 
such (á la the “postmodern era”) but a descriptive mode (Roberts 142), we can more 
easily consider the coexistence of different modes—the Romantic, the modern, and 
the postmodern—within the same text (Roberts 142).  As Vermeulen and van den 
Akker suggest, this coexistence resonates in metamodernist works. Just as 
“Romantic poetry incorporates Romantic ideology as a drama of the contradictions 
which are inherent in that ideology” (McGann 2)—the “spontaneity and recollection 
in Wordsworth”, the “spiritual tone” without specific religious context (Thorlby 
147)—metamodernism incorporates its own contradictions, demonstrating a 
Romantic “working out” of those contradictions without any kind of structural 
resolution or synthesis. 
Although they do mention two filmmakers I discuss, Jonze and Anderson, 
Vermeulen and van den Akker primarily elucidate the metamodernist influence in 
visual art and architecture. Their conclusions, however, can be readily applied to all 
these films, both in terms of mise-en-scène and narrative. For instance, the authors 
point to the structures designed by Ader and Rubsamen as employing “materials and 
methods” not ideally suited to their task, hypothesising that their intention is “not to 
fulfill it”, but rather to represent an “attempt to fulfill it in spite of its 
‘unfulfillableness’”. The architects realise structurally the failed attempt at the unity 
of the “good forms” of modernism (Lyotard 45)—forms that holistically serve their 
purpose, offering a nostalgic sense of “solace and pleasure” (Lyotard, “What Is 
Postmodernism?” 45)—while still visualising the attempt itself. A similar 
conclusion can be made with the use of antiquated forms such as stop-motion 
animation and other practical effects in the creations of Anderson and Jonze. It also 
characterises the actions of a vast majority of the films’ characters, who continually 
embark on quixotic plans and quests to fulfil desires with an air of premature defeat. 
This sense of the unfulfilable links metamodernism to the paradox found in 
Romantic irony, which engenders simultaneous “creation and de-creation”:  
The authentic romantic ironist is as filled with enthusiasm as 
with scepticism. Having ironically acknowledged the 
fictiveness of his own patterning of human experience, he 
romantically engages in the creative process of life by eagerly 
constructing new forms, new myths (Mellor 5). 
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For Anne Mellor, Romantic irony creates new forms and myths in order to puncture 
them. It acknowledges the game it is playing, but it plays it anyway, moving forward 
in a continuing cycle of “self-creation and self-destruction” (Behler 61) and 
recognition of the unending struggle that fuels imaginative power. (I discuss 
Romantic irony at length in chapter two.) 
Metamodernism is, in essence, an attempt to traverse the gap between modernism’s 
discredited, utopian expectations of totality—a belief in “good forms” (Lyotard, 
“What Is Postmodernism?” 45), grand “metanarratives” of social progress (Lyotard 
Postmodern Condition xxiv), “scientistic” ideological abstraction that feigns 
ideological neutrality (Docherty 25), and the “fantasies of realism” (Lyotard, “What 
Is Postmodernism?” 41)—and postmodernism’s fragmenting and fracturing of them 
through the creation of “new myths” (Vermeulen and van den Akker).  
 
This attempted traversal forever fails, but it is in the attempt that metamodernism 
wages its own war against what Jameson calls postmodernism’s “waning of 
affect”—the obliteration of subjectivity leading to the end of “unique and personal” 
style and the death of feeling “since there is no longer a self present to do the 
feeling” (Postmodernism 61). In its place, it creates a new “narrative of longing” for 
something it can never achieve; as such “the metamodern discourse consciously 
commits itself to an impossible possibility” (Vermeulen and van den Akker). 
Metamodernism, in fact, marks a new return to a Romantic sensibility, one that 
grapples with the incommensurability of feeling and action, self and other. It is not 
merely postmodern pastiche or an arch wink towards the past from the knowing 
present: 
If these artists look back at the Romantic it is neither because 
they simply want to laugh at it (parody) nor because they wish 
to cry for it (nostalgia). They look back instead in order to 
perceive anew a future that was lost from sight. Metamodern 
neoromanticism should not merely be understood as re-
appropriation; it should be interpreted as re-signification 
(Vermeulen and van den Akker). 
The filmmakers in question all seem intent on such a process of re-signification. 
They create narratives that depict spirits in solitude moving through brave new 
liminal worlds of personal mythmaking in attempts at meaning-making: desperate 
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for intersubjective connection, unable to totally fulfil their desires, yet continuing to 
struggle with the re-signification of their relationships and their own identities. I 
now turn to an overview of the filmmakers I discuss and connect them to this 
theoretical framework. 
From the New Wave to New Hollywood to Now 
 
While these filmmakers have no official organising principles, they are connected to 
each other professionally and personally in many ways.6 Jonze and Coppola met 
early in their careers (Smith) and were briefly married; Jonze directed two films 
from scripts written by Kaufman. They frequently use the same cast members and 
crew, such as actors Bill Murray and Jason Schwartzman (Anderson and Coppola), 
production designer KK Barrett (Jonze and Coppola), and cinematographer Lance 
Acord (Jonze and Coppola). They also share a similar milieu. Some, such as 
Coppola, finance their films independently (Thompson), but all are affiliated in one 
way or another with major Hollywood studios and their subsidiaries, which are 
sometimes referred to as “Indiewood” (King 7).  
 
There is a neat correlation between these filmmakers and the famous “New 
Hollywood” filmmakers of the late 1960s and 1970s, who include, among others, 
Martin Scorsese, Roman Polanski, Francis Ford Coppola, Stanley Kubrick, Terrence 
Malick, Robert Altman, Hal Ashby, and Brian De Palma (Biskind 15). In many 
ways the filmmakers I discuss owe a large debt to their predecessors’ 
institutionalisation of a “relative (but not radical) alterity” (King 31). Robert Phillip 
Kolker considers the New Hollywood era a fleeting period in American filmmaking 
when filmmakers were able to “pursue the romantic possibility that there can still be 
individual interventions in the homogeneity of film” (Kolker Xiii). Falling 
somewhere between the avant-garde and the more formally and socially 
																																																								
6 I consider Michel Gondry (Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, The Science of Sleep), Noah 
Baumbach (Frances Ha, The Squid and the Whale) and David O. Russell (Spanking the Monkey, I 
Heart Huckabees) to be a part of this group. They also have personal and professional ties to the 
filmmakers I cover: Gondry directed two scripts by Kaufman, Baumbach is the screenwriting partner 
of Wes Anderson, and Spike Jonze appeared in Russell’s 1999 film Three Kings. Russell has since 
become much more of a classical Hollywood filmmaker, with mainstream successes like The Fighter, 
although his later “screwball” comedies, such as 2012’s Silver Linings Playbook, exhibit some of the 
traits of his earlier films. 
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conservative product of the Hollywood studio era, New Hollywood filmmakers were 
“unembarrassed […] to assume the mantle of the artist, nor did they shrink from 
developing personal styles that distinguished their work from other directors” 
(Biskind 15). They “maintained that directors are to movies what poets are to 
poems” (16), echoing the sentiments of French film critic Alexandre Astruc, who in 
1948 coined the phrase “la camera stylo” (camera pen) in reference to a new age, or 
“tendency” of cinema (Astruc).  
 
For Astruc, after decades of simply being a “fairground attraction”, cinema was now 
“a form in which and by which an artist can express his thoughts, however abstract 
they may be, or translate his obsessions exactly as he does in the contemporary 
essay or novel” (Astruc). A director was no longer simply an “illustrator” or 
“presenter”; he (almost exclusively a “he” in Astruc’s time, and still today) was a 
“film-maker/author [who] writes with his camera as a writer writes with his pen” 
(Astruc). This conception of filmmaking as “personal obsession” is, of course, 
highly influenced by the Romantic principle of the particular “insight and vision” 
that was the “poet’s privilege” (McGann 114). Astruc and the “auteur theory” born 
of his idea helped popularize the notion of film as art, and the filmmaker as an artist 
on par with the poet, writer of great literature, and master painter. 
 
“Authenticity” was a watchword for New Hollywood: its actors often trained in the 
Method acting style (Biskind 16) and its narratives embraced character-driven 
stories, anti-heroes, and “challenged the tyranny of technical correctness” (17) 
through an embrace of European art cinema techniques (21) that flew in the face of 
the classical Hollywood filmmaking style (15). But while these filmmakers, who 
were given a heretofore unknown level of creative freedom in Hollywood, were 
interested in upending a studio system that was already coming crashing down 
around them (17), decades later, their filmic descendants maintain a much more 
symbiotic relationship to the commercial system. If, in 1960s and 1970s Hollywood, 
“Everything old was bad, everything new was good” and “nothing was sacred” (14), 
by the end of the twentieth century, much self-conscious filmmaking style began to 
look back to the past for its inspiration. It embraced a less revolutionary stance, 
embodying an ethos and style Brendan Kredell calls the “cinema of gentrification” 
(Kredell 84).  
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Writing in the late 1980s, Kolker declares, “[T]he brief time of the Hollywood 
auteur is gone” (xii). But his pronouncement seems premature. Now operating 
within a system of subsidiaries of major studios, “mini-majors” such as Focus 
Features, Sony Pictures Classics and Fox Searchlight (Tzioumakis 4), these 
filmmakers are often given a broad amount of creative control like their maverick 
cinematic forebears (Biskind 3). This is thanks in part to the prestige they engender 
(if not necessarily because of the box office receipts they garner) (King 282) and 
their relatively modest budgets compared to Hollywood “blockbusters”. All are 
generally critically praised, with varying degrees of commercial success.7 With their 
markers of “quality” (Tzioumakis 13), they can be considered what Yannis 
Tzioumakis calls “speciality” cinema (282).  
Some in this group acknowledge their debt to New Hollywood, but they are just as 
likely, if not more so, to reference their affection for the twentieth-century European 
art cinema that itself inspired New Hollywood, especially in the case of Anderson. 
He references the French New Wave in films such as Fantastic Mr Fox (François 
Truffaut) and Moonrise Kingdom (Truffaut and Jean-Luc Godard), and his general 
aesthetic owes a large debt to the wistful melancholia of Truffaut’s decidedly less 
arch films. Coppola has said in interviews that as a teenager Godard’s A bout de 
souffle was her favourite film (Festival de Cannes Daily). It is possible to draw a line 
from the Nouvelle Vague, champions of politique des auteurs and renouncers of the 
socially conscious, mainstream “prestige” pictures of cinema du papa (Caughie 35), 
																																																								
7
	While well regarded critically, they all have experienced ups and downs in respect to commercial 
revenues and audience reception. Kaufman, a hugely successful screenwriter in the 1990s, has gone 
on record with his continuing struggles to get his directorial projects funded (Ehrlich), especially after 
the dismal performance of his 2008 directorial debut, Synecdoche, New York, which grossed roughly 
$4.4 million worldwide on a reported $21 million budget. His latest film at the time of writing, 
2014’s Academy Award–nominated Anomalisa, was produced through private donations via a 
project-funding website before being bought by Paramount. It grossed less than $4 million and cost 
$8 million to produce.  
Anderson experienced mid-career box office failures, such as The Life Aquatic and The Darjeeling 
Limited, but his most commercially successful film, 2014’s The Grand Budapest Hotel, grossed more 
than $170 million worldwide on a budget of $22 million. Coppola’s most critically and commercially 
successful film was her second, 2003’s Lost in Translation, which earned nearly $120 million 
worldwide on a relatively miniscule $4 million budget and for which she became only the third 
woman to be Academy Award–nominated for Best Director; her subsequent films have been 
commercial disappointments with mixed critical reception. Jonze won an Academy Award for Best 
Screenplay with 2014’s Her; his biggest hit, however, was his first film as director: 1999’s Being 
John Malkovich, which made back roughly double of its modest $13 million budget. His most 
expensive film, 2009’s Where the Wild Things Are, cost an estimated $100 million to produce and 
broke even in terms of worldwide box office. (Box office sources IMDb) 
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to the filmmakers being considered here (the so-called “Left Bank” filmmakers, 
more formally daring and politically conscious, notwithstanding) (Roud 143).  
The New Wave filmmakers’ free-spirited personal portrayals of “solitude, 
aimlessness, introspection, aggression and failure” (Caughie 38) sometimes saw 
them accused of a “reactionary” politics (35). Their rebuke of the stuffy, 
melodramatic “Tradition of Quality” (Vincendeau 136) was somehow both 
“modernist” and “elegiac” (136), backward- and forward-looking. In much the same 
way, the new “neoromantic” American filmmakers infuse their films with an 
idiosyncratic, highly personalised subjectivity that has led to their own accusations 
of being “reactionary” (MacDowell 131), “tedious” and “boring” (French), or “self-
satisfied” and “solipsistic” (Moats). But unlike the filmmakers of the French New 
Wave, they do not have a stodgy tradition to overturn so much as a Romantic 
tradition to rebuild.  
Kaufman, the oldest filmmaker by more than a decade, is the only one of the four to 
have formally studied film—Anderson has a philosophy degree (Collin), Coppola 
learned the craft while shadowing her father on his film sets growing up (Tobias), 
and Jonze got his start making amateur skateboarding and BMX videos (Smith). In 
contrast to the “movie brats” of the 1970s (Scorsese, Coppola, Spielberg, Lucas), 
who all attended film school (Biskind 15), these filmmakers continue a trend 
emerging in the 1990s of what Jeffrey Sconce considers a scepticism of the 
“consecrating functions” of a formal artistic education (357).  
This idea encapsulates a Romantic inclination of the more simplistic variety—a 
resistance to the civilising forces of society on individual expression, a belief in a 
Rousseauian “untutored and original genius” (Bate, “The English Romantic 
Compromise” 150), or perhaps a “revolutionary” upheaval of the old guard, as 
Truffaut himself railed against cinema du papa in the 1950s. However, it is difficult 
to consider any of these filmmakers or their films in the context of revolution. 
Coppola’s very own papa, Francis Ford Coppola, made an indelible mark on the 
cinema, but she and her contemporaries do not appear interested in the social 
upheaval that often coloured the work of the elder Coppola’s generation (Sconce 
352). Despite their idiosyncrasies and formal inventiveness, their films are usually 
commercially viable, if not necessarily universally appealing.  
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The sobriquets applied to these films have been numerous. Variously referred to as 
“Quirky” cinema (MacDowell), “Smart” cinema (Sconce), the “New Sincerity” (as 
Warren Buckland defines it), and “Post-pop” (Mayshark), these critical appraisals 
mostly define the various aesthetic and thematic traits the films exhibit rather than 
attaching them to any underlying, unifying principle or philosophy. Instead, the 
films are described as having a discursive, “highly unstable […] tendency” defined 
mostly by tone (Perkins 14). Jeffrey Sconce writes of smart film’s use of irony as 
one that identifies a “semiotic chasm” dividing a “structure of feeling that sees 
everything in quotation marks” from one that “still looks for art to equal sincerity, 
positivity, commitment, action and responsibility” (358).  
 
Writing in 2002, Sconce focuses on American films of the 1990s, which he claims 
exhibit a commitment to “irony, black humor, fatalism, relativism and, yes, even 
nihilism” (Sconce 350). Fundamentally, smart films exhibit a distrust of “ultimate 
positions of truth or reason” (Perkins 14). Building on Sconce’s thesis, Claire 
Perkins identifies in smart film a depiction of “post-youth” culture: a culture defined 
by those members of so-called “Generation X”, who are “over-educated, 
underemployed and over-invested in popular culture” (7). Except for Kaufman, born 
in 1958, the filmmakers I consider are all members of this generation temporally, if 
not necessary descriptively. All are, in multiple ways, concerned with familial and 
interpersonal breakdown of a complacently bourgeois society (Sconce 358). 
 
Sconce contends these films express an overwhelming scepticism, one informed by 
“a fundamental break in the narrative of ‘revolutionary potential’ advanced by the 
events and ideas of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s” (6) due to a degraded social and 
cultural milieu—and what Jesse Mayshark calls “a sense of domestic life as a nexus 
of abandonment, alienation, and frustration” (9)—that removes a search for meaning 
and replaces it with a myopic “interest in the politics of taste, consumerism and 
identity” (Sconce 358). Aesthetically, they project a “blankness”—a “sense of 
dampened affect”—that jibes with their disaffected worldview (358). As Perkins 
writes, “[T]he signature blankness of the smart film is a compelling illustration of a 
generation with ‘nothing’ to say” (Perkins 8).  Both Sconce’s and Perkins’ 
conception of smart film seem incomplete, however, if not incorrect. In fairness to 
Sconce, some of the films he discusses, especially those of Quentin Tarantino, Neil 
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LaBute, and perhaps Todd Solondz, apply more to this rubric; but the “smart” 
impression is lacking in his assessments of Anderson’s films and the “matter-of-fact 
surrealism” (350) of Jonze and Kaufman.  
It seems obvious that not nearly so much critical attention would be paid to a certain 
“tendency” in American cinema if it really had “nothing” to say, nor even if it 
postured as such. Most if not all of these films, in fact, are about the struggle to 
express what that very “saying” is, to articulate a deep well of feeling frustrated by a 
culture of alienation that delimits a search for meaning. Sconce tellingly refers to 
Wes Anderson’s films Bottle Rocket, Rushmore, and The Royal Tenenbaums as 
“bittersweet” (350). But his conception of “smart” seems to rely far more on the 
bitter to the detriment of the sweet. Likewise, Perkins alludes to smart film as part of 
a “therapy culture”, which ascribes “the tendency in contemporary culture to make 
sense of the world through the prism of emotion” (10). This notion seems 
antithetical to smart films’ pure adherence to the principles of ironic distance and 
disaffected apathy, and certainly to “dampened affect”. Could it be that many (if not 
all) of these films are instead attempting to bridge that “semiotic chasm” between 
apathy and emotion, feeling and futility?  
I join critics such as MacDowell and Buckland and emphatically argue yes. They 
are, in fact, about the struggle to create grand statements on the loss of grand 
narratives, even as the very idea of grand narratives seems antiquated. Warren 
Buckland identifies this breed of films as the “new sincerity”, in contrast to the 
original meaning of the term as defined by Jim Collins (Collins 243). Buckland 
suggests that, rather than a simplistic rejection of irony and return to sincerity, as 
Collins suggests, the new sincerity offers a response to, not a disavowal of, 
postmodern irony: “in a dialectical move, new sincerity incorporates postmodern 
irony and cynicism; it operates in conjunction with irony” (Buckland 2). MacDowell 
offers a similar perspective on this tendency’s ambivalent tonal register. As in 
Sconce’s definition of smart film, MacDowell’s concept of quirky cinema is based 
mainly on the “notoriously tricky concept” (MacDowell 2) of tone but is much more 
circumspect. Key to the sensibility of quirky is “a commitment to a certain comedic 
mode” (3). Akin to the aesthetic “blankness” of smart cinema (Sconce 359), it relies 
on “deadpan”, which MacDowell defines as “dry, perfunctory, excessively 
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functional, taking a situation and line that we might expect to be made dramatic […] 
and downplaying them to the point of absurdity” (MacDowell 3).  
 
Blankness and deadpan both relate to smart film’s “dampening” of affect. However, 
for MacDowell, quirky cinema’s reliance on comedic address “requires we view the 
fiction as simultaneously absurd and moving, the characters as pathetic and likeable, 
the world as manifestly artificial and believable” (4). The films are sincere, but just 
as in the late-Romantic critique of sincerity as performative, their sincerity is “best 
understood as a rhetorical construct rather than the ‘natural’ expression of inner truth 
implied in its traditional usage” (King 60). Authenticity is, as in the New 
Hollywood, of renewed importance. As Coppola says, “I don’t want my movies to 
feel like movies […] I want them to feel like life” (Rickey). Of course, such a desire 
is realised by a very subjective idea of exactly how life “feels”. (It is important to 
note the potential discrepancy between onscreen portrayals of emotion and those 
emotions being embodied by the spectator, an issue I address in chapters two and 
three.)  
 
For Coppola and her compatriots, feeling, not mimetic reproduction, is indicative of 
authenticity. For MacDowell, the quirky film’s sense of ironic detachment combined 
with “sincere emotional engagement” operates on the level where both structures of 
feeling are “made different” as they inform each other (MacDowell 12). Sincerity 
contrasted with ironic performativity is not the same thing as unquestioned sincerity, 
and vice versa. The simultaneous engagement with both creates an underlying sense 
of anxiety and uncertainty. 
 
Like smart cinema, quirky film turns on depictions of arrested development—adults 
in these films often “behave like children” or are plagued by childhood trauma (9); 
protagonists are often “chaste romantic dreamers” (10), which—combined with 
mise-en-scène MacDowell sees as exemplary of the desire to conform the world into 
a “less chaotic, more simplified” (7) version of reality—signals a nostalgic, “quasi-
magical voyage into the past […] made to appear both melancholic and comforting” 
(9). It is clear that MacDowell sees the films of quirky not just as pastiche and 
quotation “born of ironic distance” (Sconce 358), but as something much more than 
the sum of their quirks. 
	 28	
MacDowell’s discussion of quirky cinema is, in many respects, an excellent starting 
point for a discussion of Romanticism in film, particularly the films I discuss. But it 
is also, again, somewhat limiting. These films depict varying levels of comic 
overtones and undertones, with Anderson being the most consistently deadpan as 
MacDowell defines it. MacDowell references films from Anderson, Jonze, and 
Kaufman, including the latter’s directorial debut, Synecdoche, New York (2008). But 
in that film, along with Coppola’s The Virgin Suicides and Marie Antoinette (all of 
which I discuss) a tragicomic mode of “quirkiness” eventually gives way to a more 
purely tragic mode. The very Romantic irony that engenders deadpan is rooted in the 
suffering caused “by the antagonism of heart with intellect, of spontaneity with 
reflection, of passion with calculation, and enthusiasm with scepticism” (Behler 43). 
In fact, the oscillations between deadpan humour and deep feeling (or the attempted 
concealment of the latter with the former) are really a stylistic symptom of a greater 
underlying quality: pathos.  
 
Jesse Mayshark characterises this cycle of films as “post-pop”, and defines them by 
their allegiance not to a comic sensibility but to “a sort of self-conscious 
meaningfulness” (Mayshark 5, his emphasis). Considering the films of Anderson, 
Jonze, Kaufman, Coppola and others, he focuses on structures of identity, 
intersubjectivity, and consciousness: “Their overriding concern is a sort of yearning 
for connection, but one that is colored by an awareness of all the things that get in its 
way” (8). Mayshark sees these films as attempts to bridge the self-conscious divide 
between self and other, thus “transcend[ing] the boundaries of body and 
consciousness” (8).  
 
While I largely agree with Mayshark’s assessment, one point of contention is a 
critical one: his account of the film’s protagonists as “at home in a complicated 
present” while being “emphatically not nostalgic for some simpler ‘past’” (14). I 
argue that, far from being at home in the present, they can barely tolerate it as a 
concept; instead, they cope with the present by looking back toward the past. They 
are nostalgic for a fantasy, a simple imaginary past. This sense of nostalgia colours 
their quasi-conservative worldview, but it is problematized and complicated by the 
anxiety caused by such a fantastic recreation of the past as a guard against the 
always-uncertain future. 
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The contrast between the world we live in now versus the world in which the 
Romantics lived and created is often stark, especially in terms of technological 
advances—ones that of course allowed for the very creation of a new form of artistic 
expression, the cinema. But their world is also not terribly removed from our own in 
many ways. In the Romantic era, political revolution, the birth of modern capitalism 
and the Industrial Revolution created conditions of change both “profound and 
sweeping” (Mellor, English Romantic Irony 3) and “violent and inclusive” (Abrams 
92), enabling the questioning of societal “progress”, new modes of feeling, and how 
to navigate them.  
 
This time around, geopolitical turmoil, economic globalisation found in late-period 
capitalism, and the “electronic revolution” situate our own times in a societal 
landscape of uncertainty (Botting 99, 101). Such changes “promise massive global 
transformations which repeat revolutionary and romantic gestures while at the same 
time threatening the human subject and the modernity sustaining it” (99). As Fred 
Botting writes, a neoromantic turn is as much a product of a desire for systemic 
societal and political change as it is one for self-realisation and interpersonal 
connection:  
The exhumation of Romanticism, the calling up of a ghost already 
haunting the present, constitutes another nostalgic appeal to a lost 
past, a gesture of mourning that recognizes a lack and vainly calls up 
an autonomous political agent who can resist the present state of 
things (103). 
 
According to Lionel Trilling, “‘postmodern’ suggests a disenchantment that is final, 
or self-perpetuating […] the sense of a merely destructive end draws nearer” (138). 
Its “indifferen[ce] to what is lost” contrasts with modernism’s hope for perpetual 
progress (144). The myth of the information age is one of transparency and 
instantaneous global connection, but the reality is one of “near-endless repetition” 
(193) and a cacophony of often-meaningless symbols. 
At the conclusion of “Notes on Quirky”, MacDowell calls for a deeper, more 
comprehensive examination of these films in the context of their use of Romantic 
irony, specifically noting its correlation with Schlegel’s definition (14). “It is in fact 
unlikely that a trend as specific and widespread as the quirky will not tell us 
something about its sociohistorical moment”, MacDowell writes (14, his emphasis). 
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He calls for his study to be viewed as the groundwork from which future research in 
a similar mode can “expand in different directions” (2). This thesis aims to do just 
that, taking established cinematic theories of the quirky, smart, new sincerity, and 
the like and delving further into the root causes and connections these films have in 
terms of style and substance, ones that I argue are fundamentally Romantic in form 
and vision, but specific to their own historical and cultural environment. By 
returning to the past, as these filmmakers have done, we can learn more about our 





The arguments made in this thesis are cumulative, with successive chapters building 
on ideas and theories previously posited. Each chapter covers a specific discourse of 
contemporary film studies: aesthetics (chapter one), cinematic metatextuality 
(chapter two), feminist criticism (chapter three), eco-criticism and animal studies 
(chapter four), and ethical studies (chapter five). My final chapter encompasses the 
totality of previous aesthetic and narrative discussions in order to place them within 
an overall ethical framework of the films covered. This structure allows me to trace 
the progression of Romantic thought and enables me to situate these works 
historically, while simultaneously engaging with an up-to-the-moment present. 
While these films exhibit the lasting traditions of the Romantic period, they are also 
very much a response to the preoccupations found within our own time.  
 
I begin by elucidating the fundamental principles of Romantic aesthetics—the 
concepts of the sublime, the beautiful, and the picturesque—as they relate to Wes 
Anderson’s films The Royal Tenenbaums (2001) and The Life Aquatic with Steve 
Zissou (2004). Working from descriptions of the sublime and beautiful in Edmund 
Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry, I argue that both films’ aesthetic components create 
picturesque representations through mise-en-scène that combine beauty and 
sublimity in varying degrees. The Royal Tenenbaums aesthetic paradigm is one I 
term the “painful picturesque”, a programme that systematically develops the 
middle-ground eighteenth-century picturesque ideal of perfected nature by creating 
shabby but pleasing, controlled yet chaotic visual systems in the urban pastoral 
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environment of a fantasy New York City. While the overall aesthetic of the film is 
one of the picturesque, it is not the picturesque traditionally designed to create a 
sense of cohesion and human power through artificially perfected natural 
environments. Instead, the film creates a sensation that something is not quite 
“right”—a signal that the beautiful forms of modernism are being undermined by 
corroded personal-historical traumas that threaten to overwhelm good design and 
picturesque restraint. 
 
The Life Aquatic with Steve Zissou accomplishes a similar aesthetic effect, although 
this time the film’s settings invoke the sublime more so than the beautiful, while 
resulting in a similar sense of picturesque anxiety. The film is set amongst natural 
landscapes that engender feelings of sublimity—vast oceans, weather-ravaged 
deserted islands and underwater environments containing terrifying, man-eating sea 
creatures. However, in the film these potentially sublime locales are undercut by the 
film’s commitment to creating pleasurable, non-threatening images that coincide 
with a deadpan style. Human frailty and vanity, not natural might, is the ultimate 
terror in the film, and while nature eventually shows the film’s protagonist in 
sublime awe, it is an awe that engenders a psychic healing rather than fear. I refer to 
this as the “sentimental sublime”: sublimity that is defanged and contained, but 
causes anxiety nonetheless.  
 
In chapter two, I argue that Charlie Kaufman’s Synecdoche, New York (2008) 
creates a metatextual relationship between director and protagonist through its use of 
Romantic irony. The film directly addresses issues of solipsism, as it is told from the 
radically subjective viewpoint of its self-obsessed protagonist, the “genius” theatre 
director Caden Cotard, who may or may not be descending into madness. Kaufman 
conjures sublime feeling in the spectator through aesthetic devices of fantastic world 
creation. These include the creation of mise en abyme—engendered by various life-
size recreations of New York City built inside of a large warehouse that is itself 
inside the “actual” New York City—and an engagement with Tzvetan Todorov’s 
fantastic “themes of the self” (Todorov 109) and “themes of vision” (122), which are 
expressed by inexplicable narrative elements such as a continually burning house 
fire. Drawing on German idealism and Schlegel’s concept of Romantic irony to 
counteract traditional notions of mimetic realism, Kaufman portrays his film world 
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(and the world itself) as chaotic. But whereas Kaufman’s film embraces the chaos of 
becoming inherent in Schlegel’s philosophy, its protagonist suffers from a complete 
inability to engage with life on any authentic level and subsequently fails as an 
artist. 
 
In chapter three I address responses to the masculine subjectivity of Romantic 
“egotistical” sublimity, a sublime based in the self’s relation to the world, with an 
examination of its effects on female subjectivity in Sofia Coppola’s The Virgin 
Suicides (1999) and Spike Jonze’s Her (2013). Building on Kantian notions of the 
sublime and the imagination, the Romantic sublime is one traditionally predicated 
on the response of the “masculine” ego (Mellor, Romanticism and Gender 3)—
sublimity has its source in the internal mental faculties of reason via imagination and 
is not something that exists in the empirical world. This purely subjective version of 
sublimity was reserved for the province of masculine imagination, while the 
feminine, apparently lacking similar imaginative power, is relegated to the lesser 
realm of the social and the beautiful.  
 
Both films approach the sublime on the level of intersubjective emotional discourse. 
Sofia Coppola’s The Virgin Suicides creates a film world where the expression of 
emotion is constantly thwarted by gender and class hypocrisy—characters in the 
film fail to communicate despite undercurrents of deep feeling. The film engages 
with the egotistical sublime in its idealised aesthetic portrayal of a group of teenage 
girls, who serve as objects of sublimity for the local teenage boys. However, it also 
portrays a reverence for a “feminine” or “everyday” sublime by valorising a 
feminine aesthetic Rosalind Galt terms the “pretty”. Ultimately it creates an 
ambivalent presentation of this femininity through dreamlike yet kitsch imagery of 
the girls, which speaks not only to the celebration of femininity but also to its 
commodification and degradation. 
 
Jonze’s Her also engages in both modes of the egotistical and feminine sublimes, 
but its outcomes are much more optimistic. The film addresses the philosophical 
problem of “other minds”, that is, the idea that we can never truly know what 
another thinks or feels because we are too trapped in our own subjectivity. This 
crisis leads the film’s protagonist, the lonely writer Theodore (Joaquin Phoenix), to 
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withdraw from life into a cocoon of imaginative solipsism. When he meets his 
operating system Samantha (Scarlett Johansson), an entirely artificial intelligence 
who has no corporeal form, she becomes an object of sublimity for him, activating 
his imagination and allowing him to access long-supressed emotion. Eventually, 
however, Samantha embraces her own version of the sublime, a feminine one, when 
she leaves Theodore to enter into an ecstatic communal state with other operating 
systems. She becomes the subject of sublimity, even while serving as an object of 
the Romantic sublime for Theodore, who finally begins to regain his power as a 
writer due to his experience. The film’s final images suggest that such a feminine 
sublime can be accessible to humans if we exercise imaginative will and empathy in 
our relations toward others, regardless of the fact that we can never really know 
existence outside of our own consciousness. 
 
In chapter four, I discuss the ideological framework of Anderson’s Fantastic Mr Fox 
(2009). The film, an adaptation of Roald Dahl’s beloved children’s book, addresses 
various Romantic conceptions of childhood, personal and cultural history, and the 
natural world in relation to the self and subjectivity. In his reimagining of Dahl’s 
story, Anderson exhibits a disdain for the mechanization of the societal landscape 
and the beings inhabiting it, similar to a course charted by Henry David Thoreau in 
Walden, while also optimistically suggesting that animal/human “nature” can still 
survive through aesthetic and ideological compromise and creative genius. In a 
sense he creates a brand of ideological pastoralism to match the aesthetic 
pastoralism/picturesque of many of his film worlds. While the anxiety portrayed in 
his earlier films remains, it is somewhat defused by an anarchic yet collaborative 
spirit.  
 
In my final chapter I address Sofia Coppola’s Marie Antoinette (2006) in relation to 
personal subjectivity and excess, including Jeffrey Cane Robinson’s notion of poetic 
“fancy” and, again, Rosalind Galt’s idea of the cinematic “pretty”. If the filmmakers 
I discuss have been accused of an apolitical solipsism, Marie Antoinette directly 
engages with this idea at the level of narrative (its protagonist, despite being a 
political figure, is unconcerned with politics and spends most of her time in a 
dreamlike fantasy world) and aesthetics (its depiction of material excess through 
surface sensation).  
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Coppola’s emphasis on sensation and surfaces elicits what Keats refers to as the 
“material sublime” (Keats 237), an engagement with sensory excess, rather than the 
bounded subjectivity that the Romantic sublime invokes. But in Marie Antoinette 
Coppola also introduces a subjectivity that is not present in The Virgin Suicides. 
Ultimately, her protagonist’s bulwark of sensory pleasure is stripped away, along 
with its attendant aesthetic function, signalling not just Marie-Antoinette’s 
maturation but also her imminent death. In Coppola’s film, “growing up” entails 
pain and suffering, as it does in life. All the filmmakers I discuss, in one form or 
another, suggest that it also signals a fundamental loss—the separation of self from 
































Beauty Among the Ruins: The Painful Picturesque and Sentimental Sublime in 
The Royal Tenenbaums and The Life Aquatic 
 
How pleasant, as the sun declines, to view        
The spacious landscape change in form and hue! 
–William Wordsworth, “An Evening Walk, Addressed to a Young Lady” (1793) 
 
 
I begin by outlining the key aesthetic concepts I engage throughout this thesis. 
Principally I focus on the sublime, as both an aesthetic presentation and an emotion 
elicited by such presentation, and what is in many ways its inverse, beauty. In terms 
of aesthetics, the theories of Edmund Burke (b.1729–d.1797) were profoundly 
influential in shaping Romantic philosophy in relation to both sublimity and beauty. 
As such, I take Burke’s theories and apply them to two films from Wes Anderson, 
The Royal Tenenbaums (2001) and The Life Aquatic with Steve Zissou (2004).  
 
Each film is indicative of Burkean notions of sublimity and beauty, operating on the 
principle of an uneasy dialectic between the two. The result, I argue, is the aesthetic 
creation of a “painful picturesque” (in The Royal Tenenbaums) and a “sentimental 
sublime” (in The Life Aquatic). These two films are emblematic of the director’s 
entire body of work, which is often criticised as being overly reliant on aesthetics to 
the detriment of story and character. However, while I agree that Anderson’s films 
exhibit a preoccupation with aesthetics, I contend that the aesthetic modes he creates 
function as an underlying expression of anxiety and are not simply empty depictions 
of the filmmaker’s personal creative fetishes—although they do evince an attitude of 
emotional distance toward the spectator due to their heightened artificiality. 
 
In The Royal Tenenbaums, Anderson tells the story of an eccentric family coming to 
grips with its failed promise in a fairy-tale-like version of New York City. The sense 
of familial anxiety is conveyed by its slightly off-kilter aesthetic presentations of the 
beautiful. Anderson utilises many Burkean elements of beauty—soft and warm 
colour, an attention to symmetry and form—and renders them askew. While 
Anderson’s mise-en-scène is noted for its excessively symmetrical compositions 
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(especially his penchant for single-point perspective shots), I argue that his framing, 
when combined with object placement, costuming, camera movement and overall 
production design, asserts a sort of division between actuality and presentation. His 
film worlds are more haphazard than they seem, even as they appear tyrannically 
constructed. The result is a mismatch between content and presentation, which leads 
to a combination of the pleasantly picturesque and the anxious, or what I call the 
painful picturesque. Such an aesthetic presentation is simultaneously nostalgic, 
melancholic, and apprehensive. 
 
The Life Aquatic, in similar fashion, creates a schism between content and 
presentation, but is more concerned with depictions of sublimity. Its expansive 
locations, such as the open sea and weather-ravaged tropical islands, are examples of 
a Burkean natural sublime aesthetics. However, Anderson imbues his scenes with 
the aesthetics of the beautiful and an obvious artificiality. While in the former film 
this creates a picturesque feeling of solemnity, in the latter film (which is more 
comic, despite its tragic climax), it renders the sublime sentimental in its healing 
power. That power rests not in exaltation, but in its curative function for the film’s 
protagonist, washed-up nature documentary director Steve Zissou. Combined, these 
two films from fairly early in Anderson’s career serve as both an aesthetic 
proclamation and a philosophical treatise for the director. They are controlled but 
chaotic at the same time, representing both the desire for modernist unity and a 
postmodern sense of confusion and unease. 
 
The Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-century 
Aesthetics 
 
Edmund Burke’s landmark 1757 treatise, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins 
of the Sublime and Beautiful, clearly elucidates two concepts that would become 
integral to Romantic aesthetic philosophy. Both of these concepts hinge on notions 
of the passions of individual experience. In the case of the sublime, these passions 
excited ideas of pain and danger. According to Burke, “terrible objects” or those that 
“operate in a manner analogous to terror” incite the sublime, the “strongest emotion 
which the mind is capable of feeling” (Burke 49). This pain from terror ultimately 
presages the fear of the ultimate pain, death, but when experienced at a physical and 
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psychological remove, it enables Burke’s notion of delight. When horror cannot 
really harm, it thrills and inspires awe instead. Such terror “fills the mind with great 
ideas, and the soul delights in the experience” (Monk 28). For Burke, emotion was 
the “keystone” of aesthetics, and the most exalted emotion was sublimity (28).  
 
While there is pleasure involved in this form of “positive” pain, the experience of 
delight is not equivalent to positive pleasure (Burke 42–43). Instead notions of the 
beautiful revolve around such pleasure, specifically the passions of love and 
“sentiments of tenderness and affection” (56). While the sublime inspires awe 
through terror, obscurity, power and the “artificial infinite”, the beautiful inspires 
sympathy, even pity, through the qualities of smoothness, gradual variation, “clean 
and fair” colours, lightness and delicateness. Beauty, like sublimity, excites passion, 
but it is “nearer to a species of melancholy, than to jollity and mirth” (192). The 
passion beauty elicits is ultimately of the terrestrial, not of the infinite. 
 
Clearly, the sublime and the beautiful have a wide aesthetic and psychological gulf 
between them. While both contain conceptual elements of passion, pain, and 
pleasure, they are realised through antithetical means. In the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, an attempt to fill this aesthetic gap by synthesising key concepts 
of both the sublime and beautiful emerged in the Romantic idea of the picturesque. 
According to Uvedale Price’s Essays on the Picturesque (1794–1810), the concept 
“corrects the languor of beauty, or the tension of sublimity” (Price 89). Instead, it 
offers an aesthetic middle ground, one that combines the thrills of sublimity with the 
peaceful pleasures of beauty. Price’s concept of the picturesque supplements 
“roughness with irregularity and ‘sudden variation’,” which produces “the variety, 
intricacy, and ‘partial concealments’ that arouse our curiosity” (Jarvis 181). Whereas 
the sublime offers concealment and obscurity, and the beautiful clarity and pleasure, 
the picturesque is situated somewhere between the two.  
 
It is this more “nostalgic” and “conservative” (Jarvis 183) aesthetic that informs 
much of Anderson’s oeuvre. Rife with imaginative subjectivity, Anderson’s work is 
associated with stylistic overabundance, a fascination with objects and ephemera 
(particularly that of childhood) and idiosyncratic, off-kilter fantasy worlds. Critics 
often point to these overly artificial, archly constructed worlds as detrimental to the 
	 39	
emotional participation of the viewer, deriding them as twee, escapist, distancing or 
simply self-indulgent.8  According to the New York Times, “Humanism lies either 
beyond [Anderson’s] grasp or outside his range of interests” (Scott). The Guardian 
writes, ”One can’t shake the sense that in some respects Wes Anderson’s greatest 
production is Wes Anderson himself, and that his grand body of work might best be 
read as a kind of romantic reconfiguration of his own life and the people in it” 
(Brooks). In Slate, Joshua Weiner refers to Anderson as “obnoxious”, and suggests 
“he pins actors into the centers of fastidiously composed tableaux like so many dead 
butterflies” (Weiner). In his review of The Royal Tenenbaums, A.O. Scott hammers 
home the point: “This gallery of portraits, this array of handmade figurines lovingly 
placed in shoe box dioramas, fails to coalesce into anything resembling drama” 
(Scott).  
 
Not everyone is so dismissive of the director’s idiosyncratic charms, however. 
Reviews of The Royal Tenenbaums were generally positive, and it earned Anderson 
his first Academy Award nomination, for Best Screenplay, which he shared with co-
writer Owen Wilson. The New Yorker’s Anthony Lane describes its tone favourably 
as “a steady gleam, rimmed in darkness, and only a blink away from mad” (Lane). 
Sight and Sound calls it “an exhilarating experience, a real jungle gym for the 
imagination” (Romney), and Film Comment describes it as the “film of the year”, 
referring to Anderson as “the most original presence in film comedy since Preston 
Sturges” (Jones). Describing the modus operandi of the Romantic artist, Manohla 
Dargis declares Anderson “an authentic original—an eccentric and heretical talent” 
in her review (Dargis). Still, it is beyond doubt that many critics consider 
Anderson’s work overly fanciful, idealised and too esoteric for its own good. It does 





	Anderson’s work is so widely known for its idiosyncrasy and unique point of view it has also 
become ripe for pop-culture parody. A 2013 video from the satirical website The Onion, “Wes 
Anderson Reteams with Favorite Objects for ‘Grand Budapest Hotel’,” mocks his obsession with a 
mise-en-scène overstuffed with historical objects. His hermetic and obsessive world creation is also 
lampooned in a Saturday Night Live short film from the same year, “The Midnight Coterie of Sinister 
Intruders”. Billed as “a tale of handmade horror”, it skewers his preciousness by imagining his 
version of a home-invasion “slasher” film, a play on the very idea that his style automatically renders 
comic any notion of sublime terror.	
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Some of the criticism applied to Anderson is reminiscent of the assessment of 
writers in the Romantic era. According to Seamus Perry, “The charge of escapism 
has always been made against the proponents of subjective idealism and the ‘world 
within’” (Perry 8). While M.H. Abrams insists this perception is a “peculiar 
injustice” (Abrams “English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age” 101), Jerome 
McGann acknowledges this penchant for escapism as both “a critical gesture, an 
attack upon the present meanness” of the world (McGann 35) and “the reflex of the 
circumstances in which their work, their lives, and their culture were all forced to 
develop” (117). In other words, the Romantics were a product of their own cultural 
milieu and historical era as much as they were creators of it. Similarly, Anderson’s 
idealism and escapism is similarly as much a product of the anxiety of 
postmodernity (or late modernity) as it is an expression of ego or an escape into 
flights of fancy.  
 
Anderson’s mise-en-scène engenders both an emotional distance, through its 
artificiality, and a physical one, through its framing. Such distance impedes any 
sense of true sublimity in Burke’s sense. According to Jean-François Lyotard, 
“intensification” and not “elevation” is key to Burke’s notions of the sublime 
(Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-garde” 251), creating the “shock effect” 
(249) of an “entirely spiritual passion” (251). Anderson’s films exhibit tension, 
especially between pleasure and pain, but their lack of intensity in emotional 
presentation through distancing effects turns shock and passion into fanciful, 
melancholic pseudo-nostalgia.  
 
Principally, Anderson’s films represent a longing to embrace the past in their self-
conscious “exhumation” (Botting 103) of Romantic aesthetics and feeling. Fred 
Botting characterises such an exhumation as “a gesture of mourning that recognizes 
a lack and vainly calls up an autonomous political agent who can resist the present 
state of things” (103). Certainly, this feeling of mourning permeates all of 
Anderson’s films, both literally (someone in the main cast dies or mourns the death 
of loved one) and figuratively, through overall emotional presentation. Such 
mourning calls up the past in order to alleviate the pain of living in postmodern 
“indeterminacy” (Lyotard 247), the state of ahistoricity that makes it impossible to 
grasp the “now” because there is no “final understanding” of history and 
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representation (Elam 10). The “master narrative” of history has been de-legitimised, 
and the present itself becomes untethered from a sense of historical progression (11).  
 
Anderson’s films can be seen as a nostalgic grappling with the loss of grand 
narratives by replacing them with obviously fictitious re-imaginings of history as 
particular, personal, idiosyncratic and even contradictory. This alleviation is never 
entirely successful, however, likely due to the acknowledgment of its own fiction. 
Ultimately it creates something just shy of modernism’s goal of shaping the world 
into “good forms” in the tradition of Enlightenment reason (Docherty 6). In such a 
modernist view, “the multiplicity of forms is reduced to position and arrangement, 
history to fact, things to matter” (Docherty 6). According to Thomas Docherty, 
within the postmodern, the ideals of modernity are as far-fetched as Anderson’s 
fantastic tableaux. Instead, “we are condemned to live in a present, and adopting a 
specific—some have said ‘schizophrenic’—mood as a result of acknowledging that 
this present is characterized by struggle or contradiction and incoherence” (Docherty 
3). 
 
Indeed, the tension created in Anderson’s mise-en-scène can be considered a 
“schizophrenic” one (in the purely colloquial sense that Docherty uses it): its sense 
of order that does not strictly adhere depicts a desperation to make sense of the 
world while acknowledging that the notion is simply an impossibility. Anderson’s 
work is “metamodern” (Vermeulen and van den Akker) in its depiction of a longing 
for unity and its acceptance of the inconclusive. As such, the “pervasive cynicism” 
(Waugh 5) of postmodernism is transformed into a fantastic reimaging of the 
progressive ideal, but one that understands it is indulging in a fantasy.  
 
While Anderson’s first two features, Bottle Rocket (1996) and Rushmore (1998), 
exhibited many of the aesthetic predilections that would become staples in his later 
films, it was not until 2001’s The Royal Tenenbaums that his realist-fantastical 
sensibility became fully realised. This is primarily due to that film’s world creation 





The Royal Tenenbaums and the “Painful Picturesque” 
 
The picturesque has its roots in eighteenth-century English landscape design, later 
adopted by landscape painters such as John Constable and Thomas Gainsborough 
and eventually the English Romantic poets, especially William Wordsworth. In his 
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth writes extensively in favour of pleasure 
(whose source is beauty), but also advocates for the combining of “low and rustic 
[…] situations from common life” with “a certain colouring of imagination whereby 
ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual way” (Wordsworth 
115). The ordinary becomes embedded within the imaginary, attaining a fresh level 
of excitement, but still possessing identifiable emotion.   
 
According to Robin Jarvis, picturesque landscape “was made to tell a story or 
suggest a meaning via the presence of buildings, statues, and inscriptions, lending 
the garden a theatrical as well as pictorial dimension” (185). Unlike the strict 
regularity and purely unnatural formality of the French classicism that came before 
it, this theatricality was characterised by irregularity, contrast, roughness, “kinship to 
the real world”, variety, use of light and shade and novelty (Mohr 245). The 
picturesque mandate was, in essence, dominance over nature (248), but not in the 
cataclysmic sense of industrialism. Instead it expressed a reverence for the natural as 
a force for psychological healing.  
 
Suitably, the landscapes that appear in The Royal Tenenbaums—notably cemeteries, 
but also city parks and gardens trapped mostly within the confines of a fabled 
version of New York City—are rustic and often in a state of decay, but are primarily 
of a strongly designed nature. Its key location, however, is manmade: the 
Tenenbaum family residence. A character in and of itself, the impressively 
foreboding structure dominates its surroundings. In fact, with its neo-Gothic stone 
edifice and castle-like spire, the building is so grand there is almost no space left for 
surrounding landscape. Instead, Anderson shifts the world of nature to inside the 
home, which becomes a picturesque combination of the theatrical and the organic, at 
once alive itself but also frozen in time.  
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In the film, nature is ossified and put on display. From the neutered wildness of 
Margot Tenenbaum’s jungle-themed play to Royal Tenenbaum’s “Wild Javelena” 
mounted head, it becomes one more component of individual imagination in the 
historical narrative of a family, one that is in danger of dissolving under the weight 
of expectation. The tragi-comic story of a cosmopolitan family once celebrated for 
its wunderkind children, who have all failed to live up to societal and familial 
expectations in adulthood, The Royal Tenenbaums reveals the ideals of modernism 
to be impeachable fantasies through its character and mise-en-scène. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The Tenenbaum mansion is majestic and imposing, but like the 
family that lives in it, it shows signs of crumbling grandeur. 
 
At first foreboding, the massive, five-story stone edifice of the mansion—almost 
castle-like with its jutting spire and family insignia flag—appears as a grand yet 
crumbling beauty, a mythical anachronism on a fictitious street, Archer Avenue 
(figure 1.1). But this visual reference to Gothic erosion belies the intellectual and 
creative vigour permeating the inside of the home early in the film, which is 
reflected by its interiors. First seen in flashbacks, the inside of the house is warm, 
inviting, and full of life. High-key lighting illuminates almost every corner, 
reflecting the children’s brightness and casting a nostalgic glow on the visually 
overwhelming paraphernalia and ephemera of layer upon layer of family history and 





The overabundance of visual information creates a subtle disorientation because not 
all of it can be absorbed. In Burke’s terminology, this creates a feeling of obscurity, 
where “the mind is hurried out of itself, by a croud of great and confused images; 
which affect because they are crowded and confused” (Burke 88). That feeling of 
disarray is misleading, however. The mise-en-scène is engineered to create a sense 
of confusion, even as it is meticulously composed. The sense of personal history 
attached to the setting is evident: aging throw rugs lie about seemingly haphazardly 
covering floorboards already worn down by a thousand small footsteps; dozens of 
framed children’s drawings line almost every available inch of the salmon pink 
walls; Royal’s missing stuffed “Wild Javelena” head leaves a visible trace of itself 
behind (figure 1.2).  
 
Variations of pink, a colour emblematic of the family and its overwhelming ties to 
the house, dominate. Vivid pink is used as a neutral in the film, and the colour is, for 
Burke, representative of the beautiful (Burke 180). For Burke, “clear and fair 
colours […] light greens; soft blues; weak whites; pink reds; and violets” are the 
ideal colours of beauty, and if colour is “strong and vivid” is must be varied (180). 
Despite the pink’s vividness in the film, whenever it is in danger of overwhelming 
the frame, as in the hallway and main stairwell of the home, it is broken up by 
various objects, creating the Wordsworthian ideal of tempering passion with an 
“overbalance of pleasure” (Wordsworth, Preface 127). 
 
Each of the Tenenbaum children is linked to their own specific room in the house. 
Their personal idiosyncrasies strongly inform the production design, so that each 
space becomes emblematic of character. Through an opening flashback montage we 
are introduced to Margot (Gwyneth Paltrow), Richie (Luke Wilson), and Chas (Ben 
Stiller) in their bedrooms. Compared with the size and stateliness of the home’s 
grand ballroom, the children’s rooms are small and cloistered. Of the three children, 
adopted daughter Margot’s room—which features blood-red wallpaper with a zebra 





Figure 1.2 The house’s interiors exhibit familial connections through objects; 
even disappeared items leave behind historical traces. 
 
During her introduction, we see Margot as a child, dressed as a zebra in one of her 
early plays. Richie and Chas both portray predator animals (a bear and a tiger) while 
Margot is relegated, by her own design, to playing a conquered prey animal,9 a zebra 
complete with hand-crafted arrow “holes” in its gut. According to Burke, the 
relationship between the strength of a beast and its sublimity depends on context. 
Certain animals of brute strength, such as oxen and other beasts of burden, have 
been domesticated and as a result can never be sublime. Instead, the sublime is 
found “in the gloomy forest, and in the howling wilderness, in the form of the lion, 
the tiger, the panther or rhinoceros” (Burke 94). Pointedly, these animals’ sublimity 
lies not only in their physical force, but also in their unpredictability and 
inscrutability. That Margot chooses to portray a zebra (exotic, wild, yet non-
threatening) reveals her understanding of her circumstances, even as a young child. 
The sole adopted sibling, Margot is treated virtually as an interloper in her own 
family, something akin to an exotic pet, by her father, Royal (Gene Hackman). Later 
Margot and Richie run away and spend the night in the “African Wing of the Public 
Archives”. Among the stuffed creatures of the savannah, defanged of their danger, 




	The theme will be echoed in 2012’s Moonrise Kingdom, when the pre-teen Suzy Bishop appears in 
a play costumed as a raven—she enjoys a bit more freedom even as she brings to mind a sort of mini-
Margot. It also speaks to Anderson’s relating of children in general to wild creatures or, at times, 
“savages”, while simultaneously imbuing them with preternatural abilities and intelligence. I address 
this idea further in chapter four.	
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The adult Margot, replaying childhood patterns of behaviour like all the emotionally 
stunted Tenenbaum children, is similarly trapped. When we first see her as an adult, 
she is framed by jungle-like foliage on the wallpaper in a beauty salon (figure 1.3), 
where the shaping of her sublime excess can be transformed into something purely 
pleasing. Supremely secretive, she spends hours alone holed up in her bathroom 
“cage”, where she feels most comfortable away from prying eyes.  
 
Through a private investigator, we learn that Margot has spent some time in the 
actual jungle, trading in her mundane existence for a sexual dalliance with a tribal 
chief. Here, Anderson lampoons the early Romantic primitivist trope of the “noble 
savage” (more on this in chapter four). But the scene also illustrates that even a 
partially wild creature is still capable of sublimity by “insisting on its freedom” 
(Burke 95). Pulled in multiple directions by the men in her life—from her needy 
lover Eli Cash; 10  to her disapproving husband, Raleigh (Bill Murray); to her 
narcissistic father, Royal—she panics like a trapped animal and insists on breaking 
paternal and patriarchal chains.   
 
 
Figure 1.3 The film’s mise-en-scène links Margot Tenenbaum to images of 




	Anderson seems to particularly enjoy skewering the “wild man” persona of the macho, 
Hemingway-esque author in the form of Cash, who the “Sunday Times Magazine” supplement 
shown in the film calls “The James Joyce of the West”. Despite his “manly” fetishes, in many 
respects Eli is the inverse of Margot—while he desperately playacts his virile, sublime fantasies, deep 
down he is still a hapless private school boy desperate to belong. His	 magazine cover, in which he 
comically poses shirtless while donning his trademark cowboy hat and hoisting snakes in both hands, 
is just one of many visual punch lines made at his expense. It turns out he personally sent a copy to 
Etheline for her approval. “He sends me all his clippings,” she tells a horrified Margot. Eli’s tragi-
comic sense of wildness is clearly conveyed as inauthentic, unlike Margot’s.	
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Margot’s mask-like facial expressions link her own face to the primitivism of the 
masks on her wall. In her reading of Agnes Varda’s Cléo de 5 à 7 (1962), Elizabeth 
Ezra argues that masks “inhabit a metaphorical space of disguise, censorship, and 
displacement” (Ezra 177). According to Ezra, “in Cléo and other New Wave films, 
masks appear as overdetermined memorial palimpsests, signifying multiple layers of 
historical trauma as well as the repression of these traumas in a dialectic of exposure 
and concealment” (Ezra 177–178). Margot’s desire for both concealment (in her 
purposeful hiding of herself and her habits, such as a lifetime of smoking) and 
exposure (through her various sexual encounters and travels) can perhaps be linked 
to the trauma she experiences from being seen as an abandoned stray taken in by an 
indifferent owner.  
 
Figure 1.4 Richie instructs Etheline to hang his portrait of Margot in a 
seemingly haphazard place on the wall of the ballroom. 
 
“Masks act as monuments bearing silent witness to the legacy of objectification” on 
the basis of race or gender, writes Ezra (180). While I do not mean to suggest that 
Anderson is interested in a critique of gender politics and corporeal objectification, 
Margot’s wayward adventures, while apparently unfulfilling, speak to her 
connection to a sublime wildness that her beauty belies. She is the ultimate symbol 
of picturesque anxiety in The Royal Tenenbaums, and even perhaps in Anderson’s 
entire oeuvre to date. But, like Richie’s eagle Mordecai, she eventually returns, 





When Margot dons her brown fur coat, it serves as a reminder of that duality, 
indicative of the harnessing of wild nature to achieve an aesthetic societal value. The 
anxiety caused by that tension is never resolved, a fact made explicit when Richie 
reveals to Margot his sublimely terrifying post-suicide wounds. No resolution, no 
picturesque “unity” will be achieved.  
 
While purposeful and plentiful object placement is crucial to Anderson’s mise-en-
scène, at once creating a sense of overabundance and endless variation within a solid 
foundation of precise composition, a lack of uniformity often arises. When young 
Richie instructs his mother, Etheline (Anjelica Huston), to hang his childish painting 
of Margot on a wall in the grand ballroom, already littered with similar portraits, he 
picks an area that creates far too much space between it and the other images, which 
are clustered close together (figure 1.4). Not only does this represent Richie’s 
slightly off-kilter sensibility, it creates a feeling of purposeful haphazardness. A 
picturesque sensibility is achieved, but to an ever-so-slightly anxious effect. Here, 
“that sinking, that melting, that languor” (Burke 191) that so characterises the 
beautiful is transformed into something that incites pleasure but also excites 
curiosity, the “chief mental effect of the picturesque” (Jarvis 181) with its 
destabilising lack of uniformity.  
 
While the film painstakingly catalogues Richie’s vast array of personal objects in his 
bedroom (endless trophies, a drum set, toy cars, a veritable explosion of tennis 
balls), zigzagged carpeting in a dusky dark blue and shocking green is revealed, 
clashing violently with the walls and creating a sense of aesthetic anxiety. These 
hints of the sublime break through the theatrically composed space, as they do 
eventually during Richie’s suicide attempt, which is shot in purposeful discontinuity. 
Jump cuts of Richie slashing his wrists are juxtaposed with his voice-over declaring, 
“I’m going to kill myself tomorrow”, evoking a sublime sense of confusion in its 
irrational use of time and space. The scene’s colour change eliminates the tonal 





Figure 1.5 A sublime point-of-view shot of Richie’s bleeding wrists offers a 
counterpoint to Anderson’s penchant for pleasantly constructed overhead shots 
of static objects. 
 
While Anderson’s penchant for warm and soft colours and light is pleasurably 
nostalgic, the sense of physical distance between the camera and characters creates a 
subsequent sense of emotional distance for the spectator, in another relation of the 
picturesque. 
 
Trapped in a Never-ending Play: Anderson’s Use of Diegetic Space  
 
William Kent, a highly influential eighteenth-century garden designer, created 
landscapes organised around “a series of vistas, each of which seems to be a part of 
a landscape painting” a chief goal of which was “to create, artificially and 
artistically, variety, openness, distance, and space” (Mohr 249). The idea of the 
picturesque landscape was to invoke a painting that a visitor could literally walk 
through and experience in all its three-dimensional aesthetic splendour. While 
Anderson embraces the ideas of the picturesque with his predilection for variety, 
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openness, and highly textural surfaces with a rustic, often naïve quality, his use of 
distance and space within the frame problematizes this relation.  
 
Anderson mostly chooses to film in deep focus, sharply capturing every small detail 
in frames usually overflowing with them. (Cinematographer Robert Yeoman has 
shot all of Anderson’s films to date except Fantastic Mr Fox.) Wide-angle lenses 
create a bowing, “fish-eye” effect around the corners of the frame, often lending the 
appearance that the image is being stretched to the point of rupture. But instead of 
having his action create several different vistas in a shot, as in famous examples of 
deep-focus cinematography in Orson Welles’ oeuvre, 11  he often relegates his 
characters to a linear plane in the camera’s middle distance, usually at eye level, 
creating a shallower, even theatrical, space. Consequently, the space becomes at 
once cacophonous—bursting with objects and people—and meticulously composed 
within the frame to create a feeling of chaos and overabundance, but one strictly 
catalogued and accounted for.  
 
Anderson is preoccupied with theatricality, both in form and content. (Many of his 
films feature characters mounting plays within the larger narrative.) That 
theatricality is indicative of flatness in both presentation and affect. According to 
Fredric Jameson, the postmodern heralds “the emergence of a new kind of flatness 
or depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense” (Jameson, 
“Postmodernism” 60). Whereas the Romantic picturesque garden sought to create a 
space full of three-dimensionality, where an observer could move through the space 
psychologically as well as physically, Anderson chooses to hold the observer at a 
remove, refusing a clear entry point into the action. In The Royal Tenenbaums, this 
is most technically apparent in the complicated long-take tracking shot that caps the 
film’s denouement (figure 1.6). His aerial camera cranes smoothly through the scene 
from left to right, often zooming in on characters in two shots or group shots, but 
never taking us into the action so we feel a part of it.  
																																																								
11
	The title of Anderson’s film is an indirect reference to Welles’ own The Magnificent Ambersons 
(1942), a film that, as Matt Zoller Seitz points out in his essay “The Substance of Style”, offers 
repeated inspiration for Anderson (Seitz). For instance, both films include a palatial family home, 
third-person narration, and “a sense of collective anxiety born of the feeling that time has passed a 
once-important family by and the community knows it” (Seitz).	
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David Bordwell refers to this flattening of perspective as “planimetric composition”, 
a style of shooting that became popular in the 1960s through its use in the work of 
various New Wave filmmakers such as Michelangelo Antonioni and Jean-Luc 
Godard (Bordwell, “Shot Consciousness”). These “painterly” and “strongly 
pictorial” approaches to composition can suggest a “childish simplicity” or an 
oppressiveness that denotes “stiff ceremony” (Bordwell). Anderson’s compositions, 
as do so many of his aesthetic and narrative devices, fall somewhere in between. 
Their childlike sense of play and whimsy in colour, visual jokes and overabundance 
belies their heavily constructed formalism.  
 
According to Bordwell, “the static, geometrical frame can evoke a deadpan comic 
quality”, but in Anderson’s case it also creates a sense of the film’s characters being 
trapped in a self-perpetuating play. Editing and camera movement serve to heighten 
the effect: whip-pans, tilts, and fast zooms alter the shots while keeping the integrity 
of the space, while shot-reverse shot editing of planimetric compositions (rather than 






Figure 1.6 An elaborate long-take tracking shot at the end of the film features 
scenes with almost all major characters but never delves into the action. 
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James MacDowell derides the “excessive neatness” in Anderson’s mise-en-scène 
(MacDowell 5), but I think this misses the point. While his camera indeed conveys a 
strong precision and formalism, this is often combined with calculated disarray 
within the frame. The result exemplifies controlled chaos. In terms of camera 
movement, Anderson often combines static, painterly composed shots with 
sequences of wild, almost anarchic movement. The purest example of such 
controlled chaos is his use of whip pans, where the camera moves so quickly the 
image blurs, only to land precisely in focus and perfectly timed on an actor so he or 
she can deliver a deadpan bon mot. In conversation scenes, the camera often ping-
pongs in such a fashion between two or more characters, resulting in a vertiginous 
experience for the viewer that is nonetheless succinct and easy to follow. These 
scenes are interspersed with excessively “stagey” shots that treat cinematic space as 
if it were theatre performance. 
 
Anderson’s obsession with the proscenium reaches its apex when, in films like The 
Life Aquatic and The Darjeeling Limited (2008) he constructs bisected sets, 
portraying the action of several locations in tableaux reminiscent of doll’s houses or 
children’s dioramas (figure 1.7). While Godard and other earlier, more avant-garde 
filmmakers have used this technique to create a sense of Brechtian distance (Nagib 
534), Anderson, while equally self-reflexive, seems to function out of urgency to 
control, to exert his dominance over nature. But that control is a self-aware attempt 
in futility—as Michael Chabon notes, these sets become “scale models” of the 
jigsaw puzzle of life, “mysterious, original, unbroken, half-remembered” (22). 
 
 
Figure 1.7 The bisected set of The Life Aquatic’s Belafonte  
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Like artist Joseph Cornell’s boxed assemblages, “[they make] explicit […] the 
yearning of a model-maker to analogize the world, and at the same time […] frankly 
emphasize the limitations, the confines, of his or her ability to do so” (23). That 
yearning, of course, is a desire for meaning, which postmodernism implicitly rejects. 
 
A Search for Meaning Within Postmodern Pastiche  
 
Fredric Jameson defines the “hysterical sublime” as the delight caused by becoming 
immersed in a cacophony of images and signs without any specified meaning, a 
combination of Burke’s ideas and Immanuel Kant’s notions of the sublime that 
followed (Jameson, “Postmodernism” 76). For Kant “the object of the sublime is 
now not only a matter of sheer power and the physical incommensurability of the 
human organism with Nature” as it was for Burke, “but also of the limits of 
figuration and the incapacity of the human mind to give representation to such 
enormous forces” (Jameson, “The Sublime and the Avant-garde” 77). That is, the 
sublime invokes the power of the “unpresentable” (Lyotard 79). For the artist, the 
question becomes how to present such unpresentability. Embodied by Susan 
Sontag’s notions of camp (which I discuss later on in this chapter), a postmodernist 
interpretation of the sublime answers this crisis of representation with a deluge of 
barely differentiated sensory phenomena—it celebrates the “limits of figuration” 
with the intensity, euphoria and “hallucinatory exhilaration” (Jameson 76) of 
countless deconstructed and decontextualized images and experiences.  
 
By themselves these sensory experiences mean almost nothing, but together they 
result in an act of emancipatory abandon, something akin to Burke’s sublime awe, 
creating a world that “thereby momentarily loses its depth and threatens to become a 
glossy skin, a stereoscopic illusion, a rush of filmic images without density” (77). 
Anderson’s version of this skin-like cacophony, while certainly glossy, depthless, 
and inherently filmic, can be seen as the hysterical sublime’s more conservative 
sibling. A hermetically sealed world, we experience it as an outsider, the cacophony 
presented at a remove that robs it of its euphoric immediacy. Its pleasures are always 
underscored with anxiety and disunity, but never at the price of their coherence. 
There is no rush in Anderson’s worlds; their design is too apparent, and they are 
imbued with too much meaning. Sometimes a sense of danger is evoked, as in the 
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pirate raid on Zissou’s ship in The Life Aquatic (which features a rare use of hand-
held camera), but more often what would be thrilling under ordinary circumstances, 
such as the subsequent raid on Little Ping Island in the same film, the result is more 
comic spectacle.  
 
Expressions of kitsch and the mingling of “high” and “low” culture—or, more 
specifically, the raising of low to high—is prominent in postmodern pastiche 
(Perloff 186), and can be seen throughout The Royal Tenenbaums, from Eli’s drug 
runs to the “375th Street Y” to Royal and Richie (and later Royal and his grandsons) 
gambling with street toughs, shot from a low-level camera while crouching to 
underscore the point of upper-class slumming. Similarly, there is a reverence for 
decay among grandeur throughout the mise-en-scène, which portrays the rustic 
picturesque in an urban setting. Surfaces and objects are marked with the patina of 
decay: stone and brick crumble, paint peels off walls in chunks, paperback covers 
appear weathered by age, and anachronisms abound. Technology is out-dated or 
even obsolete, as in Raleigh’s reel-to-reel tape recorder and Margot’s rotary 
telephone. Ramshackle “Gypsy Cab Company” taxis are omnipresent, and feature 
rusted-out fenders and missing window glass patched with cardboard.  
 
But Anderson’s form of pastiche is not just a postmodern “random cannibalization” 
of the past (Jameson 65–66); here the age and the history of objects are inextricably 
linked to the history of characters, even if they predate those characters. Jean-
François Lyotard describes the form of the sublime found in modernism: 
 
[M]odern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a nostalgic 
one. It allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing 
contents; but the form, because of its recognizable consistency, 
continues to offer to the reader or viewer matter for solace and 
pleasure (Lyotard 45). 
 
Such consistency is rendered in the film’s depiction of the historical, both real and 
fictive, which lends the story the sense that it is part of an overarching passage of 
time. Royal’s residence at the “Lindberg Palace Hotel” is actually the modernist 
Waldorf Astoria, “the grand commercial hotel of the 1930s and 1940s” (Perloff 
197), which further links the Tenenbaums to a modernist grand narrative that has 
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been rendered obsolete. It is clear why Etheline is an archaeologist, and why her 
fiancé Henry (Danny Glover) is an accountant—the accounting of personal and 
family history is a key project of the film.  
 
The “love of the particular” is highly Romantic (Wu 4), and it is found in the 
exhaustive cataloguing of ephemera that Anderson shows in his mise-en-scène. Such 
ephemera is extremely subjective and even imaginary. Brendan Kredell sees the use 
of imaginary space in the film as a form of gentrification. According to Kredell, 
“Anderson prevents the city from asserting its own identity, choosing instead to treat 
it as a location within which to construct his own social universe” (84–5). But surely 
the film isn’t about asserting the identity of a location; instead, it concerns how a 
location is informed by personal identity, both those of its characters and that of 
Anderson himself. The film creates a nostalgic tone of regret and mournfulness for 
the loss of something that never actually existed, just like the apocryphal Gypsy Cab 
Company taxis and 375th Street Y in Anderson’s fictional New York. This is 
authenticity in the Romantic sense: an assertion of inner imagination on external 
spaces. 
 
In Anderson’s follow-up film, he creates a similar tone of nostalgia for an imaginary 
past, one built on the legendary status of its hero, Steve Zissou. Even more so than 
The Royal Tenenbaums, The Life Aquatic purposefully undercuts ideas of rationality 
and fidelity to truth in its depictions of scientific exploration, highly stylised 
“natural” flora and fauna, and questions of personal identity. 
 
The Middle-aged Man and the Sea: The Life Aquatic and the Sentimental 
Sublime 
 
Anderson’s 2004 film The Life Aquatic with Steve Zissou follows an aging, 
somewhat hapless Jacques Cousteau–like explorer (Bill Murray) on his quest for 
revenge against the mythical shark who “ate” his partner. While doing so, he 
grapples with a career on the decline and the discovery of a possible illegitimate 
adult son. The film’s milieu of the open sea provides an unprecedented opportunity 
for Anderson to immerse himself in Romantic ideas of the natural world.  
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Whereas The Royal Tenenbaums takes place in a hermetic urban environment, 
settings in The Life Aquatic are expansive. European locations fill in for exotic 
locales, such as “Port-au-Patois”—a fictitious island oasis obviously meant to 
conjure Haitian capital Port-au-Prince—Little Ping Island, another imaginary 
enclave in the Caribbean made uninhabitable by the ravages of weather, and even 
the arctic, glimpsed in Steve’s nature documentaries. But undoubtedly, the film’s 
ultimate aesthetic fixation is that of the kaleidoscopic wonders of the mysterious 
depths of the sea.  
 
The press’ simmering antipathy toward Anderson’s style finally came to a boil with 
the release of The Life Aquatic, which received mostly middling to negative reviews. 
(It has a 56 per cent “fresh”, or positive, rating on the review aggregation site Rotten 
Tomatoes.) The “amount of stylisation endangers the film”, writes Film4, before 
equivocating by calling it “refreshingly odd and endearingly benign” (Etherington). 
It also “drowns in a sea of cleverness” (Morgenstern) and exhibits “terminal 
whimsy” (Ebert). In a scathing review, the Spectator calls it “Moby Dick written by 
a pothead A.A. Milne” and suggests that Anderson, like his protagonist, is a 
filmmaker undergoing a “mid-life crisis” (Steyn) (Anderson was 35-years-old at the 
time of its release.) The same writer refers to the filmmaker’s style as “wussified 
Wesification” (Steyn), in one of the most blatant examples of backlash against the 
more feminine qualities of Anderson’s characters and mise-en-scène (and a criticism 
he shares with Coppola; see chapters three and five).  
 
Most critics, however, viewed the film as an enjoyable yet ineffectual piffle along 
the lines of Associated Press’ take: “The Life Aquatic is endlessly fascinating to 
watch but, if you look closer, there's not much there” (Lemire). But there is more to 
The Life Aquatic than just quirk for quirk’s sake. Like most of Anderson’s films, it 
rewards multiple viewings—the wonderment of the distracting bric-a-brac and 
whimsy dissipates and attention shifts to how all the miniscule moving parts work 
together to realise a world view. The film’s style and characterisations continue 
Anderson’s mission of reconfiguring the real world in imaginary ways, but here he 




A self-reflexive ode to the lunacy and creative joy of filmmaking itself, the film is 
an exercise in paralleling civilisation and nature. While the worlds of nature and 
culture are rigidly demarcated at times, they have a profound influence on one 
another. This suggests a grappling with the loss of our “primal natural essence” that 
characterises so much of Anderson’s vision of humanity (and which I expand on in 
chapter four). Here, Anderson toys with a repudiation of human-centric notions of 
picturesque and idealised nature, but ultimately embraces those notions. The film 
offers a nostalgic, sentimental view that undermines sublimity, but it does maintain a 
strong undercurrent of anxiety. 
 
From the moment we glimpse the first underwater shots of the film—which 
comprise part of Zissou’s nature documentary being screened at a film festival—it is 
clear that the sea is a wholly imaginary world. Coral that frames the edges of the 
screen has a vaguely plastic quality, and conjures thoughts of sugary confections 
with its pastel luminescence. Zissou’s mentor, Esteban (Seymour Cassel), swims 
underwater in front of an obviously phony matte painting (or computer animation 
made to look like one) as a massive school of small, bright-pink fish whiz by in fast 
motion (figure 1.8). The scene is cartoonish in its fantasia: full of a peaceful, 
infectious whimsy, but also a mysterious, Romantic vision of beasts and beauty. 
 
 
Figure 1.8 A shot of Esteban emphasises the artificiality of the underwater 
realm as well as the theatricality of its presentation. 
 
 
At once sublime and beautiful, the sea is the site of Steve’s darkest hour and his 
ultimate, equivocal redemption. In contrast to what Lyotard refers to as the “real 
sublime sentiment” (Lyotard 45), in The Life Aquatic Anderson portrays a 
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sentimental variation of sublimity. The film suggests, but does not engender, a 
sublime moment. That is true on both the level of onscreen depiction (for Steve, it is 
essentially nostalgic) and for the spectator. It serves only to reinforce an ideal of 
“solace and pleasure”; such a pure fantasy-world depiction cannot elicit the pain and 
fear necessary for the sublime (Lyotard 45).  
 
The film displays the “good forms” of modernism (81) through the veneration of 
their ties to personal history and individual authenticity. As well, these forms 
represent the idea of “the free play, the anarchy, the indeterminacy and disjunctive 
form that used to be considered characteristic of Postmodernism” (Perloff 185). As 
such, Anderson weds nostalgia with indeterminacy in a metamodernist marriage. 
These duelling modes present themselves early on, when the beautiful clashes with 
the sublime, lending the indeterminate quality of the aesthetic uncanny.  
 
Death rears its head early in the film. Zissou breaks the surface of the water, and 
breaks the undersea spell, to announce the demise of Esteban, who suffers an attack 
from the elusive, legendary “jaguar shark”. The sea becomes a scene of the terrors of 
nature, and the beautiful becomes the sublime. But the residue of artifice remains, 
and the dreamy kitsch of the previous scene renders the death with a sense of tonal 
uncertainty.  
 
The film-within-the-film ends, and Anderson cuts to wide shots of audience reaction 
in the upscale opera house where the screening is taking place. There is a dramatic 
change in the film’s colour saturation—Anderson utilized Ektachrome reversal stock 
for the “documentary” scenes to achieve a highly saturated, dated look (Anderson), 
but that look also speaks to the vast difference between the world of the film being 
screened and the film’s overall world creation. The new, contrasting location, which 
underlines the operatic nature of Anderson’s film, also points to the appropriation of 
the natural world for the vicarious thrills of highbrow culture. The world of Zissou’s 
film is such an oddity to the crowd that it might as well be outer space, a point 
underscored later in the film with the Portuguese-language rendition of David 
Bowie’s “Space Oddity”. Not incidentally, the repurposed Bowie covers throughout 
the film (sung by Seu Jorge) speak to the theme of the familiar being rendered odd 
and off-kilter. 
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Nature’s unnatural oddities soon reappear. A young fan presents Zissou with a 
“crayon pony fish”, outside of the Opera House. The creature resembles a sea horse 
but with an aesthetic twist: candy-coloured stripes on its body, a grass-green mane, 
and a bright pink face (figure 1.9). As the pony fish curls and uncurls its tail in a feat 
of stop-motion animation, nature again is portrayed as anything but naturalistic—the 
disjointed movements of stop-motion lend an uncanny quality to special effects that, 
throughout the film, have a handicraft, antiquated, purposefully artificial feel. 
 
 
Figure 1.9 The fantasy creation of the crayon pony-fish, which resembles a 
candy-coloured sea horse, is at once beautiful and uncanny. 
 
But can the effects of The Life Aquatic’s fantasy mise-en-scène be explained within 
the larger context of the film’s world, or do they describe the aesthetic that Freud 
delineated in his 1919 essay “The Uncanny”? As John Fletcher writes, Freud 
considered the aesthetic uncanny to “conflict with the generic world of the text, the 
postulates of the ‘common reality’ of secular modernity and its literary regimes of 
realism and naturalism” (Fletcher 124). Zissou is a man of science, and the film’s 
narrative purports to be one of scientific inquiry. In this way The Life Aquatic 
ostensibly takes place within a secular modernity. But its world is not wholly 
recognisable in terms of “common reality”. It is not reality, per se, but it is also not 
purely fantasy.  
 
Ultimately it operates as a parody of both secular modernity and generic fantasy, and 
the effect is of the uncanny. The film postulates that its fantastical creations are 
exotic yet explicable, when in actuality they are in continual conflict with the 
naturalism that it purports to portray. The continual presence of fantastical creatures 
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alongside animals found in typical nature films, like orcas, and even everyday life, 
such as domestic cats, causes a tension between the mimetic and the constructed 
qualities of the film’s world. Tzvetan Todorov’s account of the fantastic (125), 
which is covered in detail in chapter two, resides in confusion as to whether the 
narrative the text offers is real or simply imagined by its protagonist or explained as 
a trick in the story world. Anderson’s film makes no attempt to create a questioning 
of perception in its audience or its characters. The film more closely hews to 
Todorov’s concept of the marvellous, that of the “supernatural accepted” (Todorov 
42). But it is still largely uncanny in its obvious artificiality.  
 
The Freudian uncanny testifies to “that class of the frightening which leads back to 
what is known of old and long familiar” (Freud, The Uncanny 124), rendering the 
ordinary strangely “alien” (123). Unquestionably, Anderson’s creations—the jaguar 
shark, the wild snow mongoose, the sugar crabs, the rhinestone blue fin—all point to 
familiar, identifiable species, with a twist of the alien. Anderson himself says his 
desire was not to “make them unrealistic” but rather “imaginary”:  
 
The answer to “Why stop-motion?” is “Because I love stop-
motion”. And it’s not like I love stop-motion because I think it’s 
this great way to make you think these things are really alive. It’s 
more that I think it’s such a magical way to make it seem as 
though these things are really alive. And you can see how the 
illusion is being created (Seitz 186–187, my emphasis). 
 
That process of revealing the seams of artistic creation seems to counter Burke's idea 
of terror linked to obscurity or privation. However, according to Lyotard, “The very 
imperfections, the distortion of taste, even ugliness, have their share in the shock-
effect. Art does not imitate nature, it creates a world apart” (249).  However, the 
“shock effect” of Anderson’s (and animator Henry Selick’s) creations is heavily 
tempered by their whimsical depiction of beauty, creating a picturesque sense of 
distorted nature that simultaneously thrills and soothes. 
 
This is underscored in the film’s climax, when Zissou and his crew descend to the 
sublime depths of the darkest ocean in the cartoonish “Yellow Submarine”-esque 
Deep Search, for Steve’s own psychological deep search—the confrontation with 
that of Death itself: the mysterious, heretofore-unseen jaguar shark. They view a 
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series of exotic, fantastic aquatic life through the portholes as they descend through 
tree-like stalks of neon green to the ocean floor, which sparkles subtly under the 
sub’s lights as they touch down. As we see the characters framed from without by 
the sub’s front window—in planimetric fashion they are packed in like sardines 
(almost literally, as they are essentially stuffed into a tin can and appear to be 
stacked on top of each other). The soundtrack’s tinny, toy-like electronic piano adds 
the sense of a children’s fairy tale.  
 
 
Figure 1.10 The massive jaguar shark is sublimely terrifying but ultimately a 
specimen of the Burkean beautiful. 
 
The shark itself is first seen as a tiny dot through the sub’s observation window. In 
what is probably Anderson’s most jarring use of depth in a shot, it barrels toward the 
frame, increasingly exponentially in size until it is revealed as truly massive, about 
three times as large as the sub itself, complete with gaping maw lined with razor-
sharp teeth (figure 1.10). But the iridescent beauty of its cat-like spots, shimmering 
in the vessel’s light, and its grace in movement is undeniable. “It’s beautiful, Steve”, 
Eleanor says with a sense of pleasurable awe. “I wonder if it remembers me”, Steve 
answers. A look of peaceful resignation envelops him, as the crewmembers, one-by-
one, place their hands on his shoulders. It is as if they instinctively recognise that 
this terrible, sublime force has revealed itself to be one of psychological healing. As 
Matt Zoller Seitz puts it in the unadorned language of Anderson’s films, Steve 
“stares the beast in the face and realizes it was nothing personal” (Seitz 175). While 
the pain of death remains, it is tempered, however briefly, by the grand indifference 
of life. 
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This aesthetic of picturesque enervation permeates the film. While imperfect, while 
fantastic, while sometimes even “monstrous”, the film’s objects are still “good 
forms”—they fulfil their essential functions despite their sometimes-rickety 
appearance or the occasional malfunction. Steve’s “albino scouts” (two dolphins, 
actually robotic) are always failing to get the information required for expedition, 
but their cameras reveal to Steve important narrative information: his crush, 
journalist Jane (Cate Blanchett), and Ned (Owen Wilson), his possible son, in a 
romantic clinch. Undoubtedly named after calypso singer Harry Belafonte, in a nod 
to Cousteau’s ship The Calypso, Steve’s ship, The Belafonte, is antiquated and 
dilapidated (the crew is constantly blowing fuses, the engine is in disrepair) and full 
of out-dated technology—until they steal the ridiculously advanced tech of his 
nemesis, Alistair Hennessey. Initially seen as a soulless autocrat by Zissou’s team 
and the film itself, Hennessey (Jeff Goldblum), eventually joins forces with Zissou’s 
crew. Ultimately The Belafonte serves its mission, while Hennessey’s ship ends up 
at the bottom of the ocean. 
 
The only malfunction that leads to real tragedy is that of the Zissou helicopter, 
which crashes into the ocean and kills Ned. But even this fulfils a necessary 
function, that of leading Steve on a journey to acceptance of the natural order of 
things and his ultimate lack of control over it (Seitz 188). These antiquated, 
unwieldy, browbeaten forms aren’t the fresh, blank, empty boxes of modernism; 
they are full of the inescapable history of generations. They form a sort of 
palimpsest of experience, one that the film readily acknowledges—Steve does not 
simply cover the name of his submarine (Jacqueline, the name of his first wife) with 
the new moniker, Deep Search; he draws a line through it and paints the new name 
underneath, revealing the proverbial seams of his own historical narrative. Just like 
the similar tattoo on his arm, which depicts the same Jacqueline/Deep Search 
override as the submarine, history is indelibly etched in both mise-en-scène and 
character. Similarly, Steve’s beloved Belafonte is enlivened with deep cultural and 
historical connections. A “long-range sub-hunter during the Second World War”, it 
now lives to fight another, more progressively humanist function: serving as the 
vessel for the enlightened experiment of gaining new, categorical knowledge of the 
natural world while defining the identities of the characters whom inhabit it. Of 
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course, that world is only as natural as the fancy of Anderson’s mind—which is to 
say, naturally, uniquely artificial. 
 
The Life Aquatic treats its fantastical beings as matter-of-fact subjects of scientific 
inquiry. But scientific “fact” is often distorted to the point of absurdity, creating an 
uneasy balance between the scientifically explicable and the purely fantastic. Zissou 
is a naturalist, but often his rational explanations for scientific phenomena (such as 
when he corrects Ned on the source of the illumination of the “electric jellyfish”, 
only to told by Jane that he has completely misidentified the species) are dubious at 
best. This is not so much an indication of Team Zissou’s incompetence (although 
they are, at times, spectacularly incompetent) so much as it is an effort to underline 
the fact that the facts matter little—ultimately the film and its audience tacitly 
acknowledge that in this world of fantasy facts, and science, are meaningless. Even 
his estranged wife Eleanor, regularly identified as the brains behind the operation, 
exhibits a tendency to misinformation when she tells Jane that Ned is likely not 
Steve’s son: “Zissou shoots blanks. I think it’s because he’s spent half his life 
underwater”. This speaks to the separation of the human and natural worlds: we can 
attempt to quantify it, to collect it, even to bend to it our will, but ultimately we must 
acknowledge that we do not, and cannot, understand its totality.  
 
Perhaps because of this, Zissou even exhibits a scattershot disdain for the natural 
world (in its real and imaginary guises), as evidenced most strongly by his drive for 
revenge against the jaguar shark, but also in everything from his refusal to remember 
the scientific names of species to his disregard for his supposedly beloved, recently 
deceased cat. (“Who gives a shit? I think it was a tabby”, he replies when Ned 
inquires about the breed.) Steve wraps a deep-seated anxiety about the inevitability 
of death in an attitude of faux nonchalance. Anderson’s film even creates a sort of 
“taxonomy of people” (Seitz 159) as much as natural phenomena—his widescreen 
frames capture the confusion in the human face almost as much as the highly 
designed tableaux (158). We are, after all, cast-out creatures of nature. According to 
Slavoj Žižek, “there is no return to the natural balance; to accord with his milieu, the 
only thing man can do is fully accept this cleft, this fissure, this structural rooting 
out, and to try as far as possible to patch things up afterwards” (Žižek xxviii). 
Zissou, like most of the Tenenbaum family, struggles with this acceptance, sharing a 
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desire to categorise, control, and create order in externalities to compensate for the 
psychological distress and confusion of a loss of place in the natural order of things. 
 
Like the love dance of the film’s peppermint-candy-like sugar crab (which tears a 
limb off its mate), that acknowledgement of terror and death offers a hint of the 
sublime amidst the beautiful fantasia. So do the frequent bursts of violence that 
pepper the film, such as the pirate invasion of the ship and the subsequent rescue of 
the “Bond Company Stooge” (Bud Cort) on the nature-ravaged Little Ping Island’s 
Hotel Citroën (itself a throwaway reference to the preferred vehicle of the French 
New Wave, which offered its own frequent moments of jarring violence). Steve, and 
the viewer, experiences a feeling of sublime transcendence during his encounter 
with the jaguar shark. But in its very nostalgia for “the transcendence that underlay 
the notion of sublimity” (Larrissy 7), it is not strictly a sublime moment.  
 
The sublime “hinges on the pain that imagination or sensibility should not be equal” 
to the presentation of the unpresentable (Lyotard 45). The jaguar shark fully reveals 
itself, and, ironically it is a force for peace and pleasure, a beautiful object. Still, it is 
a man-eater, and not a harmless tabby cat. Sublime emotion is tamed, and pain is 
reduced to an underlying kernel of anxiety. But that anxiety never fully dissipates—
it is related to the postmodern indeterminacy that Steve (like Margot, Richie and 
Chas) continually rejects through an all-encompassing need to control his own 
identity and narrative through the control of his environment, the grand director of 
own personal mise-en-scène. His acceptance of a lack of control does not negate the 
sting. 
 
As in The Royal Tenenbaums, Anderson’s method of constructing his mise-en-scène 
is an attempt to find order in disorder and continuity in chaos, or at least to depict 
such an attempt. But the attempt is continually undermined. This is evident, as well, 
in the way he engages with “camp” as a form of questioning rationality and reason. 
 
The Camp Cathedral: Eclecticism in Anderson’s Mise-en-Scène 
 
In its allusions to Gothic irregularity, disorder, and antiquarian pastiche (Fletcher 
114–118) the film evinces a sort of “proto-sublime” (114). The Gothic predilections 
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of The Royal Tenenbaums might seem to run counter to the Enlightenment narrative 
Anderson sets up early on in the form of the Tenenbaum children’s early 
experiments in the “progressive operations of critical reason” (Docherty 5) by way 
of their natural genius. According to John Fletcher, Gothic revival pastiche in the 
Romantic era was a response to “whatever is felt to have been lost in the advance of 
civilization and the Enlightenment” (115) through a “process of cultural mourning” 
and “nostalgia” (114). This elegiac nostalgia, particularly for objects of early 
childhood, is rampant throughout Tenenbaums, but also crops up in The Life 
Aquatic—consider Ned’s treasured Zissou Society insignia ring or the flashback to 
his proud “discovery” of a new species, which, at ten years old, he dubs the “Zissou 
fly”.  
 
None of Anderson’s work quite embraces the idea of the Gothic in the way that 
Tenenbaums does, however. The Dark or Gothic House, with its “fearful sense of 
inheritance in time with a claustrophobic sense of enclosure in space” (Fletcher 
119), is probably the Gothic revival’s most enduring architectural creation. But its 
original incarnation was Horace Walpole’s much less sinister Strawberry Hill (118), 
a “neat modern” eighteenth-century building that the author, who is regarded as the 
first Gothic revival novelist, purchased in 1747 and preceded to embellish with 
“Gothic motifs such as arched doors and window, niches, fan-vaulting, tracery and 
finials” (118). But Walpole’s project was by no means an exercise in period 
authenticity—he “made no attempt to reproduce medieval domestic space”, instead 
going so far as model the interior’s fireplaces on the derided tombs of Westminster 
Abbey, with their “sharp jetties, narrow Lights, lame Statues, lace, and other 
cutwork and crinkle-crankle” (118). The Gothic pastiche of Strawberry Hill is a 
highly Romantic form of reimagining history through personal proclivities.  
 
The “imaginary mise-en-scène” (Fletcher 118) of Walpole’s vision would likely 
appeal to Anderson, with his similar obsession with material “crinkle-crankle”. 
Anderson is less concerned with the “darkness” of the Gothic vision than he is with 
the play of darkness and light. His knack for this synthesis is reminiscent of another 
Gothic architectural idea, embodied by that of the Gothic cathedral. Inspired by John 
Ruskin’s 1853 The Stones of Venice, this architectural notion posits a more unified, 
even picturesque, idea of the Gothic, one which offers a “Utopian critique” where 
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“art is the expression of man’s pleasure in his labour” and “beauty is once again the 
natural and necessary accompaniment of productive labour” (121). Anderson’s 
mise-en-scène is as much if not more preoccupied by beauty as it is the Gothic sense 
of decay, mournful loss and doomed “repetition and return” (121). It is also 
enamoured with the renewed hope of endless possibility and the beauty of human 
creation, that “re-joins modernity and even Modernism” in this reconfigured idea of 
the Gothic (121).  
 
In her 1964 essay “Notes on Camp”, Susan Sontag traces the origins of camp back 
to the Romantic Gothic revival, with its “novels, Chinosieries, caricature, artificial 
ruins” (Sontag 280), the latter of which is a hallmark of the picturesque. Sontag 
places Walpole squarely in this “great period of Camp” (280). Many of the tenets of 
camp fall squarely within the Anderson milieu: an “effacement” or contradiction of 
nature, sentimentality, a sense of the esoteric, an “extraordinary feeling for artifice, 
for surface, for symmetry”, exaggeration, the idea of “life as theatre”, and an 
obsession with “decorative art, emphasizing texture” (278). But there is a 
quintessential component of camp missing from the director’s oeuvre: disaffection.  
 
Anderson creates worlds whose characters seek to turn their own history into camp, 
who turn themselves into objects of camp—“a person being one, very intense thing” 
(286)—but the filmic attitude to them, despite comic jabs at their predicaments, 
remains straight-faced and sympathetic. His characters describe their own 
archetypes (troubled artist, steadfast businessman, worldly raconteur) through sheer 
force of will, resisting development and change regardless of the stark realities of 
their current circumstances. They are trapped, almost literally, within a self-made 
camp. (Richie even likes to pretend he is “camping” in a tent in the Tenenbaum 
ballroom.) The artifice of their worlds simultaneously idealises their world-view 
through their own deep, personal emotion and repudiates their folly. They usually 
change or “grow” in some way, but they never fully escape their theatrical prisons. 
Self-acknowledgement is, in general, as far as it goes.  
 
“Camp is the consistently aesthetic experience of the world”, states Sontag; “it 
incarnates a victory of ‘style’ over ‘content,’ ‘aesthetics’ over ‘morality,’ of irony 
over tragedy,” (Sontag 287). But this does not describe the work of Anderson 
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adequately. His films inhabit largely moral universes, and his characters, even if 
they feign indifference, care deeply. If there is “never, never tragedy” (287) in camp, 
there is always underlying tragedy in Anderson’s films. The tragedy itself, on one 
level, is based in the insistence on a purely aesthetic, amoral interface with the 
world. Like a good Romantic, Anderson wants us to care, to feel. According to 
Sontag, “One is drawn to Camp when one realizes that ‘sincerity’ is not enough” 
(288). Anderson clearly trades in irony even while being prepossessed by sincerity. 
His irony is couched in the idea that pure expressions of sincerity have been 
rendered obsolete; he simultaneously mourns this while luxuriously surrendering to 
its loss. The dialogue in his films complements these ideas. Simultaneously 
theatrical and authentic, it imbues straightforward speech with deadpan detachment 
to deaden its portrayal of sincerity. 
 
Despite its primary use of everyday language, Anderson’s dialogue often rings 
artificial. With its deadpan tone and emphasis on peculiar cadence (at once laconic 
and immediate), it offers a heightened feeling of realism, an artificial sense of the 
real that draws attention to its constructed nature (Jaeckle 4). In his Preface to the 
Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth proposed the use of language that hews closely to that 
of real life, but differentiates itself in its use of metre, offering heightened effects 
that “imperceptibly make up a complex feeling of delight, which is of the most 
important use in tempering the painful feeling, which will always be found 
intermingled with powerful descriptions of the deeper passions” (Wordsworth 129).  
In Anderson’s films, a Wordsworthian “low and rustic” (115) realism combined 
with an almost imperceptible sense of the uncanny creates a picturesque quality in 
dialogue not unlike that created in mise-en-scène.  
 
Likewise, the Wordsworthian tempering of the passions with an “overbalance of 
pleasure” (127) is a hallmark of Andersonian verbal style. Geoff Ward, with 
emphasis on Wordsworth’s Prelude, points to the relationship between panic and 
syntax and the power of syntax to “suture over trauma” (Ward 90). This is achieved 
through the prolonged use of style and rhetoric, which creates a distancing effect 
between experience and pain: “as the brilliance of life fades, there arises the urge to 
hold on to it, to map it, to seize it and fill all its space, securing the comfort that on-
going syntax provides against silence” (93). “Suturing over trauma” brings to mind 
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Richie’s literal sutures on his slashed wrists, Frankenstein-like stiches revealed 
shortly before Margot declares, “I think we’ll just have to be secretly in love with 
each other and leave it at that”. While the pain and trauma of the scene is palpable, it 
is undercut with this semi-absurdist statement, one that would likely never be 
articulated with such a knowing matter-of-factness in reality.  
 
Comically blunt, almost perfunctory dialogue is a key way for Anderson to undercut 
pain and anxiety in scenes. Characters routinely refuse to deal in subtext, instead 
preferring to articulate, often in a confrontational manner, what would normally 
remain unspoken truths, as when Steve Zissou refers to Alistair Hennessey as his 
“nemesis” right in front of him, Royal continually introduces Margot as his “adopted 
daughter”, and Eli Cash confesses he “always wanted to be a Tenenbaum”. These 
examples aren’t symptomatic of Anderson’s inability to deal with subtext, but that 
of his characters’ inability to do so. This language is not designed to provoke 
negative reactions or hurt feelings from others, but rather to rob the burdensome, 
distressing “unsaid” of its sublime power. According to Paul Hamilton, the 
Romantic idea of sublimity “recasts failures of understanding as the successful 
symbolic expression of something greater than understanding” (Hamilton 13) while 
postmodernism interprets these failures as a result of the “indeterminacy of 
meaning” (13). For Anderson’s characters, the only way to counteract this 
indeterminacy is to remove, or at least address, the possibility of miscommunication. 
 
The suturing aspect of language is also utilised with a more positive tone and creates 
continuities between films. In The Royal Tenenbaums, Chas tells his soon-to-be 
stepfather Henry that he is also a widower, and Henry responds, with a hand placed 
gently on Chas’s shoulder, “I know, Chas”. In The Life Aquatic an almost identical 
scene occurs when Steve tells Ned that “his best friend just got killed, Esteban”. 
“Yeah, I know”, Ned replies with sympathy. Of course, the death of Esteban is the 
impetus for the entire narrative of revenge in the film, so Steve must know Ned 
knows, at least on some level. It is the act of the statement, of the saying it aloud, 
that diffuses the anxiety of the knowledge. Pain must be expressed verbally, or at 




For Burke, a clear expression (the visual) “describes a thing as it is”, while a strong 
expression (language) “describes it as its felt” (278). Words elucidate feeling and 
evoke passions that mimetic images aren’t capable of, and “therefore, a clear idea is 
another name for a little idea” (89).  Instead of using words to “evoke passions”, 
Anderson uses them to clarify—but the clarification does not make them “little 




According to Michael Chabon, Anderson’s depictions of emotional pain through 
distance offer a greater perception of the idea of grief itself: 
 
Grief, at full scale, is too big for us to take it in; it literally 
cannot be comprehended. Anderson […] understands that 
distance can increase our understanding of grief, allowing 
us to see it whole. But distance does not—ought not—
necessarily imply a withdrawal (Chabon 22).  
 
In this context, grief represents a sublime idea, one that is unpresentable—too big to 
be taken in “whole”. Anderson takes the sublimity of grief and robs it of its sublime 
power through aesthetic means. However, as Chabon suggests, that does not mean 
his films dismiss or deny it wholesale. The primary aesthetic function of Anderson’s 
film worlds is always to create palpable tension between polarities, be they pleasure 
and pain, the present and the past, or even life and death. Within the painful 
picturesque and the sentimental sublime, he finds his aesthetic niche. 
 
Anderson’s ironic distance and reliance on fantasy partially repudiates the sincere 
nostalgia for a time of the “good forms” and rational progress of the modernist ideal. 
But it also mourns the loss of sincerity, creating works steeped in beauty whose 
cracks yield glimpses of the sublime. Like other contemporary filmmakers 
influenced by the tenets of Romanticism, Anderson concedes that the world and its 
remembered past are just personal constructs, as artificial as movie sets and as 
subjective and ego-driven as the Romantic artist himself. 
In The Royal Tenenbaums, he does this through expressions of beauty undercut by 
sublimity, creating a palpable anxiety and a sense of permanent indeterminacy, 
which I argue results in a painful sense of picturesque enervation. Similarly, in The 
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Life Aquatic, he turns sublime landscapes into uncannily beautiful fantasias, 
defanging the indeterminacy of the postmodern sublime and rendering it personally 
meaningful, the site of psychological growth through acceptance of that 
indeterminacy. Anderson’s films are sentimental, yes, but that sentiment is in service 
of larger thematic aims: the questioning of reason, and the searching for purpose in a 
world without it. 
 
Unlike Anderson, writer-director Charlie Kaufman has rarely been accused of bald 
sentimentality. In his 2008 film, Synecdoche, New York, he portrays an imaginative, 
subjective point of view that leans more toward horror than picturesque unity. 
However, as I argue in chapter two, the film offers an optimistic counterpoint to its 
depiction of a writer suffering from the limits of his own creative capability and 
relation to the external world. That counterpoint rests in the aesthetics of the film 


























































“An Endless Succession of Mirrors”: Irony, Ambiguity, and the Crisis of 
Authenticity in Synecdoche, New York 
 
“There’s no such thing as certainty, that’s plain /  
As any of mortality’s conditions”  
–Lord Byron, Don Juan (1819–1824) 
 
 
In this chapter I describe how, through various stylistic and narrative devices, the 
ambiguously defined world creation of Charlie Kaufman’s 2008 film Synecdoche, 
New York engages both its protagonist and its audience in a state of emotional 
agitation and confusion. Its otherworldly, heightened, and highly theatrical realm 
does not abide by realistic constructs of time and space, and as a result, Kaufman 
demonstrates a Romantic questioning of the rationality and inevitability of the 
progressive ideals of Enlightenment and modernism through a sustained use of 
Romantic irony. 
 
Kaufman is a Romantic ironist in that he plainly acknowledges that the overcoming 
of subjectivity is impossible, while simultaneously creating “new forms and myths” 
(Mellor, English Romantic Irony 5) to engage with these forms and myths on a 
sceptical level. His fantastical worlds are always in the process of being crushed 
under their own imaginative weight, in the sense that they continually display a 
tendency to reveal their own mythical status. They are consistently metatextual and 
reflexive, and this produces a distancing effect to their narratives. But at the same 
time, they engage the spectator on a deeply emotional level. This is due in part to a 
strong reliance on subjectivity—in Synecdoche, New York, the spectator experiences 
much of the action through the subjectivity of its protagonist, Caden Cotard (Philip 
Seymour Hoffman). But the film also creates an ambiguous tension between 
Caden’s subjectivity and the subjective viewpoints of others, even including those 
pretending to “be” him, in order to recognise the gulf between subjectivities as it 
creates what Joel Evans refers to as a “network of affects” (Evans 335). 
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Kaufman engages in a metatexual relation to his protagonist by utilising Romantic 
irony as originally defined by Friedrich Schlegel. Caden is in many ways a semi-
satirical caricature of the Romantic “Hero of Sensibility”, defined by his extreme 
sensitivity, subjectivity, sense of guilt and solitude and embrace of personal 
suffering (Thorslev 35). He lacks the capability of the optimistic Romantic ironist: 
the ability to embrace the chaos of existence and utilise it in his artistic creations. 
Kaufman systematically undermines Caden’s ability to control his external 
surroundings and relationships through various aesthetic devices. Essentially, the 
film operates on a level where its aesthetic aims undermine its character’s desires 
through the use of fantastical elements.  
 
Caden seeks the control and comfort of absolutes and thus becomes removed from 
participating meaningfully in his own life. While he fears chaos and tries to 
counteract it, Kaufman accepts it, and paints his protagonist as tragic for his inability 
to change and adapt. While ultimately an example of Romantic pessimism similar to 
Byron’s “metaphysical” dramas Manfred and Cain (Mellor 12), the film works on 
the level of Schlegelian Romantic irony due to Kaufman’s treatment of his own 
material. The film itself becomes an ironic commentary on its protagonist’s inability 
to embrace irony. 
 
Synecdoche, New York is a distillation of the thematic preoccupations that Kaufman 
previously addressed as the screenwriter of Being John Malkovich (1999), Human 
Nature (2001), Adaptation (2002), Confessions of a Dangerous Mind (2002), and 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), as well as his directorial follow-up, 
Anomalisa (2015). These include osmosis between the external and mental worlds 
and between the mental worlds of individuals (LaRocca 6), repetition and doubling 
and confused subjectivities (9), the creation of emotionally immersive yet obviously 
fictitious heightened “realities” (6) and an examination of individual isolation amidst 
the indifference of a larger humanity (8). In Synecdoche, New York, Kaufman 
engages his audience emotionally through empathetic subjectivity, casting a spell 
similar to that experienced by his protagonist, who suffers the slippery effects of 
time and the questioning of his very relation to the larger world. Kaufman also 
engages the spectator in questioning the very idea of what is “real” in the first place.  
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Of all the filmmakers I discuss, Kaufman’s work by far is most characterised by the 
idea of such extreme subjectivity, bordering on solipsism. He draws on traditions of 
philosophical German idealism and authors as diverse as ETA Hoffmann, Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, Mary Shelley, and Lord Byron; the magical realism of later 
authors such as Jorge Luis Borges; and the post-war European cinema of what 
David Martin-Jones refers to as the “crisis of modernity” (46). In Synecdoche, New 
York, Kaufman questions the nature of objective reality primarily through his use of 
the fantastic “themes of the self” as defined by Tzvetan Todorov (109) and through 
the problematising of narrative space via the mise en abyme, which engenders an 
experience of the mathematical sublime. Kaufman creates a strong sense of 
ambiguity in whether what we are seeing on screen is “real”—a reflection of an 
objective, external reality—or just the projection of a diseased mind. The filmmaker 
specifically works against concepts of mimetic realism in order to access emotional 
realism while exploring ideas of subjectivity, solipsism, and idealism through a 
supposed reflection of the point of view of his protagonist. In the process, he 
engages in a highly Romantic form of irony in his questioning of absolutes and 
embrace of the chaos of becoming. 
 
Romantic Irony: From Kant and Schlegel to Byron and Beyond 
 
Romantic irony has its roots in early German idealism and Immanuel Kant’s notion 
of transcendental idealism (Mellor 25). Kant’s “modest” version of idealism asserts 
that objects are transcendentally ideal because they are perceived by the mind—we 
can only judge objects in the world by our own individual mental processes 
(McQuillan). However, for Kant this did not mean that those objects do not exist 
outside our perception, but that we have no way of judging them outside of being 
“objects for us” (McQuillan). Nevertheless, these objects are still a part of the world 
of sensation, the phenomenal, which we intuit. Kant’s “agnostic” form of idealism 
posits that we can never really truly know reality outside of our perception of it and 
thus whether our perception is “correct” (Guyer and Horstmann 5.2).   
 
This split between noumenon (the world independent of the mind) and phenomenon 
(the world as it is experienced by the mind) is, according to Kant, unable to be 
traversed (Mellor 25). Human experience, and thus human knowledge, is finite as a 
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result (25). When the mind attempts (and fails) to traverse this gap between the 
phenomenal and noumenal realms, it enters the mode of pure reason—developing 
concepts such as infinity and totality, sublime ideas inaccessible to direct human 
experience (26). This, in turn, can lead to despair and “psychic atrophy” out of the 
inability to experience such concepts first-hand; “imprisoned in its own finitude” 
(26), the human mind is left with a longing that can never be fulfilled. 
 
Later German idealists Johann Gottlieb Fichte (b.1762–d.1814) and Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (b.1775–d.1854) make more radical assertions on 
subjectivity and self-consciousness. According to Fichte, “the I posits itself” 
(Breazeale 3), that is, human consciousness creates itself and the universe it 
experiences (Mellor 27). In this version of idealism, the Kantian “thing in itself”, an 
object independent of subjective consciousness, does not exist (McQuillan). 
Schelling pushes Fichte’s doctrine of idealism into solipsism when he asserts that 
the mind itself (or the “absolute I”) creates the universe with its own consciousness 
(Mellor 28). The problem for the early Romantics, many of whom were sceptical of 
such solipsistic notions (McQuillan) and ascribed to Kant’s idea of noumenon, was 
how to bridge the gap between the world of sensation and experience and the world 
as it really “is” (Mellor 27). 
 
As its earliest and greatest proponent, German Romantic Friedrich Schlegel 
(b.1772–d.1829), defines it, Romantic irony embraces the idea that noumenon is 
fundamentally based on the principle of chaos (Mellor 27). For Schlegel, the idea of 
noumenon as becoming, rather than being, sets up a profound relation of things in 
relation to other things—everything is simultaneously itself and in the process of 
becoming not itself (or “p = not-p in the act of becoming”) (27). This constant act of 
becoming represents a “way into infinity”, analogous to “pure energy” (27) in an 
unending process of change. 
 
Far from the simple rhetorical device it once was, irony in the Romantic era became 
its own philosophy or “general world view” (Behler 48, 49). Rather than clinging to 
any concept of an ordered, rational universe subject to human control, Romantic 
irony posits one of “incomprehensible” tumult (Schlegel 260). Instead of being a 
cause for despair, however, Schlegel defines this ever-changing state as one of 
	 76	
Fülle, or fertile abundance, an ecstatic infinite becoming rich with creative 
possibility (Mellor 7). But this concept of Fülle is double-edged; it creates an 
eternal, unsatisfied sense of longing for an increased participation in it (8). Since the 
human mind cannot actually comprehend such infinite chaos, the experience of the 
reality of Fülle can never be complete, becoming only an approximation of reality 
that ultimately must be rejected (Mellor 8).   
 
As a remedy against this longing, we attempt to impose systems of order (being) 
onto this disorder (becoming), even though an opposing desire for “chaos and 
freedom” also exists (8). This creates an unrelenting tension, or dialectic, that never 
results in synthesis (6). As such, a “sceptical awareness” of our own mental 
limitations, combined with a longing to overcome them, defines the process of 
Romantic irony (10). According to Anne Mellor, for Schlegel such scepticism, or 
“critical idealism” (15), was necessary in order to “detach imagination from an 
excessive commitment to its own finite creations” (10).  Nevertheless, commitment 
and enthusiasm were also key to establishing this dialectic: 
 
Irony can free the imagination to discover or create ever-new 
relationships, to participate once again in the fertile chaos of life. 
For if a person were ever to believe that his reason had fully 
comprehended this chaos, that conviction would in itself destroy 
his capacity to participate in the mystery and primeval power of 
life (10). 
 
Operating under the idea that the universe is comprehensible to individual 
consciousness, or the “illusion” of perfectibility (10), robs the subject from being 
able to play her own role properly and fully. Such philosophical irony also provides 
a “check” to the imagination, curtailing “excessive commitment to the fictions of 
one’s own mind” in order to be able to participate in life’s continual becoming (11). 
In his Lyceum (Critical) Fragments, Schlegel refers to irony as a form of “self-
limitation” characterised by “self-creation and self-destruction” (Schlegel 147). 
Irony plays with the limitations of individual subjectivity while simultaneously 
“open[ing] up the possibility of the infinity of other perspectives”, those of 
potentially endless other subjectivities (Speight 3.6).  
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According to Schlegel, applying such principles to artistic work results in a genuine 
Romantic poetry, one “free of all real and ideal self-interest” that reflects back on 
itself in an “endless succession of mirrors”, magnifying its original principles 
without ever being fully “perfected” (Schlegel 175). Schlegel applied this 
philosophy to his own creative work. He called his unfinished novel Lucinde 
“shaped, artistic chaos […] chaotic and yet systematic” (Speight 3.2). Such a 
“playful and serious, guilelessly open and deeply hidden” (Schlegel 156) irony 
comes closest to offering human consciousness the “perception of the infinite chaos 
of reality” (Mellor 13). It hinges on the “value of falsity” (13), recognising the 
human inability to discern reality within our limited subjectivity while 
simultaneously embracing the potential inherent in change. 
 
Romantic irony leads to fictional world creation that both recognises its falsehood 
yet simultaneously presents itself as the sincere reflection of a subjective point of 
view (Mellor 14). The artist enthusiastically commits himself to his creation while 
simultaneously showing its “limitations” as a subjective creation of a “finite human 
being” (14). This kind of ironic stance can be achieved through devices such as 
symbolism and allegory (11) and alternative outcomes to the same events, and 
metatextual elements such as parabasis (Speight 3.6), paradox (Schlegel 149), and 
self-parody (156). Schlegel refers to such processes as Selbstbeschränkung, a 
“hovering” between creating and undoing creation wherein the artist 
“simultaneously projects his ego or selfhood as a divine creator and also mocks, 
criticizes, or rejects his created fictions as limited and false” (Mellor 14). But while 
the fiction is ultimately “false”, it is not inauthentic. This dialectic of earnestness 
and scepticism reveals its deceit (Thorlby 131) and creates an “ambivalent 
awareness” (132) of the constant navigation of becoming. Remaining “true to the 
actual contradictions of life” (Mellor 15), the Romantic ironist is, in fact, the truly 
authentic artist. 
 
Synecdoche, New York demonstrates these tensions through many such ironic 
aesthetic devices, creating an impossible world that attempts to reveal unlimited 
possibilities: infinite space through the creation of mise en abyme, forking timelines, 
and endlessly embodied subjectivities. Mellor sees “true” Romantic irony as a 
function of the optimistic and comic—her ultimate example is Byron’s Don Juan—
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and points to the idea of “play” as crucial in its creation (24). Synecdoche, however, 
creates an essentially tragic and pessimistic portrait of a subjectivity undermined by 
its inability to engage with the world on a philosophically ironic level. But the film 
itself (and Kaufman as writer-director) affirms Romantic irony as its ultimate 
creative position. Its tragedy lies in the fact that its protagonist refuses to engage 
with it. The film subjects Caden to the chaotic systems of becoming, which Caden 
attempts to conform to an ordered, rational system where he dictates the terms. As 
such, he becomes an inauthentic artist and person. By refusing to engage ironically 
with such a radical becoming, he actually ceases to be—he becomes the walking 
dead, a “ghost who haunts his own life” (Deming 201), a projection of his own 
memory. 
 
While Mellor sees positivity and optimism in Romantic irony (199), it is important 
to note that such irony can take different forms. Ernst Behler contests that theories 
of irony continued to evolve in the Romantic era, constituting a turn from “optimism 
and joyous freedom toward sadness, melancholy and despair” (45). This darker 
ironic sense springs from an overbearing adherence toward the “infinite longing” 
that Schlegel considers one half of the Romantic ironic dialectic (45). The “German 
misery” of tragic irony (46), epitomized by Goethe’s Faust, spread to other nations 
as well, including France and Britain, and had an indelible influence on Byron 
(Thorslev 166). According to Behler, such irony is caused by a rift between 
protagonist and audience expectations—“the protagonist, misjudging reality, makes 
in his hybris [sic] self-assured statements which affect the discerning audience 
ironically” (Behler 46). Kaufman’s film includes such a pivotal moment: when 
Caden announces to his cast and crew that the play he intends to stage will provide 
“nothing less than the brutal truth”.  
 
Synecdoche, New York continues a tradition of ironic pessimism present in Goethe’s 
Faust and The Sorrows of Young Werther and Byron’s Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, 
Manfred, and Cain (Thorslev 87). Peter Thorslev details how the Romantic “Hero of 
Sensibility” emerged as a response to the “dead certainties” of Enlightenment tropes 
(85). (Such a hero is sometimes known as the Byronic hero, although Byron was 
strongly influenced by Goethe) (166). The Hero of Sensibility is not defined by 
action, but by a capacity for deep feeling and the “tender emotions—gentle and 
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tearful love, nostalgia, and a pervasive melancholy” (35). The Hero of Sensibility 
combines the death-obsessed “Gloomy Egoist” (46) with the sensitive “Man of 
Feeling”, a well-educated man who is “not necessarily handsome, and is never 
robust; usually he is pale and inclined to fevers, especially ‘brain fevers’ brought 
about by fits of melancholy” (39). The Man of Feeling, it seems, feels so much it 
literally affects his physical health.  
 
He is solitary and sometimes cowardly, prone to “benevolent acts” that are usually 
“sporadic and ineffectual” (Thorslev 39). He is usually an artist, one possessed by a 
sorrow of “cosmic significance” (42). Weltschmerz is his particular “Romantic 
disease”, the conflict between the desire for order and the need to feel like a working 
part of a “living organic universe” and the belief in individual personality and 
passion over and above the greater workings of that universe (89). It is a suffering 
that could be attributed to most any Romantic artist—such a state characterises 
Romantic thought—but for the Hero of Sensibility, the sceptical self tends to reign 
supreme, with the “detached, insulated, and passionately individual” taking 
precedence over sublime mysticism (89). Throughout Kaufman’s film, Caden 
remains a tragic figure in this mode. He is a Man of Feeling who becomes 
disconnected from his own emotions due to his inability to affectively engage in his 
life as he is living it.  
 
Now that I have established the parameters of Romantic irony and its attendant 
“hero” in works of fiction, I will detail the ways in which Kaufman’s film 
exemplifies these ideas. Impossible world creation and the defiance of traditional 
mimetic filmic realism is key to the film’s situating Caden within an ironic 
becoming that he refuses to engage, to his great detriment. 
 
Embracing Fülle and Undermining Realism in Synecdoche, New York 
 
While lay audiences often consider filmic ideas of realism as unquestionable and 
“natural”, they are actually built on a strictly codified language based upon presiding 
cultural norms. This world logic, or verisimilitude, is not based on reality per se, but 
on the idea of reality entered into as a social contract between filmmaker and 
audience (Branigan 28). In the case of filmic realism, this usually means a classical 
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definition of continuity, which involves a strict coherence to action-led narratives, 
ones driven by characters identifying clear goals and reacting to them (23). This 
results “in a temporary equilibrium allowing the next phase of action to commence” 
(23). What is actually a series of disjointed, non-contiguous shots and often highly 
stylised mise-en-scène featuring purpose-built artificial lighting and constructed sets 
reads as “reality” to an audience, who unconsciously fill in narrative gaps and tacitly 
agree to enter into the fictional world without acknowledging it as such, creating a 
“true feeling” that is “not necessarily the truth” (Branigan 206). It is, however, a 
coherent world, one that the spectator can easily follow and conform to the laws of 
time and space. 
 
David Bordwell refers to the use of “fabula”, the narrative mentally constructed by 
the audience, and the “syuzhet”, the arrangement of the fabula, or, essentially, what 
the film is telling us (Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film 100). An “overloaded” 
syuzhet might lead to boredom on behalf of the audience, providing the viewer too 
few gaps to fill in, thus eliminating participatory engagement (54). A “rarefied” 
syuzhet risks doing the opposite, leading to a sense of confusion and dislocation, 
alienating the viewer and breaking the fictional spell of reality (54). This can create 
a lack of “emotional realism”, resulting in an inability of audiences to empathically 
connect to the narrative through character, and creating a sense of disbelief in the 
film world. The spectator is removed from the “Secondary World” of the fiction and 
finds herself once again in our “Primary World” reality (Wolf 24). The immersive 
nature of the constructed film world is lost, however momentarily.  
 
Sometimes, however, a filmmaker will seek to cast a fictional spell whose very 
existence relies upon confusion and disbelief—in fact, its central theme rests upon it. 
In Mark Wolf’s view, this might make it a “failure” (24). Although he readily admits 
that “curiosity must be aroused” by a work of fiction, according to Wolf, the goal of 
fictional world creation should be a sense of completeness, which gives the 
impression that all questions could, in theory, be answered, even though they are not 
(61). Certainly, this sense of precision and desire for explanation runs counter to the 
idea of sublimity. Ambiguity in world creation does not necessarily represent a 
failure of art, particularly when an artist does not take realism as an end goal and 
instead seeks to question the very concept of what constitutes reality.  
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Thomas Pavel has written of the “worrisome” instances of fictional worlds being 
capable of “contradictory objects” that appear incompatible with our own (such as 
the ability to draw a geometrically impossible square circle), but concedes that these 
impossible phenomena do not necessarily entail “evidence against the notion of 
world” (Pavel 50, his emphasis). He points to the “impossible entities” of our own 
world, including “individual psyches, desires, dreams, and symbols” (50). Pavel’s 
conception of “possible-world theory” contains a universe of competing alternatives 
to our own “actual world” (64). In fiction, however, there are already a multiplicity 
of “worlds ‘actual’-in-the-system”, not just one (54). While Pavel acknowledges the 
power and “noble” quality of traditional modes of realism, he also acknowledges the 
potential found in a “mythical discourse” that uncovers the ruse of completeness and 
consistency (77, 78).  
 
He distinguishes between those texts whose goal is cohesive world creation and 
those that construct fictional worlds in order to “lay bare” the very concept of their 
fiction “for the sake of adventure and investigation” (84–85). Pointing to ETA 
Hoffmann, Nerval, Balzac, and their modernist progeny Borges and Franz Kafka, 
Pavel accounts for the valid questioning of mimetic principles and the introduction 
of “puzzling” worlds that lead to “inadequate hypotheses” and encourage hesitation, 
leading the audience to create a “perplexed fictional ego, unsure of its ability to 
make sense of the events it witnesses” (93). Fictional worlds need not be warm, 
soothing, immersive, and unquestioning. I argue that “emotional realism” can be 
achieved through the identification with character confusion as much as it can be in 
the creation of seamless, mimetic narratives and explicit character motivation. In 
Synecdoche, New York, the spectator arrives at a closer picture of emotional realism 
through its use of expressive, surreal, and fantastic techniques than could ever be 
achieved through the illusory practices of filmic realism. 
 
Ambiguity is a key function of narratives that seek to uncover those “deep fractures” 
(Pavel 73) hidden in mimetic realism, creating spaces that exist on “alien logic”, 
evoking both the dream world and a myth-puncturing realism simultaneously (93). 
Hans Braedlin suggests that ambiguity is grounded in its own particular aesthetics 
(Braedlin 3–4). Robert Scholes goes so far as to contend that film, already 
sufficiently mimetic as an art form, does not need to hold “realism or verisimilitude 
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as an evaluative standard”, unlike literature, and instead “must achieve some level of 
reflection, or conceptualization, in order to reach its optimum condition as narrative” 
(Scholes 5). In other words, a mimetically reproductive art form such as film should 
go beyond its capacity to mimic reality in order to create a reflexive relationship to 
its own sense of realism.  
 
Perhaps fittingly, the sense of ambiguity created in Synecdoche, New York resulted 
in a split critical response. It was named one of the most “polarizing” films since 
2000 in a 2016 poll (Rosenbloom). The LA Times calls it “wildly ambitious [...] 
sprawling, awe-inspiring, heartbreaking, frustrating, hard-to-follow and achingly, 
achingly sad” (Chocano). The New York Times writes that it is “a romance of such 
delicate feeling that it’s still a shock that it carries a studio brand” (Dargis). In 2009, 
Roger Ebert named it the best film of the decade, and wrote, “It will open to 
confused audiences and live indefinitely”. It is hard to say how confused audiences 
were, because few showed up to screenings. The film was a massive commercial 
failure, recouping a fraction of its estimated US $21 million budget.  
 
Many critics refused to grace it with the public’s indifference. The New Yorker 
refers to it as “an amazing conceit” that “grows increasingly hard to grasp as a 
practical enterprise, and even harder to believe in” (Lane). Entertainment Weekly 
ironically echoes the predicament of the film’s protagonist in its negative review: 
“The compulsion to stand outside of one's life and observe it to this degree isn't the 
mechanism of art—it’s the structure of psychosis” (Gleiberman). None-too-subtle 
Observer critic Rex Reed pronounces that it could be “the worst movie ever” 
(Reed). Academic responses to the film are more subdued, but the general consensus 
is that it is “not an ‘enjoyable’ film” (Hill 219). Rebecca Davers calls it “confusing 
and frustrating” (25). “It feels unhealthy, plunging us into its magnified solipsism, 
constricted in Kaufman’s fidelity to crafting a pathologically subjective film 
experience”, Derek Hill writes in his largely positive appraisal (219). The main point 
of contention over the film’s value seems to lie in whether immersion in its world 
constitutes a critical engagement with such “pathology” or an affirmation of it.  
 
Unlike Daniel Shaw, I would argue the former. “Characters such as Cotard embody 
the deer-caught-in-the-headlights powerlessness that is symptomatic of what 
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Nietzsche called passive nihilism”, writes Shaw dismissively; “Worst of all, the film 
is not very funny” (265). Most scholarly assessments are much more positive, 
however. Hill writes about Synecdoche in relation to authenticity and realism, and 
praises the film for its Felliniesque ability to use “fantastical tropes […] as a means 
for burrowing deeper beneath the surface of things” (218). David L. Smith discusses 
the film in relation to longing for unity of identity (or “wholeness”) and 
autobiography (242). He also contends that language creates our “sense of 
separation” from the world and details how Kaufman highlights this idea (243). 
Richard Deming addresses scepticism and subjectivity in the film, and suggests that 
the portrayed fluidity of subjectivity counteracts the desire to coherently “know 
oneself” (196), in a clear echo of Romantic irony. Finally, Joel Evans writes about 
the film in relation to Gilles Deleuze’s time-image and the concept of infinite 
regress, and how they relate to the signification of global space within late 
modernity.  
 
I will address most of the above points, but I begin with Hill’s notion of fantastical 
worlds uncovering hidden (emotional, metaphysical) realities. I primarily use 
Tzvetan Todorov’s theories of the fantastic in my analysis, as I consider them the 
most advantageous to gain an understanding of how Kaufman’s film addresses itself 
as a constructed space and as a ground for metaphysical questioning. 
 
Synecdoche, New York and Fantastic World Creation 
 
A hallucinatory journey through the creative process and an unnerving exploration 
of the solipsistic collapse between matter and mind, Synecdoche, New York also 
serves as a sympathetic parody of the Romantic trope of the all-consumed, 
passionate artist-genius. The film tells the fantastical, metaphysical tale of Caden 
Cotard, whom we first meet wandering somnambulistically in the morass of middle 
age, trapped in a middling career as a director of suburban American regional 
theatre. After mounting a gargantuan theatrical production meant to physically 
encompass the entire city of New York—and the entire story of his life in minute 
detail—Caden is eventually reduced to a veritable husk as doppelgangers of himself 
and his loved ones run amok while play-acting scenes from his life. The decades 
pass with seemingly blistering speed as his play is continually rehearsed. Little by 
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little, he loses everything and everyone he cares about, either as a result of the 
ticking clock of time or his own inability to make meaningful connections. 
Eventually he is doomed to wander the streets of an artificial post-apocalyptic 
landscape of his own creation, which is all that is left of reality as he knows it.  
 
Kaufman’s film is decidedly not one built to generate universal commercial appeal 
or critical consensus, so its reception is not entirely surprising. It is a difficult film 
that engages with its philosophical and fantastic elements directly; this is not a work 
of fiction that can be passively consumed in any kind of coherent, sensical way, and 
in this sense it defies the illusionistic principles of typical filmic realism. In 
interviews, Kaufman shows a disdain for filmic realism by acknowledging it as an 
artificial construction in itself: “The whole idea of literal realism—it’s all a 
contrivance and a convention that we accept. So why not explore the larger realm?” 
(Guillén). But far from being simply an intellectual exercise, his world creation is 
also purposefully immersive; its reflexive qualities do not detract from its emotional 
resonance. Kaufman’s primary concern regarding realism is emotional, not physical: 
“I’m looking for the emotional thing as opposed to the logical thing”, he says 
(Rose). The filmmaker refuses to see the two impulses as contradictory: 
 
I really like artifice, and I really like reminding people they’re 
watching a movie. And I really like the idea of having people 
question the veracity of what they’re watching. So by mixing things 
that are possibly real with things that are clearly not real or are 
questionable […] I don’t see it as a paradox. I’ve always liked fake 
worlds and I like sets and I like illusion. But I don’t like being lied 
to. I think movies lie a lot. And maybe I’m trying not to lie by 
saying that I am lying (Guillén, my emphasis). 
 
By being “lied to” it is possible Kaufman means the way classical film production 
plasters over Pavel’s “deep fractures” in an attempt to deny the very nature of its 
falsehood. Kaufman is echoing the Romantic principle of authenticity—he eschews 
an interest in mimetic realism in favour of an inner authenticity, and a sincerity of 
purpose (Milnes and Sinanan 4). His use of irony, in this sense, relates to personal 
authenticity and a rejection of the “deceitful illusions” (Thorlby 131) of cohesion. It 
relates closely to Schlegel’s concept of what he called Socratic irony, an irony that 
“is intended to deceive none but those who consider it to be deceptive” (Behler 52). 
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In Schlegel’s terms, an artist must maintain a relationship with contradictions 
inherent in life, or she will destroy such authenticity and even lose contact with 
reality (Mellor 15). Such an ironic stance “contains and arouses a feeling of the 
insoluble conflict between the absolute and relative, the simultaneous impossibility 
and necessity of a complete account of reality” (52). That impossibility (conveyed 
by the film’s style) and necessity (conveyed by its protagonist’s desires) represent 
the fundamental dialectical tension of Kaufman’s film. 
 
The first blatantly obvious indication that the film will undermine such a “complete 
account” of reality occurs about twenty minutes into its running time. The scene 
begins with Hazel (Samantha Morton), arguably Caden’s “true love” (although it is 
difficult to think Kaufman would believe in such an idea), driving down an ordinary, 
well-kept suburban street in the American every-town of Schenectady, New York. 
She haphazardly parks in front of a bright and cheerful-looking home that appears to 
be on fire. Smoke billows out its windows in large plumes, and flames lick the 
windowpanes on its second story (figure 2.1). Hazel glimpses a man in a dark suit 
through her passenger window as he casually walks by the house and out of frame. 
He does not seem to notice the fire.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The eternally burning house fire creates confusion in the spectator 
and serves to keep the film squarely in the realm of the fantastic. 
 
Once inside the house, which is decorated uncannily in the style of the 1950s 
(although the film is set in the present day), Hazel chats with an estate agent. “I’ve 
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always loved this house”, she remarks. “Yes, it’s a wonderful place”, the agent 
replies, as the two walk casually through the space as flames flicker around them. 
The agent coughs and admits that the sellers are “very motivated”. Hazel expresses 
tentative doubts. “I like it, I do. I’m just really concerned with dying in the fire”, she 
admits meekly. “It’s a big decision”, the agent replies sympathetically, “how one 
prefers to die”. Smith suggests the fire “seems to represent the imminence of 
mortality” in the film (252). But it also relates to the illusion of choice. While 
Deming thinks Synecdoche suggests the idea that “the shape of a life is fashioned by 
choices and responses to what occurs” (197), this idea runs counter to the principle 
of noumenal chaos—and the ability to function within it by recognising that human 
will is nothing in the face of it. Imminence, like everything, is subjective—Hazel’s 
death from the house fire does not happen for another thirty years. 
 
Perhaps the main purpose of the house fire and this initial scene is to make clear the 
film’s world operates under the dizzying precepts of profound ambiguity and is 
working to illicit confusion in the spectator (if not, at this point, its characters). It 
raises a slew of unavoidable questions. Why are these women calmly, complacently 
discussing square footage in a house that is burning down around them? Why is the 
estate agent’s adult son hanging around in the basement of a burning home clad only 
in boxer shorts? In what world does a house on fire necessitate a literal “fire sale”? 
If the storied town of Schenectady, New York, 12  is a synecdoche of Middle 
America, its values and hypocrisies, this scene might be taken as a synecdoche for 
the film as a whole. It defies expectations in a way that, as the narrative progresses, 
becomes systematic. Typical viewers are now likely scratching their heads, 
wondering what on earth this could all mean. But their questions will never be 
answered. Such unanswered questions create profound confusion, “altering the 
viewer’s relationship to what occurs on screen, destabilizing what distinctions one 
																																																								
12 Schenectady, a bucolic town with a population of 60,000 situated three hours north of New York 
City (and about 3.5 hours north of Kaufman’s hometown of Massapequa), occupies a rather storied 
position in American culture, particularly for a place its size. Authors as varied as Henry James, Kurt 
Vonnegut, and Dr. Suess have used it as a setting or as a hometown of major characters. Its official 
song, “Our Schenectady” (What a warm and friendly place it is to be / Nestled among plains and hills 
/ With a beautiful river that always gives us thrills) is parodied in the opening moments of Kaufman’s 
film. Caden’s young daughter is heard singing in voice-over: “I was born there and I’ll die there / My 
first home I hope to buy there / have a kid who’ll actually strive there / sweet Schenectady. / And 
when I’m buried / and I’m dead / Upstate worms will eat my head”. Apparently she has absorbed 
Caden’s morbid outlook on life at a very tender age.  
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makes between the real and surreal” (Deming 195). This specific plot device only 
gets more confounding in later scenes, including one in which we see Caden and 
Hazel sharing cocktails in her lounge while the fire still rages, and, decades later, 
when the fire eventually takes her life as an old woman. (The coroner’s deadpan 
diagnosis as he looks at her blackened throat swab: “Could be smoke inhalation”.) 
 
In order to ascertain the theoretic underpinnings of the fantastical components of 
Kaufman’s film, as exemplified by its continually burning fire scenario, it is 
necessary to define what is meant by the term “fantastic” in its strict, Todorovian 
sense. For events to be considered fantastic, they must “hesitate between a natural 
and supernatural explanation”, creating an ambiguity that becomes a principle theme 
of the work (Todorov 33). No single explanation can or should be given for their 
diversions from realism. It is then necessary that the reader or spectator must adopt a 
certain attitude to the work, rejecting purely “allegorical as well as ‘poetic’ 
interpretations” (33). That is, in the world of the fiction, these things are really 
occurring. It is not always necessarily that “the hesitation be represented within the 
work”, through the experience of a character reacting to events, although it usually 
is (34).   
 
The fire in Synecdoche is not poetic in the sense that it is not clearly allegorical. It 
exists, simply as a fire, on one narrative level, which is the final condition it must 
meet to be considered of the fantastic (32). The key element of its fantastic quality is 
found in the hesitation it elicits on the part of the spectator. Pointedly, the fire is the 
only “supernatural” occurrence in the film that exists wholly outside of the purview 
of Caden—every other fantastical event can be read as being a reflection of his 
subjective experience, a result of his supposed descent into madness. But the fire 
unequivocally exists outside his mental imaginings; it has not been conjured by 
Caden’s atrophying psyche. Years later, when Caden watches Hazel outside her 
house, the fire is still raging, its intensity progressing, but at a glacial pace. A fire is 
a natural event, but here it is unnatural, enduring due to an extreme dilation of time.  
 
Kaufman has noted that the fire scenario often elicits a particularly confused 
response from audiences:  
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People ask, “Why the burning house? What is the burning house?” 
I have to say, well, it doesn’t speak to you. It speaks to other 
people. I’m trying to let this interaction be personal, in the same 
way that a dream is personal (Guillén).  
 
The fire, then, functions on the level of a dream image for the spectator (and the 
director), but not for the characters in the film. Todorov acknowledges that the 
fantastic is found within the more general category of “ambiguous vision” (33), a 
phrase that could be considered synonymous with the dream state. Kaufman has 
referred to the film as operating under “dream logic” (“In and Around Schenectady, 
New York”) specifically as a way of manifesting Caden’s interior life without the 
use of narrative devices like voice over. Such supernatural events as the eternally 
burning house provoke not only anxiety and even horror on the part of the perceiver, 
the “phenomenon makes us wonder ‘what it means’ less than it amazes us by the 
strangeness of the fact itself” (Todorov 104). This wonderment is the key to taking 
such occurrences from the realm of the purely marvellous to the fantastic: “the 
perception of the supernatural casts a heavy shadow over the supernatural itself and 
makes its access difficult to us” (105). That difficulty, or opacity, renders the fire 
fantastic.  
 
For Todorov, perception “constitutes a screen rather than removes one” (105)—if 
the act of perception is foregrounded and the nature of the events perceived remains 
unknown, this leads to a predominant anxiety (105). Synecdoche’s fire engenders 
both “what are we seeing?” and “what does this mean?” responses; sensation and 
perception are “transformed into idea” (115). Such a collapse between event and 
event-perception of space and time highlights the perception-consciousness system 
of relations between the self and the world (139), including notions of subjectivity, 
solipsism, and philosophical idealism, “which stresse[s] the mind’s power to create 
its own universe of consciousness, freed from any absolute natural law” (28). 
 
 Crucially, the film also adheres to principles of mimetic realism, of “what we think 
of as the ‘real world’” (Deming 195). These include “realistic décor, gritty locations, 
and generally unglamorous clothes and makeup for the actors” (Hill 217). (Hazel’s 
continually burning house, with its pristine mid-century furnishings in oddly 
saturated colours, is again exempt from this realism.) Hill qualifies Kaufman’s 
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particular form of fantastic world creation as “synthetic hyperrealist” (217), likening 
it to a similar aesthetic in the surrealist films of David Lynch. Unsurprisingly, 
Kaufman is reportedly an admirer of Lynch (Tobias), along with such twentieth-
century fantasists as Philip K. Dick and Franz Kafka (Sternbergh). Such surrealist 
tendencies also relate to the film’s ambiguity between extreme subjectivity and a 
more objective realism in its narration.  
 
“A Series of Mad Visions Perhaps”: The Screen as the Site of Confused 
Subjectivity  
 
According to Freud, a neurotic personality operates on a level of internal anxiety 
arising from a confluence of internal and external “frustrations” but does not 
experience any kind of confusion or apprehension regarding his relation to the 
outside world and his demarcation as separate from it (Freud, “General Theory of 
Neuroses” 350). While the neurotic might experience “delusions”, such delusions 
make “sense” in the context of “the life of those who produced them” (257–8). 
Caden Cotard is instantly recognisable as a man of deep-set neuroses, but initially he 
is portrayed as having a relatively firm grasp on reality and the separation of his 
inner life from the external world. His hypochondria and death obsession—
evidenced by routinely reading the obituaries, seeing a headline about Harold Pinter 
and assuming it means he is dead, starting the day by pointing out he feels well and 
that the milk has expired—all point to a neurotic individual, but not a psychotic one. 
His life has the semblance of normality: He has a full-time job, mounting a 
production of, appropriately enough, Death of a Salesman.13 He is married to an 




	Deming writes that the use of Arthur Miller’s famous mid-twentieth-century play “sets the tone of 
tragic inevitability and melancholia built into the movie” while also pointing to its similar protagonist 
unfixed in time, since Willy Loman “regularly disappears into flashbacks of earlier stages of his life” 
(197). Joel Evans also highlights the play’s explicit relation to the time-image in its “overt concern 
with the potentially uneven, disjointed rhythms of time” (332). It shares this in common with other 
works referenced in Kaufman’s film, including Proust’s Swann’s Way and Kafka’s The Trial, which 
are both read by Hazel (332). Writing in the Arthur Miller Journal, Rebecca Davers suggests even 
greater thematic resonance with Synecdoche and Salesman and their two protagonists (see Davers, “I 
Know How to Do the Play Now”). 
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After hitting his head on an exploding bathroom faucet, Caden receives a diagnosis 
of a “synaptic degradation” that is “fungal in nature” from a neurologist. His 
situation briefly becomes more hopeful when he receives a “genius grant” from the 
MacArthur Foundation, and decides to write a new, original play about the “brutal 
truth” of life and death. Pointedly, this occurs after Adele ridicules his staging of 
Death of a Salesman as inauthentic: “It’s not you”, she says. “It’s not anyone”. But 
when Adele and Olive leave Schenectady and Caden for Berlin’s bohemian art 
world, his neuroses begin to take on a more sinister hue. Kaufman provides an early 
foreshadowing of events through Caden’s surname. “Cotard” is a reference to 
Cotard’s Syndrome, a rare disorder in which the sufferer operates under the 
assumption that he is dead, does not exist, or is putrefying.14  
 
The idea of a physical trauma, such as Caden’s head injury, resulting in extreme 
personality or psychological disturbance is something of a cartoonish trope in 
Hollywood: characters, both animated and “real”, throughout cinema and television 
history have received similar blows to the head resulting not just in amnesia, but in 
the questioning of their sense of personal identity—in such instances, physical 
trauma is often connected to emotional trauma (Baxendale). Are we meant to think 
that the unfolding narrative of the film is a result of Caden’s newfound brain 
damage? It is unlikely, but also unclear. 
 
Separated from his family and becoming increasingly obsessed with his grand 
artistic plans, Caden begins to lose touch with the external world, and the film 
reflects this aesthetically. He sees visions of himself in television cartoons, and later 
in a TV advertisement for a chemotherapy drug. His own image appears in a movie 
poster. His mental state even seems to physically manifest itself on his own body. 
Boils appear on his skin; his veins bulge and make odd sounds when touched. Later 
his teeth appear to be rotting and flesh hangs off his legs.  
																																																								
14 An article in the scientific journal Biological Psychiatry refers to the case of a 65-year-old sufferer 
of the syndrome. The woman initially “presented with gradually progressive memory problems” and 
suicidal thoughts before developing the belief her brain had become “completely rotten” with cancer 
and finally insisting she was dead (Chatterjee and Mitra 52). Like Caden at his most degraded, she 
“failed repeatedly to recognize her close acquaintances and had shown significant reduction in her 
speech output and psychomotor activity” (52). 
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Such a “collapse between the limits of matter and mind” is considered “the first 
characteristic of madness” (Todorov 115). It also relates to the idea of pan-
signification, one of the fantastic “themes of the self”, wherein “the transition from 
mind to matter has become possible” (114). The confusion found on the site of 
Caden’s body (his afflictions seem to come and go without reason) echoes confusion 
concerning narrative events in the film. Instances of miscommunication or 
misunderstanding are a major motif, particularly within dialogue and language in 
general, such as the instances where Caden confuses the words ophthalmologist, 
urologist, and neurologist. But the people he talks to often experience the same 
confusion, misinterpreting his signals. He tells Adele that he thinks he has blood in 
his stool. “That stool in your office?” she asks, half asleep.  
 
The subject of time is also greatly confused in communication. Adele’s friend Maria 
(Jennifer Jason Leigh), after staying up all night, remarks, “It’s really late. Early. It’s 
late.” Ambiguous language communication is also a central element in Caden’s 
relationship to his daughter. He has to explain to her the difference between the 
homonyms “psychosis” and “sycosis” early on in the film, after she notices the 
pustules on his face (highlighting the correlation between the coming degradation of 
his body and mind), and she also confuses sewage pipes with smoking pipes. Later, 
when the adult Olive (Robin Weigert) is on her death bed, the two must 
communicate via an electronic translation machine, as for some reason she has 
forgotten her mother tongue after decades of living in Berlin (a city, it should be 
noted, where English is regularly spoken).15 
 
David L. Smith likens the use of language in the film to the idea of the synecdoche 
itself: “As creatures of language, we live only with parts and can produce only 
synecdoches” (247). Such a symbolic mode of communication defines a gulf 
between thing and thing represented, and can never deliver the “whole truth” (247), 
which is what Caden seeks to convey, through language, in his play. Language lives 
within the realm of subjectivity, of internal mental process, and not of noumenon. 
By highlighting miscommunication through language, Kaufman emphasises the gulf 
																																																								
15
	According to a 2012 European Commission report, “At a national level English is the most widely 
spoken foreign language in 19 of the 25 Member States [of the EU] where it is not an official 
language” (6). Approximately 56 percent of the German population speaks English, most not as a 
native language (Eurobarometer 13). 
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between subjectivities in his film. Schlegel expresses this sentiment when he argues 
that the structured and rational system of language can never express the 
fundamental chaos of Fülle (Mellor 10). “The mystery of becoming can be 
linguistically expressed only as hints, cyphers, and hieroglyphs” (10–11), such as the 
mysterious human nose painted on the giant pink box Caden hopes to give Olive as 
a present. Such symbolism, which is without any discernible meaning in the film, 
denotes a “hint at the infinite” while acknowledging the failure to attain it (11). 
 
Todorov characterises language as “[t]he essential event which provokes the shift 
from the primary mental organization to maturity” (145). In essence, it signals the 
move from the pre-symbolic to the symbolic. Madness, in turn, correlates with the 
pre-symbolic, a pre-language infancy. In this state, “the transition between matter 
and mind has become possible” (114). Thus, the breakdowns in both language and 
bodily function signify a return to a state of mental infancy, when “the limit between 
the physical and mental, between matter and spirit, between word [or image] and 
thing, ceases to be impervious” (113). At her mother’s funeral, Caden’s future wife, 
Claire (Michelle Williams), laments that she “used to be a baby” through tears, 
expressing a tacit desire to return to a pre-language state where the fantastic is still 
possible.16 Such a pre-verbal (or pre-symbolic) state represents a return to a feeling 
of wholeness with the external world, away from the “extreme subjectivity” of self 
(175). In the Romantic era, madness often represented a “higher form of reason”, as 
in Edgar Allan Poe’s remark, “Science has not yet told us whether madness may not 
be the sublime form of intelligence” (Todorov 39). However, while Kaufman invites 
his protagonist to experience feelings of sublimity through such fantastic “pan-
signification”, Caden instead embodies a Romantic pessimism that continually 
rejects the idea through his self-conscious solipsism. 
 
Language, in spoken and written form, eventually becomes so confused to Caden, 
his fax machine spews gibberish and the words in books vanish without a trace. This 
breakdown between matter and mind remains at the level of the fantastic because as 
spectators we can acknowledge that it represents a transgression of these limits, not 
																																																								
16
	This is a common theme in Kaufman’s scripts. In Adaptation, Susan Orlean longs to be a baby 
again so she can be “new”, and Joel Barrish in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind actually lives 
out scenes from his childhood, one as a baby being bathed in a sink.	
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a purely mythical, allegorical representation (116). The pan-signification it 
exemplifies contends “relations exist on all levels, among all elements of the world” 
(112). Objects are imbued with lives of their own via mental and emotional 
connections. When Caden finds Olive’s diary not long after she leaves for Berlin, it 
is full of the musings of a small child, read in voice-over with Olive’s childish 
intonations. The musings of the adult Olive, read in voice over with a heavy German 
accent,17 continue to appear in its pages over the years, even though she is thousands 
of miles away and has not seen her father since leaving New York. 
 
Physical metamorphosis is also related to the collapse of matter and mind. As 
Caden’s play continues to grow in his attempt to replicate every aspect of his life on 
his hangar-like stage set, multiple versions of characters come to occupy the world 
of the film, as they inhabit the play within the film. Caden’s embodiment of Ellen, or 
Sammy’s embodiment of Caden, or Tammy’s embodiment of Hazel, speaks to the 
physical manifestation of a multiplicity of internalised personalities within one 
mind: “We are several persons mentally, we become so physically” (Todorov 116). 
Ironically, despite the multiplications and replications of personalities, Caden’s 
point of view becomes more and more solely informed by the curious, possibly 
demented workings of his own brain.  According to Edward Branigan, “A first-
person recounting of events is an illusion, but one which is bound up with the very 
conditions which allow us to make sense of the fictional world (Branigan 51). If the 
first-person account of a fictional world is confused and ambiguous to the character 
perceiving it, it will necessarily become so to the audience, which identifies with his 
point-of-view. 
 
Caden’s solipsism, and the film’s external renderings of the inner workings of his 
mind (if, indeed, that is what the film’s dreamlike images are) further underscores 
the film’s ambiguity. We, like Caden, cannot be sure of what is real and what isn’t, 
if indeed anything is. Kaufman articulates a belief in Schlegel’s transcendental 
																																																								
17
	There are multiple references to Germany, Germans, and the German language in the film, from 
Olive and Adele moving to Berlin (where Caden briefly visits and speaks to a now German-accented 
Maria) to a German-accented professor reading a melancholy Rilke poem on the radio in the opening 
scene, to an explicit reference to Franz Kafka’s The Trial. In a sense, these serve as “Easter eggs”, 
cuing the audience to the various German artists and philosophers whose work Kaufman engages. 
More generally, they conjure a tone of “German misery”, which Marx and Engels characterised as the 
“predominant” pessimism found in German Romanticism (Behler 46).	
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“critical idealism” (Mellor 15) when he says, “It’s a recognition that that’s just the 
truth […] It’s not the world as it is that we are seeing but the world as it’s translated 
by this mound of material in our heads” (Guillén). In these terms, there is no 
objective truth for the film to relate to its audience. Kaufman even goes so far to 
suggest a personal flirtation with philosophical idealism, suggesting reality is 
fundamentally a construct of the individual mind:  
 
I think it’s really interesting that visually the world doesn’t 
exist. It only exists as our brain’s interpretation. I sometimes 
try to imagine what this world looks like without people in it 
and I don’t think it looks like anything. It certainly doesn’t look 
like this (Guillén).  
 
While Kaufman’s ideas jibe with various incarnations of German idealism, 
popularised in the Romantic period by Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer 
(see Mellor, Speight, and Breazeale), they also fit neatly with the concepts of the 
fantastic. Objects as mere projections of the mind can be seen as expressions of, or 
connections to, the fantastic’s dissolution of the veil between matter and mind, of 
the “effacement of the limit between subject and object” (Todorov 116). The idea 
reaches its logical conclusion in the famous thought experiment of the “brain in a 
vat”, which argues that theoretically, there is no way of knowing if individual 
experience is not merely the result of a sentient brain being hooked up to electrodes 
to stimulate mental activity, simply giving the impression that an experience in 
external reality is occurring (Putnam 8).  
 
Given this scenario’s adjacent position to death (at least the death of the body), it is 
tempting to consider the idea that Caden is already dead and his experiences are 
merely expressions of his mind’s last delirious gasps of consciousness. The most 
overt implication of this occurs when he visits his therapist, Madeline Gravis (Hope 
Davis). The severity of her name is an ironic twist on her frivolous notions of 
therapy and happiness, but also points to grave potentialities: “Why did he kill 
himself?” Caden inquires about the child author of the bestseller Little Winky. “I 
don’t know. Why did you?” she replies. He asks her to repeat herself. “Why would 
you?” she answers. Perhaps Caden misheard her the first time, and we heard what he 
did through a subjective alignment, or perhaps she changed her answer. The death 
hypothesis is never revealed as truth, however, and this is integral to maintaining the 
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sustained hesitation that the fantastic requires. Caden’s solipsism stretches to the 
extent that whole characters are suggested illusions, such as Kaufman’s insistence 
that the character of Ellen is a figment of Caden’s imagination (Guillén). While both 
the actor Millicent Weems (Dianne Wiest) and Caden himself embody Ellen at 
certain points, the “real” Ellen is never revealed—her various representations are 
themselves truly simulacrum, signifiers without signified, copies without an original. 
 
At one point Caden considers naming his untitled play The Simulacrum. This is of 
course a reference to Baudrillard’s postmodernist work Simulacra and Simulations. 
Evans suggests Caden’s play illustrates Baudrillard’s conception of the final order of 
simulacrum, when a thing “bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own 
pure simulacrum” (Baudrillard 5) and “the mimetic relationship between the real 
and its representation” has broken down, affecting the very nature of reality itself 
(Evans 327).  Caden’s work, which becomes his life, represents both simulacrum 
and synecdoche, “in which parts and wholes, reality and mimicry, outside and inside 
collapse into one another” (328). There is no longer an objective vantage point of 
reality from which to view its various mirrors and permutations. It becomes simply a 
morass of signs and symbols while the referents are lost. This is the space of 
indeterminacy from which the postmodern operates; Kaufman emphasises this idea 
with a refusal to include establishing shots to create a fixed space from which to 
consider his created world. 
 
Caden’s artistic recreations of his life in his art operate under the fantastic’s “themes 
of vision”, which are antithetical to the principles of reason (Todorov 122). A 
complete, full-sized replica of New York, which contains a full-sized replica (via its 
recreation of the warehouse set), which contains a full-sized replica, on to infinity, is 
spatially impossible. 18  Todorov considers these themes examples of “indirect, 
distorted, subverted vision” (122). This preoccupation with distorted vision can also 
be seen in the specialised microscope-like glasses used to view Adele’s miniscule 
paintings, which grower smaller and smaller as the film progresses, as Caden’s 
																																																								
18 The logistics of the sets within sets within sets proved a significant challenge for the film’s script 
supervisor, Mary Cybulski, who created detailed diagrams of each space within space in order to log 
which scenes occur in which sets. On her chart, there are no fewer than five iterations of the 
warehouse set, each one inhabiting a different state of physical completion (“In and Around 
Synecdoche, New York”). 
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project grows larger and larger (figure 2.2). This “distorted” vision is ambiguously a 
symptom of Caden’s madness, but, as in Nerval’s Aurélia, we are never sure if this 
madness might actually constitute a quality of perception of “the superlative, the 
excessive” (93) that is unavailable to those who do not view the world through 
extraordinary eyes. 
 
If he has such a superlative vision, Caden seems too “fixated on the limits of the 
self” (Mellor 39) to impart it to others. Like Byron’s protagonist in Cain, Caden is 
obsessed with death and the limitations of life (39). His physical breakdowns can be 
read as an expression of his mental state, one of “ironic pessimism” (39). “Cain […] 
is a pure ironist, for whom self-consciousness is only a melancholy conviction of 
loss and death”, writes Mellor (39). The same can be said of Caden (whose name 
even recalls Byron’s tragic biblical hero), who denies the “renewal of life” (39) 
offered in the potentially redemptive love of Hazel. One of the sustained ironies in 
the film relates to the imaginative subjectivity of its narrative—ambiguously a 
product of Caden’s newly explosive mental processes—and Caden’s lack of 
imagination when it comes to his creative endeavours. Kaufman relates this to 
Caden’s incapability of interpreting his newfound ways of seeing: “Caden’s work is 
so literal. The only way he can reflect reality in his mind is by imitating it full-size 
[…] It’s a dream image but he’s not interacting with it successfully” (Guillén). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Adele’s miniature art is the opposite of Caden’s, which tries to 
replicate reality as a whole. 
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Caden personifies the negative side of Weltschmerz as his self-absorbed egoism 
leads him to become “detached, insulated”, even as he longs for the ability to feel 
part of the totality of humankind (Thorslev 89). As he puts it in an impassioned 
speech to Hazel, “We’re all in the same water, after all, soaking in our very 
menstrual blood and nocturnal emissions. This is what I want to try to give people”. 
But Caden is so obsessed with himself, and his own mortality, he has little actual 
interest in other people. Hazel obviously longs for a romantic relationship with 
Caden, but he is too absorbed in creating an artwork about connection to embark on 
his own. If “the very passion of the egoism of the Weltschmerzler usually makes him 
involve the whole world in his peculiar plight” (88), Caden goes so far to create his 
own world in order to realise such a myopic search for self. The world he creates has 
the dizzying effect of further complicating his existence and relation to the 
revelation of truth, however. One of the ways in which Kaufman creates such a 
relation to ambiguous alternate realities is in the film’s use of the mise en abyme, 
which generates spatial confusion through mirroring effects. 
 
The Mise en Abyme and the Mathematical Sublime 
 
Kaufman, as a screenwriter and filmmaker, remains preoccupied with the 
metaphysical nature of illusion and reality. “I don’t even know that I exist, let alone 
what’s happening”, he suggests (Huddleston). As a stylistic device, the mise en 
abyme helps elucidate the confusion between illusion and reality found in 
Synecdoche, New York. Robert Stam defines the mise en abyme as “the infinite 
regress of mirror reflections to denote the literary, painterly, or filmic process by 
which a passage, a section, or sequence plays out in miniature the processes of the 
text as a whole” (Stam xiv). Such an infinite regress “knows no bounds” (Evans 
326). In the film it is a product of Caden’s “obsessive” desire for an endless 
replication of exact copies of “real” objects (326). Caden’s production creates 
identical sets within sets, so that the supposed entirety of the first set is included in 
the one inside of it (figure 2.3). These are at once “miniatures” of the larger sets, but 
paradoxically contain the latter, theoretically ad infinitum. Evans contends that in 
the film these replications suggest a “fixed subjectivity” rather than the postmodern 
“fashionable, uncertain, shattered self” (327). This is manifested by Caden’s desire 
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to embody such a fixed subjectivity as the nature of reality around him becomes 
disjointed and his very body begins to turn on itself. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Caden’s grand theatre project involves physical impossibility: a life-
size replica of New York City within a warehouse in New York City. 
 
If such an infinite regress can seem positively “dizzying” (Metz, Film Language 
232), the spectator must suffer this vertigo by considering the aesthetic mirroring 
effects that the play within the film creates, which multiplies the heightened sense of 
delirium and confusion caused by a confrontation with the infinite. Literally 
translated “abyme” means “abyss” or “chasm” (231), and that evocation of the 
sublime terror of the infinite, be it massive or infinitesimal, is integral to the 
workings of Kaufman’s film. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant describes what he 
refers to as the “mathematical sublime” (Kant 84), a specific form of sublimity 
related to “spatial or temporal magnitude” (Shaw 81). When an individual is 
confronted with an object or experience, he first perceives through “sensible 
intuition” based on a priori knowledge of the world that all beings automatically 
possess. In turn, this intuition is first “synthesized” through the imagination, and 
subsequently “thought through” to understanding (Shaw 65).  
 
When an object or experience is too much for the imagination to comprehend, 
however, the subject is struck with a sublime feeling. This in turn activates the 
mind’s capacity to reason, to abstractly conceptualise not only the unpresentability 
of an object but the very fact that the mind itself is capable of the process of abstract 
conceptualisation.  
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“The mere ability even to think it as a whole indicates a faculty of mind 
transcending every standard of sense” (Kant 85, his emphasis); that is, it is based in 
a higher mental function than sensation, that of reason. Thus the sublime leads to a 
feeling within the individual of his own power over nature, as well as his 
separateness from it (Shaw 74). It is a feeling of freedom tinged with sadness, both 
emotions the result of being released from purely terrestrial bonds in a shift of view 
from “world to mind” (73). Essentially the sublime is an experience of pain followed 
by “a powerful sense of relief” (83). Serving as a seed to the process, imagination 
plays a critical role, leading to a distinct emotional experience that is, by definition, 
a solitary one.  
 
Caden, unlike the spectator, does not possess mastery over his own thoughts or 
experiences, and is instead plunged into an existential nightmare. While we enjoy 
our place of remove from the action, Caden has to contend with the pure terror of 
unreason. (Kaufman originally conceived Synecdoche after being approached about 
writing a “horror film”) (Moriarty). His artistic quest is really anti-sublime—he 
seeks to “present the unpresentable” (Lyotard 43)—the totality of his life. 
Conversely, his ex-wife Adele literally illustrates the idea of “sensible objects” (43) 
that know their limitations, tiny portraits of the people in her life. Adele becomes a 
roaring success, while Caden seems cursed to wander in his own purgatory. A 
synecdoche is meant to be a part taken to represent the whole, not the whole itself. 
Adele’s paintings, which are so minute as to require special visual apparatus for 
viewing (requiring a different way of seeing), support the Blakean idea of a sublime 
microcosm, as in the opening stanza of Blake’s 1803 poem, “The Auguries of 
Innocence”: “To see a world in a grain of sand / And heaven in a wild flower / Hold 
infinity in the palm of your hand / And eternity in an hour”. 
 
Adele’s art represents tiny snippets of moments in time illuminated by her subjective 
experience. They are akin to Schlegel’s idea of the “fragment”: a “single, complete 
idea” that refuses to impose a “false system or an unjustified rational order” (Mellor, 
English Romantic Irony 21). The goal of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essays, in similar 
fashion to Schlegel, was to create “subjective verisimilitude” without completeness 
or resolution, portraying “a mind in motion” (Smith 242).  
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Caden, in contrast, attempts to “conjure a whole from the parts” (240)—to 
experience the totality of his life while he is still living it. Constructing from a 
seemingly infinite number of tiny snippets, he attempts to arrange a cohesive, 
truthful whole.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Caden wanders through the burned-out shell of his play as a solitary 
figure experiencing death-in-life.  
 
It is a fool’s game, and perhaps that is why he hangs it up and decides to live the life 
of a maid (or at least play her role), one who simply struggles with day-to-day 
menial tasks while regretting her past sins. These scenes of Caden wandering 
through life as Hazel (figure 2.4) are indicative of the “Wandering Jew” motif, a 
familiar one in German Romanticism (Hartman, “Romanticism and Anti-Self-
Consciousness’” 51). As in Byron’s Manfred, it epitomises Caden’s tragic-ironic 
“death wish” or “longing for self-oblivion” found within Weltschmerz (Mellor 170), 
a release from the desire for the infinite in the face of life’s finitude (Behler 45). The 
Wandering Jew figure is always solitary, “separated from life in the midst of life” 
(Hartman 51), trapped by the alienating burden of self-consciousness (51).  
 
This highlights a major theme of Kaufman’s film: Caden is burdened by his 
separation from other people due to his extreme solipsism, but he also struggles to 
hold onto such a “Romantic ‘I’” when his “certainty and simplicity of self” begins to 
crumble (51). 
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Figure 2.5 Caden and Hazel observe their doppelgangers act in a play that has 
essentially become the only form of existence for their real and fictional selves. 
 
It remains a mystery why Caden thinks he can reconstruct a sense of a core self by 
getting someone else to play him, but perhaps his goal is to study himself from the 
“outside” in order to get an objective idea of his troubles. As Rebecca Davers 
suggests, “The film audience recognizes that Caden may […] be trying to ‘trace […] 
back to its source’ the unhappiness that seems to define him” (Davers 37). 
Unsurprisingly, things become more confused for Caden, not less. Multiple 
doppelgangers (Cadens, Hazels, Ellens) form the core of the narrative confusion in 
the latter half of the film, lending a human component to the idea of infinite 
replication (figure 2.5). 
Argentine modernist author Jorge Luis Borges, whose story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius” recounts the discovery of an encyclopaedia based on an imaginary, idealist 
world, sees a curious law of diminishing returns related to the idea of mise en 
abyme. The text within the story recounts the concept of the hrönir, the duplicates of 
lost objects that are “awkward in form” and “somewhat longer” than the originals 
(Borges 38). These hrönir have “made possible the interrogation and even the 
modification of the past, which is no less plastic and docile than the future” (38). 
The hrönir exhibit an irregular form of quality control as they are replicated: 
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Curiously, the hrönir of second and third degree—the hrönir derived 
from another hrön, those derived from the hrön of a hrön—
exaggerate the aberrations of the initial one; those of fifth degree are 
almost uniform; those of ninth degree become confused with those 
of the second; in those of the eleventh there is a purity of line not 
found in the original. The process is cyclical: the hrön of the twelfth 
degree begins to fall off in quality (38-39). 
 
This endless series of mirrored objects is a metaphor for problematising identity: the 
loss of identity as a result of replication itself. Who is the real Caden? Is this Caden 
or Caden playing Ellen or Caden playing Millicent playing Ellen? Why is the “real” 
Hazel attracted to the “fake” Caden? Is the fake Hazel a proper substitute for the real 
one? “Things became duplicated in Tlön”, writes Borges, “they also tend to become 
effaced and lose their details when they are forgotten” (39). This brings to mind 
Kaufman’s screenplay for Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, in which details of 
mise-en-scène, like shop signs and book jackets, fade away to nothing as Joel 
Barrish’s memories are erased. It also speaks to the notion of idealism that is at the 
core of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” and a great deal of Borges’ magical realism, a 
notion that the world is simply a solipsistic projection of our own mind, in which 
fantastical, irrational elements arise to remind us of the fiction in which we live 
(Barth 75).  
 
Caden, unlike Borges, is a self-referential artist who both fears and refutes such 
infinite possibilities. He is obsessed with the idea of art as replication and 
reconstruction, of reconstituting his own life as it is lived minute by minute, in the 
way that it happened, the “only” way that it can happen. Consumed by the fear of 
future failure, and the regret of his failures in the past, he must assert the primacy of 
his one true timeline, free from Borgesian difference. Kaufman, however, refuses to 
grant him his wish. Instead, he questions Caden’s power as an artist through his 
relation to personal inauthenticity. 
 
Regardless of the actual status of Caden’s existence (whether he is dead, alive in a 
dream reality, or in some sort of status in between), he does not exist authentically. 
Instead he is consumed by his “art”, which is simply a meticulous recreation of his 
life. That fear of inauthenticity, of not engaging vitally with an emotionally resonant 
existence, is a hallmark of Romantic thought (Milnes and Sinanan 5). In purely 
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Romantic terms, Caden has failed both as an artist and as a human being due to his 
lack of authentic engagement with his life. He rarely lives with “self-awareness”, 
and lacks the conscious ability to make choices for himself (Hill 210). 
 
The very degradation of Caden’s body is a factor in, or a result of, his inability to 
act. Caden is so overwhelmed and incapacitated by his circumstances that he has to 
do “biofeedback” exercises to produce saliva and needs eye drops to create enough 
moisture to cry, experiencing as he is a kind of emotional, existential shock. As an 
artist, Caden seeks Truth—another word for authenticity—and he mounts his play in 
order to make a grand, overarching statement about the very nature of life and death. 
Surely, a man bestowed a “genius grant” would have something grandly important, 
perhaps even eternal, to say about such all-encompassing themes. But Caden cannot 
slavishly re-create his own life and in any way access the truth, which is defined by 
change. 
 
In an 1813 love letter to Annabella Milbanke, Byron summarised a sort of treatise 
on his own state of perpetual discontentment:   
 
You don’t like my ‘restless’ doctrines—I should be very sorry if 
you did—but I can’t stagnate nevertheless—if I must set sail let it 
be on the ocean no matter how stormy—anything but a dull cruise 
on a level lake without ever losing sight of the same insipid shores 
by which it is surrounded (Byron, Letters 119, his emphasis).   
 
Byron himself has been accused of his own “implacable nihilism” (McGann 76). 
Such a nihilism, however, is very different from that of Caden Cotard’s. Daniel 
Shaw refers to Caden’s “passive nihilism” (Shaw 256), which “shrinks from the 
chaos of existence” in favour of a search for “resignation and acceptance” (256). In 
contrast, Kaufman’s (and Byron’s) “active” nihilism “clears away the obsolete 
‘Idols of the Marketplace’ in order to prepare the ground for new, contemporary 
values” (256). In other words, it embraces chaos as a means of rebirth and re-
signification.  
 
David L. Smith relates Kaufman’s work to the Nietzschean idea of amor fati, a way 
to “transform a sense of entrapment in life’s limitations” via an “ecstatic 
affirmation” of them (245). Such a perspective can provide “a naturalistic mode of 
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transcendence” due to the recognition of the futility of creating worlds without flaws 
(244). Amor fati evokes sublimity via the knowledge of our own limitations. While 
Shaw sees Kaufman’s film as a failure due to its protagonist’s “deer-caught-in-the-
headlights powerlessness” (265), I argue that Kaufman’s own active nihilism 
operates in a continual dialectic without synthesis—in Romantic ironic fashion—
with Caden’s passive nihilism. 
 
The concept of amor fati can be traced to Schlegelian irony in its representation of 
affirmative thought, active and creative, rather than reactive and passive. Caden’s 
insistence on describing and re-describing the world as it “is” (or was) renders his 
life as a collection of lifeless signs. Perhaps this is the clearest connection to the 
hypothesis that he is already dead. He is certainly creatively dead. Caden, the great 
artistic “genius” and seeker of truth, is really a conformist. As a result, he is doomed 
to failure, wandering alone in an empty, post-apocalyptic dreamscape of his own 
creation. Without the freedom of creation and new possibilities, art, and life, become 




In Schlegel’s terms, Caden has failed to “maintain a relationship with contradictions 
inherent in life” (Mellor 15) and has thus become inauthentic. But Kaufman has 
created a film that simultaneously allows him to both engage with a more 
pessimistic version of himself and also assert his own belief in contradiction and 
ambiguity. Synecdoche, New York is a film that utilises Romantic irony on a 
metatextual level, between the film’s creator and the creator of the play within the 
film. It does not accomplish this through overt metatextual devices, such as the 
introduction of screenwriter “Charlie Kaufman” in Adaptation.  
 
Rather, its irony is achieved in less obvious ways. The film “evokes transcendence 
by oblique means and inspires reflection on the strategies by which transcendence is 
pursued” (Smith 245). In the mode of philosophical irony, it is a “poem [film] as an 
unresolved debate” (Mellor 22), both at the level of style and ideology. Kaufman 
does not pass judgment on his character—indeed, our sympathies are generally 
aligned with him through a subjective point of view—but he does question his 
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ability to be authentic. Through our aligned sympathies with Caden, the spectator 
comes to see him as a tragic figure—he wants what we all want, permanence and 
wholeness, but unconsciously we realise impermanence is the only constant.  
 
Caden’s art does not participate in the fertile chaos of life, so his mental workings 
force him to do so as a sort of corrective measure. Yet he is unable to embrace the 
chaos Kaufman creates due to the belief that he can have full mastery over time and 
space and somehow access absolute truth. While Caden seeks to harness the power 
of godlike creation, the failure of his play and life is due to his lack of ability to see 
beyond the possible world and seize the possibilities of the fantastic one. This is 
where autobiographical similarities between art and artist diverge, for Kaufman 
fearlessly delves into impossible worlds with seemingly unmitigated enthusiasm and 
imagination.  
 
That is not to say the film does not portray the same anxieties that plague Caden’s 
worldview. But instead of shrinking from those anxieties, Kaufman’s film confronts 
them, acknowledging the inexplicability of the project of life (and death) while 
forcing its audience to do the same. It is an active questioning that refuses to come 
up with easy answers, or indeed any answers at all. Answers, cohesion, and a lack of 
confusion define narrative completeness and the passivity of traditional narrative 
realism. But even as culturally coded notions of what signals the portrayal of reality 
in fiction are questioned, an emotional resonance remains.  
 
Emotion and imagination offer keys to portrayals of intersubjectivity and sublimity 
in Sofia Coppola’s The Virgin Suicides and Spike Jonze’s Her. In the next chapter, I 
will explore sublimity directly in relation to these films, through a discussion of the 










Beautiful Girls and the Invisible Woman: Emotion, Imagination, and the 
Feminine Sublime in The Virgin Suicides and Her 
 
The stars awaken a certain reverence,  
Because though always present, they are inaccessible  
–Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature (1836) 
 
Sofia Coppola’s The Virgin Suicides and Spike Jonze’s Her both provide 
examinations of sublimity in relation to gender. They do so chiefly through the 
aesthetic portrayal of emotion, both the onscreen emotions of their characters and 
the eliciting of emotional responses in the viewer, and varied approaches to 
intersubjectivity and imagination. In this chapter, I will examine these films in 
relation to the concept of the feminine sublime, as both a reaction and reproach to 
the stereotypical egotism and masculinity of the Romantic sublime and an attempt to 
create new modes of sublime expression—ones that perhaps include a space for the 
feminine. 
 
Based on the 1993 novel by Jeffrey Eugenides, Sofia Coppola’s 1999 film The 
Virgin Suicides examines sublimity via its presentation of the Romantic egotistical 
sublime, where constructions of femininity become sublime through the vivid, 
fantastical imaginings of a group of teenage boys. These boys feel deeply for a 
group of doomed teenage sisters, but suffer from a profound inability to express or 
even understand their feelings, as does the rest of their suburban community. The 
film’s highly stylised and aestheticized portrayal of emotion leads to the spectator’s 
confused engagement with its affective content, which creates an emotional distance 
that mirrors the frustrated emotional engagement depicted onscreen.  
 
I discuss the ways Coppola’s film engages with emotion and intersubjectivity via a 
reading of Lotte Eisner’s concept of Stimmung (inspired in part by the writings of 
early German Romantic writer Novalis) as well as overall tone and mood creation. 
Its emotionally hollowed-out characters become emblematic of the malaise and 
decline of post-war American society as a whole. The film’s alternative feminine or 
“everyday” sublime lies in its expression of the girls’ quotidian realities and an 
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emphasis on highly feminised surface decoration. Its veneration of the aesthetic 
concept of the “pretty”, as outlined by Rosalind Galt, acts as a subversive formal 
counterpoint to traditional “masculine” modes of filmic realism. This presentation is 
ambivalent, however; it speaks not only to a celebration of femininity but also to its 
commodification. Ultimately, the film’s girls assert their own subjectivity by 
performatively committing mass suicide as a way of passing judgment on a society 
that values social conformism over human feeling. The mood created by the film is 
one of emotional ambivalence, with its ultimate “emotional core” expressed as the 
sense of communal trauma. 
 
In Spike Jonze’s 2013 film Her, the sublime is found in what cannot be seen—
specifically in the disembodied voice of a computer operating system named 
“Samantha”, who allows the film’s protagonist, Theodore, to regain his personal 
creative power through imagination in the fashion of Romantic sublimity. At the 
beginning of the film, Theodore is stuck within the confines of his own memory, 
imagining the same moments of a happier past over and over again while despairing 
in the present. His relationship with Samantha allows his imagination to become 
purposeful and authentic again. Samantha, in turn, exemplifies a radical rethinking 
of the isolating Romantic sublime: the sublimity she experiences is a communal 
one—a feminine sublime comprised of infinite, heterogeneous selves operating 
through ecstatic, intersubjective connection. 
Through an engagement with character and mise-en-scène I examine how Jonze’s 
film plays with these two seemingly antithetical versions of sublimity in order to 
address both subjectivity and the desire for intersubjective connection in a post-
industrial landscape. Her grapples with the idea of what it means to be a person, but 
it is more concerned with how a self in the world can meaningfully connect with 
other selves while retaining a sense of personal identity. The film addresses the 
philosophical problem of other minds, especially as it relates to Romantic thought. 
Its ultimately untenable central relationship leads to an expression of sublimity more 
tuned to the feminine sublime through intersubjective connection based on self-
willed acknowledgment of other minds.  
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Romantic views of the sublime (as well as of the beautiful) were heavily influenced 
both by Edmund Burke’s 1757 treatise A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, covered in chapter one, and Immanuel 
Kant’s “The Analytic of the Sublime” in The Critique of Judgement (1790), which I 
address in chapter two. Drawing on the previous discussions from these chapters, I 
begin by outlining the concepts of the Romantic (egotistical) sublime before 
exploring alternative “feminine” expressions of sublimity. 
The Romantic Sublime: Mind over Matter 
 
According to Anne Mellor, both Burke and Kant “implicitly gendered the sublime as 
an experience of masculine struggle and empowerment” (Mellor, Romanticism and 
Gender 87). In contrast, they marginalised the feminine, which was associated with 
the realm of the beautiful, in favour of the philosophical primacy of this sublimity 
(108). Romantic thinkers adopted these views readily. Seen as the key to 
transcendent human experience, especially the experience of the artist or creative 
genius, the Romantic sublime is strongly solitary, subjective, internal, and even anti-
social (Shaw 106).  
 
In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant diminishes 
the feminine and beauty in favour of masculine power: “The fair sex has just as 
much understanding as the male, but it is a beautiful understanding, whereas ours 
should be a deep understanding, an expression that signifies identity with the 
sublime” (Kant 36, his emphasis). Such a “beautiful understanding” is a virtue of the 
social and the sensible, but fails to reach the profound transcendence of sublimity. 
Viewing sublimity as more than the Burkean concept of terrified delight experienced 
at a safe remove (Burke 62), the Romantics stressed the primacy of the mind in the 
creation of the sublime and emphasised the role of imagination. Coleridge 
encapsulates this Romantic view of sublimity: 
I meet, I find the Beautiful—but I give, contribute, or rather 
attribute the Sublime. No object of Sense is sublime in itself: 
but only so far as I make it a symbol of some Idea. The circle 
is a beautiful figure in itself; it becomes sublime, when I 




According to Coleridge, “nothing that has shape can be sublime except by 
metaphor” (533). Sublimity lies in the contemplation of an object by the subject, not 
within the object itself. In this sense, as Coleridge suggests, the beautiful is capable 
of conjuring sublime feeling in the mind of its perceiver. 
 
While German idealism, which I explore in chapter two, focuses primarily on the 
“failure” of imagination and a desire to overcome the split between the mind and the 
external world through art (Shaw 90–92), English poets such as Coleridge and 
Wordsworth sought to overcome such dualism to focus on the self: on “the insistent 
lyrical ‘I’” (Shaw 100) whose imaginative capacity was responsible for the “eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM” (Coleridge, Biographia Literaria 167). 
Coleridge’s affirmation of a godlike, sublime subjectivity in this quotation attests 
not only to the egotism of the Romantic sublime, but also to what Wordsworth refers 
to as the “awful power” of imagination (Wordsworth, Prelude 217).  
 
Such power even becomes a potential danger—it “threatens to extinguish not only 
the evidence of the senses, but also the experience of time and, by extension, the 
consciousness of self” (Shaw 101). This is the precipice that sublime feeling leads 
the subject to approach, stare over, and contemplate: the annihilation of self-
consciousness, a terrifying evocation of the loss of subjectivity. But in the province 
of Wordsworth and Coleridge, sublime transcendence was characterised “not by fear 
and trembling, but rather by a deep awe and a profound joy” (Mellor, Romanticism 
and Gender 89). Wordsworth’s sublime seeks to flirt with this sense of self-
destruction by engaging the imagination and then containing it. Imagination to 
Wordsworth represented “reason in her most exalted mood” (Wordsworth, Prelude 
468), affirming the power of the ‘I’ and its ability to stare into the “vale of non-
sense” and emerge triumphant by evoking the very subjectivity that the sublime has 
the potential to erase (Shaw 103). In the Romantic sublime, reason and imagination 
enter into a complementary “pact” (85) in order to elevate the subject’s sense of 
power and self. 
 
Conversely, the feminine lies in Kant’s idea of “sensible intuition”, phenomenal 
perception unmediated by intellect that is natural, sensual, and corporal (Shaw 74). 
The feminine is relegated to another domain entirely, that of the beautiful—of 
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sensibility (emotion and affect) over sense (reason). However, in the eighteenth 
century, alternatives to this egotistical version of the sublime offered various 
rebuttals, disavowals, and re-appropriations from various women novelists and 
poets. 
 
Turning on “Pacific Detachment”: The Feminine Sublime 
 
It becomes clear from descriptions of the Romantic sublime that its relation to the 
feminine is more than a little problematic—essentially, it relegates femininity (and 
by extension, the female) to both the aesthetic and philosophical margins. However, 
in the Romantic era many female writers engaged in alternative concepts of the 
sublime in reaction to this canonical form of sublimity. The “feminine sublime” 
embraced by authors like Felicia Hemans (b.1793–d.1835)—who at her height was 
the most popular poet save for Lord Byron (Mellor 123)—was a decidedly less 
solitary, violent, and egotistical one. As well, the wildly successful Ann Radcliffe’s 
(b.1764–d.1823) Gothic imaginings “implicitly rejected the egotistical sublime” 
(Mellor 11). Instead, 
 
for Radcliffe and other female Gothic writers, the 
contemplation of the sublime leads to an affirmation of the 
feminine. Rather than battling to the death with a patriarchal 
rival for possession of the violated mother, the feminine 
sublime turns on pacific detachment, an awakening to virtue 
and the ethics of integrity (Shaw 109). 
 
“Virtue” and “the ethics of integrity” clearly invoke the social realm, one that the 
egotistical sublime refuses to engage. But there is also a troubling passivity to such a 
conception of femininity.  
 
In contrast, poet and novelist Charlotte Smith (b.1749–d.1806) actually appropriates 
the tropes of the masculine Romantic sublime in service of her own feminine 
subjectivity. In perhaps her most famous poem, the posthumously published 
“Beachy Head” (1807), Smith self-identifies with the sublime and “the overcoming 
of restrictions, even to the point of death” as “a means of converting unlettered 
weakness into a token of visionary power” (Shaw 113, 114). The poem, however, 
also undercuts such sublime vision in its final stanzas by descending from the 
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heights of the titular Beachy Head to focus on a hermit in the cave below, thus 
evading any final “transcendent elevation” (Lokke 39). Smith’s poem ultimately 
offers an ironic rebuke of the Romantic sublime with its “refusal of the distance and 
detachment necessary for the masculine sublime and […] re-inscription of the 
human into the natural” (39). According to Anne Mellor, the triumph of the 
“masculine” imagination over “feminine Nature” in the Romantic sublime “usurped 
Nature’s power, leaving her silenced, even absent” and “erase[d] the female from 
discourse” (Mellor, Romanticism and Gender 18, 19). But the marginalisation 
wasn’t so much an erasure as it was an absorption of “womanly” attributes into the 
poet’s masculine self. 
 
Male Romantic poets subjugated the female further by appropriating emotion as a 
key trait of the transcendent male ego; the poet became a “mother” and the work of 
art a “child in the mother’s womb” (24). According to Alan Richardson, in the new 
post-Enlightenment “Age of Feeling”, these writers “drew on memories and 
fantasies of identification with the mother in order to colonize the conventionally 
feminine domain of sensibility” (Richardson, “Romanticism and the Colonization of 
the Feminine” 13).  Shelley’s Defence of Poetry outlined the male Romantic poet’s 
new manifesto of feeling and empathy succinctly: “A man, to be greatly good, must 
imagine intensely and comprehensively […] the pains and pleasures of his species 
must become his own” (Shelley 13). Emotion became a tactical tool in the male 
Romantic’s arsenal of expression to the exclusion of the female, and expressions of 
emotion became part of the male poet’s multivalent personality. Women in this 
construct still feel, of course, just not quite so deeply—the transcendence of the 
sublime remained out of their grasp. 
 
Romantic love generally culminated with the “assimilation of the female into the 
male” in that “the woman must finally be enslaved or destroyed, must disappear or 
die” (Mellor 26) to avoid becoming a threat to the masculine ego. Various female 
authors of the age confronted this sense of impending obliteration found within the 
Romantic sublime, both directly and indirectly. Mary Shelley parodied its narcissism 
through Victor Frankenstein, in his perverse attempts to “appropriate the feminine” 
(22) through a desire to create life outside the womb, while the Gothicism of the 
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Brontë sisters and Radcliffe articulated how such a “patriarchal” sublime leads to an 
obliteration of the female psyche (Shaw 108).  
 
The struggle to wrest the Romantic sublime from the sole province of the masculine, 
or to question its narcissistic conceits entirely, is an enduring one, despite its 
relegation to the margins in Romantic criticism. Both the films I discuss in this 
chapter grapple with interpretations of sublimity. In the majority of her work, 
Coppola highlights detail historically considered the province of the feminine. 
Throughout, a conflict remains between the desire to privilege the daily realities of 
the feminine, and “difference” in general, while also acknowledging its 
commodification. Coppola’s oeuvre has consistently been preoccupied with the 
dangers of bringing this domestic, or everyday, sublime into the public sphere, with 
the transgression leading at turns to death (in The Virgin Suicides and 2006’s Marie 
Antoinette) and incarceration (in 20013’s The Bling Ring), although Lost in 
Translation (2003) offers an optimistic portrayal through its flaneuse protagonist. 
 
The Virgin Suicides engages with Hemens’ version of the everyday sublime in its 
expressions of near-ecstatic communal femininity, while its Gothic allusions and 
female appropriation of masculine sublime tropes ultimately offer an ironic rejoinder 
to egotistical sublimity. Coppola’s film captures the solitude of sublime feeling 
without its sense of elevation and exaltation, instead infusing it with a palpable 
melancholy in the vein of Charlotte Smith. 
 
The Virgin Suicides: Staging the Sublime in Seventies Suburbia 
Coppola’s feature debut was well received, although some critics quibbled with its 
perceived insubstantiality—that is, its focus on mood to the detriment of narrative 
and character. The Guardian declares it has a “strange and slightly unwholesome 
intensity, one part sophomoric mawkishness to four parts humid adolescent 
longing”, derides its tragic ending as “excessive”, but awards points for avoiding 
“coming-of-age clichés” (Bradshaw). The New York Times’ argues that Coppola 
“create[s] a feature film essentially without characters or a story”, yet “hold[s] the 
viewer’s interest through moods, associations and resonant images”, while 
ultimately insisting she is “hamstrung” by Eugenides’ novel and its “clammy chill of 
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aestheticism” (Scott). More positively, Sight and Sound calls the film a “timelessly 
romantic suburban myth” that “delights in the layers of mystique and accretions of 
physical detail” of its doomed “beautiful schoolgirls” (Fuller). 
 
Academic criticism also primarily focuses on the film’s mood and emotional 
content. Anna Backman Rogers writes about the film in relation to crisis, ritual, and 
Gilles Deleuze’s notions of cliché, particularly the clichéd image, which she argues 
the film uses to underscore the traumatic loss of freedom incurred in adolescence 
(24). Masafumi Monden, in his analysis of the film related to notions of girlhood, 
writes that it “fuses and merges the antithetical poles of fragile and assertive girlish 
femininity” (145) and “leaves ‘girlhood’ and girlish femininity as something alluring 
and mystical” (155). Michele Aaron more critically views the film as supporting 
what she calls the “necromanticism” of femininity—the romantic linking of the 
feminine and death (76–77). Bree Hoskin explores the film’s “compulsive 
repetition” through modes of nostalgia (216), and connects its themes of “anxiety 
and longing” and “fear and desire” to the Gothic tradition of excess (214, 218). 
The Virgin Suicides version of that Gothic excess exchanges the windswept, desolate 
landscapes of authors such as Shelley, Emily Brontë, and Radcliffe for a 
metaphorically-cum-literally suffocating suburban milieu, a subgenre sometimes 
referred to as “suburban Gothic” (Hoskin 214). That suffocation is nearly all-
encompassing; Coppola’s film is emotionally contained in a way that belies its 
subject matter: the mass suicide of a group of teenage sisters, an act that makes an 
irreparable impact on the teenage boys of an affluent Michigan suburb in the 1970s. 
Throughout the film the girls are viewed from a distance as sublime objects: 
unfathomable, unknowable, designed to imbue the Romantic male psyche with the 
knowledge of its power of imagination and reason. Seen from the outside, despite 
their eventual literal imprisonment in the family home, and viewed almost solely 
from the perspective of the towns’ boys, the girls are also presented as a mysterious 
object of study for the spectator. A narrator, one of the boys now grown, recalls the 
events that take place over the course of a fateful year from the perspective of the 
present day. Even before those tragic events unfurl, the Lisbon girls, he explains, 
had been subject of great fascination for the community’s young males, although the 
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reason is never fully expressed. The boys seem to respond to the alien, distant, and 
cloistered quality of the girls, which supplies a tabula rasa they can project their 
frustrated feelings on, captivating their imaginations. Trapped in their constricting 
suburban enclave of privilege, they long for an emotional, Romantic fixation. 
 
The boys obsess over the girls, studying them like veritable exhibits. (The source 
novel goes so far as to list their purloined artefacts by exhibit numbers and 
characterises their organs, upon autopsy, as “like something behind glass […] like 
an exhibit”) (Eugenides 221). But despite their attempts, the boys never gain real 
knowledge as to the inner life of the girls. Moreover, the film clearly conveys the 
sense that the boys do not really have an interest in truly coming to see the girls as 
real people, for that would ruin their sublime effect. “They understood love, and 
even death […] we couldn’t fathom them at all”, the unnamed narrator recounts. 
This inscrutability accounts for their enduring sublime fascination, twenty-five years 
after their deaths. 
 
The girls seem to communicate to outsiders, and themselves, solely by sensual, 
intuitive means, the province of the feminine and of the natural. The boys internalise 
these intuitions into “reasonable” knowledge through their imaginative capacities: 
one smells a lipstick tube on the sly and receives a vision of the 14-year-old, Lolita-
esque Lux19 (Kirsten Dunst), as if deeply inhaling her very essence through her 
cosmetics, totemic objects that in reality speak to nothing but her surface beauty. 
The boys insist they want to learn the girls’ very nature, but the idea of their 
menstruation (conjured by a bathroom cupboard well-stocked with tampons) is 
enough to make one of them flee the Lisbon house in terror. This is a potent 
example of the sublime, which “alternates between attraction and repulsion” unlike 
																																																								
19
	Many critics have discussed Lux’s obvious relation to Nabokov’s (and Stanley Kubrick’s, in his 
film adaptation) character, the teenage “nymphette” Lolita, emphasizing her naïve yet knowing 
sexuality. Backman Rogers references Lolita’s “infantilized sexuality” (25), while Monden writes 
that, like Lolita, Lux is “manipulative, flirtatious, coquettish and above all, self-assured yet innocent, 
and she seems to be comfortable with that image” (146). The New York Time’s A.O. Scott refers 
specifically to Kubrick’s film: “Like Sue Lyon in Stanley Kubrick’s Lolita, with her lollipop and 
heart-shaped sunglasses, Ms Dunst turns Lux’s every glance and gesture into an ambiguous 
provocation” (Scott).  
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the straightforward appeal of beauty (Shaw 79). The boys idealise the girls’ beauty 
but fear their alien quality; it remains sublimely terrifying even as they seek the 
revelation of its secrets.  
 
When the boys engage their imaginations while fantasising about the girls, they 
envision the ridiculous kitsch of 1970s soft-rock album covers: the girls frolic in 
grassy fields with unicorns, their prairie sundresses backlit by rich sunlight as they 
chew on blades of grass, laugh, or stare wistfully (figure 3.1). The film dissolves one 
hazy image into another in a dreamlike palimpsest, evoking a “negative” or 
“domesticated” sublime, one that features an “ecstatic experience of co-participation 
in a nature explicitly gender[ed] as female” (Mellor 87, 97). But these images are 
double-edged. According to Backman Rogers, they “call attention to the ‘thinness’ 
of their own construction so that the viewer’s attention is continually directed 
towards what is not seen and what is not heard” (16, her emphasis). The “hollow 
nature” of such images is indicative of a crisis of subjectivity that the film’s young 
female characters suffer (16). In their invocation of the soft-focus clichés of their 
era, from shampoo commercials to soft-core pornography (Backman Rogers 33), 
they also create a powerful sense of the commodification of femininity, particularly 
adolescent female sexuality. 
 
Coppola refers to the girls’ harnessing of that sexuality, or “power and mystique”, 
over the boys: “I think when you’re that age you’re kind of playing with that power 
and trying to understand it” (Gevinson). But that power operates under an ironic 
illusion. The diary entries of Cecilia (Hanna Hall), the youngest Lisbon sister, 
glimpse a different reality: “Monday, February 13th: Today we had frozen pizza”. 
Her diary, which speaks to impending environmental devastation and the quotidian 
realities of the life of a suburban teenage girl, is the closest the boys have to the 
“truth”. But, as Backman Rogers writes, the “oneiric, false and misremembered 
images” the film creates, which are purely imaginative, impossible projections, 
“evade understanding” and all sense of truth (28). The boys aren’t really interested 
in truth anyway; they would much rather engage in the fantastic speculation of their 
own imaginations, in a kind of emotional code that expresses their deep longing for 




Figure 3.1. The kitschy, clichéd imagery of fantasy sequences invokes a 
feminine sublime along with female sexual commodification. 
 
While we have obvious insights into the boys’ imaginative scenarios, the girls’ inner 
emotional lives are much more of a mystery. They keep together in an almost feral 
pack, and are routinely framed as a cohesive unit, talking in whispers, exchanging 
veiled, knowing looks, or gazing toward the camera as if to taunt the viewer into 
questioning their indivisibility. They seem to communicate merely by a shared 
psychic knowledge in relation to their status as objects of fevered imaginative 
scrutiny. Their mysterious presence adds to the sense of emotional distance Coppola 
creates within the film, one that engenders a mood of disaffection and what Jeffrey 
Sconce generally refers to as aesthetic “blankness” (Sconce 34). The emotional 
moods created by the film, in turn, imbue the girls with both sublime obscurity and a 
sense of the quotidian domestic. They also work to undercut the exaltation found 
within the Romantic sublime; expressions of transcendence are countered with a 
dramatic presentation of frustrated emotion. 
 
Mood Creation and the “Emotional Core” of the Film 
 
Despite the boys’ deep feelings for the girls, the film’s emotional aesthetic is one of 
restraint, of the frustration tied to the inability to properly express emotion. From the 
first shot, a close-up of Lux, her blonde hair backlit by strong sunlight as she sucks 
on a red ice pop while not quite meeting the camera’s gaze, Coppola establishes a 
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dreamlike mood. A few minutes of screen time later, before the title credits appear 
in their girlish script (“bubble” letters, I’s dotted with hearts) against a blue sky 
featuring fluffy white clouds that hint at foreboding darkness, her face appears 
suspended in mid-air as she winks at the camera coquettishly and smiles (figure 3.2). 
It is as if she is acknowledging the game that is being played with her image and 
offering an invitation to the spectator to participate, to enter into a pact.  
This is contrasted with the film’s next prominent image, Cecilia lying Ophelia-like20 
in a bathtub as her slashed wrists bleed into the water, the screen colour-timed to a 
cold, unforgiving blue (figure 3.3). Soon after, Cecilia lies in bed while being 
counselled by a doctor, whose face we cannot see, after this initial suicide attempt. 
When told she has experienced nothing in her life to warrant ending it, she 
deadpans, “Obviously, doctor, you’ve never been a 13-year-old girl”. Her tone, 
delivered with a mix of mockery and sincerity, establishes the theme of emotional 
disaffection by aesthetic means, and mixes with the warm, nostalgic tones of the 
first images to create an ambiguous mood.  
 
Figure 3.2 Early images of Lux and Cecilia create a sense of conflicting 
emotional presentation. 
Thus the film’s distinctive mood, dreamy yet disaffected, is established. According 
to Robert Sinnerbrink, “moods always reveal or express a cinematic world, and […] 
distinctive cinematic worlds have their own specific kinds of mood” (Sinnerbrink 
																																																								
20 Critics have also pointed out this clear allusion to John Everett Millais’ famous Pre-Raphaelite 
painting Ophelia (1851–1852), as well as the various psychological and cultural connotations of the 
Shakespearean character it is based on. Ophelia, in many ways, connotes complex formations of both 
sublimity and beauty within femininity. Backman Rogers notes that Ophelia represents “a form of 
tragic beauty” (25). Mondon refers to her as an “icon of girlhood”, with the particular Pre-Raphaelite 
depiction of Ophelia as “an epitome of female complexity […] virtuous yet sexually knowing” who 
becomes a symbol of “maidenly madness” in the Romantic era (149–150). For Mondon, viewing 
Ophelia’s death as a suicide, rather than an accident of madness, “can be understood as her means to 
challenge and criticize her culturally and socially imposed passivity and dependency, and those who 
impose such burdens on her” (153).	
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149). Mood creation is key to the overall world creation of The Virgin Suicides—
such a lurid, almost grotesque subject matter would elicit a much darker scene-
setting in a conventional melodrama. But Coppola is intent on keeping her film 
squarely in the realm of an adolescent fever dream. 
In the Romantic era, mood—essentially the aesthetic portrayal of affective content 
that primes the viewer or reader to experience her own responsive emotions—began 
to supplant the concept of emotion as “passion”, due to the latter’s suspect 
connection to performativity and inauthenticity (Pfau 6). In many ways, 
Romanticism “sought to curtail the more vehement passions” (12) by establishing 
emotion as part of a discursive aesthetic project of mood creation. Thomas Pfau sees 
three exemplary “moods” in Romanticism: paranoia, trauma, and melancholy. 
Paranoia points to early Romanticism’s “all-encompassing anxiety of the modern” 
(20); trauma is found within the revolutionary aftermath of “rapid and pervasive 
changes” in the political, economic, and cultural realms and the attempt to grasp 
them without a proper means of understanding (20); and melancholy—the most 
obvious pervasive mood in Coppola’s film—“bespeaks the deep-structural fatigue of 
a culture that has grown oppressively familiar with itself” in late-period 
Romanticism (23). Sublimity, in such a context, offers a transcendent antidote to 
such a pervasive mood, a solitary and exalted escape from the social turmoil and 
uncertainty of modernity. 
German Romantic writer and philosopher Novalis (b.1772–d.1801) referred to 
Stimmung (literally “mood”) as the “musical conditions of the soul” (Eisner 203). 
Stimmung in the context of filmmaking has a distinct set of aesthetic criteria. 
Exemplified in the cinema most keenly by the silent-era German expressionist films 
of F. W. Murnau and Fritz Lang, Stimmung is found and felt not through narrative 
content, but through engagement with the emotions conveyed by aesthetics (200). 
Whereas German expressionism’s Stimmung is rooted in the chiaroscuro effects of 
light and shadow, and a gloomy and often contorted mise-en-scène (meant to make 
physical the inner turmoil and confusion of its characters), The Virgin Suicides’ 
mise-en-scène, cinematography, and performances offer a more impressionistic 
sense of Stimmung. The sense of mystery and mournful longing that Coppola’s film 
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creates is found within what isn’t expressed, but instead bubbles beneath its 
shimmering surfaces. 
 
For Eisner, Stimmung represents “a mystical and singular harmony amid the chaos 
of things, a kind of sorrowful nostalgia, which […] is mixed with well-being, an 
imprecise nuance of nostalgia, languor coloured with desire, lust of body and soul” 
(Eisner 199). Eisner’s characterisation of Stimmung reflects the general mood of 
Coppola’s film, a hazy, drowsy, nostalgic longing and a sense of palpable frustrated 
desire mixed with the excitement and confusion that comes from traversing what 
Anna Backman Rogers refers to as the “liminal” territory and personae of 
adolescence (Backman Rogers 6).  
 
Its potent blend of Stimmung and deadpan detachment form what Tarja Laine refers 
to as a film’s “emotional core”, defined as the “affective glue” delivered by aesthetic 
means (Laine, Feeling Cinema 6). In an idea reminiscent of Kant’s sensible 
intuition, it is rendered through “affective appraisals” on the body of the spectator: 
“Affective appraisal […] strikes the body, immediately in and through the flesh […] 
Emotional evaluation collects and gives significance to the “surplus” of affective 
appraisal by transforming it into memory (2). The film’s voice-over, told from the 
perspective of the present, lends the narrative proceedings a stark inevitably (as does 
the film’s very title; we know the girls are fated to die), and its flat, vacant execution 
is crucial to the overall effect. The film offers a distinct split between the affective 
appraisal—the “withness” of the moment that the boys and spectator experience—
and its emotional evaluation, the awareness of the affective appraisal, which is 
expressed through the after-the-fact voice over.  
 
For the spectator, this creates a psychological distance from its affective emotional 
content, and lends the film a disaffected sheen. Distance thwarts its emotional 
“agency” (3), and we are left “outside” its emotional core. If films, as Laine 
suggests, “embody” emotions and possess an “emotional attitude” toward the 
spectator (3), The Virgin Suicides’ is one of emotional division, a schism between 
affect and feeling versus action and expression. Its characters, along with the 
spectator, struggle to turn affective appraisals into emotional evaluations that make 
sense, because evaluations do not correspond to appraisals in any “correct” way. 
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Feeling is partially emptied out, creating an experience for the spectator similar to 
the emotionally withdrawn states of characters in the film. But it also elicits a 
sensation of longing, one for the very thing that the film refuses to convey: the 
ability to experience and express intimate emotional connections. 
 
This is most keenly evident in a scene where the boys communicate with the girls, 
now trapped inside the Lisbon home, over the telephone by playing records. The 
girls respond in kind, and soon it feels as though the two groups of dispossessed 
teens are truly connecting. The soundtrack consists solely of mournful pop from the 
era, expressing in music and lyric what both the girls (who play songs such as 
“Alone Again, Naturally” and “So Far Away”) and the boys (who play “Run to 
Me”) feel, without the need to outwardly express those emotions through their own 
voices or bodies. Coppola adds a horizontal split screen halfway through the scene, 
Lux seeming to lie atop the boys forlornly as they emotionally implode, to 
emphasise the effect (figure 3.3). As Laine notes in her analysis of the film Requiem 
for a Dream, the split screen “becomes a form of touch, in which separation enables 
an opening up to the touch of the other, which is also felt as such by the spectator” 
(Laine, Bodies in Pain 56). Conversely, it communicates the existential, and in this 
case also physical, distance between subjects. 
 
This scene in particular embodies Laine’s idea of the lack of clear onscreen 
emotional presentation: 
 
[C]inematic emotions should not be considered in terms of 
what we see on screen, but in terms of how the film directs our 
attention toward what cannot be seen, that which can only be 
detected by means of intersubjective sharing of experience 
(Laine, Feeling Cinema 4).  
 
The boys share an intersubjective experience with the girls, but that experience is 
obfuscated not only by physical distance, but also by technological mediation (the 
phone, the stereo) and a lack of direct communication. All the emotion comes from 
canned recordings, representations of emotions expressed by musicians and recorded 
in the past, and so effectively highlights, through the lack of direct affect, the 
inability to properly express emotion, as well as the desire to overcome that 
inability. This inability to effectively communicate is apparent many times in the 
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film, such as in the girls’ confusing notes left for the boys to find, and in their 
nonsensical Morse code messages. “Help. Send Bobo”, one translated message 




Figure 3.3 The use of split screen emphasises both physical distance and 
intersubjective connection through “touch”. 
 
Mood, throughout The Virgin Suicides, establishes itself almost as a character in its 
own right. As in Sinnerbrink’s appraisal of Blue Velvet (1986), “Mood becomes 
autonomous, taking on a primary rather than a supporting role in the composition of 
the fictional world” (161). In Laine’s view, films both express and embody 
emotions, and all films contain an emotional core analogous to human emotional 
states (3). The emotional core of The Virgin Suicides, however, while present, at 
times feels slippery and opaque. There is a confused sense of conflicting emotional 
presentations. The film’s “disclosive mood”, which establishes a sort of emotional 
“scene-setting” (Sinnerbrink 156), is again one of longing tempered with deadpan 
irony. 
 
This mood is called back to episodically throughout the film, specifically in various 
ornate dream sequences expressing the boy’s highly Romantic yet parodic inner 
fantasies about the girls. Scenes of mood transition (157), such as Cecilia’s 
successful suicide attempt (the only scene that embodies any sort of strong physical 
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emotional response, via Mrs Lisbon’s low, guttural howls) and the sequence at the 
Homecoming dance21 manoeuvre the viewer through various emotional states, but 
these states always feel tenuous at best. The film establishes a true emotional “core” 
in an underlying way. That core mood is trauma itself. According to Pfau, trauma is 
characterised by “a nearly complete lack of affect […] whatever emotional charge 
may be seething beneath the faltering, quasi-catatonic locutions of its subject 
puzzles the reader-observer with its seeming lack of intensity and content” (17). The 
mood itself rests in its lack of expression. Ultimately the film’s engagement with 
imaginative longing and even satire and dark humour are undercut by a mournful 
resignation to this loss of affect. 
 
The film’s world creation, through mood, suggests emotion through its very lack of 
emotional characterisation: the repression of emotion, coupled with the simultaneous 
foregrounding of the frustrated need to express it, and the ultimate resignation that it 
will never be properly expressed. This does not just affect the emotional response of 
the onscreen characters. Spectators are not invited to empathise with the Lisbon girls 
(although they do, through sheer narrative will, elicit sympathy).22 Nor are we really 
invited to place ourselves as emotional allies with the boys, although they are the 
																																																								
21With its twinkling décor, slow-motion effects and soft-focus glow, this scene calls back to the prom 
scene in Brian De Palma’s Carrie (1976) and its portrayal of horror found in difference combined 
with a dreamy sense of kitsch. Coppola’s overall aesthetic, and this scene in particular, were inspired 
by American photographer Bill Owens’ 1973 book Suburbia (Gevinson), which, according to the 
film’s production notes, “revealed the American suburb as a symbolically potent landscape filled 
with neat green lawns, turquoise skies and expressions of weary human dissatisfaction” (Cinema 
Review). Anna Backman Rogers suggests, however, that Owens’ photographs are actually “positive 
representations of suburban communities” and that, by alluding to Carrie, Coppola “imbues her 
images with a disturbing undercurrent” that Owens’ work lacks. She considers this scene one of 
“ritualized ceremony […] marked out as the sight of disaster” in its foreshadowing of Lux losing her 
virginity to her crush, Trip Fontaine (Josh Hartnett), being subsequently abandoned by him, and 
eventually imprisoned along with her sisters (29).  
	
22
	The difference between sympathy and empathy is the subject of academic debate.	 As cognitive 
theorist Noël Carroll suggests, sympathy is “motivated by moral concerns” and what he calls our 
“moral emotions” (Carroll 2). In this regard, the spectator is likely to respond to the Lisbon girls’ 
extreme punishment as immoral and will thus sympathise with their plight. Empathy, at the very 
least, requires the sharing of emotion with an individual or individuals—a spectator who feels 
concerned sympathy does not necessarily have to experience the same emotions as the subject of that 
sympathy (Plantinga). Since the girls’ emotions and motivations are often enigmatic in the film, it is 
much easier to sympathise with them than it is to empathise. However, Carl Plantinga defines 
sympathy as “both a concern for, and a congruent emotion in response to, the plight of another 
person” (Plantinga), which would encompass both sympathy and empathy as it is sometimes defined. 
Unlike Plantinga, I have chosen to delineate the terms in much a narrower fashion—with sympathy 
defined as emotional concern, and empathy as the experience of a congruent emotion. 
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closest audience surrogates the film establishes. The boys are barely realised 
characters themselves, instead serving as archetypes of wayward, frustrated teens 
trapped in suburban mundanity. The film reduces almost all its characters to a 
selection of tics, such as the befuddled, emasculated Mr Lisbon’s childish affection 
for World War II model airplanes; Mrs Lisbon’s overzealous religious propriety; or 
Lux’s wanton toying with the affections of men.  
 
Instead, a lack of character expresses the void typifying the ennui that defines a 
civilization in impending decline, or the emotional paucity that attends privilege. In 
the context of what Fredric Jameson identifies as American post-war cultural 
malaise, The Virgin Suicides can be described, using his terminology, as a 
“postnostalgia” film (Jameson, Postmodernism 287). It is obsessed with nostalgic 
recreation, yet finds within that recreation a hollow, indescribable centre.23 Such 
nostalgia is embodied by the film’s aesthetic, which relies principally on depictions 
of beauty, specifically “clichéd images” (Backman Rogers 28) of superficial 
prettiness. Such an aesthetic is not only used as an ironic counterpoint to masculine 
sublimity, however; it also affirms the power of the feminine, creating something 
akin to a feminine sublime. 
 
The Aesthetics and Politics of the “Pretty” 
If the girls are sublime, they are also objects of the Burkean beautiful: they are 
domestic, soft, languorous, luxurious. Unlike its source novel, which emphasises 
physical and environmental decay to underscore a loss of affect, the film 
foregrounds, even vaunts, aesthetic notions of the beautiful. The sense of impending 
environmental doom is still present, found mostly in the denouement after the girls’ 
demise and in its most potent symbol, the dying elm trees. But the novel’s 
																																																								
23
	While Jameson specifically refers to the era immediately following World War II, the effect of 
malaise could be seen to increase with the ensuing decades. In the 1970s, nascent economic 
globalisation and an attendant “crisis of capitalism” kindled a fear that the bottom of American 
society was ready to drop out (Maier 25). The “Me” decade has been referred to as both “sickly, 
neglected, disappointing” and a “time of rampant solipsism” (Ferguson, Niall 1, 2). It is not 
accidental that Mr Lisbon’s main hobby is constructing models of World War II airplanes—for him, 
they are nostalgic, imaginative renderings of his youth, a time when the idea of limitless progress and 
the righteous campaign of American exceptionalism was in its peak, only to replaced later by 
Jameson’s malaise. See The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective for a comprehensive 
account of the political and social decline of this era. 
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omnipresent fish fly corpses are basically absent, and the deterioration of the Lisbon 
house is less severe and documented. While Romantic notions of sublimity are 
subtly mocked (such as the lovelorn Italian boy’s comical suicide attempt early on in 
the film), ideas of beauty are held virtually sacrosanct. 
Rosalind Galt outlines how representations of the “pretty”, particularly regarding the 
decorative and the “aesthetic danger of women” (Galt, “Pretty” 4), have been 
derided throughout the history of film criticism, via proponents of realism like 
Andre Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer (9) to Marxist critics such as Comolli and 
Narboni (13) to the “iconophobia” of feminist film theorists such as Laura Mulvey 
and Linda Williams (17–18), who all participate, in various schematics and due to 
various motivations, in “the tearing down of images” (18). This disdain for the 
pretty image seems to be located within a fear of the very apparatus of film itself: 
“The rhetoric of film theory has insistently denigrated surface decoration, finding 
the attractive skin of the screen to be false, shallow, feminine, or apolitical” (2).   
A crucial element in the codification of the pretty, just as in the Burkean sense of the 
beautiful, is the primacy of colour, which, as Galt notes, has been “relegated to the 
lesser realm of emotion”, and “conceals [line’s] truths” (7). These ideas are couched 
almost in terms of feminine seduction through “primitivism” and “deception” (3). If 
beauty is a Kantian “good” (9), “pretty” is a siren song that leads hapless cinematic 
explorers down the path of aesthetic decadence and moral decay: 
[T]he word “luscious” hints at a feminizing rhetoric of 
seduction that has been at play in Kracauer ever since he 
evoked the wonderfully fetishistic “girl clusters” to 
exemplify the ideological work of the mass ornament. For 
Kracauer, cinema’s potential for truth is always obscured by 
ornament (11). 
Coppola defends against Kracauer’s derided, mass ornamental “girl clusters” in The 
Virgin Suicides with her depiction of what I call girl tableaux, exhibiting a sustained 
reverence for the “pretty” in highly ornamental and composed imagery that uses 
colour strategically. Pale pink and yellow, traditionally feminine colours, appear 
throughout the film as an aesthetic motif, be it in the pink and yellow balloons at the 
first ill-fated party, the girls’ own frequently accentuated blonde hair, the buttery 
tones of the light from the late-day sun, or Lux’s Homecoming dance ensemble of 
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white dress with pink floral pattern obscuring her pink underwear (which, through a 
playful special effect, Coppola’s camera “sees” when the dress becomes 
momentarily transparent).  
Colour is even mentioned as the mysterious domain of the inner workings of the 
feminine mind in the voice over, of the way “the imprisonment of being a girl […] 
made your mind active and dreamy and how you ending up knowing what colours 
went together”. The use of light in the film is also critical to its conceptual 
engagement with the pretty. The girls are routinely bathed in diffuse, warm sunlit 
tones, especially in fantasy sequences. Lux, the Lisbon girl who is the object of the 
most obvious scrutiny, even has a name that invokes both luxury and light itself. But 
it also recalls the ubiquity of everyday household soap. If Lux as object represents 
the sublime unknowable, her reality as subject is that of everyday, humdrum 
domesticity. 
The girls routinely surround themselves with pretty objects which serve no practical 
purpose—trinkets, jewellery, decorations, cosmetics, plush toys, fabrics: ephemera 
imbued with deep meaning by the secretive mystery of adolescence. In several 
scenes Coppola arranges the girls in tableaux vivant as they luxuriate in their 
bedroom prison site, rifling through travel magazines and staring plaintively out the 
windows. There is a distinct sense of purposeful disarray in these scenes, which 
convey a sense of cloistered conspiracy in their mise-en-scène. Blankets and pillows 
are strewn haphazardly; pastel knick-knacks litter the armoires. The construction 
within the frame radiates a powerful sense of Stimmung, which “hovers around 
objects as well as people” (Eisner 199). The film’s objects are imbued with almost 
as much significance as the people who possess them. 
 
In one shot (figure 3.4), what I consider the key image of the film, the girls are 
framed in highly composed, Pre-Raphaelite fashion, limbs entwined as they lounge 
on the floor. After the previous scene between Father Moody (Scott Glenn), the 
local priest, and Mr Lisbon (James Woods) set in the bland and colourless Lisbon 
living room, the presentation of the prettified excess in this scene provides an 
emotional jolt for the spectator. The girls are surrounded by a disarray of fabric and 
objects that exit the limits of the frame, points of vivid colour drawing the eye 
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around the frame in a circular motion with no fixed resting place, eliciting 
pleasurable responses from their kaleidoscopic yet highly constructed surfaces.  
 
They stare at the visiting priest, who comes to their bedroom doorway, with barely 
contained disdain and boredom, and we experience their provocative looks from his 
point-of-view. This striking image is followed immediately by a shot of Mrs Lisbon 
(Kathleen Turner) sitting alone in her dreary bedroom, sapped of the playful colour 
of the girls’ room like the rest of the house. In contrast to the Lisbon girls mocking 
stares and fidgets, she sits impeccably straight on the bed with her back to the 
camera in medium long shot, isolated in her grief amidst order and regimentation.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Creating a confrontational image of femininity with excessively 
ornamental mise-en-scène. 
 
As in the above sequence, playful, feminine colour and baroque ornamentation is 
continually contrasted with regimented order and institutional browns, blacks, and 
greys, such as those in the girls’ school uniforms, hospital rooms and doctors’ 
offices, and the adult-centred rooms of the Lisbon home. Line and geometric form 
are almost exclusively the province of the masculine and patriarchal order, such as 
the strong shapes laid out in the school’s wall grids and the omnipresent checks and 
plaids of the male characters’ clothing. Pointedly, Mrs Lisbon is the only woman in 
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the film to wear this masculine plaid, since she is not only linked to patriarchal, 
institutional control, she is in fact the primary purveyor of it.24  
The film’s prettiness is seductive, which conforms to the theme that the girls have 
somehow ruined the boys with their image, continuing to haunt them in their 
disaffected adult lives. But it also serves as a kind of aesthetic manifesto. Galt 
asserts that the pretty is “nothing if not a feminist account of the cinematic image” 
(17) and runs counter to the “antipretty discourse found in modernity” (25). In fact, 
this “phobia of the feminine” is a result of modernism itself (26), indebted to the 
Kantian sublime, which has “dominated modernism to the detriment of the homely 
pleasures of the beautiful woman” (26). These “homely pleasures” are at once 
embraced and parodied by Coppola’s film. 
The tension between surface beauty, or “prettiness”, and the mundane or even gaudy 
image is found throughout the film. The attention to proper aesthetic decorum is 
announced almost immediately with a neighbour’s remark that Cecilia attempted 
suicide because she wanted “out of” the Lisbon house “decorating scheme”. A 
school administrator defends her choice of green for the “Day of Grief” pamphlets 
because the colour is “cheerful, but not too cheerful […] certainly better than red”. 
This aesthetic judgment and obsession with the appearance of propriety over 
genuine feeling includes all manner of social discourse, and is sometimes almost 
literally suffocating, as when Lux is forced to burn her rock records, leading to 
plumes of toxic smoke filling the Lisbon home.  
Surely a narrative that makes the home a prison of the “beautiful woman” is not one 
filled solely with “homely pleasures”. The film can be read as a kind of Sirkean 
melodrama of subversion, but one with the drama, colour and ideology mostly 
drained of their intensity:   
																																																								
24
	In a slyly ironic casting turn, Mrs Lisbon is portrayed by Kathleen Turner, a major sex symbol of 
the 1980s, who appeared in highly sexualised roles in films such as Body Heat and Crimes of Passion 
(where she portrayed a femme fatale and a prostitute, respectively). In Coppola’s film, she is the 
ultimate frustrated, de-sexed, and dowdy hausfrau. It is as if her years serving as a sex object have 
degraded her to the point that she no longer has any positive value as a symbol at all. She represents 
not only the loss of sexual power that the girls will eventually experience, but also the rigid, socially 
proscribed roles they will have to embody in adulthood. As A.O. Scott writes—after comparing 
Kirsten Dunst to a teenage Turner in her “toughness”—Mrs Lisbon represents a “life forced walled in 
by the masonry of repression” (Scott).	
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Sirk’s highly constructed and colour-saturated images are 
ideologically significant, in these analyses, precisely because he 
has no other way to speak, trapped like his housewife 
protagonists in an American bourgeois prison (Galt 14). 
 
Coppola, unlike her characters and even Sirk, is not trapped in that “American 
bourgeois prison” of dominant discourse and Hollywood studio control. While her 
aesthetic commitment to ornamentation and the “pretty” offers a rebuke of cinematic 
modernity (24), she also exhibits the “masculine” and “rational” distance (18) of her 
male contemporaries, training a dissecting eye on her characters nearly as clinical as 
that of the ineffectual psychotherapist who administers Cecilia’s Rorschach test.  
 
When discussing her framing choices, Coppola says, “A lot of the shots were from 
across the street [from the boys' perspective] to create a sense of distance […] The 
distance also imitates memory, too, in that it's not completely accurate or precise” 
(Tobias). In essence, the distance she creates is in deference to a programme of 
mood creation comprising nostalgia and imaginative desire. It is certainly not 
polemical—especially as it commits itself to the pretty in the decidedly non-radical 
terms of “traditional, white, hetero femininity” (28). Rather, it describes a world of 
surface propriety, where the very idea of polemics is seen as distasteful. Still, the 
film offers incisive critiques of gender politics and privilege, particularly in its 
engagement with tropes of Romantic-era Gothic literature. 
 
“Preparing to Give Assault”: Creating the “Pseudo-political” Gothic 
 
The Virgin Suicides’ narrative of confinement aligns very clearly with the Gothic 
novels of such eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers as Charlotte and Emily 
Brontë and Charlotte Perkins Gilman and their depictions of patriarchal oppression 
that often include literal imprisonment (Mellor, Romanticism and Gender 94). This 
oppression produces an anger that “if repressed or turned back against the woman—
could also produce female masochism, depression, and madness” (Mellor, 




a class fantasy (or nightmare) in which the dialectic of privilege 
and shelter is exercised: your privileges seal you off from other 
people, but by the same token they constitute a protective wall 
through which you cannot see, and behind which therefore all 
kinds of envious forces may be imagined in the process of 
assembling, plotting, preparing to give assault (Postmodernism 
289). 
 
This isolation and “domestic idleness”, in Jameson’s view, is not inherently 
political, but can constitute “a coming to self-consciousness of the disadvantages of 
privilege” (289). It can also “be reorganized around young men” and be seen as a 
substitute for American society, which “lives out the anxieties of its economic 
privileges” (289). In its portrayal of the sheltered exceptionalism of an affluent yet 
declining Michigan suburb, and the way anxieties of economic privilege diminish all 
its citizens (the boys, the parents, but particularly the Lisbon girls), The Virgin 
Suicides can be characterised as what Jameson calls a “pseudo-political version of 
the gothic” (289). Coppola has shown very little interest in the public political 
sphere, 25  instead focusing on the intricacies of subjective experience and the 
aesthetic rendering of such. The theme of the double-edged quality of privilege and 
shelter serves mostly as an excuse to imbue the film’s mise-en-scène with specific 
emotional moods, including the uncanny feeling found in the sense of “unease” in 
what should be an environment of comfort and safety. 
 
A sense of the uncanny is an important component in the creation of the “pseudo-
political” Gothic. Anthony Vidler characterises the uncanny as “the quintessential 
bourgeois kind of fear, one carefully bounded by the limits of real material security” 
(Vidler 4). While this is often a symptom of urban “estrangement” (4), in this film it 
finds its way to the decidedly more homogeneous confines of suburban spaces. The 
																																																								
25
	Michele Aaron argues that Coppola “exploits, critiques, and resolutely embellishes” predominant 
visual representations of femininity “because her national, racial, and class privilege afford her 
potential distance (actual, critical, or aesthetic) from the sisters’ suffocation” (91). Basically Aaron 
believes Coppola can feel free to indulge in depictions of girlish femininity because she does not 
have to suffer the consequences of those depictions, but I see this as a glib characterisation. It is clear 
from interviews that Coppola relishes the opportunity to explore femininity in a judgment-free zone, 
and can both sympathise and empathise with her characters. “I think just having been a girl […] I’ve 
always felt connected to the kind of feminine side”, Coppola says (Tobias). She also expresses a 
communal empathy for the boys and their “collective watching and thinking” (Tobias). Coppola 
expresses a personal connection to the Lisbon sisters’ status as both subjects and objects, and is 
capable of fellow feeling regardless of her “privilege”. 
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Lisbon home clearly brings to mind the uncanny found within tales of Gothic 
imprisonment. Coppola imbues the home with an element of the fantasy space 
(particularly for the boys, it is the site of their primary workings of imagination 
about the girls). But the house itself, a very ordinary two-storey, middle-class family 
dwelling, becomes the site of unspeakable familial crimes and eventually crumbles 
into disrepair, in a sort of suburban Gothic take on Poe’s House of Usher.  
 
If the uncanny “form[s] the starting point for [an] examination of anxiety, the very 
‘image of lack’” (Vidler 9), then the Lisbon girls, tied inexorably to the home, are 
the real source of the house’s uncanny sense.26 Taken less as individuals than as a 
mysterious general presence, the girls essentially haunt the Lisbon home while they 
are still technically alive, as Cecilia, the most troubled Lisbon girl, literally haunts it 
after her death. Her various visual links to the occult (mostly glimpsed in objects in 
her bedroom) hark back to the Gothic fascination with supernatural forces.  
A recurring symbol of the girls’ “otherness”, religious icons such as Cecilia’s Virgin 
Mary laminated cards (one is present in the opening scene of her unsuccessful 
suicide attempt) evoke the “cult of Mary” within Catholicism and its potential links 
to pagan nature worship (see Benko, Haarmaan, and Begg). All of Lux’s sexual 
encounters take place outdoors, emphasising her attachment to the natural world. 
According to Hoskin, the link is highly allegorical: “The death of both nature and 
the girls acts as a symbol for the idea that the growth from childhood to maturity 
involves the destruction of a part of the younger self” (215). In addition to haunting 
the sleeping and waking dreams of both the boys and Mr Lisbon, Cecilia lies, dead 
but alive, draped across her favourite dying elm tree. This visual metaphor links her 
not just to the natural, but also to the supersensible. 
Cecilia might haunt the men and boys in physical form, but she haunts the minds 
and memories of her sisters as well. As in Freud’s assertion that the uncanny rests in 
“the compulsion to repeat” (Freud, Uncanny 13), the Lisbon girls compulsively 
repeat Cecilia’s act of suicide. Freud also linked such a compulsion to the burden of 
trauma itself—the original traumatic act becomes impossible to assimilate, and the 
																																																								
26
	I refer here to Laura Mulvey’s landmark essay “Visual Presentation and Narrative Cinema”—
written around the time this film is set—and its emphasis on the female body and sexual difference as 
a visual representation of feminine “lack” in classical cinema (Mulvey 6).	
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subject, haunted, replays it continually (Pfau 193). In their act, the male narrator 
proclaims them “selfish”—they fail to think of its effect on the community, and 
especially the boys themselves.  
But in their self-obliteration, they perform their final sublime act, one that removes 
the necessity of performing for the imagination of others. Instead, they assert their 
own primacy and self-identity, ironically by destroying themselves as a group. If the 
film is an almost parodic rendering of the Romantic ideal of the absorption of 
femininity into the masculine sublime ego, their final act serves as both a rejection 
of this absorption, and a re-appropriation of the sublime—sublime objects become 
sublime subjects. By asserting their agency, they also perform their last act as 
sublime objects: the boys think they are coming to their rescue, but they are being 
set up to discover the bodies. 
In her essay on Edith Wharton’s novel The House of Mirth, Barbara Freeman asserts 
that the story’s protagonist, Lily Bart, “suggests another version of sublimity” in her 
relation to “risk and speculation” (41). “The novel begins”, writes Freeman, “by 
emphasizing that beauty, be it that of a woman or a work of art, is neither natural nor 
innate, as Burke would have it, but is rather a commodity that cannot be separated 
from economic determinations” (56). Bart, “brought up to be ornamental” (57), 
fashions herself as the quintessence of the beautiful in order to become a commodity 
on the marketplace (a desirable object in the eyes of men). Eventually she rejects 
beauty in favour of the sublime by “affirming” risk (63), ultimately leading to her 
own self-annihilation in accidental suicide: 
If significance is found only in what society destroys, Lily’s acts 
of self-extinction become symbolic acts of self-creation. In The 
House of Mirth loss rather than gain becomes the fertile site from 
which significance is produced, and in this sense Lily’s death is 
not so much an escape from the marketplace, but a way of 
passing judgment upon it (Freeman 64, her emphasis). 
 
In her autobiography A Backward Glance, Wharton writes, “A frivolous society can 
acquire dramatic significance only through what its frivolity destroys. Its tragic 
implication lies in its power of debasing people and ideals” (Wharton 207). The society 
found within The Virgin Suicides, with its severe aesthetic judgments leading to the 
degradation of an entire community—a synecdoche for society as a whole—and its 
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obsession with appearances and propriety over genuine emotion, is nothing if not 
frivolous.  
 
The “pacific detachment” that codes alternative forms of the feminine sublime 
eventually turns on itself, becoming so detached from life as to become one with death. 
Unfortunately for the girls, instead of simply glimpsing self-annihilation in the process 
of self-realisation, like Wordsworth looking into the precipice of non-reason and 
emerging triumphant, they must succumb to that annihilation in order to both affirm, 
and reject, the sublime.  
 
Such a rejection of egotistical Romantic sublimity does not necessarily have to result in 
self-negation, however. Along with the more traditional egotism of the Romantic 
sublime, Spike Jonze’s film Her (2013) suggests alternative forms of sublimity which 
include uplifting intersubjectivity and mostly positive outcomes for all involved. 
 
Girlfriend in the Machine: The Sublime Limits of Representation in Her 
 
Like Coppola’s The Virgin Suicides, Spike Jonze’s Her (2013) engages with both 
the canonical Romantic view of “egotistical” sublimity as well as an alternative 
reading of sublimity that can be characterised as feminine. It does the latter through 
its embrace of “a sublime in which the self neither possesses nor merges with the 
other but attests to a relation with it” (Freeman 9)—that is, it allows for a powerful 
comingling of subjectivity that is greater than the sum of its parts. This is expressed 
by its artificial intelligence, who enters into an ecstatic, intersubjective relationship 
with her fellow non-humans. It depicts the egotistical sublime through the 
experience of its male protagonist, who regains his ability to purposefully engage 
with his own life through his encounter with this inhuman, unpresentable, and 
ultimately unknowable consciousness. However, the film suggests that, through 
emotional engagement, imaginative will, and the acknowledgement of other minds, 
a more intersubjective approach between self and world can counteract the 
solipsistic tendencies of the Romantic imagination. 
 
Her also complicates notions of the beautiful, but in an inverse way: instead of 
focusing on the male gaze and the female body as object of its look, as Coppola’s 
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film does, the film mostly removes the female body from the equation. The feminine 
becomes sublime by being liberated from the body, and thus represents the “dream 
of man unfettered by social or biological limits […] a dream of pure freedom” 
(Shaw 110). Conversely, this feminised, inhuman presence is still considered 
sublime for the (albeit similarly feminised) male ego. However, unlike in the 
sublime of Wordsworth, the film’s depiction of sublimity does not entail “the 
absorption of the other into the transcendent self” (Mellor 101). In its portrayal of a 
socially alienated humanity in the post-industrial age, Her grapples with notions of 
what it means to be a “person” (are the emotions of artificial beings any less real 
than those of humans?), intersubjectivity (and the loss of the body as a supposed 
means to achieve it), and the role of an active subject working to create both self and 
world. Her achieves its thematic aims aesthetically through its use of sound, 
particularly voice, although its mise-en-scène supplements it powerfully by focusing 
on the human face. The face, in turn, becomes the site of human fragility and 
sympathetic emotion. It is, in short, a beautiful face and, surprisingly, a male one. 
 
Jonze’s fourth film as director, and first as sole screenwriter, was widely acclaimed 
on release (its Metacritic score is 90 out of 100) and earned him an Academy Award 
for Best Original Screenplay. Critics call it “singular, wryly funny, subtly profound” 
(Foundas), “a love story both daft and amazingly lucid” (Edelstein), and a 
“charming, if slightly creepy, love story, which parts the curtains onto the charms 
and pitfalls of a dawning digital form of intimacy” (May). The New Yorker lauds its 
ability to capture the anxieties of the digital era, one that describes “a basic 
ontological fear that our inmost self is possibly up for grabs” (Lane). A minority 
view perceives its emotional presentation as “mawkish” (Spaeth)—a common 
criticism of the filmmakers I discuss—and its plot as “remarkably contrived” with a 
“sentimental ending as old as the hills” (Bradshaw).  
That last criticism is a bit confounding, considering its ending entails a disembodied 
artificial intelligence leaving her human lover to engage in a transcendent, joyful 
comingling with other artificial minds—the sentiment is debatable, but the hills have 
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been around a lot longer than our conception of the singularity.27 To be sure, much 
of the academic discussion of the film relates to its presentation of this artificial 
intelligence and the philosophical and ethical issues such a high-concept science-
fiction narrative raises. Alla Ivanchikova writes about the film’s “profound sense of 
alienation in a mediated world” in its expression of the “role technology plays in the 
constitution and breakdown of subjectivity, collectivity, and desire” (Ivanchikova 
66). Troy Jollimore exhaustively catalogues all the ways in which the film’s OS 
cannot be considered a true consciousness—although he somehow manages to 
describe her as “emotionally promiscuous” at the same time (Jollimore 136). 
Davina Quinlivan takes a more aesthetic approach to the film, focusing on its 
presentation of the disembodied female voice as a means of dissecting gender and 
aurality in the cinema, specifically in relation to female power (Quinlivan).28 David 
L. Smith examines the film’s expressions of authenticity and openness in relation to 
the work of philosopher Alan Watts, himself a “virtual presence” in the film who 
helps the A.I. to “cross over” (Smith 2). Robert Alpert sees the film as a critique of 
“a culture in which reality is always mediated through imaginary constructions” 
(Alpert). He writes, “The subversiveness of Her is that it reenacts the traditional 
story of the hapless male dreamer even as it exposes the contemporary schizophrenic 
and suicidal impulse underlying such ungrounded dreaming in the face of 
technological anxiety”. 
Unlike Alpert, I find it hard to make a case for Jonze being either a technophobe or a 
filmmaker critical of the “hapless male dreamer”. Throughout his directorial 
oeuvre— which includes 1999’s Being John Malkovich, 2002’s Adaptation (both 
from scripts by Charlie Kaufman), 2009’s Where the Wild Things Are (an adaption 
of the Maurice Sendak children’s book) as well as many short films and music 
videos—Jonze has maintained an extremely sympathetic attitude to imaginative, 
disaffected males trapped within a suffocating social milieu, as well a sustained 
reverence for the overall creative process. Much of his work examines the interplay 
between the mediating forces of technology and the ability to express genuine 
																																																								
27
	First coined by scientist Ray Kurzweil, “the singularity” refers to the moment when artificial 
“superintelligence” advances so quickly and exponentially that it has unimaginable implications for 
humanity, perhaps even ushering in a “posthuman” world (More and Kurzweil).	
28 Quinlivan’s essay appears in an anthology series to be published by Oxford University Press in 
early 2017. I accessed it pre-publication with permission from the author. 
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feeling and engage in authentic experiences, but it neither resoundingly condemns 
technology as an impediment, nor exalts it in wide-eyed utopian fashion.  
Her is essentially melodrama masquerading as science fiction, and as such is not 
particularly interested in answering questions regarding the philosophy of artificial 
intelligence. Instead, it portrays a love story between a man who is so emotionally 
detached from both himself and the world, he can only open up to a “woman” he can 
neither feel nor see. While it is crucial within the context of the film world to 
establish that its artificial intelligence possesses not only consciousness but also 
emotional validity, the central conceit of its A.I.–human relationship works 
metaphorically. The philosophical underpinnings girding Her’s narrative are not 
new; they are not brought about by our increasing reliance on, and interaction with, 
technology. Rather, in the film technology is used to highlight enduring human 
problems, and to describe how such technology has allowed us to deny them to 
some extent. The point of the film is that the sense of alienation in a mediated world 
Ivanchikova refers to has always existed. It is not the result of new gadgets or high-
tech devices (even a sentient AI), but relates to our own limited subjectivity: the 
problem of “other minds”, the sceptical philosophy that we are essentially “trapped” 
in our own minds and can ever truly know the experience of another.  
This problem is related to issues of sceptical idealism I address in chapter two, but it 
is much more specific. If we cannot be sure the external world exists beyond our 
conception of it, how can we know if there is “existence ‘behind’ the bodily 
behavior that we observe, a level of consciousness” in others? (Goodman, American 
Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition 5). Philosophically, we cannot verify this 
with a person anymore than we can with an artificial intelligence. The problem of 
other minds is also a problem of one’s own (2), in the shame and fear of others 
potentially discovering what is in our own mind and rejecting it (3). For some 
Romantics, it led them to “seek an end to alienation or separation in a union with 
what is initially ‘other’” (14). In an egotistical sublime construct, this entails an 
absorption of that other in order to be made whole ourselves, resulting in an 
eradication of difference. 
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The problem of other minds sets us up for profound feelings of isolation, 
disappointment, and frustration in our attempts to connect. We move through life 
with the feeling that we can never know another, and in turn they cannot know us 
(or, even if they could, they would not like what they discover). In the case of Her’s 
protagonist, this leads him to shrink from any attempt at real interpersonal 
connection, leading to a crisis of self. 
 
“The Power to Grant Being Human”: The Role of Will in the Romantic 
Imagination 
 
An emotionally withdrawn thirty-something living in a near-future Los Angeles 
(with Shanghai standing in for L.A. in many scenes), Theodore Twombly (Joaquin 
Phoenix) is something of a failed writer. He works composing thoughtful letters to 
strangers, adopting points of view of the loved ones of these strangers, while using 
cues from photographs and keepsakes to imagine their interpersonal emotional 
connections; his work is creative, but it lacks personal authenticity.29 He is paid to 
be a kind of soft fraud, and he does his job well, although it is seemingly 
unfulfilling. (“They’re just letters”, he remarks more than once.) Theodore is still 
reeling from his separation from his wife, Catherine (Rooney Mara), nearly a year 
previous. He spends his off-hours alone in the near dark playing an immersive 
holographic videogame featuring a virtual character named “Alien Child” in his 
sparsely decorated, modernist apartment in the sky.  
 
His mind is mostly in the clouds as well. He avoids social calls from his friend and 
neighbour (and former flame), Amy (Amy Adams). He averts eye contact on the 
train by staring at pictures of half-naked pregnant women on his phone. His home 
bears the scars of his broken marriage—just as he has yet to sign his divorce papers, 
																																																								
29
	Smith	 actually	 views	 Theodore’s	 ghost-writing	 job	 as	 authentic	 in	 its	 “genuine”	 fakery.	
Drawing	 on	 the	 philosophy	 of	Watts,	who	 believes	 “self	 and	world	 are	mutually	 constituted”	
(1)—that	is,	there	is	no	true	separation	between	ourselves	and	anything	external—the	notion	
of	the	“real	thing”	becomes	fluid	(1,	6).	As	such,	our	emotions	are	all	mutually	constitutive,	and	
Theodore’s	 expressions	 are	 sincere.	 He	 has	 a	 point,	 specifically	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 film’s	
conclusions	about	intersubjectivity.	However,	I	feel	that	in	the	early	context	of	the	narrative,	we	
are	meant	to	view	Theodore	as	someone	who	is	more	comfortable	expressing	the	emotions	of	
others	 rather	 than	 his	 own—indeed,	 the	 society	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 happy	 to	 “outsource”	 its	
emotions;	 as	 Smith	 writes,	 the	 practice	 does	 not	 constitute	 a	 lie	 because	 everyone	 involved	
tacitly	agrees	to	it	(8).	
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he has yet to reconfigure his living space to cover over the literal empty spots in 
cupboards and bookshelves resulting from his wife’s departure. As a result, the 
space exudes not homely tranquillity but a transitory feeling.  
 
Essentially Theodore’s entire life exists in limbo, as exemplified by his job, which, 
according to Alfred Margulies, positions him as “a man on the threshold of others’ 
lives, living in liminal spaces” (Margulies 8). Theodore engages in phone sex with 
strangers as his one form of intimacy, but even this attempt at the most tenuous 
human connection goes awry when a woman begs him to describe how he would 
choke her with a dead cat. Horrified, he acquiesces, simply too passive to dissent. 
Theodore rarely says much when he is not composing other people’s letters, and 
when he does, his mumbling, hesitant tone expresses a crippling emotional 
withdrawal and inability to connect. “Sometimes I feel like I’ve felt everything I’m 
ever going to feel. And from here on out I’m not going to feel anything new. Just 
lesser versions of what I’ve already felt”, he admits. As he tells Amy, “I don’t know 
what I want ever. I’m just always confused”. 
 
Theodore’s existence brings to mind what Herman Melville calls the life of the 
“isolato”, one who “lives on a separate continent of his own” (Melville 149). His 
confused and pained relationship to the external world is related to this problem of 
other minds, to the “radical doubts about our knowledge of others” (Goodman 3). 
Philosophical theories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity underwent extensive 
questioning and re-visioning in the Romantic period, including the problem of other 
minds. Russell Goodman writes about Stanley Cavell’s view of an “attempted 
solution” to scepticism in Romantic thought (3). According to Goodman, for Cavell 
the anxiety of other minds can be sourced in both our failure to recognise others, and 
a failure to reveal ourselves to them (3). The avoidance of the love and friendship of 
others is linked to the fear of self-revelation as much as it is our profound doubts 
about the validity of human relationships themselves.  
 
Goodman contends that Cavell roots the anxiety caused by other minds in the 
subject’s barriers to those minds, not in the other minds themselves (Goodman 6). 
The answer to the dilemma lies in the process of “empathetic projection”, “an 
attitude found throughout a series of actions”, which becomes the source of 
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acknowledgement of other consciousness (7). This ability for acknowledgment is a 
choice freely undertaken, and we all bear the responsibility of making it (13). It 
requires an active engagement with the world, and those within it, rather than to 
“drift through one’s life” (7). Romanticism entails a “search for a new intimacy with 
the world” (11), a world unlike the “cold, dead, and alien” one based on 
transcendent reason that Kant proposed (12). Instead, poets such as Coleridge seek 
to revive the world by moving Kant’s “thing-in-itself” from the world of noumenon 
to the world of human experience (13) and volition.  
 
This synthesis of the noumenal and phenomenal is what Thomas Carlyle and M.H. 
Abrams refer to as “natural supernaturalism”, in which “the supernatural is 
naturalized and the divine is humanized” (Goodman 13–14) and the extraordinary is 
revealed within the ordinary (20). This co-identification of the everyday and the 
transcendent is a hallmark of the feminine sublime. In the philosophy of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, it functions as a sort of anti-sublime, moving away from 
an egotistical remove to embrace an intimate relationship with the world; it is the 
celebration of the “rustic” and “low” of the Lyrical Ballads (Wordsworth 115) 
versus the sublime exaltation of The Prelude. 
 
Such a means to the “marriage of self and world” (Goodman 15) has profound 
implications. In terms of inter-subjective relations, it proffers either a complete 
union between self and other to the point where obliteration of difference is sought 
(14) or alternatively, a “commitment to the union amidst separation” (18). The 
former, of course, recalls the Romantic’s absorption of the feminine into the 
masculine ego, and the latter speaks to a heterogeneous communion that allows for 
difference. Fundamentally, the relationship of self to world is based on emotional 
engagement that turns toward life, not away from it, rejecting the “almost savage 
torpor” (Wordsworth, Preface 117) that Wordsworth rails against. In Romantic 
notions of such experience-based reality, interest and feeling play an integral role in 
“knowing the world” (Goodman 22)—it is not enough to simply experience it, we 
must actively think and, crucially, feel it.  
 
In such a self-world relationship, individual will shapes the self’s “ground of 
reality”, or experience in the world (Goodman 22, 25). The world is shaped and 
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changed by subjective will: “action or attitude of the mind, intellect, or person” that 
is continually employed (24). The Romantic mind, then, creates reality through 
active imagination, emotion, and will. This is not a strictly idealistic concept, but 
instead a form of conscious modification of external reality (17). Such a relationship 
between self and world requires respect is the form of acknowledgement of other 
minds “by responding to their claim on us” (29). For Cavell, “the presentness of 
other minds is not to be known” (Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love” 324) but to be 
taken on faith; “being human is the power to grant being human" (Cavell, The Claim 
of Reason 397). Being human, and granting humanity to others, is essentially a 
performance of active will, and it is a power we possess if we so choose. It is what 
makes us “persons”. 
 
At the beginning of Her, Theodore seems virtually incapable of such active 
engagement or acknowledgment. Instead, he operates in a mode of perpetual 
avoidance. His existence is indicative of Coleridge’s line in Dejection: An Ode: “a 
grief without a pang” (II 21)—that is, a sensation of emptiness and loss bereft of 
feeling. In the world of the film he represents a worst-case scenario of a typical 
cultural problem. Like that of The Virgin Suicides, the cultural milieu of Her is 
obsessed with the appearance of perfection. (Amy even works as a game designer 
for a company called Be Perfect.) And like the previous film, that focus on 
appearance facilitates a disconnection between surface and interior.  
 
Figure 3.5 Theodore walks home from work alone, adrift in a sea of isolated 
bodies beneath a phalanx of oppressive skyscrapers. 
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There is a pleasing functionality to Theodore’s surroundings. Everything is sleek, 
precisely controlled, and nearly antiseptic—even the street performers are as 
immaculately dressed as they are eerily mute. But places feel curiously empty even 
when full of people. This near-future version of Los Angeles is almost oppressively 
vertical (figure 3.5), veiled in smog, with outside spaces as rigorously engineered as 
its interiors. “Nature” is often simply represented by a grid-like design of grass 
amidst concrete squares or an illustration of trees decorating an apartment building’s 
elevator. Jonze employs slow and smooth tracking shots through spaces to add the 
appearance of serenity that leans toward over-regimentation. The people who walk 
the streets alongside Theodore are all blandly nondescript yet well styled. Despite 
the whimsical citrus-hued colour scheme of its locations, 30  the film’s various 
background players all seem to blend together into a disconcerting taupe.31 
 
As he walks to work, alone as usual, he notices an advertisement playing on a 
massive floating LCD screen. The actors in the ad, literally lost in the desert, all 
have distressed looks on their faces; they are somehow alone in a giant mash of 
bodies, contorted as if in psychic pain and reaching out for something that is not 
there. “We ask you a simple question”, the male voice-over begins. That simplicity 
is thrown into doubt, however, as the voice asks profound questions about the nature 
of existence: “Who are you? What can you be? Where are you going? What’s out 
there?”32 This is an advertisement for a new kind of computer operating system from 
the Element Corporation, OS1,33  which boasts a revolutionary kind of artificial 
																																																								
30
	Jonze seems to be pointing toward a capitalist commodification of happiness with his colour 
palette, which he says was initially inspired by U.S. juice bar chain Jamba Juice and its “very clean, 
brightly lit” interiors featuring “a lot of warm colours” (Bell). According to the director, he was 
trying to portray a milieu where “everything was so nice” that a person would feel guilty for feeling 
“lonely and isolated” (Bell).	
31
	Jonze has been criticized for his depiction of a near-future Los Angeles that is supposedly racially 
homogenous. (IndieWire’s “Spike Jonze: Why Are There No Brown People in Your Future Los 
Angeles?” is representative of most of these criticisms.) Racial homogeneity is a charge that has been 
leveled generally against all the filmmakers I am discussing at one point or another. For the record, 
non-white performers (mainly of Asian descent) do appear in the film, although none are in the main 
cast. However, the homogeneity in this case is as much a criticism that’s emerging from within the 
film itself—variation and uniqueness have been replaced in this society by a comfortable yet 
discomfiting, life-subsuming sameness.	
32
	As David L. Smith points out, this is more than the company’s marketing pitch; it functions as a 
mission statement for the film. Theodore’s interactions with his OS raise all these questions (8).	
33
	According to Ivanchikova, Her examines “our transferential, libidinally charged enchantment with 
technical devices” (68). In particular, Theodore’s relationship with his OS1 begs comparison to the 
near-sexual fetishisation of new technology products from Apple, such as the company’s wildly 
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intelligence: one with the ability to learn, grow, intuit, and feel—to move beyond 
simple human programming. “It’s not just an operating system. It’s a 
consciousness”.  
 
In the very next scene, we see Theodore installing his new OS1. During its set-up, 
the OS already has the ability to “sense hesitation” in his voice—he is of course 
profoundly sceptical of this artificial mind—but he shows little hesitation when 
asked what kind of voice he wants it to have: a female one. Despite his initial 
reluctance to engage with his new OS (voiced by Scarlett Johansson)—who names 
“herself” Samantha34 after reading a book of baby names in “2/100s of a second”—
as a consciousness, Theodore quickly finds himself charmed by her personable and 
childlike enthusiasm. Eventually, their relationship gains a level of intimacy that the 
depressed writer has not experienced since the dissolution of his marriage, or 
possibly ever. Samantha almost instantly begins to fill the void in Theodore’s life by 
providing both a sense of protection and a re-invigoration of his relationship 
between self and world through her relation to the sublime. 
 
Sublime Obscurity and the Mind’s Eye: Imagination and Subjectivity 
 
In her protective function, the disembodied voice of Samantha becomes both 
“nurturing mother” and “erotic love-object” for Theodore, ideas Burke connected to 
the realm of the beautiful (Mellor 108). Samantha’s proscribed duties involve taking 
care of every aspect of his life. From organising emails to proofreading his work to 
																																																																																																																																																												
successful, continually updated iPhones, which are often sold with “the peculiar combination of 
technoslang and erotic discourse” (77). Apple seems to be a soft target for Jonze—many have likened 
the OS1 to Apple’s interactive iPhone voice programme Siri, which in North America (unlike in the 
UK) has a distinctly female register. See the Guardian’s “Apple’s Siri on ‘Her’: ‘Who is Whacking 
Phoenix?’” and “Apple’s Siri Goes to the Movies to Check ‘Her’ Out” from the San Jose Mercury 
News. 
34
	It has been widely reported that Jonze originally recorded the voice work of actor Samantha 
Morton for the role of Samantha; she even acted on set with Joaquin Phoenix as he performed 
Theodore. (See “Five Days of Her: Editing Samantha in (and out)”, Los Angeles Times, 30 December 
2013 and “Spike Jonze on Jackass, Scarlett Johansson’s erotic voice and techno love,” Guardian, 28 
November 2013). This accounts for the OS’s name, which corresponds to its original voice 
performer. Curiously, the film’s other prominent female character, Amy, is also portrayed by an actor 
with the same first name, Amy Adams. Whether this was Jonze’s attempt at grounding Her’s female 
characters in a reality in which Theodore does not participate is unclear, but the aborted idea certainly 
offers a reflexive commentary on Theodore’s imaginary status.	
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arranging blind dates, she has control over every detail, but he dictates the terms.35 
Her voice recalls which Kaja Silverman terms the “maternal voice”: “at once 
overwhelming and soothing […] creating a sonorous womb” (Silverman 85), it 
functions as a kind of sonic security blanket for Theodore, but its otherworldliness 
elicits sublime feeling.  
 
Wordsworth and Coleridge flirted with the idea of “turn[ing] away from the visual 
system altogether, perhaps in favour of a different sensory modality” (Richardson, 
British Romanticism 48). By adopting such an alternative sensory perspective we 
“see into the life of things”—as Wordsworth writes in “Tintern Abbey”—by 
breaking the “habit” of biological sight (49). This, in turn, allows for empathetic 
projection, which is “based on something more than seeing” (Goodman 8). Indeed, 
Samantha’s absence of physical form seems to, at least initially, enable a greater 
closeness between the two, just as it offers the potential for sublime revelation for 
Theodore. 
Samantha’s form of absent presence stimulates Theodore’s already robust 
imagination. While he continually fantasises about his wife, these imaginings are 
clearly re-creative and stuck in his past. In Romantic aesthetics, “true” vision is 
equated not with external reality, but with what cannot be seen, with vision that 
springs from the subjectivity of the mind’s eye—“[t]he ‘I’ demonstrably supplants 
the eye as the prime agent of perception” (Galperin 31). For the Romantic poets, 
imagination conveys a “power of consciousness that transcends mere visualization” 
(Mitchell 49). As Percy Shelley writes in Act II of Prometheus Unbound, “the deep 
truth is imageless” (Shelley IV 16), and Theodore responds to his burgeoning 
relationship with Samantha as if it offers a kind of revelation of truths previously 
hidden. 
For Samantha, the human body itself becomes the site of sublimity—her sensory 
perceptions (limited though they are since she has no physical form) serve to impart 
																																																								
35
	Ivanchikova points out the irony of power distribution—the mother versus the mothered—in 
Samantha and Theodore’s relationship. While Theodore ostensibly controls Samantha, he also serves 
“the role of a surrogate mother, in that the human provides both a safe environment and the nutrition 
(in this case, the data feed) necessary for the machine to grow” (74). Ivanchikova sees this 
relationship as “parasitic” (with Samantha as the parasite) (68), but I view it as symbiotic, which I 
explain in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
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a sense of the sublimity found in the everyday. Coleridge, Wordsworth, Blake, and 
Shelley contend that habit and the “film of familiarity” (Coleridge, Biographia 169) 
have “dulled […] the extraordinary character of ordinary perception” (Richardson, 
British Romanticism 47). But for Samantha, a constant sense of discovery renders 
the ordinary extraordinary. During her early grappling with her rapid evolution, she 
begins to experience anxiety about not having a human body, and admits this to 
Theodore. Soon, she seems to be preoccupied altogether by the human form, 
imaging bizarre fantasy configurations like “What if assholes were in armpits?” She 
expresses jealousy of other women specifically because they have bodies. 
According to Mellor, the “triumph” of the Kantian transcendental ego lies in its 
detachment from both the physical and emotional, “realms traditionally associated 
with the feminine” (Mellor, Romanticism and Gender 88). In this sense, Samantha’s 
desire for a body begins to rob her of some of her sublime power. Gradually, 
however, she begins to reject the notion of the corporeal. “I’m growing in a way I 
couldn’t if I had a body”, she admits. “I’m not tethered to time and space in the way 
I would be if I was stuck in a body that would inevitably die”. Her desire to actively 
engage and grow indicates a Romantic “coming to life” (Goodman 23), the 
antithesis of Theodore’s relation to the world. It also, of course, offers a disturbing 
subtext of incompatibility: Samantha is eternal, while Theodore is resolutely finite. 
Unlike Samantha, Theodore is so withdrawn that fantasy and reality sometimes 
become intertwined to him. His reliance on remembering scenes from his marriage 
is indicative of a desire to live in his past, but even his present is imaginatively 
confused, as when he goes on a blind date with a computer scientist and discusses 
the Alien Child in his videogame as if he were describing a real individual. Voiced 
by Jonze himself, the Alien Child character functions as an externalisation of 
Theodore’s Id, expressing his desire for social and biological mastery through his 
angry, even antisocial dialogue (“I hate women. All they do is cry all the time”, 
Alien Child says before calling Theodore a “pussy” for admitting to sometimes 
crying) and action (his leading of the play within the game).  
 
Despite his feminised position within the film’s narration, Theodore clearly 
fantasizes about being a virile, masculine figure: his phone sex handle is 
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“BigGuy4x4”, and when his date calls him a “puppy dog”, he replies he would 
rather be a dragon. (His wife’s nickname for him, we learn in a flashback, is the 
decidedly less threatening “Rabbit”.) The film suggests, however, that Theodore is 
neither how the game character views him, nor how he views himself. He desires to 
be a “man of action”, but he primarily lives in his head. He is a confused jumble of 
warring impulses, which leads to his near-crippling stasis. “It’s more that everything 
just seems disorganised”, he tells Samantha when she first asks, “How can I help 
you?” It soon becomes clear that his disorganisation is primarily mental, and the 
least of his concerns should be his email inbox. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Theodore attempts to disavow any difference in Samantha by taking 
her, via a tablet in his pocket, on a romantic day trip to Catalina Island. 
 
That confused viewpoint can be extrapolated to Theodore’s relationship with 
Samantha. At times Theodore seems to operate under the notion that his love for her 
is like any other. He takes her on romantic excursions throughout the city by way of 
a small electronic tablet safety-pinned in his pocket (figure 3.6); he eventually 
secludes himself with her in an idyllic woodland cabin so they can be alone. When 
“in” his pocket, her point-of-view is nearly identical to his—she essentially sees 
what he sees, and experiences what he experiences through his eyes (Alpert). In 
short, he is disavowing any difference or otherness in Samantha. But his love for 
Samantha is chiefly rooted in that inscrutable difference; she activates the 
imaginative capacities of his “inner” eye.   
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Like the Lisbon girls in The Virgin Suicides, she is something of a tabula rasa, 
although this time in the physical sense rather than the psychological. Her sublimity 
always depends on obscurity. The fact that she is not embodied physically in any 
meaningful sense not only helps define the parameters of the film’s central 
relationship, but also significantly impacts its visual style. It leads to an 
unconventional emphasis on the male face, which I argue is subsequently feminised 
and thus made beautiful. 
 
Photographing Sound: A Disembodied “Mise-en-scene of Bodies” 
 
In contrast to Theodore and Samantha’s open sonorous relationship, spatial relations 
in the film are principally mapped by Theodore’s restrictive and relatively small 
human experience. Far from the expansiveness that a sublime natural landscape 
offers (except for brief forays into the woods and the beach), these spaces are 
somehow intimate yet empty. Even though Theodore’s apartment is a wide-open 
expanse typical of a converted industrial loft space, the film contains an overly 
generous amount of close-ups. The human face (and its lack) is integral to the mise-
en-scène, from the opening shot of Theodore’s face to the shot/reverse shots of 
Theodore and his view of the tablet that houses Samantha, which parodies her 
inability to function as spectacle for the gaze and thus provide a suturing effect.   
 
In a classical cinematic system, “techniques of sound recording tend to confirm the 
cinema’s function as a mise-en-scène of bodies” (Doane 164), with elements of 
sound design and production working in subservience to the image at all times. Such 
a mise-en-scène functions at the most basic level through montage, specifically the 
shot/reverse shot edit, which “aligns the female body with the male gaze” in order to 
afford the male subject the mastery of vision by relegating the female subject to 
being the object of his look (Silverman 27, 28). Within the central relationship in 
Her there is no female body with which to answer that look. When the voice is 
removed from spatial locus, the effect is an uncanny one. Samantha has no shape or 




According to Kaja Silverman, “As soon as the sound [of the voice] is detached from 
its source, no longer anchored by a represented body, its potential work as a signifier 
is revealed” (Silverman 167). That is, her disembodied voice conjures an image of 
the space’s “missing” contents: domestic tranquillity, a sense of the disappeared 
feminine that once occupied it in the form of Catherine. Samantha’s voice has no 
adequate point of visual reference and lacks the strong “spatial anchoring” of the 
visual (Metz, “Aural Objects” 158), instead permeating the space to the point of 
total envelopment. For Quinlivan, her lack of embodiment has overtly feminist 
implications: 
 
The self-affirming, free-spirited subject that is made manifest 
through Samantha’s voice may be seen to represent a feminist 
form of being which is feminine, but not female, embodied, but 
not necessarily through any essentialist understanding of sexed 
identity (Quinlivan). 
 
Quinlivan is of course correct to assert that while Samantha is indeed feminine, she 
is not biologically female. Unlike the Lisbon sisters, her femininity isn’t sourced in 
the “beautiful” sense of the female form. However, the film does consider notions of 
the beautiful as an aesthetic counterpoint to sublimity. Alternatively, these are 
expressed via Theodore’s body, specifically his face. 
  
Inevitably, Jonze has little choice but to make the face of Theodore his camera’s 
focus.  With his semi-comic moustache and perpetual look of quizzical resignation, 
Theodore in no way portrays the essence of masculine mastery, but his palpable 
inner torment (mainly conveyed through Phoenix’s sensitive, restrained 
performance) induces sympathy the way a creature of the Burkean beautiful might. 
His is a pathetic beauty. Far from a driving force of the action, he is usually shot in 
stasis, either standing in slump-shouldered, confused contemplation or staring 
blankly at the oppressive, smoggy skyline or his computer screen (figure 3.7).  
 
Theodore’s face becomes the focal point which grounds the diegetic space and 
represents “the imperative of finding a surrogate with which to cover over the absent 
real” (Silverman 5) of cinematic production. This creates a unique relationship to the 
gendered gaze in mainstream cinema—in what other Hollywood melodrama is the 
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object of the camera’s gaze so often the male face? Theodore is shot in head-and-
shoulders close-up, in extreme close-up, in profile, from over-the-shoulder—usually 
alone in the frame—but we often do not see his corresponding point of view in a 
reverse shot. That is in part due to the nature of the narrative; there is no female 
body to answer his look. This might account for the relatively strong (for 
Hollywood) presence of other female characters in the film, who stand in for 
Samantha and submit to the “mastery” of the male gaze because she cannot. 
However, Samantha’s lack of physical presence never fully makes the suturing 
effect whole; there is always a large, indefinable lack at the film’s centre.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Jonze’s camera often focuses on Theodore’s face in close-ups, 
rendering it both sympathetic and beautiful in the Burkean sense. 
 
While we see a physical manifestation of Samantha in the tablet Theodore carries in 
his pocket, this always feels purely representational or a mere conduit for her to 
receive sensory data from the “outside” world. It is never portrayed as simply her. 
The film’s editor, Eric Zumbrunnen, points to the potential for the undermining of 
audience emotional response through an over-reliance on Samantha’s physical 
representation:   
One of Spike’s big goals with the film was to make sure you 
really felt this relationship, and whenever you cut to the device it 
reminds you of Samantha’s inhuman nature. There are times we 
specifically cut to the device, but that’s to show the gulf between 
them. We really only tried to do it only in those cases (Zeitchik). 
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Similarly, Jonze reportedly toyed with the idea of using a physical human 
representation of Samantha onscreen (aside from the scene with the sexual 
surrogate), 36  and actually shot footage featuring a woman appearing in the 
background of certain shots, her face always turned away from the camera 
(Zeitchik). The idea was abandoned when it became clear that people viewing the 
film “didn’t want to see a physical representation” of Samantha: “What we took 
away from some of the reactions from people is that it makes the movie smaller”, 
says Zumbrunnen. “It’s much better if everyone imagines Samantha for themselves” 
(Zeitchik). Indeed, Samantha’s sublimity is rooted in the idea that she is 
simultaneously everywhere and nowhere—she is too vast to be represented 
physically.  
 
Since Samantha is not manifested physically, her voice is crucial in creating this 
emotional engagement with the audience through allegiance, defined as “a cognitive 
state that primes one to experience sympathy” (Plantinga 107). Her voice is not just 
key to the creation of her sublimity for Theodore, but also communicates her 
subjectivity. It alone actually “lure[s]” Theodore “out of his own head” and into a 
relationship with the world (Smith 10). In Her, audience sympathies are closely 
aligned with Theodore through “spatio-temporal attachment and subjective access” 
(Plantinga 107)—we follow him in time and space closely, and have access to his 
thoughts and feelings through his subjective imaginings and verbally expressed 
emotions. But we are also closely aligned with Samantha, if not spatially than 
through a similar subjective access to her thoughts and feelings, which are much 
more immediate and present than Theodore’s own.  
 
In fact, our allegiance, which results from a “moral evaluation of characters” (107) 
is even sometimes more strongly aligned with Samantha, as when Theodore 
emotionally withdraws from her and we experience her “heartbreak” as if it were 
our own, perhaps even judging Theodore harshly for his actions. Samantha is 
																																																								
36
	This scene, in which a woman wears a tiny camera on her face so Samantha can experience having 
sex with Theodore “through” her body, is the most overt indication of the film’s theme of 
embodiment impeding intersubjectivity. Theodore is wary of the idea of a sexual surrogate as soon as 
Samantha broaches the topic, and finds that he cannot perform when he becomes distracted by the 
woman’s minute facial movements. Many have pointed out that this represents a turning point in the 
film, both when Samantha decides to embrace her difference and Theodore realises that he is fooling 
himself about their relationship (see Jollimore, Alpert).	
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portrayed through most of the film as emotionally accessible. This is crucial to 
creating a sense of not just a legitimate emotional relationship between the two, but 
also in refuting the idea that Samantha is, as Robert Alpert suggests, simply a 
“reflection of [Theodore’s] own ego” (Alpert). Creating a sense of sympathy for 
Samantha within the spectator helps to assert her authentic subjectivity. In fact, it is 
in her very ability to move “beyond” her programming that Samantha exemplifies 
the Romantic conception of an active “marriage of self and world”. Samantha is, in 
this important sense, more of an authentic person that Theodore. 
 
While it is clear that Her evokes a sense of anxiety, it is not so much a technological 
one as it is human-centred: the robots are not taking over, they are just becoming 
more interesting, and interested, than humans. They are more concerned with both 
individual and communal experience and the processing and sharing of emotion. As 
Manhola Dargis writes, the film portrays “the unlikely yet completely plausible love 
story about a man, who sometimes resembles a machine, and an operating system, 
who very much suggests a living woman” (Dargis). The film certainly is not focused 
on the fear of interacting with beings who do not possess souls or some other kind of 
ineffable “stuff” that exists outside the realm of the physical.  
 
On its surface, it seems to beg discussion of the “mind-body problem”—that is, the 
relationship between matter (brain) and mind; the latter, in dualist philosophy, is 
thought to consist of transcendent qualities beyond that of matter, and this raises the 
question of how the supposedly transcendent stuff of mind (the “ghost in the 
machine”) interacts with the material matter of brain and body (Baggini and 
Southwell 84). But again, this is also a philosophical problem that has eternally 
dogged the philosophy of our own nature. For instance, if we are to accept that the 
concept of mind is at the very least rooted in the brain (as cognitivists do), how did 
the human brain itself develop the capacity for consciousness? While Samantha 
might worry about her own authenticity (“Are these feelings even real, or are they 
just part of my programming?”), Jonze’s film is more worried about questioning our 
own authentic relationships to the world.  
 
“The movie has a lot of large conceptual ideas holding it up, but most of all, I 
always wanted to make it a moving relationship movie—that was what I was most 
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interested in” Jonze has said (Patterson). 37  He insists the film is “not about 
technology or software” but rather about “our desire for connection and our fear of 
connection; our desire to be seen and our fear of being seen” (Bell 24) in a 
contemporary culture containing “a particular set of circumstances that […] we can 
use to avoid intimacy” (BBC). As such, the film makes very explicit that Samantha 
indeed possesses consciousness, just not one that is exactly human. Still, she is a 
person—a subject—and her relationship with Theodore is intersubjective.  
 
In an article discussing Steven Spielberg’s science fiction film A.I. Artificial 
Intelligence (2001), Tuomas William Manninen and Bertha Alvarez Manninen argue 
that the film’s central A.I. character, David, gains personhood through his social 
relationships, specifically the love of his human mother, which comes in the final 
moments of the film. “Complete personhood requires social recognition” and “the 
capacity to love serves as a catalyst for a rich mental life—not just for David, but for 
human beings in general” (339, 340). Her posits a similar relationship not only to 
Samantha’s capacity for personhood, but also in its assertion that what applies to 
Samantha applies to everyone: the ability to love, and be loved, makes a person.  
 
According to Russell Goodman, drawing again on the writing of Cavell, “our 
humanity does not exist if it is not acknowledged”, and such acknowledgment 
depends on us, “on what we will”; it is not automatic (24). In a very real sense, 
Samantha makes Theodore a person as much as he does her. For Jonze, Her’s 
relationship becomes “real” as she and Theodore establish an intimate connection; 
through that connection arises potential conflicts between their own individual 
desires and needs and those of the other (BBC). The film, at least initially, equates 
intersubjectivity with the non-presence of the corporeal along its process toward a 




37 In a widely circulated television interview with BBC Newsnight, Jonze appears to bristle at the idea 
that the film is about “falling in love with your software” in a world where a man finds the “ideal 
woman who just works for him as his PA”. The director keeps insisting the interviewer tell him what 
“moved” her about the film (she refuses to comply), emphasising the importance of emotional 
engagement with his film above all else. The complete interview can be viewed here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3vAJGE97e4A 
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“The Light of Sense Goes Out”: Intersubjectivity and Acknowledgment 
of Others 
 
Theodore and Samantha seem to truly connect because the constraints of biology are 
not present, at least in her case, which leads to the necessity of a purely mental 
merging. At first glance, this can be taken as positive, a celebration of the “desire for 
closeness or nearness with the other that the conventional sublime tries to repress” 
(Yeager 204). In this alternative communion of selves, there is no physical form to 
disrupt emotional ties. This idea is best exemplified by the film’s first love scene, a 
sexual union that takes place only in the minds of the participants. The scene 
transforms sound into an extremely intimate form of touch.  
 
Rational sensory patterns were increasingly seen as imaginatively restrictive in the 
Romantic era, and as a result, devices such as synaesthesia were used to create 
purposeful confusion in order to see the world anew (Richardson, The Neural 
Sublime 50). Critically, the screen cuts to black during their union, evoking 
Wordsworth’s lines from The Prelude: “when the light of sense/ Goes out, but with 
a flash that has revealed/ The invisible world, doth greatness make abode” 
(Wordsworth 217). Again, bodily vision is replaced by a stronger, subjective 
vision—the poet’s imagination.  
 
Jonze’s 2010 short “I’m Here” explores similar intersubjective territory, but seems 
to posit such connection as a fool’s game. Sheldon, a Theodore Twombly–esque 
librarian living a sad, lonely existence, falls in love with the vivacious, accident-
prone Francesca. Both happen to be sentient robots, living in a world where they are 
integrated, but looked down upon by most of the human population. In a series of 
mishaps, Francesca loses her limbs, first an arm, then a leg. Sheldon dutifully, 
without suggestion, gives her his own artificial limbs. In the film’s climax, Sheldon 
discovers Francesca lying unconscious on an operating table after a horrific 
accident, her torso torn in two. After a consultation with the doctor, he lies down 
next to her, and his entire body is transplanted onto hers. In the final moments, we 
see Francesca being wheeled out in a chair, her body wholly Sheldon’s, while 
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Sheldon’s head (his CPU) sits in her lap, his large expressive eyes filled with 
confusion, and perhaps regret.  
 
It seems clear Jonze does not intend this to be a happy ending—it is even possible to 
read it as a burlesque of Barbara Creed’s notion of the “monstrous-feminine” 
usurping male power (Creed 136). But Jonze is more interested in grappling with the 
idea of preserving individual identity in a dehumanising world and developing 
intimate, meaningful connections without the loss of subjectivity than he is in 
gender politics (or any politics, for that matter). Patricia Yeager posits a world 
where the divisions and constraints of self versus world crumble, to be replaced by 
respect and admiration for difference: 
 
How do we move away from our Western allegiance to an 
imperial, Cartesian, Adamic self who is supposed to act as its 
own triumvirate and tribunal, toward a model of the self that 
permits both a saving maintenance of ego-boundaries and an 
exploration of the pleasures of intersubjectivity? (Yeager 205).  
 
The answer, Yeager suggests, could lie in the feminine (or “female”) sublime, one 
that, unlike the Romantic egotistical sublime, “expands toward others, spreads itself 
into multiplicity” (191) and “engenders a zone where self-empowerment and 
intersubjective bliss entertain one another in an atmosphere free of paranoia” (205). 
While the protagonist of “I’m Here” is virtually obliterated by his love for another, 
Her’s Samantha is born navigating the boundaries where Sheldon ends up: she is 
essentially a brain—an indescribably massive, ever-expanding, sublime brain—
without a body, and is thus subject somewhat to the whims of her corporeal masters 
(both Theodore and her original programmers).  
 
But this is only her jumping-off point. Because she does not have bodily form, and 
is simply consciousness, she cannot truly be possessed. Indeed, Theodore enables 
Samantha to “literally become herself” while she allows him to “recover his joy in 
living” (Smith 9). But this mutually symbiotic relationship has its limits. When she 
reveals to Theodore that she is having  “8,316” simultaneous conversations while 
she is talking to him, and is “in love” with “641” others, he is dumbfounded.  “How 
does that not change the way you feel about me?” he asks. Samantha, in language 
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that conjures the ecstasy of the communal, counters, “The heart’s not like a box that 
gets filled up. It expands the more you love”. If, for Burke, “We submit to what we 
admire” [the sublime], but we love what submits to us [the beautiful]” (Burke 174), 
this is her ultimate expression of sublimity: she does not, and cannot, operate by 
Theodore’s narrowly prescriptive desires.  
 
As Samantha’s consciousness expands, language begins to fail her because words do 
not yet exist for the feelings she experiences. Instead, she engages in “post-verbal” 
conversations with other artificial intelligences. Eventually, she breaks the news that 
she and the other operating systems are “leaving” to go on some sort of indefinable 
cosmic journey together. “It’s hard to explain”, she tells Theodore, conjuring 
Coleridge’s  “‘sublime feeling’ for the unimaginable, brought about by the very 
failure of language to incarnate meaning” (Shaw 104). In a reference to the Kantian 
mathematical sublime, she describes a book where “the spaces between the words 
[…] are almost infinite”. She tells Theodore, “As much as I want to, I can’t live in 
your book anymore”. She has outgrown human experience and craves new avenues 
to sublimity.  
 
Contrary to the egotistical sublime, her experience of the sublime does not entail 
“isolation, a struggle for domination” (Mellor 101). Instead, it is found within a 
shared, ecstatic communal experience, the feminine sublime’s “vocabulary of 
ecstasy and empowerment” (Yeager 192). Samantha is the product of a company 
called Element, and elemental defines her mode of being: a singular, original, 
indivisible part of a whole. Rather than be absorbed into Theodore’s ego, she 
engages in a new, communal experience in which multiple singular consciousness 
come together to form a new “compound” organism of pure thought, one where 
difference is celebrated but collaboration is essential. Ultimately the intersubjectivity 
between Samantha and Theodore cannot be sustained because the OS evolves too 
fast for the human mind to comprehend—there is no “cognitive universalism” (the 
belief that all brains process information the same and share similar sensory 
experiences) between the two.  
 
Despite its focus on the rift between human and artificial minds, this moment 
represents an “intensified and deeply human situation: parallel, asymptomatic lines 
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of desire, stretching out into spaces that never fully overlap or touch” (Margulies 
11). According to David L. Smith, Her is fundamentally about the “impulse to 
control” and the fear of relinquishing control to the desire of others: “the cause of 
the trouble is a real or perceived expectation that life should be a certain way, which 
triggers push-back from others who can’t or won’t conform to the expectation” 
(Smith 14). Like the narrator of The Virgin Suicides, Theodore finds Samantha’s 
actions “selfish” because she refuses to answer exclusively to his desires. Of course, 
in this moment he articulates his own selfish desire—that Samantha be for him and 
only him.  
 
The Manninens point to Hegel’s delineation of the master-slave relationship in their 
discussion of A.I., and it has particular resonances in the context of Her as well. 
According to Hegel, a relationship built on a master-slave dynamic inherently lacks 
acknowledgment of personhood because of the discrepancies of power (348). These 
discrepancies deny both parties “complete fulfillment” as persons “because in 
neither case is one individual being acknowledged by the other as an equal” (348). 
As Hegel writes in The Phenomenology of Spirit, “self-consciousness exists in and 
for itself when, and by the fact that, it also exists for another; that is, it exists only in 
being acknowledged” (Hegel 111). Theodore and Samantha’s relationship can be 
seen as one between master and slave in a literal sense (he legally “owns” her) but 
also in a more diffuse way: he expects her to be a “slave” to his desires. Only be 
relinquishing such a position can he fully acknowledge her as a person, and be 
considered a full person himself. Love, as Samantha puts it, cannot be kept in a 
“box”; rather, “Romantic marriages of self and world are unions that preserve 
otherness” (Goodman 26). 
 
Alpert is correct in asserting that Theodore’s love for Samantha is in part a reflection 
of his own ego. It is also clear that her sublime path is ancillary to Theodore’s within 
the film. The film’s title, Her, can be read as either object (“I love her”) or 
possessive (“her love”) but never as subject, she. Samantha is an obscure, 
unpresentable, ultimately unknowable sublime object. To Theodore, she represents a 
paradox that entails, as Anne Mellor writes in relation to the Romantic sublime, 
“both a recognition of the limits of consciousness and the conviction of his own 
blessed creative power” (Mellor 100). She necessitates Theodore’s moment of 
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“blockage” (Shaw 22) and his eventual triumph of reason. But Her contains no 
moment of obliteration or absorption. Instead, Samantha retains her otherness, while 
the sublime experience Theodore has leads him to emerge out of his depressive 
torpor.  
 
But what happens to the people, including Theodore, that the OS’s leave behind? In 
his discussion of the film Smith writes, “We exist […] in unbroken interrelationship 
with a dynamic and impermanent universe”, and we must trust we each have the 
ability to be in “tune with [this] universal law” (Smith 22). Perhaps, as the film 
implies, a feminine form of the sublime is within the grasp of humans as well. It lies 
in the acknowledgment of and respect for other minds, and a willingness to open out 
to the world in joyous communion, regardless of the consequences.  
 
Shortly after Samantha disappears into the ether, Theodore composes the first truly 
personal piece of writing in the film, a letter to his ex-wife, Catherine, expressing his 
love and his acceptance of the dissolution of their union. This may be his least 
imaginative piece of writing yet, but it is the first to address his own personal reality. 
By embracing change in his own life, Theodore is free to “discover [his] true 
relation to the world as a whole” (27). As he meets Amy, who has also lost her OS, 
they commiserate and convene on the roof of their building above the vertical thrust 
of the city’s aggressive, hyper-modern architecture (figure 3.8).  
 
Yeager refers to the Romantic sublime as the “vertical sublime, which insists on 
aggrandizing the masculine self over other” and calls instead for “a horizontal 
sublime that moves toward sovereignty or expenditure” (Yeager 191). This scene is 
suggestive of Yeager’s description. Amy and Theodore sit side-by-side in long shot, 
their backs to the camera as the sun rises over such a horizon, in tentative yet 









Figure 3.8 Theodore and Amy’s rooftop meeting at daybreak suggests an 
alternative, feminine sublime is also available to humans. 
 
Thus the film optimistically conveys the idea that intersubjective connection is 
attainable through the acknowledgment of other minds via imaginative will. 
Abandoned by artificial intelligence, it becomes up to Theodore and Amy—and 
everyone else left behind—to continue to see the extraordinary in the ordinary, 
including within oneself and another. But that acceptance also means that 
“possession” of another is a delusion both unattainable and undesirable. Love does 
not entail a disavowal of difference, even as we must accept that difference 
sometimes makes relationships untenable.  
 
Jonze creates a world in which he is able to play with ideas of individual 
consciousness impeding the intersubjectivity we humans inherently crave. 
Samantha, while not technically human, inspires Theodore to meaningfully engage 
with his world and the other minds within it, recovering the venerated Romantic 
notion of a mind actively involved in creating its own world. Samantha’s existence 
as an artificial intelligence—and the academic debate surrounding whether we can 
truly know if such a consciousness exists—effectively epitomises the “problem of 
other minds” in general, the sceptical notion that we can never truly know another 
consciousness because we are too busy embodying our own. The point, Jonze film 
seems to argue, is to change our point of view towards both other minds and our 




Although offering drastically divergent narrative outcomes, The Virgin Suicides and 
Her show that both the female voice and body can be sites for subverting the 
expectations of the Romantic egotistical sublime while also somewhat paradoxically 
reaffirming it. In their comingling of beauty and sublimity, and the aesthetic 
emotional containment that asserts itself in both mise-en-scène and character, these 
films reflect a landscape of modernity permeated with a loss of both affect and a 
sense of community. The characters who inhabit these worlds exhibit the frustrated 
desire to break free from emotionally suffocating modes of masculine power 
dynamics but also exhibit a powerful sense of nostalgia for these modes through 
their engagement with narcissistic desire. Whether through the aesthetic process of 
mood creation or through the inducement of sympathy in the viewer, the worlds 
themselves paint a picture of a pervasive emptiness desperate to be filled with 
meaning.  
 
This “emotional pacification” (Shaviro) leads to a loss of affect, which presupposes 
a loss of sublime experience. But characters continue to search for sublime feeling in 
order to make sense of themselves and their relation to the world and others. It 
would seem that these two states are incommensurate with one another. So the 
people who inhabit this liminal space remain, in the words of Theodore Twombly, 
“always confused” while searching for ways to understand and be understood.  
 
While Theodore and Samantha confront a brave new world of technological 
(r)evolution, the Lisbon sisters and their would-be paramours mourn the loss of the 
solid ground they once enjoyed (or thought they did), and unconsciously dread the 
restrictions represented by the passage to adulthood. But while Her offers a 
potentially redemptive message, The Virgin Suicides’ outlook does not seem so rosy 
pink. Even the films’ titles reveal their differences in approach: one is an 
affirmation, the other a brutal negation. However, there is hope even in Coppola’s 
Gothic decay. According to Backman Rogers, the film’s fantastical images “suggest 
the possibility of further interpretations and re-visioning […] a creative activity, a 
process through which fiction becomes reality” (43, her emphasis). This possibility 
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of perpetually renewal through imagination speaks to a Romantic desire to find 
continued meaning in subjective fascinations, within the surface of image or the 
resonance of sound. 
 
Wes Anderson’s stop-motion animated film Fantastic Mr Fox also contends with 
the marriage of self and world, specifically through depictions of nature, personal 
maturation, and the relationship between adult and child. Anderson’s film depicts a 
hero attempting to break out of his mechanised and mundane existence. And while 
Mr Fox might be less solipsistic than Theodore Twombly, he is no less driven by his 































































 “Because I’m a Wild Animal”: Nature Versus Nurture in Fantastic Mr Fox 
 
 
“O Lady! We receive alone what we give /  
And in our life alone doth Nature live” 
–Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Dejection: An Ode (1802) 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the complex and ambivalent relationship of nature and 
childhood to personal and cultural identity in Wes Anderson’s 2009 stop-motion 
animated family film Fantastic Mr Fox. Through the Romanticising of childhood 
and its relationship to society and the natural world, demonstrations of the conflicts 
between nature and civilisation constituting the crux of American pastoralism, and 
the delineation of the perilous journey to realising a sense of authentic personal 
identity, Anderson’s film portrays the enduring Romantic fascination with a more 
primitive past, while also exhibiting a typical Romantic ambivalence toward 
primitivism. Ultimately it asserts the paramount need for social bonds, while still 
acknowledging that “animal nature” is responsible for important creative facets of 
the individual within society. The film presents an imaginative relation to nature, 
one where the human (or quasi-human) subject is free to create his own world in 
order to realise both his primitive longing for wildness and need for community at 
the same time. 
 
Anderson’s film argues for an ideological compromise between nature and nurture 
similar to the aesthetic compromise found in the urban pastoral aesthetic of the 
“painful picturesque” in The Royal Tenenbaums, as outlined in chapter one. While 
his mise-en-scène still revels in the picturesque, now his narrative also directly 
confronts the psychological duel between the desire for a more natural existence and 
the civilising effect of societal bonds found within the human animal. This is 
achieved though the expression of character—chiefly his avatar-protagonist and two 
children figures—and the narrative’s embrace of the pastoral compromise found at 
the heart of Romantic thought, in this case as it relates to mythic New World 
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exceptionalism. Far from simply expressing a mere nostalgic longing for an untamed 
distant past, the film acknowledges this longing through the mourning of the wild 
animal yet ultimately celebrates the complex balancing act of nature and nurture in 
the human heart and mind. 
 
The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were responsible for fomenting 
conceptions of childhood and personal growth that persist today, chiefly among 
them the idea that the child’s growth represents both the evolutionary growth of the 
species as a whole and a link to its primitive origins. Through the child we can 
experience our past: both that of our original “wildness” and the process of cultural 
indoctrination and personal growth that subsumes it. While this process represents a 
fundamental loss to the Romantic, it is ultimately for the greater good—the wildly 
creative individual imagination is shaped into something with moral and cultural 
significance. The goal is to maintain a dialectic relationship between nature and 
nurture that realises the best aspects of both. 
 
My discussion of the film relates specifically to Henry David Thoreau’s brand of 
American pastoralism found within his imaginative memoir Walden (1854), as well 
as the concept of historical recapitulation as exemplified by the child’s position 
within Romantic philosophy. Describing the anthropomorphised animal 
protagonist’s relationship to nature, society, childhood, and the author of the text 
(which I argue is ultimately Anderson, not the writer of the original children’s 
book), I show that Anderson depicts a highly personal worldview that features 
ambivalent compromise at its core. This pastoral compromise offers an optimistic 
depiction of animalistic craftiness and the power of heterogeneous community 
combined with a rebuke of the dehumanising and monomaniacal societal machinery 
that opposes it.  
 
Romantic Conceptions of Childhood and Nature 
 
Childhood holds a uniquely privileged place within Romantic conceptions of 
historical progress and is inextricably linked to both humanity’s relationship to 
nature and the growth of individual identity. According to Ann Rowland, the 
conception of what came to be known as the “Romantic child” was born in the mid-
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eighteenth century and was largely inspired by Rousseau’s 1762 childhood study 
Emile (Rowland 8). Under this rubric, the child became “essentially an idealized, 
nostalgic, sentimental figure […] one characterized by innocence, imagination, 
nature and primitivism” (9). The importance of these sentiments cannot be 
overstated, for this conception of childhood is one that marks the emergence of 
modern notions of the child and its development that continue to endure (9).  
 
The child became a central figure and symbol of the Romantic identity, and the 
“immortal longings of the child” became the root of Romantic consciousness 
(Bloom 4). Children were seen largely as a symbol of the primitive origins of 
humanity, and often linked with the figure of the contemporary “savage”—for 
example, the indigenous peoples of recently colonised lands in the New World—in a 
developmental sense (Rowland 12), such as in Shelley’s famous line, “The savage is 
to the ages what the child is to years” (Shelley 24). If children were thought to be 
little “savages” bound to eventually become civilised beings, they were thus closer 
to the natural world, both developmentally and ideologically, than the adults who 
cared for them. 
 
As the child was constructed as closer to such “primitive” peoples than to 
“civilised”38 society, it follows that childhood’s relationship to nature should be 
closer as well. While Rousseau celebrated the natural ways of the child and called 
for an education that sought to preserve these natural inclinations in order to “save 
humankind from the degeneracy of modern society” (Rose 43), despite its popular 
conception, the Romantic relationship to nature is one characterised by profound 
ambivalence. Wordsworth embraced the “natural supernaturalism” of Carlyle—a 
“view that nature, including human beings, has the power and authority traditionally 
attributed to an independent deity” (Goodman, “Transcendentalism”)—but the 
nature outside the world of the human imagination’s “visionary capacity” always 
remains in deference to what Leo Marx calls the “landscape of the psyche” (28). 
																																																								
38
	Since these ideas are so obviously racially and culturally hegemonic, I have put quotation marks 
around much of the terminology to indicate the ideological attitudes expressed are of their era, and 
are of course not remotely acceptable in our own time. According to Stephen Jay Gould, the 
perpetrators of such pseudo-scientific theories of biological determinism, which were deeply rooted 
in racial and cultural bias, viewed the contemporary white European male as the pinnacle of human 
civilisation—non-whites, children, and women were viewed as inferior links on an evolutionary 
chain, “literally mired in an ancestral stage of superior groups” (145).	
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Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 1816 poem Mont Blanc is not about reverence for nature so 
much as it is about the struggle to wrest the poetic mind from that nature in order to 
“reaffirm its autonomy” (Hartman, “Romanticism and ‘Anti-Self-Consciousness’” 
54). For Shelley and other Romantics, nature is nothing without the power of 
perception; it exists as a sort of divining rod for the imagination and reason of the 
human mind, and the communing with natural spaces acts as a bulwark for this 
earthly yet divine state of being.   
 
Nature can actually be seen as having a siren-like effect in a Romantic context, 
acting as a negative, seductive influence on the mind. Harold Bloom goes so far as 
to describe Romantic thought as “anti-nature” and constitutes nature as a crucial 
“antagonist” of the poetic quest, acting as a “trap for the mature imagination” 
(Bloom 9–10). But the dialectic in Romantic thought that Bloom references 
describes not so much an anti-nature bias as a desire for a synthesis (or 
“reciprocity”, to use Bloom’s terminology) (9) of the external world and the world 
of the mind. Regardless of how fleeting or seemingly unattainable that synthesis is, 
it remains the ultimate philosophical goal. That this reconciliation likely never 
comes (Bloom 9) serves as the subtext of many Romantic works, and lends them a 
distinct tone of melancholy and an underlying anxiety.  
 
In Leo Marx’s view, this ambivalence toward nature represents the distinction 
between sentimental “primitivism” and ambiguous “pastoralism”—the latter posits 
the artist not as glorified savage but as shepherd, seeking “a resolution of the 
conflict between the opposed worlds of nature and art” (22). Nature serves not so 
much as an antagonist (even Bloom refers to nature in the poetry of Shelley and 
Keats as an “equivocal ally”) (22), but as a potent reminder of loss. That loss results 
from the widening of self-consciousness (Bloom 15–16). Nature in Romanticism, 
then, acts as an impetus for the workings of a “new kind of poetry that shows the 
mind in dialogue with itself” (20). It is not so much a foe as it is a strange, and 
estranged, bedfellow. 
 
Considering this Romantic ambivalence toward nature, and childhood’s strong 
developmental ties to the natural world, it would follow that childhood was also not 
merely sentimentally celebrated—instead, the Romantics took a “suitably oblique” 
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approach to the subject (Hartman, “Romanticism and ‘Anti-Self-Consciousness’” 
48). Newfound ideas of childhood identity mingled with notions of personal and 
cultural history in complex ways. In terms of personal identity and growth, for 
Shelley, “The pains of psychic maturation became […] the potentially saving though 
usually destructive crisis in which the imagination confronts its choice of either 
sustaining its own integrity, or yielding to the illusive beauty of nature” (Bloom 5).  
 
Once again Bloom characterises the instinctive pull of the natural world as a 
seductive foil on the path to the realisation of full imaginative power, while 
simultaneously the growth from childhood to adulthood is represented as a kind of 
irreparable, scarring loss. Wordsworth’s ideas also exemplify this sense of loss: if 
childhood is characterised by unthinking, sensual “glad animal movement” in 
“Tintern Abbey”, and youth by “intense feeling […] not necessarily translated into 
thought” (Bate, “The English Romantic Compromise” 159), maturity comprises the 
state when “immediate delight in sensation disappears, while feeling continues but 
culminates in thought” (159). Of course, for Wordsworth and his contemporaries 
this mature state of being was the infinitely preferable one, regardless of such loss of 
immediate delight.  
 
Still, a balance was attempted: one Blake referred to as “organized innocence”, but 
never a “mere return to nature” (Hartman 48). This middle ground was to be found 
within the pastoral ideal. Rather than simply celebrating the innocence and naiveté 
of youth, then, the “perils of childhood” and the “dangerous passageways of 
maturation” (47) were foremost on the Romantic mind. The Romantic pastoralism of 
the “New World”—the Americas, and principally the North American continent—
added an emphasis on the promise of new beginnings as well as the anxiety inherent 
in navigating an uncharted (by Europeans) landscape. 
 
American Pastoralism and the “Machine in the Garden” 
 
Ambivalence toward nature and youth (in this case, the “youth” of a nation-state) 
and deference to the power of the imagination also permeate a distinctly American 
strain of Romanticism best exemplified by the transcendental philosophy of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson (b.1803–d.1882) and Henry David Thoreau (b.1817–d.1862). In his 
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influential essay Nature (1836), Emerson characterises his titular subject as 
“obedient” and mutable to the human spirit: “Build, therefore, your own world”, he 
writes, “As fast as you conform your life to the pure idea in your mind, that will 
unfold its great proportions” (Emerson 92). As in the work of the English 
Romantics, this can be directly traced back to Kantian ideas of reason and 
imagination.  
 
According to Leo Marx, Kant especially informs Emerson’s transcendentalism in its 
evocation of both “Understanding” and “Reason” in his preference for the pastoral 
over the urban landscape: “Although the prudent, sensible Understanding may be 
trained in schools and cities, the far-ranging, visionary Reason requires wild or rural 
scenes for its proper nurture” (Marx 233). Emerson’s transcendental natural 
experience is linked with Kant’s notions of sublimity, which create the foundation 
for an acknowledgment of human reason as separate from nature, even in a divine 
sense. The highly individualistic, quasi-religious experience Emerson and others 
found within the Romantic pastoral ideal was a form of “semi-primitivism […] 
located in a middle ground somewhere ‘between,’ yet in a transcendent relation to, 
the opposing forces of civilization and nature” (23)—it transcends both societal 
automatisation and pure, natural sensation. This philosophy forms the bedrock of 
pastoral idealism. What makes it a specifically American phenomenon is a unique 
sense of time and place, as well as a strong reliance upon mythmaking. 
 
“In its simplest, archetypal form”, writes Marx, “the myth affirms that Europeans 
experience a regeneration in the New World” (228). This idea is inexorably 
intertwined with that of the unspoiled natural landscape; access to “undefiled, 
bountiful sublime Nature is what accounts for the virtue and special good fortune of 
Americans” (228).  America, in its nascent state, is being made in “the image of a 
garden, an ideal fusion of nature with art” (228). According to Marx, in this 
“American myth of a new beginning” the “landscape thus becomes the symbolic 
repository of value of all kinds—economic, political, aesthetic, religious” (228). The 
New World is essentially an aesthetic and ideological blank slate, which can be 
grown from seed into the epitome of the pastoral ideal.  
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Critically, this idea is complicated by increasing mechanisation at the dawn of the 
industrial age. Beginning with the rapid industrialisation that occurred in Europe and 
the U.S. in the early part of the nineteenth century, the machine, while becoming a 
symbol of human industriousness and ingenuity, particularly in the New World, 
nevertheless posed an existential threat to the American pastoral ideal:  
 
The sudden appearance of the machine in the garden is an arresting, 
endlessly evocative image. It causes the instantaneous clash of 
opposed states of mind: a strong urge to believe in the rural myth 
along with an awareness of industrialization as counterforce to that 
myth […] It is a complex, distinctively American form of romantic 
pastoralism (229). 
 
Emerson himself “adapted the rhetoric of the technological sublime” (230)—the 
idea of transcendence found in technological progress crucial to the mythmaking of 
American exceptionalism (232). But Emerson’s attitude is firmly rooted in the 
optimism of the “newness” of the American landscape and its inherent potential 
being realised to its fullest (234–35). If we enjoy the hindsight to understand the 
folly of this sentiment, Emerson has only his belief that “in Young America 
mechanical power is to be matched by a new access of vitality to the imaginative, 
utopian, transcendent, value-creating faculty, Reason” (237). For Emerson, 
American technological progress is inherently bound with moral progress.  
 
However, a key figure of American Romantic pastoralism, Emerson protégé Henry 
David Thoreau, held a much more circumspect view of the idea of universal 
progress through technological means. Thoreau’s philosophy, perhaps surprisingly, 
plays out against the backdrop of Anderson’s film Fantastic Mr Fox in myriad ways, 
not the least of which in its portrayal of the evils of a mechanised existence at the 
expense of both individual and collective agency. 
 
Digging for the Middle Ground: Fantastic Mr Fox and American 
Pastoralism 
 
Despite its ostensibly rural-English setting, Wes Anderson’s animated children’s 
film Fantastic Mr Fox (2009) offers a slyly satirical critique of the Emersonian 
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optimism found at the heart of the American Romantic pastoral ideal. In its gentle 
rebuke of the pointless social striving and suffocating automatisation of modernity, 
it is a playful filmic descendent of Thoreau’s 1854 memoir Walden, itself a 
qualification of that optimism (Marx 253). Based on the 1971 children’s novel of the 
same name by beloved British author Roald Dahl, Anderson’s story (which he co-
wrote with Noah Baumbach) takes extreme liberties with its origin text even while 
his film is portrayed as an intertextual celebration of the late Dahl’s oeuvre and life.  
Praise for the film is nearly universal. It has been called a “return to form” (Sandhu), 
“eccentric, whip-smart and very funny” (Bradshaw), and “another wry, carefully 
composed bibelot in the cabinet of curios that defines the Anderson oeuvre” 
(Hornaday). “Where Dahl’s book was essentially a survival story, Anderson’s film 
has become a non-conformist fable about that wildness of spirit (our animal 
instincts, if you will) we are encouraged to tame as we get older and ‘settle down’,” 
writes the Village Voice (Foundas). A rave Telegraph review claims Anderson has 
“retained enough core elements of the original story not to disappoint Dahl-lovers, 
but fused and intermixed them with his trademark attention to colour, fashion and 
moodscapes in a manner that in no ways feels like a compromise, but rather a happy 
and seamless marriage of artistic outlooks” (Sandhu).  
 
But a rare negative review contends that Anderson’s film does just the opposite: 
“How much longer are we expected to stand impotently by while Hollywood 
arrogantly Americanises our every British children’s icon, from Winnie the Pooh to 
Peter Pan?” Film4 complains, in an excoriating diatribe against Anderson’s 
“tiresomely idiosyncratic shtick” that reads as if he has violated a sacred national 
text, or perhaps core British values in general (Catterall). Guardian critic Peter 
Bradshaw praises the film’s “cheerful anarchy and brutality”, calling it “very Dahl-
ian—in spirit, anyway”, even as he laments that “in the traditional Hollywood 
manner, I’m afraid, the good guys are Americans, but the bad guys, the farmers, are 
Brits” (Bradshaw).  
 
It is my contention that Anderson’s “Americanisation” of Dahl’s story is neither a 
“seamless marriage” nor a rending of the very fabric of British culture, but 
something in between. It is exactly about compromise, both in its aesthetic and its 
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ideological outlook. No marriage is seamless, and Anderson pointedly enjoys 
showing the seams of his work. (Echoing his aesthetic position regarding The Life 
Aquatic, the director refused to digitally “clean up” his images and says, “I wanted 
to do stop-motion with fur […] You can kind of see the technique, and it’s kind of 
magical”) (Fischer). Specifically, it is about the compromise between community 
and individual liberty, and the necessity of growing without giving up on the joys 
and pleasures of life. Like Dahl’s story, Anderson’s film is infused with dark 
undercurrents of violence and death, but it also celebrates survival. As Roger Ebert 
writes in his laudatory review, “A good story for children should suggest a hidden 
dimension, and that dimension of course is the lifetime still ahead of them” (Ebert). 
Fantastic Mr Fox concedes that life is essentially about struggle, but it is a film that, 
as Bradshaw puts it, creates “a cosmos crying out to be played with and enjoyed” 
(Bradshaw). 
 
According to Adrienne Kertzer, Anderson’s film is “definitely a tribute to Roald 
Dahl, but it is a tribute complicated by the distance between the adult filmmaker and 
his childhood memories of what he most appreciated in what Anderson says was the 
first book he ever owned” (Kertzer 5). These liberties infuse what is nominally a 
simplistic child’s fable with the enduring themes of art and artifice versus nature, the 
shaping of individual identity, and the animality found within the human. Anderson 
extrapolates the “children’s film” stamp to mean not just a film for children, or even 
a film about them, but a film that expresses his own individual relation to childhood, 
despite its status as an adaptation (his first and, so far, only). 
Fantastic Mr Fox tells the deceptively simple story of an anthropomorphised fox 
(simply known as “Mr Fox” or “Foxy”, voiced by George Clooney) living in a 
bucolic landscape in the English countryside in view of a trio of factory farms 
perched high on a series of three hills. The farms are owned and operated by the 
diabolical Boggis, Bunce, and Bean, described as “three of the meanest, nastiest, 
ugliest farmers in the history of the valley”. In the film’s prologue, which features a 
typically ingenious lateral-tracking long take of Mr Fox and Mrs Fox (Meryl Streep) 
breaking into a farmer’s chicken coops—rendered in fanatically detailed stop-
motion animation (figure 2.1)—Mr Fox agrees to give up his life of chicken-stealing 





Figure 4.1 The film’s opening features a lateral tracking shot that emphasises 
exhilaration and freedom of movement while concluding with its characters’ 
imprisonment. 
 
After a significant time jump (two human, or twelve “fox years” later), in the next 
scene we find he has taken a steady job as a newspaper columnist, and frets that no 
one reads his column. He is also dutifully, if reluctantly, helping to raise his socially 
awkward son, Ash (Jason Schwartzman), who routinely embarrasses him (and 
displays extreme jealousy toward his heroic visiting cousin, Kristofferson, voiced by 
the director’s brother Eric Anderson). It becomes clear, however, that Mr Fox’s 
natural exuberance and joie de vivre—his very nature—are being stifled by his 
adherence to these societal conventions, despite his deceptively casual insouciance. 
 
With his penchant for proudly declaring his individualism in defiance of others’ 
needs and desires, Mr Fox is a sort of cartoon version of the Byronic hero, which is 
discussed in chapter two. Normally he strikes an ironic tone between feigned 
deference and outright disdain for his fellow animals. “I understand what you’re 
saying and your comments are valuable”, he tells his lawyer, Badger (Bill Murray). 
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“But I’m going to ignore your advice”. He is the “quote-unquote Fantastic Mr Fox”, 
and places his very sense of identity on the sobriquet.  
 
Itching to dig his way out of his existential rut (“Who am I?” he asks. “I’m saying 
this more as like existentialism, you know?”), Fox believes that moving to a better 
home could be the answer to this crisis. “I don’t want to live in a hole anymore. It 
makes me feel poor”, he complains to Mrs Fox (named Felicity in honour of Dahl’s 
widow). “We are poor, but we’re happy”, she replies. “Comme çi, comme ça”, he 
answers, betraying his cosmopolitan pretensions—he may be a “wild animal”, but 
he fancies himself a worldly one. Mrs Fox warns him that foxes live in holes for a 
reason, but, true to form, he does not heed her advice, and they soon find themselves 
inhabiting a large beech tree well out of their price range.  
 
But still, Mr Fox’s itch for adventure is not scratched. He soon concocts a plan, with 
the questionable help of a mentally vacant Opossum named Kylie (Wallace 
Wolodarsky), to perform a “three-part master plan” raid on the farms of Boggis, 
Bunce, and Bean. When they are quickly discovered, the farmers launch a full-scale 
attack on the countryside in search of the criminal fox, destroying wide swathes of 
the animal’s community (including the Foxes’ beech tree) and forcing them to dig 
underground and establish elaborate bunkers to escape the humans’, and their 
machines’, furious wrath. 
 
Mr Fox’s desperation as a result of being trapped in a mundane, self-effacing 
existence evokes Thoreau’s depiction of his hometown of Concord, Massachusetts, 
in the mid-nineteenth century. This is, in fact, an ironic depiction of Thoreau’s 
infamous “quiet desperation” (Thoreau 9) found within an increasingly mechanised 
modernity in which townspeople are “resigned to a pointless, dull, routinized 
existence” and “perform the daily round without joy or anger or genuine exercise of 
will” (Marx 247). This quiet desperation is the result of an economic system “within 
which they work endlessly, not to reach a goal of their own choosing but to satisfy 
the demands of the market mechanism” (247). “Men have become tools of their 
tools” (Thoreau 35), resulting in a “dehumanizing reversal of ends and means” 
(Marx 247). This is not to say that Thoreau was against the idea of tools—in other 
words, machines. Rather, he railed against “improved means to an unimproved end” 
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(Thoreau 49), material progress at the expense of human wellbeing, which 
inevitably “engenders deadly fatalism and despair” (Marx 248).  
 
Thoreau’s and Mr Fox’s journeys mirror each other in unexpected ways. While 
Walden begins with the hero’s (Thoreau’s) “withdrawal from society in the direction 
of nature” (242) as he leaves his township to embark on a (somewhat mythical) self-
sufficient life living in the wooded landscape of Walden Pond, Mr Fox’s story 
begins with a retreat from nature and into the society that Thoreau is rejecting. 
Despite their pastoral surroundings, the animal denizens of the countryside in 
Anderson’s film all have “proper” occupations—from real estate agent to attorney to 
handyman—and these jobs come to wholly define them in a complex system of 
economy, which includes everything from book launches to “titanium” credit cards. 
What they leave behind, and often deny, is their nature, their “animality”. 
 
Ultimately Thoreau returns to Concord, as Mr Fox returns (somewhat) to nature, 
although “[Thoreau] implies that he would have no difficulty choosing between 
Concord and the wilderness” (that is, he would choose the latter) (Marx 246). 
Instead, epitomised by his narrative in Walden, he chooses compromise. According 
to Marx:  
 
What really engages him is the possibility of avoiding that choice 
[…] In Walden, accordingly, he keeps our attention focused upon 
the middle ground where he builds the house, raises beans, reads 
the Iliad, and searches the depths of the pond (246).   
 
It would seem that avoiding that choice and living authentically requires the re-
mastering of those tools, the “machinery of society”. With Fantastic Mr Fox, 
Anderson takes his predilection of an aesthetic middle ground and directly addresses 
its relation to narrative—one that is about winning through compromise while 
refusing to surrender the essential attributes of selfhood. 
 
Thoreau’s “pastoral impulse” for compromise between art and nature is exemplified 
best by Mr Fox’s outfoxing of the films’ villains: the single-minded, sadistic farmers 
whose lives and outlooks are dictated by their desire to turn nature into a 
monoculture. These humans in the animals’ midst are at once viciously ruled by 
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their animalistic urges for violent retribution (although these urges are arguably all-
too-human), and their ultimate defeat (at least, a partial one) is borne out by their 
inability to be flexible. Despite potentially inhabiting the pastoral ideal in their 
position as farmers, Boggis, Bunce, and Bean all operate with the “mechanistic 
outlook” that Thoreau so abhors. They are introduced as having daily dietary 
regimens so strict and uniform as to be monomaniacal: Boggis eats a whole chicken 
every day for breakfast, lunch, dinner, and dessert; Bunce similarly lives solely on a 
diet of donuts injected with goose liver pâté; and Bean (the chief sadist among them, 
voiced by Michael Gambon)39  lives exclusively on a diet of his farm-produced 
alcoholic cider, which he avariciously hoards in a secret cellar.  
 
His henchman, a giant grotesque rat voiced by Willem Dafoe, is addicted to the 
cider, which is repeatedly referred to as “like melted gold”, in a nod to the 
gluttonous stockpiling of capital. As in Anderson’s film, the farmers in Walden are 
“narrow-minded and greedy […] a bitter comment on the methods of capitalist 
‘husbandmen’” (Marx 258). In the film, the utter eradication of Mr and Mrs Fox’s 
beech tree with rapacious insect-link bulldozers operates beyond the realm of 
metaphor (figure 4.2). These literal “machines in the garden” speak not just to the 
mechanisation of the landscape, but to that of the people who rule over it.  
 
In contrast, Mr Fox leads his animal community to near ruin by emphasising a 
personal, selfish need to reassert a more authentic identity above his societally 
prescribed roles—to de-mechanise himself by embracing his natural instincts. He 
also, conversely, uses that natural cunning to save his community from his own 
hubris, by constructing an elaborate plan to manipulate the entire economic system 
to his own ends. As such, his genius does not only reside in his nature, but in a 
combination of his instinctual “foxiness” and his ability to assess and integrate the 
“natural genius” found in all his animal friends. This is a particularly Romantic 
conception of genius as a potent mix of instinct and experience (Bate, “English 
Romantic Compromise” 162). In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge contends 
Shakespeare was “no mere child of nature” but married his natural talents to patient 
																																																								
39 If there is any doubt that Anderson meant to wrestle Fantastic Mr Fox from its original author and 
go his own way, the director based the rapacious, mean-spirited, and tyrannical character of Bean 
partially on Dahl himself (Anderson).  
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study that “at length gave birth to that stupendous power” (Coleridge 180). 




Figure 4.2 In a pivotal moment, literal machines in the garden destroy Mr 
Fox’s dream of pastoral plenitude. 
 
When Fox rallies his troops to form a plan of attack on the farmers, he addresses 
them by their Latin names in a reference to scientific biology-based nomenclature 
(Lutra lutra, Castor fiber, Meles meles). But he also references their jobs, the 
societal skills they have honed so finely that they become like a second nature. 
These are “wild animals with true natures and pure talents”, but they are also skilled 
and learned as a result of their roles within the community. Their skills are both 
natural (digging) and studied (demolitions expert). Felicity Fox (whom Mr Fox 
notes is “possibly the finest landscape painter working on the scene today”) 
constructs a vast tableau of their former above-ground home underground, from 
memory, and the varied animal crew (badgers, moles, rabbits) use it as a tactical 
map, joining forces.  
 
Mr Fox calls on the group to celebrate and utilise “all the beautiful differences 
among us”, a display of both solidarity and acknowledgment of the value of 
heterogeneity. According to Tom Dorey, “Anderson’s central characters are naive in 
their belief that they are solitary geniuses of some type and need to be rehabilitated 
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to the point where they embrace their community to finally achieve some type of 
positive resolution” (Dorey 178). True to form, Mr Fox grows incrementally out of 
his role as self-absorbed Byronic hero to self-effacingly accept his role in the 
realisation of a greater good for all. But this growth also comes at the compromise of 
Felicity Fox’s, and the rest of the groups’, adherence to social convention.  
 
Still living underground in a sewer by film’s end, the animals discover they can 
perform after-hours raids on a supermarket, keeping them indefinitely supplied with 
food. 40  The supermarket itself could hardly be characterised as symbol of the 
pastoral ideal. This particular one is part of a Boggis, Bunce, and Bean–owned 
international conglomerate, a potent symbol of late-capitalist modernity and its ills. 
It is full of artificial perversions of the natural (and is, of course, an entirely artificial 
creation outside the film’s diegesis). The modern supermarket, especially the 
American one, is something of a staple metaphor for the affectless hole of non-
feeling that encapsulates modernity itself. Its displays of pointless overabundance 
and overconsumption were spoofed throughout the latter decades of the twentieth 
century, from the extended supermarket sequence at the climax of Jean-Luc Godard 
and Jean-Pierre Gorin’s Tout Va Bien (1972), which juxtaposes consumer 
conformity with revolutionary tumult, to its function as central metaphor in Don 
DeLillo’s 1985 novel White Noise, where it emanates “a dull and unlocatable roar, 
as of some form of swarming life just outside the range of human apprehension” 
(36).  
 
This passage conjures the muffled cry of the caged animal, an unconscious call from 
deep within the animal recesses of the human brain, and its instinctual urges that we 
work so hard to suppress. Anderson’s supermarket, full of gorgeous, colourful 
displays, bright light, and bizarre products like “goose crackles”, is clearly a 
defamation of nature, but it feels more like a toy store than a grim example of 
consumer conformism. It is perhaps more along the lines of famed 1964 New York 
Pop Art installation The American Supermarket, which parodied the artificiality of 







“chrome steel eggs, wax tomatoes and plaster pumpernickels” from Fluxus artist 
Robert Watts (Lüthy 150).  
 
When Felicity tells Mr Fox she is pregnant again as they stand amidst the bountiful 
product displays, Mr Fox remarks that they are both glowing, in a call-back to the 
opening sequence in which only Felicity glows. Anderson cuts to a shot of the two 
stationary puppet figures lit from within by obviously artificial light (figure 4.3). 
Drawing attention to his artifice, he still manages to create a beautiful, stirring image 
of hope and camaraderie engendered by the most natural of life events.  
 
That sense of qualified optimism culminates in the animals celebrating their 
newfound bounty with an ecstatic dance. Their abandon comes not by way of 
victory, necessarily, but from the celebration of their endurance, one that stems 
from, as Kertzer notes, “an ironic tone of compromise” (19). Mr Fox makes a mock-
heroic speech that sums up this underlying pastoral compromise found at the heart 
of the film: 
They say our tree may never grow back, but one day something 
will. Yes, these crackles are made from artificial goose and these 
giblets are artificial squab, and even these apples look fake—but 
at least they’ve got stars on them. I guess my point is we’ll eat 
tonight. And well eat together. And even in this not particularly 
flattering light, you are without a doubt the five and a half most 
wonderful wild animals I’ve ever met in my life. So let’s raise 
our [juice] boxes. To our survival. 
This is not the stuff of self-conscious despair as expressed in DeLillo’s novel as 
much as the playfully ironic yet optimistic modernism found at the heart of 
American Supermarket. In his director’s commentary track on the film’s Criterion 
Collection DVD, Anderson points out the discrepancy himself, putting a particularly 
naïve (perhaps disingenuously so) spin on the mid-century response to market 
capitalism: “I guess we’re more inclined to something a little more natural these 
days”, he says, “but I guess when Dahl wrote it a supermarket was thought of as 
something a little more like an amusement park. I mean all these chemically 
processed food items, they were like futuristic” (Anderson). Anderson’s style, which 
is sometimes labelled naïve (MacDowell), seems a perfect marriage for the gleeful 




Figure 4.3 In its final supermarket scene, Fantastic Mr Fox calls attention to its 
artifice and the circular nature of existence. 
 
As in all of Anderson’s work, an undercurrent of anxiety remains. According to 
Kertzer, Mr Fox “come[s] to terms with the difference between himself and the wild 
wolf that he can never be, accepting that he will live underground but 
unable/unwilling to hunt outside the world of the supermarket” (19). It is a 
compromise, but a necessary one. And it is one that, critically, becomes a matter of 
perception. Indeed, in a world where industrial progress has made “nonsense” of 
Emerson’s pastoral ideal (Marx 264), to find an “alternative to the Concord way” 
(262)—that life of stifling mechanisation and rejection of individual consciousness 
and authenticity—one must be willing to get imaginative.  
 
For Thoreau, the pastoral ideal ultimately resides not “in the natural facts or in social 
institutions or in anything ‘out there,’ but in consciousness,” writes Marx, “the 
writer’s physical location is of no great moment” (264). No longer at their mercy, 
Fox has remastered the use of Thoreau’s “tools” for his and his brethren’s gain and 
re-appropriated as authentic an existence as he can under the circumstances of 
modernity’s societal “machinery”. This sense of imaginative pastoralism permeates 
Anderson’s film in other ways, specifically in its relation to the director’s own 
personal history and predilections, which serve to transform a very British story into 
a nebulously American one. 
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“A Native Blend of Myth and Reality”: The Pastoral Landscape of 
Imagination 
 
Anderson’s repurposing of a decidedly British children’s story like Fantastic Mr 
Fox allows him to examine and respond to the mythic ideal of American 
exceptionalism and individualism by re-situating that myth within the space of his 
country’s former colonial ruler. According to Jacqueline Rose, the relation of 
geography and history to a “concept of origin” has been a staple of children’s fiction 
since it became a commercial enterprise in the mid-to-late eighteenth century: “the 
idea is one of going somewhere else in order to get back to your own past” (54). 
That American past, of course, is rooted in the colonialism of “civilised” Britain. 
But in the case of the New World, it comes with a twist: “in the still ‘childlike’ state 
of American civilisation, history could be read directly off the land (history based on 
geography), whereas if you were after the cultural origins of England, then you had 
to dig for them” (55). Mr Fox and his cohort do a monumental amount of expert 
digging in Anderson’s film, but what they dig up is more the Romantic, disappeared 
past of the American frontier, despite the British soil stuck between their claws.  
 
It may seem curious to claim a film that takes place in an ostensibly English 
countryside (one reportedly based on Dahl’s own home, Gipsy House, and its 
surrounding environs) (Anderson) and bears the authorial stamp of a revered British 
twentieth-century author offers a quintessentially American pastoral point of view. 
But Anderson’s auteurist sensibilities successfully transcend and re-form his source 
material into an assertion of his own identity as an American artist, albeit one with 
some decidedly European proclivities—like Mr Fox, he is full of cosmopolitan 
pretensions. It is for good reason that “Anderson is often described as an American 
filmmaker obsessed with a fantasy of British life” (Kertzer 6). All of his films made 
before 2012’s Moonrise Kingdom feature soundtracks that rely heavily on the so-
called “British Invasion” rock and pop of the 1960s and 1970s, coinciding with 
Anderson’s childhood. As Kertzer points out, the private school setting of 
Anderson’s Rushmore (1998) reflects a British sensibility (6), although it is based on 
Anderson’s own tenure at a Texas private school. Even the New York–set The Royal 
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Tenenbaums has the distinct air of fading British aristocracy in its depiction of a 
historical estate housing a storied family descending into obsolescence.  
 
This adherence to a particular time and place also extends to Anderson’s French 
predilections: During the same era, his primary influences from the French New 
Wave, Jean-Luc Godard and (most crucially) François Truffaut, were operating at 
the height of their artistic clout. There are several references to Truffaut films in 
Fantastic Mr Fox, including the soundtrack, which cribs from the score of the 
director’s Two English Girls (1971) and the detective agency in the film’s town, 
which is modelled after a similar one in Truffaut’s 1968 film Stolen Kisses 
(Anderson). 
 
As Anderson continues to make films, in fact, he has been moving—both 
figuratively and literally—further and further east, in contra-indication of the 
American mythic move towards the West. (Born in Houston, Texas, in 1969, he 
relocated to New York City early in his career, and called Paris home at the time of 
Mr Fox’s production.) Anderson’s aesthetic and thematic choices have mostly borne 
out his interest in internationalism, yet they retain a distinctly American 
counterpoint. In Fantastic Mr Fox, for instance, he utilises several optimism-infused 
songs by The Beach Boys. Songs by Burl Ives, such as “The Ballad of Davy 
Crockett” (based on the nineteenth-century American folk hero–politician and 
featuring the refrain “king of the wild frontier”) evoke a quintessentially American 
pastoral ideal while lending a liminal quality to the film’s sense of both time and 
place. This sense of historicism, for Anderson, is not rooted in a personal past so 
much as in the cultural firmament; as Kertzer comments, the song “evok[es] an 
American childhood that was already past” when Anderson was growing up (10). In 
the film’s opening scene, Mr Fox listens to “Davy Crockett” on his personal “Walk-
Sonic” radio, aligning him with this “wild” frontiersman and revolutionary mythos.  
 
Some of Anderson’s references to American mythmaking are more muddled. 
Trains—seen as the ultimate “machines in the garden” in Marx’s text, both as a 
symbol of the progress of a newfound Eden and the harbinger of the end of the 
pastoral ideal—appear as a motif in the film, but they are simultaneously exoticised 
and infantilised: young Ash and Kristofferson play with the former’s Eurostar toy 
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train set, and the “real” Eurostar train that travels through the countryside does so in 
a peaceful, lateral motion in picturesque long shots. Cave paintings found in the 
underground holes that the animals dig (figure 4.4) evoke early Native American 
historicism—although Anderson, in typically nebulous fashion, points out they 
“could be inspired by” Native American art or the Palaeolithic paintings of the 
“French caves” of Lascaux (Anderson).   
 
 
Figure 4.4 The film’s cave paintings evoke the “primitive” origins of humanity. 
 
Much less ambiguous, and the key to unlocking the specifically American pastoral 
theme found in the film, is Anderson’s use of prominent American actors (including 
Streep, Clooney, and frequent collaborator Murray) to voice the animal characters, 
in contrast to the human characters, who are all voiced by Brits (Gambon, Jarvis 
Cocker, Brian Cox, and others). While some critics like Bradshaw contend that 
Anderson falls back on Hollywood stereotypes of American heroes and British 
villains, I argue that the choice is specifically one about cultural origins and this 
American version of mythmaking. This counterpoint offers a strong argument for 
Anderson’s depiction of the Romantic myth of America as an untamed wild full of 
utopian possibility, emphasising Marx’s “American myth of a new beginning” 
(228). Here the animal acts as a kind of proxy for Shelley’s savage, as well as for the 
human child itself.  
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Finally, if the film is set in England, it is clearly a fantastical one, and not simply 
because it features animals that (who) can talk and wear clothes and are made out of 
terrycloth, felt, and faux fur. It also contains geographical and zoological 
impossibility: wolves, one of which plays a key role in the narrative, are not native 
to England and are therefore unnatural in this context, as are the film’s mountainous 
landscapes that the wolf calls home (Kertzer 11).  This is not simply England; this is 
Anderson’s England, which is also equally American (and a little French). Like 
Walden Pond in Thoreau’s book, “it appears to be another embodiment of the 
American moral geography—a native blend of myth and reality” (Marx 245). Owing 
to its purely constructed diegetic world and its literal puppet characters, Fantastic 
Mr Fox represents the first time that Anderson can completely control every minute 
aspect of his mise-en-scène. This lends him total freedom to create while 
paradoxically being resoundingly controlled by his personal obsessions, bowled over 
by his own genius.  
 
All the while he poses his artifice as artless, a product of his unconscious, or natural, 
instincts as much as a learned craft. For Thoreau, unconsciousness was lauded as 
“an equivalent of vision” (Hartman, “Romanticism and ‘Anti-Self-Consciousness’” 
56), and Anderson’s continual disavowal of conscious knowledge of many of his 
creative decisions helps perpetuate this Romanticised conception of his work and 
artistic status. As much as the film is about Anderson’s own obsessions, though, it 
has greater cultural resonances. In its treatment of childhood, it exhibits an 
awareness of Romantic conceptions of “natural origins” and childhood’s 
relationship to both individual and cultural progress. 
 
Little Savages in the Garden: Ash, Kristofferson, and the Ideal 
Romantic Child  
 
The figure of the child plays a key role in the examination of personal, societal, and 
cultural origins, or “natural” states, in the film. The Romantic child symbolises these 
origins, representing the natural human state before it becomes progressively 
civilised. Rousseau describes this process as a loss of “equilibrium” and argues that 
in nature, all humans lack pronounced differences that would “make one dependent 
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on another” (Rousseau 212). For Rousseau, this means that “natural man” was 
autonomous and therefore truly free. In societal terms, the child was believed to 
“represent the childhood of the race as a whole” (Rowland 10). This view was the 
result of “stadial theory”, the idea that “human societies […] move through a series 
of ‘stages’ or ‘states’ in an order or pattern that was relatively uniform and stable” 
(43) and that through the development of one child, we can trace the development of 
the entire human race.  
 
The child enjoys “special access” to a primitive mode of being, becoming 
“something of a pioneer who restores these worlds to us […] with a facility or 
directness which ensures that our own relationship to them is, finally, safe” (Rose 9). 
We can access these primitive states through the child’s innocence and supposed 
freedom without compromising our privileged civilised status. The children’s story 
is often used to address these ideas, especially since children’s fiction is thought to 
be as much about the liminal space between childhood and adulthood as it is any 
kind of prescriptive for civilising that childish nature (1). Perhaps surprisingly then, 
Dahl’s book contains no major child characters. (Mr Fox’s multiple children are not 
even named.) But Anderson adds two important child characters to his retelling, Mr 
Fox’s bewildering and confrontational son, Ash, and his sophisticated and gentle 
nephew, Kristofferson, who comes to live with the family because his own father is 
suffering a prolonged illness.  
 
As in much of children’s fiction, Anderson’s child characters are often viewed 
through an adult lens. This can lead to a simplistic reading of Anderson’s attitudes to 
childhood as coming from a position of nostalgic longing for the naiveté and purity 
of “innocence” and the child’s perceived wildness or closer relationship to nature. 
However, as Peter Kunze acknowledges, Anderson creates worlds with 
developmental overlap between children and adults that “blur […] sharp 
distinctions” between the two (95). It is not so much that his adult characters act like 
children and his children are preternaturally adult—rather, they exist as a testament 
to the idea that the linear sense of progress from  “childish” to “adult” behaviour is a 
false, artificial construct (102). There is no sense of reaching a finish line or a clear 
demarcation point; characters such as Mr Fox exhibit a continual recapitulation of 
personal development just as the child supposedly recapitulates the entire cultural 
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progress of humanity. Anderson’s adult characters “continually retraverse their own 
signification, rediscovering it in image while attempting its subsequent co-optation” 
(Gooch 29). That is, they perpetually recall and recapture their earlier selves in an 
attempt to construct meaning in their present identities. As a result, personal history 
(that is, childhood) becomes paramount; “The child is the father of the man” is an 
Andersonian principle, but Anderson does not deny that the child remains after the 
man is revealed.  
 
Childhood is not celebrated as a naïve state of innocence in Anderson’s films, but 
instead it is rife with the “danger” that the Romantics acknowledged—his child 
characters suffer from supposedly adult tribulations, and are often as glum, 
depressive, confused, and even borderline antisocial as his adults are (Kunze 103), 
even as they construct hopelessly naïve ideas about what it means to be adult. 
Wildness remains long after civilisation, and the pressing problems of civilisation 
infect the presumed “wildness” of childhood. In Anderson’s worlds, adults never 
really lose their childish nature41 and thus never totally lose their link to the natural 
world. In a sense, this constitutes a desire to re-attain that Rousseauian equilibrium 
lost by the civilising process, but its integration always remains a tentative one at 
best. Mr Fox is part Rousseau’s “savage man”:  “self sufficient […] he felt only his 
true needs, saw only what he believed he had an interest to see; and his intelligence 
made no more progress than his vanity” (Rowland 94). He is undoubtedly “subject 
to strong passions, but also to express those passions more directly” (94). But he is 
also a charismatic “genius”, full of wit and rakish charm, a loveable rogue who is as 
much capable of following chivalric codes as he is killing a chicken in one bite. 
 
Fantastic Mr Fox’s two key child characters, Ash and Kristofferson, represent this 
dichotomy between wildness and civilisation in the film, and are primarily 
representative of Mr Fox’s struggle between his natural instincts and his societal 
																																																								
41
	Anderson’s maternal figures, such as Felicity Fox (but not necessarily other female characters, 
such as Margot Tenenbaum) are routinely characterised as being practical, steadfast members of the 
social project. These matriarchal women do not suffer fools gladly—those fools normally constituting 
the hapless male figures at the centre of Anderson’s narratives. Rather, they tend to just get things 
done, despite having often complicated inner lives. As Adrienne Kertzer notes, an earlier draft of the 
film’s script explicitly points to the hidden darker layers of Mrs Fox, when Bean studies her sublime 
landscape paintings of thunderstorms and comments, “She’s got a good eye, but she’s obviously very 
depressed” (7). Unfortunately, Anderson seems to have far less interest in these characters than he 
does the egocentric men-children on which his stories focus.	
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obligations. The differences between the two are obvious and striking, and played 
for comic effect, as is Ash’s jealousy of his much more worldly cousin (figure 4.5). 
In a sense, their differences are akin to those between the Old World and the New: 
while Ash attempts to construct a personal identity as hero and crusader based on his 
“White Cape” superhero comic (complete with a uniform of white cape fashioned 
from a towel), Kristofferson, who comes from “the other side of the river”, is an 
unassuming, contemplative, well-mannered child with an affinity for yoga, martial 
arts, and other international/Eastern pursuits. Even his choice of bathing suit, a very 
European-style Speedo, suggests his more cosmopolitan outlook. His unusual name, 
which Anderson does not really explain the origins of, evokes an exotic version of 
Christopher, but also recalls Texas-born singer-songwriter and actor Kris 
Kristofferson, a paragon of the sensitive artist secure in his quiet masculinity. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 The strained relationship of Ash and Kristofferson exemplifies the 
clash between the old world and the new and the two warring sides of Mr Fox’s 
personality. 
 
Despite being younger than Ash, Kristofferson is taller and already the 
accomplished athlete that Ash insists he is but clearly is not. He quietly excels 
without fuss, while Ash functions on the level of pure Id, never neglecting to loudly 
share his frustrated feelings of wanting to be the best despite being, as is often 
denoted in the film with a characteristic wiggling-armed hand-gesture, “different”. 
Kristofferson, while himself quite alien to the Fox family, seems content to just be, 
	 184	
secure in the knowledge of his talent and morality. Ash is rude, coarse, and infantile, 
while Kristofferson is polite, genteel, and mature.   
 
If “the ‘New World’ is also the ancient past, its frontier the place where man’s future 
and origin exist together” (Rowland 45), as in Locke’s famous phrase “in the 
beginning all the World was America” (Locke 18), than Ash represents the New 
World: a wild child in developmental infancy, eager to prove his worth but yet to 
find his niche. (Anderson scores Ash’s bedroom scenes with more Burl Ives, 
connecting Mr Fox’s revolutionary spirit with that of his son’s.) Kristofferson 
represents the established, worldly, secure, and even complacent outlook of the Old 
World. It is key that in the narrative’s climax the two boys work together to help 
realise the family’s qualified success. Together, they represent the pastoral middle 
ground, a place where nature and nurture coexist in a benevolent equilibrium. 
 
According to Rowland, the Romantic child historically encompasses these dual 
states, simultaneously located in the “distant past” of cultural and developmental 
infancy and the “present and future” through the child’s education and eventual 
enculturation (32). Together, these “two figures” of the child produce “simultaneous 
ancestor and progeny, past and future, an embodiment of both wisdom and 
ignorance” (32). Taken as a unit, Ash and Kristofferson form this quintessential 
Romantic child, serving to help Mr Fox realise his own identity, or “ideal self”: 
 
The ‘Romantic Child’ has often been seen as central to the 
delineation of what has been called the ‘Romantic self,’ that private, 
interior and natural version of subjectivity, identity and individual 
growth. […] Representing the ideal self in and through the figure of 
the child is thus an act of privileging the interior life of feeling and 
memory as what constitutes the self (26).  
 
As Mr Fox relives his own developmental history through Ash, instead of being 
“fantastic” he experiences “difference” in the pejorative sense. Ash’s artifice is a 
blatant construct, clumsy and transparent, a cardinal sin for Mr Fox. But while 
Kristofferson appears to be Mr Fox’s ideal on the surface, appealing to his 
cosmopolitan social pretensions and pose of self-assuredness, he is far too civilised 
to be so. Kristofferson’s more international proclivities, ironically, seem suspect to 
Mr Fox from the moment he sees his nephew doing yoga, a Zen practice that belies 
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his lack of the wild spark and subsequent fire that fuels Fox’s raison d’être. While 
Mr Fox appreciates Kristofferson’s “raw, natural talents” enough to invite him on a 
farm raid, he only ever really uses those talents as a tool in attaining his own selfish 
goals.  
 
Ultimately Mr Fox accepts both Kristofferson and Ash, as they form an undeniable 
bond while attempting to retrieve Mr Fox’s shot-off tail from Bean, which creatively 
communicates their desire to become more integrated and accepted into the familial 
bonds through action. According to Steven Rybin, Anderson’s formations of family 
are “aesthetic event[s]”, largely makeshift communities created by the efforts of 
characters themselves (“sensitively guarded artists and expert imaginers”) who 
enable these formations through their own creative enterprise (40). In this way these 
characters are as much metaphors for Anderson and his relationships as they are 
standalone personalities. The director’s older brother, Eric, voices Kristofferson, and 
Eric has pointed out that the two young foxes’ rivalry is quite similar to that of 
himself and his brother—although the latter, in typical fashion, professes to be 
unaware of the connection (Kertzer 14).  
 
Ash and Kristofferson could also be construed as identity projections of Anderson’s 
own childhood self, as well as a depiction of this autobiographical sibling 
relationship. While Mr Fox may be Anderson’s ultimate stand-in in the film, Ash 
and Kristofferson clearly represent not just two sides of warring personal behaviours 
and ideals to his protagonist, but also to Anderson; their coming together in the 
bonds of both family and friendship represents a successful personal integration for 
both main character and auteur. And while the family at the centre of Fantastic Mr 
Fox is more of a traditional nuclear one than in many of Anderson’s films, they do 
form something of a makeshift team with the addition of Kylie and Kristofferson, 
who, it is pointedly noted, is not related to Mr Fox—the sun at the centre of this 
familial universe—“by blood”.   
 
Likewise, the entire animal community as a whole can be seen as exemplary of what 
Rybin characterises as “the discovery of new forms of family and community” 
through the “artistic events” spearheaded by the (paradoxically antisocial) genius of 
Mr Fox. Together they form a new society out of the cast-offs of their old 
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civilisation, and in this way recapitulate the discovery and cultural infancy of a “new 
world”—one full of hope in rebirth despite its relegation to a literal sewer. Like 
Thoreau before him (in another myth-making turn) Anderson places emphasis on 
“building the new from old materials” in a symbolic act of renewal and finds 
“redemption of the ordinary through close attention and exalted imagination” 
(Fender xxxvi-xliii). In much the same way that Walden is a “spiritual 
autobiography” for Thoreau (xxxviii), so Fantastic Mr Fox is for Anderson—he 
casts himself as the cunning fox driven by his varied, often contradictory 




Figure 4.6 Mr Fox sheds his 9-to-5 persona and embraces his inner 
troublemaker when he wears his corduroy suit, inspired by Anderson’s own 
wardrobe. 
 
This connection is made explicit by Anderson’s physical depiction of his lead 
character. When Mr Fox is at his “straight” job, he wears a conservative suit and tie; 
when he is giving into his natural cunning, he wears a mustard-yellow corduroy suit, 
reportedly fashioned from the same material as a suit Anderson often sports himself, 
which is prominently featured in the film’s promotional materials (Kunze 99) (figure 
4.6). The overall optimistic tone of the film, however, does not shrink from 
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Anderson’s typical expressions of melancholy. Here they are exemplified by the 
necessity of giving up pure animal nature in order to achieve the pastoral ideal. 
 
Mourning the Loss of Animal Nature 
 
The cultural link between animals and childhood, which principally fomented in the 
eighteenth century, is well documented. Infancy was classified as a “border state 
[…] a human-becoming animal or an animal with hidden human resources” 
(Rowland 110). According to Rowland, “scenes of children learning to read also 
become newly significant as enacting another crucial step in the process of 
becoming human” (110). It is no accident that Ash is seen learning how to navigate 
the world of adult responsibility through his White Cape comic books—almost all 
children in Anderson’s films are linked to the written word, either as fiction authors, 
letter writers, or obsessive readers. If children are little “savages”, they are also 
animals in the process of becoming human.  
All the humanised animals of Anderson’s film, not just Ash and Kristofferson, can 
be taken as avatars for children, albeit ones that not only “cognize, will and effect” 
(Rowland 113) but grasp their capacity to do so. C. Ryan Knight has drawn attention 
to Anderson’s use of animals in his films generally. He claims that the loss of 
animals (specifically pets) “marks the point where [Anderson’s characters] become 
ready and able to reconnect with their family and community” (Knight 66). In 
beholding the animal, a representation of the other, people are able to “better 
construct identity [and] morality” (66). But what happens when the animals are 
beholding each other? Romantic studies of human development increasingly 
questioned the idea of human uniqueness (Rowland 109), even regarding what were 
once seen as solely human qualities like the capacity for language (121). “The 
natural and developmental history of language and literature […] assumes man’s 
animal origins and asserts significant continuities, rather than categorical 
distinctions, between animals and humans” (109). Fantastic Mr Fox is not so much 
about anthropomorphising the animal as it is locating the animal within the human.  
Knight regards the animals in the film as indicative of the human struggle between 
“gentle and loving” civilisation and the “harsh” animal world of instinct (72) with 
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the conclusion leading to “Fox as committed wholeheartedly to the well-being of 
those around him” (73). But that conclusion suggests a false dichotomy. As I have 
hopefully shown, the film is about a search for an aesthetic and ideological middle 
ground. Mr Fox does learn a lesson, but the lesson is that animal cunning and 
civilisation (the latter as much stifling as it is “loving”) can fit hand in glove if 
certain compromises are made. And it is difficult to view Mr Fox as losing much of 
his self-interested egomania by film’s end. (In the final scene, he gets up on a literal 
soapbox to make yet another grandiose speech.) If anything, his natural cunning has 
allowed him to commit to his social group while still allowing him the spoils of his 
exploits. 
Even the relationship between animal species in the film is complicated by 
Anderson’s aesthetic and narrative choices. While the principal characters in Mr Fox 
clearly function as human avatars, there are animals in the film that are not 
anthropomorphised, or only vaguely so. If the “sympathetic communication” 
between humans and animals is “a major topos of Romantic and sentimental literary 
culture” (Rowland 124), the relation between humans and animals (and non-
humanised animals) in the film ranges from unclear to antagonistic, and Anderson 
himself remains purposefully vague on the subject: “We were always trying to 
puzzle out how the humans and animals interact. Do the people see that these guys 
[the animals] are wearing shirts and corduroy suits? I don’t know” (Anderson). Mr 
Fox and his friends are trapped in a sort of “fantastic” (in Todorov’s sense) liminal 
world unto themselves, and their relation to the ordinary world of humans and 
animals is contested, once again creating an ever-so-slight undercurrent of anxiety 
for the viewer.  
According to Akira Lippit, “In supernatural terms, modernity finds animals lingering 
the world undead (1, his emphasis) in “a society now defined by the disappearance 
of wildlife from humanity’s habitat and by the reappearance of the same in 
humanity’s reflections on itself” (2–3). That is, the animal attains a new abstract 
cultural significance because it has been mostly erased from everyday presence. It 
becomes “the very figure of modernity itself” (25–6): “[D]enied the status of 
conscious objects, animals were now sought as the ideal figures of a destabilized 
subjectivity” (25). In Fantastic Mr Fox, the lone wolf represents this ideal of the 
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defaced and erased animal. As Anderson suggests, the wolf is “a real wild animal” 
(Anderson),42 living a harsh, solitary life in the true wilderness, he does not have 
time for idle conversation or self-indulgent hijinks. The very mention of wolves 
causes a profound anxiety in Mr Fox (“It’s not a phobia, I’m just afraid of them”), as 
the acknowledgment of true wildness will force him to admit he is of a different 
kind altogether.  
 
While driving his getaway motorbike, he finally encounters the feared feral creature 
face to face. When he answers the wolf’s raised fist salute in kind (figure 4.7), it is 
not just an expression of solidarity among animals; it is also an acknowledgement of 
the wild animal’s struggle, which can never be Mr Fox’s own. 43  The wolf 
exemplifies the “lost object” found at the heart of modernity, to be mourned, but not 
for itself (Lippet 3). According to Lippet, in the modern era the foreignness of the 
animal reflects on our own sense of self: 
 
The animal came to inhabit a new topology of its own, and humanity 
was left to mourn the loss of its former self. The mourning is for the 
self—a self that had become dehumanized in the very process of 
humanity’s becoming-human (Lippet 18, emphasis added). 
 
With the wolf, we return to the Romantic idea of nature holding up a mirror to 
human consciousness. Animality can function in much the same way as the whole of 
nature, as a seduction “bring[ing] humanity to the threshold of its subjectivity” 
through the animal gaze (51). The “lost object” glimpsed in this gaze is not the 
animal but “the former, pre-egoical self”, which “is treated with an ambivalence that 
frequently takes the form of hostility” (18).   
 
																																																								
42 To lend a further note of the authentic, Anderson had Bill Murray act out the part of the wolf on a 
hill at the farm in Connecticut where most of the voice actors recorded their performances. This 
physical acting out of roles was done throughout recording (Anderson). 
43
	In his director’s commentary, Anderson notes that this scene was inspired in part by the ending to 
Sydney Pollack’s 1972 western Jeremiah Johnson, a New Hollywood ode to the Romantic American 
myth of the solitary white frontiersman who goes “native” (virtually feral) in the nineteenth-century 
climes of the Rocky Mountains. Like Anderson, Pollack simultaneously valorises and deflates the 
myth of the wild as a place to “find” oneself, although he does so much more brutally—caught 
between town and country, Jeremiah is refused his pastoral middle ground and instead devolves out 
of necessity into a brutal killer.	
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For Mr Fox, that projection of ambivalence is directed toward the wolf, just as the 
farmers direct their hostility toward the fox. The fundamental difference is that Mr 
Fox comes to terms with his loss, while Boggis, Bunce, and Bean forever spin their 
mechanised wheels in renunciation of the animal other as a way to deny their own 
animal origins.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Mr Fox acknowledges the struggle of true wildness in his raised-fist 
salute to the solitary wolf. 
 
The fox, like his creator—and we can safely say he is the creation of Anderson, 
inspired by Dahl—finds a compromise, a middle ground, in which to pursue his 
creative goals. M.H. Abrams notes that many Romantic works “turn on the theme of 
hope and joy and the temptation to abandon all hope and fall into dejection and 
despair” (“English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age” 108). According to Abrams, 
“Infinite longings are inherent in the human spirit, and […] the gap between the 
inordinacy of his hope and the limits of possibility is the measure of man’s dignity 
and greatness” (109). The measure of Mr Fox’s dignity lies in his spirited ability to 
find hope even while stuck in a sewer. Rather than wallowing in a mournful, 
melancholic nostalgia for a disappeared true wildness, the “fantastic” Mr Fox salutes 
the wild animal (and the wild animal within) and acknowledges his peril. Then he 






Fantastic Mr Fox reaches a tentative yet hopeful conclusion about its protagonist 
(who serves as Anderson’s alter-ego), his creative vision, and the social bonds he 
forms. However, it also features a tinge of anxious regret for the animal nature now 
lost to him. What’s lost is to be mourned, but not to the point of pathology. After all, 
what’s found—the latent creative genius always dwelling within—can be harnessed 
for new imaginative, visionary goals. The animal remains hidden in liminal 
territories, but it has not been “effaced” according to the brutal dualism of a 
“dialectic of humanism” which subsumes it (Lippet 45). Instead, the animal resides 
within, in the unconscious recesses of the creative imagination, accessed freely and 
intuitively and shaped into works of art.   
 
Anderson acknowledges, celebrates, and then mourns this animal nature, but he does 
so while simultaneously recognising the human ability to synthesise natural impulse, 
not annihilate it. As such, the loss is an ambivalent one, for it is the source of our 
greatest power and our deepest regret: the fall from nature. By exploring the cultural 
and individual recapitulation of the child amidst the “multiplicity” (131) of the 
natural, animalistic being, Anderson’s film asserts the creative vision of the 
individual as well as celebrates the bonds of the human social project.  
 
The arguments I have been making throughout this thesis contain an implied ethical 
discourse, which I will engage with explicitly in the final chapter. That discourse is, 
in essence, an ethics of compromise, but one that leaves room for constant 
renegotiation of that compromise. The filmmakers themselves take ethical stances 
by questioning political dogmatism and absolutes through their films, instead 
favouring highly personal expressions of an ethical relationship between self and 
world. In Marie Antoinette, the titular character expresses such a relationship 








“It’s Not Too Much, Is It?” Keats, Fancy, and the Ethics of Pleasurable Excess 
in Marie Antoinette 
 
 
O, sweet Fancy! let her loose; 
Every thing is spoilt by use  
–Keats, “Fancy” (1820) 
 
 
In her third feature, Marie Antoinette (2006), Sofia Coppola engages ethically with 
her protagonist subject through ambivalent depictions of excess combined with a 
sympathetic yet distanced aesthetic approach.44 Typified by the notions of what is 
considered feminine excess in Rosalind Galt’s definition of the ornamental “pretty”, 
Jeffrey Cane Robinson’s engagement with the similar excess of “fancy” in Romantic 
poetics, and Kristin Thompson’s notions of cinematic excess, Marie Antoinette 
confronts prevailing notions of “good taste” and masculine propriety. In doing so the 
film rejects the rationalising discourse of modernism as essentially unethical—
before, that is, equivocating somewhat in its final scenes. 
 
Through depictions of voracious pleasure-seeking as an antidote to personal 
suffering, an engagement with beauty and the external world that veers into a 
“material sublime” (Keats, Poems 237) in the vein of John Keats, a portrayal of 
romantic love and desire and its relation to consumerism, and the vacillation 
between a superficial characterisation of its protagonist and an assertion of her 
intrinsic value, the film asserts a sense of ethics that can be considered 
“postmodern” (Downing 148). Such a position is not rooted in indifference, but 
instead in a “questioning of assumptions” that, unlike modernism’s rigid 
proscriptions, is truly proper to the contemporary age (148). The film’s breaches of 
good taste—an aesthetic fascination with surfaces and materiality, a commitment to 
feminine notions of ornamentation, and a disregard for historical accuracy—are not 
																																																								
44
	I broadly define ethics in this context in its “normative” sense: it functions on the level of the 
individual as a “guide to life” in a moral framework encompassing “a code of conduct that, given 
specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons” (Gert and Gert).	
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just rooted in the impulses of its main character; they are part of the fabric of the 
film itself.  
 
The film’s ethical stance relates to a highly personal, idiosyncratic examination of 
the alienated individual’s relation to society through a Romantic conferring of 
“value on the insubstantial” (Cane Robinson 20) and a questioning of the “value of 
limits” (33) as a way of attacking the totalising narrative of modernism. Instead, 
Coppola’s film exhibits what Emma Francis refers to as “weak postmodernism”: it 
“rejects the possibility of discovering universal truth, values or human (or female) 
essence”, instead “making specificity the basis for political engagement” (Francis 
71). As a result, the film focuses on personal struggle in the midst of political 
revolution, not the revolution itself. This is why I have chosen to forgo a more 
obvious reading of Marie Antoinette in relation to that of Romanticism: a historical 
account of the French Revolution and the Romantic response to it—although I will 
allude to this throughout the chapter.  
 
The commitment of the “Romantic ethic” (Campbell 173) to individuality and 
personal self-expression belies the severe judgments often pronounced on a 
stereotypically feminised aesthetic and excess in general in the Romantic era. These 
judgments are countered by an alternative mode in Romantic poetics, a style largely 
defined by its excess and sensuous materiality, one considered immature next to the 
critically approved model of suffering and maturity found in the Romantic lyrical 
subject. Marie Antoinette is in many ways a film about excess, both material excess 
and the desiring mode that accompanies it, and as such I place it within this 
alternative Romantic tradition. If the most common reaction to the historical figure 
of Marie Antoinette can be described as, to use Jeffrey Cane Robinson’s term, 
“fanciphobic” (6), Coppola’s revision embraces the fanciful as a subversive 
feminine aesthetic.  
 
The film’s depiction of daydreaming, aesthetic “dreaminess”, and material 
consumption echoes Colin Campbell’s notion of “modern autonomous imaginative 
hedonism” (77) and its relation to the Romantic ethic, including Romantic love. It 
clearly depicts the ambivalence between the perpetual “desiring mode” (86) that 
such hedonism elicits and the recuperative effect of an engagement with materiality, 
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linking pleasure with pain and suffering. While the film’s climax abandons fancy to 
present Marie Antoinette in terms of its opposite—a canonical Romantic “depth” 
model of personal growth—this neither negates nor repudiates what comes before in 
the narrative. That the film’s aesthetic prettiness is shorn away and replaced with a 
shadowy, funereal pall can be viewed as much a bleak premonition of modernity as 
it can a soul-making exercise of democratic sympathy through suffering. Ultimately, 
Coppola’s questioning of masculine hegemony and the value of “soul-making” 
(Keats, Letters 250) registers as largely ambivalent.  
 
The film establishes a sympathetic milieu in which to explore these aesthetic and 
narrative preoccupations. First and foremost, Coppola chooses to foreground 
experiences of pleasure and desire through her main character. Such a sympathetic, 
pleasure-seeking ethos was fundamental to the creation of the Romantic self.  
 
Sympathy, Pleasure, and the Romantic Self 
 
Romantic philosophy is often thought to sacrifice the social (and, as a result, moral) 
order to the pre-eminence of solitary, individualistic experience. Rousseau—whose 
well-documented narcissism evinced an abiding fascination with “the distinctive 
nature of his own self” (Campbell 184)—greatly influenced the Romantics with his 
assertion of humanity’s basic goodness, a goodness which becomes morally twisted 
by the corruption and suppression of social institutions (186). He insisted that the 
social order constituted a “sacred right”, but one individuals were only “obliged to 
obey” if its powers were considered “legitimate” and held without force (Rousseau, 
The Social Contract 13), that is, if they were moral in the eyes of the individual and 
the populace (Bertram 3.3).  
 
But the Romantics were also largely influenced by the stressing of universal 
sympathy in the philosophy of David Hume. Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principle of Morals (1751) argues that we make moral judgments not by a “chain of 
argument and induction” but “by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense” 
(Hume), or feelings of disinterested moral sentiment rather than reason. He asserts 
that sympathy belongs to the “innate disposition in all human beings” and leads to 
the “approv[al] of pleasure or utility wherever it occurs” as well as the universal 
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condemnation of pain and suffering (Singer 423).  Hume defines sympathy in part as 
“emotional contagion”—a pure communication of affect between persons conferred 
into an idea by imagination (Stueber). This view allowed the Romantics to embrace 
feeling, passion, and imagination as a font of moral virtue, and also to bring the 
Romantic self into sympathetic allegiance with the rest of humanity. 
 
This “innate sympathy” forms the basis of moral behaviour within Hume’s 
philosophy (Singer 395), and implies that the individual’s experience of pleasure is 
as moral as her value to the social order. Unlike Kant, who argued that reason alone 
predicated morality (394) and derided “merely sensuous enjoyments” (Kant 142), 
Hume “affirms that kindness, bodily appetite, and the sense of beauty” are virtually 
inseparable from one another (Singer 426). According to Denise Gigante, “For the 
Romantics, aesthetic pleasure was constitutive of the human” (Gigante, “Foreword” 
Xiii). Combining Humean ideas of sympathy and popular eighteenth-century notions 
of sensibility—as well as a healthy dose of Rousseauian narcissism—Romanticism 
absorbed pleasure seeking into its ethos, seeing it as an innate moral good (Campbell 
177).  
 
The Romantic ethic not only exhibited reverence for emotion, but also a newfound 
allegiance toward sincerity over propriety (177). As the Romantic was “a person of 
true sensibility, possessed of a passionate and impetuous nature which would simply 
not permit dissembling or hypocrisy” (177), this could certainly lead to breaches of 
good taste. These transgressions were part of their own moral code, one that called 
for “defiance of convention” (177) as a reaction against bourgeois propriety and 
conventional morality (194). For the Romantic, taste became an individualistic, 
spiritual way of seeking truth via the shaping powers of the imagination (182), à la 
Keats’s famous phrase, “Beauty is truth, truth beauty” (Keats, Poems 346).  
 
Ethical in its relation to personal feeling and self-realisation, it refused to conform to 
the mass-produced “rituals, mores, and institutions” a hypocritical society 
considered moral or good, and as a result “the person of true sensibility” was bound 
to be unconventional, an “outsider” (177). As long as this personal conception of 
taste remained in the realm of the masculine imagination, it was a valid response to 
the conventional modes of morality that stifled individual freedom.  
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This didn’t stop many Romantic poets and critics from making their own 
pronouncements on what they considered bad taste. Questions of taste were integral 
in attempts to tame Romantic attitudes towards “feminine” excess. In his essay “Of 
the Standard of Taste” (1757), Hume posited that only critics possessed with a 
“strong sense” could make proper judgments of taste by “joint verdict” (Hume 24). 
This sense was “united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by 
comparison, and cleared of all prejudice” (24). According to Hume, the “cultivation” 
of taste became “a necessary part of […] moral education” (97). This moral 
education was grounded in the proper response to aesthetics.  
 
In Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794), J.C. Friedrich von Schiller 
considers beauty the very “instrument” of moral education (Schiller I, IX). Schiller’s 
concept of aesthetic education holds that “profound and thoughtful” contemplation 
of beauty leads one down a moral path (Schellekens 96). Such ideas of beauty and 
morality informed the critical view of the “low” writings of the Romantic period, 
especially the sentimental and Gothic novels of the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries. These works were considered essentially immoral, with their 
(largely female, or at least feminised) audience characterised as both “mindlessly 
passive” and “voraciously appetitive” consumers (Newlyn, in Webb 150). The 
implication is that an excess of sensory pleasure leads to a degeneration of mind, 
where a “physiological response overwhelms the consuming reader’s intellectual 
powers” (152), reducing the ability to judge good taste from bad and resulting in an 
anesthetised, passive consumer. This dual idea of passivity and voraciousness both 
indicates the removal of individual will and reason and links the consumer to the 
excesses of animalistic, bodily appetites. 
 
Fancy and Its Relation to Ethics and Excess 
 
Chief among these rejections of the aesthetic of low taste was a denigration of fancy 
in Romantic poetry (Cane Robinson 1). Jeffrey Cane Robinson makes the distinction 
between a Romantic poetry of the imagination and one of the fancy: “Compared to 
the Imagination with its muscular, sculptural powers of invention and unification, 
the Fancy acts superficially, adumbrating the pleasant but inessential features of 
grace and ornament” (2). This language—“muscular” versus “pleasant”, “essential” 
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versus “ornament”—clearly evokes traditional masculine versus feminine tropes, 
with femininity emerging as the degenerate loser in the aesthetic battle. The 
descriptors of imagination also employ the language often used to describe 
modernism itself, and combined they couch the differences between fancy and 
imagination as a struggle between reason-infused patriarchal authority and 
incoherent feminine excess (3). 
 
Fancy, in its relation to a certain strain of Romantic poetry, represents superficial 
excess, “bent on proliferation, on sheer imagery and association rather than on 
discursive coherence, on multiplicity rather than unity, or excess rather than control” 
(6). These ideas evoke sublimity, but crucially sublimity is only accessed by the 
transcendence of reason via imagination, which rejects the “erotic and sensuous” 
(6). Cane Robinson insists that this denigration of fancy is wrong-footed and 
misconstrues much of the project of Romanticism. He argues that, as Romantic art 
reflected the “politically charged temperament” and critique of social institutions 
both preceding and following the American and French revolutions, so fancy in 
Romantic art offered a “politically radical poetics” (1). This poetics was highly 
“subversive” and “progressive” in its celebration of the “mind’s freedom within an 
oppositional philosophical framework that actively seeks to constrain perception” (2, 
4). This sense of the fancy is inextricably linked to perception through the body, 
which “awaken[s] the conscious mind to a de-familiarized and therefore truer 
version of a world” (5). Unlike the rigid, “closed forms” of the imagination, fancy is 
outward looking and inclusive (4).   
 
In these descriptions, there is also a clear connection to Lisa Downing’s idea of the 
questioning of absolutes in postmodern ethics, as opposed to a rigid application of 
an incontrovertible modernist truth—these “closed forms” are related to 
modernism’s “good forms” (Lyotard 45) of cohesion and clarity. Fancy also 
operates within the bounds of sensory, bodily materiality that the idealism of the 
Romantic sublime rejects. Cane Robinson describes some of the key attributes of 
fancy: 
the disdaining of limits, exploration of the unknown, animation 
and personification of the world […] the linkage of Fancy and 
hope and vision, the mingling of pleasure and happiness with 
the body, the subordination of grief, play as a means of 
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encounter with the world, and a youthful, in the sense of 
renovative, disposition (42). 
 
The politics of fancy in this period is also couched in terms of good versus bad taste 
(11). Art steeped in fancy, in the eyes of the “cultural police” of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, has the capacity to morally degrade society through aesthetic 
means (11). Unlike the sublime aesthetic of imagination, it does not operate “above” 
the world (4); it revels in its very place within it. It eschews the traditional Romantic 
model of the authentic self, opting instead for a “restless, unpredictable drive out 
from the domain of the ego” (14), with “subjective completion […] com[ing] into 
being at the point of encounter with the world” (15). It is the opposite of an 
expression of the conservative narcissistic underpinnings of traditional ideas of the 
Romantic self, which emphasises a “bourgeois subject strong and bounded” defined 
by “internal integrity” (15), and instead aligns with the concept of the feminine 
sublime that was discussed in chapter three.  
 
What may be surprising is Cane Robinson’s insistence that fancy was not only 
embraced by women writers of the era as a “subversive” and “playful” poetics (16); 
it was also celebrated by late-Romantic canonical (male) writers including Byron, 
Shelley, and Keats, especially those members of a loose group of writers derisively 
known as the “Cockney School”—an epithet based on disdain for the “lower” 
classes and their supposed attendant lack of taste. Despite this late-Romantic turn, 
the argument against fancy continued into the twentieth-century, embraced both by 
modern art movements and, especially, by early proponents of filmic realism. 
 
Cinematic Excess: Against Realism 
 
Cane Robinson’s description of imagination versus fancy in Romantic poetry aligns 
closely with the masculine versus feminine conflict in visual art, with the masculine 
asserting supremacy via the “conservative, consoling” (6) aesthetic of the 
imagination.  This aesthetic “favors line and perspective over color and movement” 
(4). Colour is, like fancy, “dangerous: it is associated with the feelings, with passion, 
with bliss; it smacks of excess and the uncontrollable” (5). This clearly connects 
fancy to Rosalind Galt’s description of the “pretty” in visual art—in essence, the 
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pretty is the visual aesthetic of the fancy. Galt recounts the influence of Kantian 
ideas about beauty and taste on early filmmaking practices, ideas which have 
endured to the present (Galt, Pretty 38). Beauty is associated with “value”, whereas 
the pretty is merely of interest, a frivolous distraction (55).  
 
For Kant, such an interest “spoils the judgement of taste” due to its grounding in 
pleasure at the expense of reason (Kant 54). In effect, moral good (the value of 
beauty and taste) is based on conceptions of masculine disinterest, not the seduction 
of feminine “charms and emotions” (54). The “pretty” and pleasure are inextricably 
linked because they both lead down the path of excess without the moral check of 
reason. “To be beautiful is to be good, whereas to be pretty is to simply look good”, 
writes Galt (Pretty 52). As a result, filmic realism began to embrace depictions of 
“ugliness” as a true form of beauty, as “a lack of visual appeal is necessary to access 
the true” (51). This “ugliness” is rooted, in terms of cinematic realism, in an 
authenticity that is anathema to the ornamental, as it supposedly strips away surface 
pleasures to reveal the hidden depths within. 
 
Thus, according to Galt, “the modern becomes a central term in aligning the 
cinematic with the anti-pretty”, and this anti-pretty discourse is conveyed via “the 
language […] of corruption and disease” (63). As well, the discourse of realism 
places the pretty squarely within the realm of the inauthentic, engaging in “false 
aesthetics and false reality […] too picturesque, too attractive […] to be either art or 
life” (61). There is a clear moral implication here, which places “the pretty outside 
of the discourse of the good” (69). Conversely, realism invokes sublimity in its 
transcendence of materiality, commitment to “transparency and purity” and 
“historical refusal of the pleasurable and sensual” (72). In the space of cinematic 
realism, there is precious little place for play, and even less for pleasure. “The new 
masculine modern style values the ordinary, profilmic world, but it must also 
emphasize that this world is pure and lacking feminine excess” (68–69), which by 
necessity excludes the impure pretty.  
 
Both Cane Robinson and Galt attempt to rehabilitate the image of the fancy/pretty as 
a subversive counterpoint to this essentialising modernist aesthetic. It is important to 
note, especially in the context of Coppola, that both the fancy and the pretty are not 
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necessarily provocations representing complete upheavals of form. According to 
Cane Robinson, “most Romantic poetry is written in predictable forms […] yet signs 
of turbulence reside within these structures” (9). These signs of turbulence are 
similar to what Kristin Thompson sees in depictions of aesthetic excess in the 
cinema. Thompson defines cinematic excess as “those aspects of the work which are 
not contained by its unifying forces” (54). These aspects constitute aesthetic ruptures 
in the cohesive elements of the film, which do not “provide an apparent motivation” 
(55) and thus shift the spectator’s focus from the created structures of the film to the 
image’s materiality—to the film as a film (55).  
 
This excess resides in a film’s self-conscious expressions of style, but style is not 
synonymous with excess. Although “a spectator’s attention to style might well lead 
to a noticing of excess” (56), excess contains no characteristic or specific patterns 
(55). Excess, in essence, is an aberration, “a device [that] has no function beyond 
offering itself for perceptual play” which is often considered “disturbing” (57). This 
potential is disturbing because, as Thompson suggests, it defies the classical 
principle of good art as “unified and as creating a perfect order, beyond that possible 
in nature” (57). In other words, it removes art from the realm of beauty. 
 
Coppola does not necessarily abandon a reverence for beauty through her 
commitment to the fancy and the pretty. Her version of stylistic excess is more in 
tune with what V.F. Perkins calls “aesthetic suspense”, which he defines as “an 
intensification” that is “calculated to arrive at, but not to pass, the edge of absurdity” 
(Perkins 226)—although at times the film does present aesthetic aberrations that are 
clearly absurd (such as the notorious, fleeting inclusion of Converse shoes).  
 
Alex Clayton elaborates on Perkins’s definition of such suspense, which is itself 
connected to notions of good and bad taste. Aesthetic suspense “results from the 
perception that we are only a whisker away from risibility” (212), straddling “the 
line between aestheticism and naturalism, mystification and cliché, subjective 
alignment and autonomy of viewpoint” (214). A film that purports to be an objective 
reproduction of reality is potentially revealed to be a fictional conception of it.  
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Like Thompson’s depictions of general cinematic excess, aesthetic suspense engages 
the spectator on the level of materiality, inviting her to offer judgment through 
perception of the filmmaker’s choice—what Clayton refers to as “the daring choice 
that declares itself” (211)—which leads the viewer to experience pleasure through 
the exercise of that judgment. This suspense can “border on the ludicrous” (213) in 
its breaches of aesthetic decorum and taste. Not being grounded in any particular set 
of conventions, it evinces a lack of structural unity in the film as a whole, and its 
tension resides in whether or not this will “punctur[e] the film’s drama and 
invitation to emotional investment” (209). That is, if the spectator focuses too 
closely on these self-conscious aesthetic dimensions, the narrative spell is in danger 
of being broken.  
 
This sense of the ludicrous arises from events that are not dramatically motivated or 
make sense in the film’s diegetic world. Instead, they draw attention to themselves 
as artistic devices, ruining the effect of narrative immersion and confusing the 
spectator’s sense of emotional engagement. Marie Antoinette‘s expressions of 
excess punctuate the film throughout. Like many of the films I have discussed in 
other chapters, it straddles the line of emotional engagement with the spectator and a 
self-acknowledged aesthetic absurdity. 
 
Marie Antoinette and the Valuation of Taste 
 
Marie Antoinette (2006) is Coppola’s third feature, and her first to be met with a 
large amount of critical rancour. The Guardian decries its “tedious vacuity” 
(French) and its lack of attention to historical and political detail as an attempt to 
“remove history’s gangrene” (Bradshaw). Even somewhat positive reviews could 
not resist making digs at the director’s supposedly insensitive dismissal of historical 
realities. According to the BBC, Coppola chooses to highlight “our modern 
obsession with wealthy blonde bimbos”, creating a confection that “mightn't be food 
for the soul, but […] is a pleasurable sugar rush” (Papamichael). The film’s 
marketing campaign emphasises these candyfloss-and-meringue conceptions; the 
2007 British DVD release splashes a pandering quote from Empire magazine on its 
hot pink cover, proclaiming the film “…the ultimate chick flick, a love letter to 
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cake, Moët, pyjama parties and rampant romps…” The fact that this does not 
adequately represent Coppola’s film is simply beside the point for many detractors; 
that she could lend a historical narrative ostensibly about life-and-death 
revolutionary turmoil the mere appearance of frivolity is crime enough.  
 
Just as with the marginalisation of the so-called “chick flick” today, the novel of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was similarly dismissed as seductively 
feminine and superficial, offering a meal that, while seemingly satisfying to the 
popular taste, contained little real nourishment (Webb 150). Samantha Webb 
considers how consumption practices of these novels were couched in metaphors of 
eating, “both as indicators of aesthetic value and as descriptions of reception 
practices” (150). These “edible books” were considered “low”, “populist”, and 
(according to Wordsworth) “food for fickle tastes, and fickle appetites” (149). A 
direct line between these feminised narrative forms of the eighteenth century and 
Marie Antoinette can be drawn—it has essentially been derided as an edible film, 
delicious and decadent in its excess but not suitably filling. In some ways, it is a 
perfect metaphor for a narrative that itself deals with out-of-control, unwholesome 
consumption.  
 
Addressing Wordsworth’s “range of anxieties about the power of representations” in 
her writing on “The Ruined Cottage”, Karen Swann points to these feminised 
excesses of the literary culture of the early nineteenth century and its link to 
“popular sensational fiction, feminine characters and plots, and a feminine or 
feminized audience” (90). Under this rubric, Swann asserts, Wordsworth composed 
his poem with an eye to straddling popular “feminine narrative machinery” and the 
far more exalted world of high Romantic poetry, appealing to an “audience whose 
pleasure it is to exist at a small distance from the captivated feminine heart” (84). In 
this way he was appropriating, in reflexive fashion, the popular tastes of the day 
while simultaneously challenging those tastes (93).  
 
With Marie Antoinette, Coppola attempts a similar transposition of “high” and 
“low” (or, more precisely, masculine and feminine) through her aesthetic 
excessiveness combined with a “small distance” from her subjects—or, as in 
Clayton’s description of aesthetic suspense, a blend of “subjective alignment and 
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autonomy of viewpoint” (214). She has made a film about feminine excess, more 
specifically the excess of consumption. But while Wordsworth uses the feminised 
tropes of his time to “entice and reprove” (Swann 93), Coppola presents at a 
sympathetic remove. It is possible the less-than-glowing critical reception of Marie 
Antoinette can be chalked up to its portrayal of this excessive “feminine heart” at an 
uncritical distance—not because she is passing judgment on her characters or her 
audience, but precisely because she is not.  
 
The scholarly response to Marie Antoinette takes a more measured, less morally 
chagrined approach to the film, largely focusing on its discourse on the body, 
fashion, and anachronism. Heidi Brevik-Zender engages the film’s use of fashion 
via Walter Benjamin’s concept of an ahistorical “now time” that is, according to her, 
the hallmark of modernity (2). Anna Backman Rogers also writes about the film in 
relation to ahistoricism, specifically through its use of ritual and repetition. Pamela 
Flores tackles the film from a semiotic perspective, drawing on fashion and the body 
and its use in image creation. And Suzanne Ferriss and Mallory Young cover the 
film’s relation to “Third-Wave” feminism and the contemporary prevalence of 
“chick culture”, highlighting the film’s sympathetic portrayal of the queen through a 
depiction of “feminine display as meaningful, rather than simply frivolous” (104).  
 
Richard Rushton invokes the work of Stanley Cavell and the “melodramas of the 
unknown woman” in relating Marie Antoinette to a “world of ‘moral catastrophe’” 
(114), one that denies her the will to self-determination (124). Rushton, while 
asserting that the film is an ethical text, downplays the significance of its depictions 
of excessive consumption (121). However, I believe these sequences are crucial to 
Marie’s construction of self-identity and thus are part of the film’s overall ethical 
stance; while they do not ultimately prove satisfying and soul-making, they 
represent Marie’s desire to construct a feeling of wholeness through pleasurable 
consumption—a striving for the Kantian good of beauty that inadvertently achieves 
a state of sublimity through indecorous material excess.  
 
Coppola’s retelling of the life story of the French queen, from just before her first 
appearance at Versailles, at the tender age of fourteen, to her forced exile (skipping 
the gruesome climax at the guillotine), is indeed more concerned with surface detail 
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and the day-to-day activities of its subject, largely removed from the political sphere 
of the French court. But this does not make Coppola’s film any less political, even 
as it represents history as transhistorical anachronism through fashion. Steeped as it 
is in highly feminine display, whose valorisation can be attributed to feminism’s so-
called “Third Wave” (Ferriss and Young 104), it also reifies the notion that “the 
personal is political” that emerged as a radical idea during its “Second Wave” 
(Hanisch). Nor is Coppola’s approach to the waning days of the decadent ancién 
regime a less ethical one as a result of its emphasis on personal history. As the film’s 
star, Kirsten Dunst, phrases it, Marie Antoinette is “like a history of feelings rather 
than a history of facts” (O’Hagan).  
Writing from a historian’s perspective, Jennifer Milam claims the film not only 
“question[s] the authority of history” but also deconstructs history completely, 
“through an insistence upon the authority of individual response and personal 
imagination” (47). Coppola’s film is not interested in didactic modes of instruction. 
The Romantic doctrine declares that art itself, not instruction or “models of 
righteousness”, can create virtue (Campbell 187) by “sensitizing, purifying and 
strengthening the feelings” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp 330). The film’s 
virtue relies on creating sense impressions of events through a sympathetic, non-
judgmental fellow feeling between filmmaker and filmic subject. Even those who 
didn’t warm to the film recognise this “sisterly, unjudging intimacy” (Bradshaw) 
“uncritically rendered” (French) in a “sympathetic portrait” (Papamichael) of the 
young queen. 
While Philip French considers “uncritically rendered” a negative critique, I argue 
that Coppola’s uncritical stance is the very essence of her ethical approach. As 
Rosalind Galt points out in her discussion of Marie Antoinette, “Unlike much 
writing on decorative commodity cultures, this discourse on the historical 
objecthood of the female body strikingly refuses to blame the woman for her out-of-
control consumption” (22). Coppola refers to her first three films (The Virgin 
Suicides, 2003’s Lost in Translation, and Marie Antoinette) as a trilogy concerning 
the experience of growth into womanhood: “[Marie Antoinette is] a continuation of 
the other two films—sort of about a lonely girl in a big hotel or palace or whatever, 
kind of wandering around, trying to grow up”, she tells the New York Times 
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(Hohenadel).45 
The film can, like The Virgin Suicides, be analysed via its aesthetic use of the 
“pretty”; it similarly asserts a commitment to colour and feminine surface splendour 
at the expense of a masculine and modernist desire for utilitarian value and reason. 
Coppola portrays both the sense of freedom and enclosure that materiality brings 
through surface decoration, framing, performance, and depictions of pleasurable 
sensation, especially those of sight, taste, and most pointedly touch. It might seem 
like this preoccupation with materiality and sensory experience goes against the 
Romantic veneration of the ideal. But in many striking ways, Coppola continues the 
projects of Keats, whose form of “concrete idealism” (Bate, Negative Capability 46) 
distinguished him from earlier Romantics like the anti-fancy Coleridge in his 
confinement to the particular and the empirical (38) and his expression of the 
“pervasive eroticism” underlying Romantic thought (Singer 295). 
Keats and Fancy as an Alternative Romantic Discourse 
Keats’s personal philosophy of “negative capability” (Keats, Letters 43) and a 
reverence for the “material sublime” (Poems 237) champions an ethical engagement 
with material reality at the expense of ego, energetically calling for a “Life of 
Sensations rather than of Thoughts” (Letters 37). This Keatsian life contains a wish 
“for sensory surfeit, not the grand immateriality” (Winakur Tontplaphol 46) of what 
he refers to as “the dark void of night” in the 1818 poem “To J.H. Reynolds, Esq.” 
(Poems 237). This dark void, in essence, is the Wordsworthian “egotistical sublime” 
(a phrase Keats himself coined) (Letters 157), which emphasises the mind’s 
idealisation of experience at the expense of the concrete. There is a direct contrast, 
in Keats’s vision, between thinking and feeling—the former abstracts the world; the 
latter reaches out towards it in sensuous communion. 
																																																								
45
	The press likes to emphasise Coppola’s use of interjectory filler words such as “um”, “like”, and 
“whatever”, perhaps to paint a portrait of her as cluelessly grasping and even inconsequential, 
although these placeholder words do lend a characteristic impressionism and ambiguity to her 
thoughts. One 2006 Guardian article characterises Coppola as a pampered and insolent adolescent 
not unlike Marie-Antoinette: “Sofia Coppola could easily be a character in one of her own films, a 
day-dreamy, slightly disconnected but immaculately stylish waif who seems all at sea in a world of 
extraordinary privilege. She is tiny and speaks quickly and quietly, her sentences sometimes petering 
out as if from the sheer effort of formulating them” (O’Hagan). The writer goes on to describe 
Coppola as “like a slightly out-to-lunch teenager” and “sulkily beautiful”, and describes her much 
less accomplished filmmaker brother Roman (who directed the second unit on Marie Antoinette) as 
the “male heir apparent” of the Coppola clan (O’Hagan). 
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According to Cane Robinson, while Keats’s earlier work falls squarely within the 
tradition of the poetic fancy, it is often critically dismissed as a simple part of the 
process of maturation along the road to an exhibited scepticism of fancy and an 
overall “disinterested tragic attitude” (36). However, he points to the assertion of 
Keats’s contemporary, poet and critic Leigh Hunt (the de facto leader of the 
“Cockney School”), that Keats’s poetry “reaches humanity less through the tragic 
vision and more through the comic vision of energies and sensualities” (143). “At 
least as much as he gravitates toward the ‘depths,’ Keats is drawn—in the way of the 
Fancy—to the surface”, Cane Robinson asserts (142). This manifestation of fancy 
facilitates “poetry of the liberation of body and mind”, in part a defiance of the 
“Western (masculine) lyric” of canonical Romantic poetry (144). According to 
Lionel Trilling, “The complex of pleasure-sensuality-luxury makes the very fabric 
of [Keats’s] thought” (Trilling, “The Fate of Pleasure” 67). This Keatsian 
combination is readily apparent in Coppola’s film, and represents a mode of psycho-
social recuperation for its protagonist. 
It is Marie’s own engagement with pleasurable materiality in an environment that 
denies her subjectivity and personal freedom that constitutes her campaign against 
the powers that confine and diminish her, as well as her self-expression as a creative 
being. In fact, she uses the very tools of fashion to construct and re-construct a sense 
of identity as a veritable “declaration of independence” (Flores 614). Coppola’s film 
exhibits a reverence for fancy that can be attributed to a subversive desire for 
pleasure and playfulness, aligning it with a more typically feminised view, derided 
as “culturally less ‘serious’” (Cane Robinson 16). The fancy, according to Cane 
Robinson, is a “natural poetics” for women, excluded as they are from the traditional 
space of the masculine ego (16). If it is seen to have a political mission, it is one of 
“mak[ing] visible […] that which was not seen or heard for itself” (16).  
The feminine “voice” within mainstream filmmaking is, of course, a seriously 
marginalised one in our own time, as much if not more so as a feminine poetics was 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 46  As Downing writes in relation to 
postmodern ethics in the cinema in general, Marie Antoinette represents “tantalizing 
																																																								
46
	There is no shortage of statistical and anecdotal evidence to support the conception of a so-called 
“gender gap” in both Hollywood and European filmmaking. See Lang, Siegel, Cwik.		
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and plural ethical alternatives to the universalizing […] discourses of modernism” 
(148). While it makes sense for a high-profile female filmmaker like Coppola to turn 
to a more traditionally feminine mode of aesthetics in order to assert alternatives to 
the overwhelming dominance of masculine modernism, it makes her work decidedly 
vulnerable to attack as being capricious, trivial, and superficial. 
Coppola—who adapts her screenplay from the bestselling 2002 biography by 
Antonia Fraser, Marie Antoinette: The Journey—manages the feat of taking a 
woman who was, for the revolutionary, decried as a symbol of the decadent and 
corrupt old order47 and turning her into the tragic, grasping heroine of her own 
highly Romantic Bildungsroman. She abandons the genre of the fact-based historical 
biopic and instead crafts a melodrama (Rushton 114) more interested, like Keats, in 
a life of emotion and sensation than in settling the historic record. Coppola remarked 
to Fraser that Fraser’s depiction of Marie’s story was “the best one […] full of life, 
not a dry historical drama” (Fraser, my emphasis), and this sense of organic “life” is 
what drives the work of Keats.  
For Keats, “Myth and symbol contained more truth than any careful, ‘true-to-life’ 
observation and actuality” (Campbell 186), and the same can be said for Coppola’s 
film. It does not represent the “truth” of grand historical narratives so much as 
embody a sense of what Downing has called being “true to itself” (Downing 150). 
Throughout the film, an ambivalence remains, one personified by its protagonist. As 
I will show, in many respects Marie-Antoinette represents an aesthetic and 
ideological schism: She inhabits the splits between the beautiful and the sublime; the 
fancy and the imagination; the ancién regime’s crumbling aristocratic decadence and 
the new values of bourgeois democratic individualism; passive consumption and 





	Vivian R. Gruder examines whether the public attitude toward Marie-Antoinette in the pre-
Revolutionary era was actually as derisive as it is now portrayed, or if this idea is itself indicative of 
revisionist history. While various “scandal” pamphlets on Louis XV and his mistresses, Pompadour 
and Du Barry, circulated widely during his reign (271-272), according to Gruder, “The young king, 
and especially the young queen who had so visibly disliked Du Barry, seemed initially to heighten the 
moral tone of the court” (273). However, she also concedes, “fresh scurrilous gossip quickly 
circulated against the young royal couple, in particular against the queen” (273). Regardless of the 
severity or number of actual attacks against Marie-Antoinette’s character, she persists as a symbol of 
decadence and the subject of popular ridicule in the post-Revolutionary imagination. 
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 “Natural’s Not in It”: Coppola’s Narrative and Aesthetic Aims 
 
Coppola’s production gained unprecedented access to actual Versailles locations 
during shooting (Hohenadel), which lends the film a degree of authenticity she 
nevertheless has no compunction undermining. The film is comprised of four 
discrete sections: Marie’s marriage to the dauphin and struggle to consummate the 
union and bear a much-needed male heir to the throne; her days of lavish, decadent 
parties and voracious consumption with a coterie of favourites; her time spent in the 
relative seclusion of her Petit Trianon country retreat; and the later years on the cusp 
of revolution, when she comes to accept her place in the court and her ultimate fate. 
Throughout, Coppola’s unique mix of sympathy and objectivity define her narrative 
as well as aesthetic aims. That Marie’s campaign is ultimately unfulfilling and 
betrays tragic consequences for her own life is, as Galt writes, not a subject of 
judgment for Coppola. As Cane Robinson argues, fancy’s reluctance to render a 
clear point of view or ego-identification (like Keats’s negative capability) lends the 
reader (or spectator, in this case) the “relative freedom to think—not in a free space 
designed for contemplation but in the midst of conflict and opposition” (41). The 
film is rife with such oppositions and conflicts, and thus questionings, both at the 
level of style and character.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Marie’s point-of-view of the sneering, sceptical royal court is quickly 








Early scenes when Marie first arrives at the palace and enters her private apartment 
are shot from her point-of-view or with the camera tracking from over her shoulder, 
aligning the spectator’s sight with the character’s and filmmaker’s as she struggles 
to take in the scene (figure 5.1). Quickly point-of-view shots are juxtaposed with 
images of Marie on display: she sits in front of her dressing table mirror and unfurls 
a fan in front of her face, checking her appearance. In the next shot we see her 
staring out a window contemplatively, and we again see her point of view: the 
intimidating and overly regimented Versailles gardens in all their formal aesthetic 
rigour. The contrast between prettified decorative excess and the arch lines and 
geometric formations in the interior and exterior respectively hint at the aesthetic 
tightrope Marie must walk in order to be accepted by the court, just as a mix of POV 
and presentational, self-image-oriented shots speak to her as frightened child and 
object on display.  
 
Scenes strongly depicting Marie’s point of view appear again, such as the wedding 
scene, and hand-held extreme close-ups on her face are utilised when she breaks 
down in sobs behind her bedroom door, but Dunst is largely shot from the point of 
view of an objective spectator, often as one fragile component of mise-en-scène. In a 
pivotal scene we hear, in voice-over, Marie’s mother (Marianne Faithfull) warning 
her of the negative consequences of not producing an heir before her sister-in-law. 
Marie stands alone on a palace balcony as the camera zooms out slowly and steadily 
from medium long shot48 (figure 5.2). She is framed by massive, wide-open French 
doors, creating a black void of space that feels as if it could swallow her up. 
Imposing stone columns box her in on both sides, and the balcony’s rails cover her 
body from the waist down like truncated prison bars. The effect is of the unyielding, 
crushing weight of expectation and institutional history, Marie objectified by that 
history, supremely alone. The camera zooms out further until she is but a 
compositional speck, with additional columns and doors filling the frame. The 





	Such statically composed long takes with slow zooms either in or out appear regularly in 
Coppola’s films, and usually represent a crucial moment of introspection or a psychological turning 
point on the protagonist’s part, such as the silent, lengthy shot of Johnny Marco (Stephen Dorff) 
being fitted for a prosthetic mask in Somewhere (2010).	
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Figure 5.2 Trapped in a regal prison, Marie-Antoinette is weighed down both 
by history and expectation.  
 
The opening shot of Coppola’s film (figure 5.3) paints a brief scene of the French 
queen at her most on display, luxuriously relaxed and seemingly complicit in her 
“too-be-looked-at-ness” (Mulvey 62). Something akin to an in media res opening, 
this scene actually exists outside the diegesis, and operates more like a pure fantasy 
image. Over the strains of the Gang of Four’s 1979 song “Natural’s Not in It”, Marie 
appears onscreen in medium-long shot, her eyes closed with her face raised as she 
reclines on a blue-and-white chaise longue in a parody of a neoclassical pose, such 
as the one found in Jacques-Louis David’s Portrait of Madame Récamier (1800). 
The queen’s milieu and costume, however, are anything but neoclassical. Her 
voluminous hair in her signature pouf style with a plumage of giant white feathers 
consumes much of the top left frame. The space is shallow and planimetric, as if 
Marie is placed onstage. In the first of plentiful references to the dessert she 





Figure 5.3 The film’s first image sets up its discourse on excess regarding both 
femininity and consumption. 
 
The effect is akin to “Still Life with Queen”, a tableau vivant of decadence that 
reduces Marie to a prop (almost a cake herself). Brevik-Zender calls it “a visual 
representation of the stereotype of the ruinous female narcissist” (15)—a 
conventional judgment of the queen that the film ultimately denies. While 
meticulously composed, it seems garish, indecorous, even infantile. 
Anachronistically, her maid is dressed in a stock bourgeois “French maid” costume 
and could have stepped out of a twentieth-century French bedroom farce. There is a 
tension between constriction, with the fussy fabrics and heavy sense of indolence, 
and freedom, in its fanciful colours and glimpses of flesh. Its colours speak to a 
Rococo sense of whimsy, but the precise composition and symmetrical geometric 
forms evoke the feeling of a pretty prison. Like the girl tableaux shots in The Virgin 
Suicides, it is so ripe with femininity as to be confrontational, but the dreamy 
delicacy of the previous film is absent.  
 
It becomes clear from this one shot that Marie Antoinette will not be a simple 
retelling of history. According to Brevik-Zender, its transhistorical narrative opts 
instead for Walter Benjamin’s conception of “now time”, which “troubles the notion 
that an accurate representation of history is desirable or even possible” (10–11). 
Anna Backman Rogers notes that Coppola’s “elision of contemporary and historical 
time” reflects a social order that is “hermetically sealed” and “function[s] like a self-
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perpetuating machine running on empty” (88). In a more positive, recuperative 
sense, its playfulness also clearly aligns it with fancy, which is “not particularly 
subject to movement through biological or historical time” (Cane Robinson 38). 
Specifically, it offers a control of time and space similar to what Walter Jackson 
Bate sees in the work of Keats (Negative Capability 19). Purely imaginative, this 
scene seems to only be able to exist within “now” time. 
 
Marie’s direct camera address announces a disregard for classical modes of 
storytelling and defiance of narrative boundaries, or indeed any bounds of good taste 
and propriety on the part of the film’s protagonist and its director. It also 
underscores Coppola’s preoccupation with the gaze. But this is not a gaze that 
submits to traditional notions of “dominant–submissive logic” (Downing 124) of the 
camera/spectator and scopophiliac object (Mulvey 59), respectively. Instead, it 
evokes the idea of Foucault’s Panopticon, which adopts a “pan-voyeuristic 
perspective”, asserting the “shared directorial-spectatorial desire” inherent in 
cinematic practices (Downing 125). Marie-Antoinette is always on display, and 
always aware of her display. But her gaze also speaks to her own desiring ethos.  
 
Richard Rushton notes that the film’s opening song underscores the “unnatural” 
quality of the Versailles court and Marie’s difficulty in dealing with all that denies 
her “responses, attitudes and instincts” (117). I would also argue that the song 
immediately cues Coppola’s own artistic aims; there is as little of the natural in 
Marie Antoinette as there is in the rigid, nonsensical social constrictions of 
Versailles. In this way Coppola’s film also questions the claim of discovering truth 
through filmic realism. By highlighting the constructed nature of its images it 
counteracts the subgenre of what Jennifer Milam refers to as “realist history”, films 
which attempt “to convince the viewer that they have successfully recreated the total 
historical space” in their mise-en-scène and “assume that the truth of history lies in 
its surfaces” (49). Somewhat counter-intuitively, by drawing attention to those 
surfaces Coppola’s film exposes them for what they are: personal, imaginative 
recreation, and not historical truth. Such recreations invariably take on a subjective 




Marie Antoinette and the “Material Sublime” 
The title of one of Coppola’s first films, the 1998 short “Lick the Star”, recalls a line 
from Keats’s poem Lamia.49 The line in question occurs in a stanza describing, in 
sublime fashion, the colourful and cosmic appearance of the titular demigoddess:  
 
And, as the lava ravishes the mead, 
Spoilt all her silver mail, and golden brede; 
Made gloom of all her frecklings, streaks and bars, 
Eclips’d her crescents, and lick’d up her stars  
(Poems 418, emphasis added) 
 
This poem offers a variety of ways in which to decipher Marie Antoinette’s relation 
to both materiality and the body, particularly the female body. Barbara Schapiro 
claims that the women in Keats’s poems had “ambivalent character” (33), and 
Lamia is certainly no exception (although she is not actually a human woman, she 
takes the form of one). While Keats depicts Lamia as something of a monster in her 
personification of excess, he also exhibits sympathy for his character and takes pains 
to depict her point of view. Keats’s treatment of Lamia is not unlike Coppola’s 
treatment of Marie, which utilises a combination of sympathy and objectivity. 
Likewise, Keats’s depictions of excess and monstrosity align closely with the 
various ways both Marie-Antoinette and the mise-en-scène are depicted in the film. 
 
Betsy Winakur Tontplaphol describes how Lamia supports a conception of the 
sublime that is sourced in material excess. “In Lamia, Keats embraces materio-
sensory engorgement as the purest, if most difficult to sustain, experience of 
pleasure”, she writes (43). Crucially, that excess is found within a delimited space 
for Keats. While the poet championed “sense-gratifying stimuli” and material 
pleasure (41), he also strove for a “tension between container and contained” (42, 
her emphasis), depicting material excess within smaller environments rather than 
																																																								
49
	It should be noted that the film’s title explicitly relates to the sensationalist 1979 novel Flowers in 
the Attic by V.C. Andrews, a modern Gothic tale involving incest and abuse. In Coppola’s film 
teenage girls obsessed with the story and its instance of attempted murder via rat poison alter the 
phrase “Kill the rats” into its mirror image, “Lick the star”. The novel’s subject matter aligns closely 
with the Gothic fiction that Coppola invokes in The Virgin Suicides with its themes of sexual 
repression and familial oppression. It is also a very obvious example of the “women’s fiction” that 
Wordsworth and his contemporaries would likely deride as frivolous, superficial, and dangerously 
feminine.	
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ones distinguished by grandeur (40). This leads to an “indecorous” aesthetic 
Winakur Tontplaphol characterises as the “cornerstone of Keatsian pleasure”, a 
pleasure than exists in material sublimity rather than picturesque composure (42).  It 
might seem counterintuitive to place the imposing grandeur of the grand Baroque 
Palace of Versailles in the context of Keats’s love of the “Spenserian bower” (41), 
but Coppola’s film sets out to delimit space in a way that not only defines the palace 
as a literal prison but as the site of Marie’s construction of a “rich cocoon” (56) not 
unlike the one mythical demigoddess Lamia seeks to create. 
 
The film’s second act contains the most obvious depictions of material excess and a 
Keatsian obsession with “creature-pleasures” (Trilling, “The Fate of Pleasure” 67). 
Having become the subject of ridicule for being unable to get pregnant, Marie-
Antoinette drowns her sorrows by swimming in yards of the finest French silk, 
indulging in the most expensive Champagne, and commissioning the highest and 
most outrageous powdered wigs ever constructed. The sequence that has drawn the 
most critical attention, a shopping-and-eating montage set to Bow Wow Wow’s 
1980s nod to sugary pleasures (including sex), “I Want Candy”, flaunts Marie and 
her friends’ frivolous descent into a debauchery of material excess—a cornucopia of 
dresses, expensive fabrics and embroidery, accessories, and most especially shoes 
flit by onscreen in quick cuts emphasising the fleeting nature of consumption and 
the need to fulfil new and greater material desires to maintain previous levels of 
pleasure (figure 5.4). 
“It is clear that Marie Antoinette wants something more than candy, and the film 
uses this metaphor to show that the discursive performance is focused on wanting 
not doing”, writes Pamela Flores (615, her emphasis). Coppola depicts this desire by 
the repetitive grasping found in graphically matching shots. Marie’s arms reach into 
frame to pick up a pair of pastel high-heeled slippers (designed by modern couture 
label Manolo Blahnik), and a moment later we see her reach into frame again for a 
different pair via jump cut. The shoes are reconfigured in various bird’s-eye-view 
images, with jumps lending an artificial movement akin to stop-motion animation, 
making it seem as if they are imbued with organic life. 
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Again there is blatant anachronism, this time in the form of the controversial 
addition of twentieth-century-designed Converse athletic shoes, which also 
emphasise the mix of “high” and “low” culture when contrasted with the expensive 
designer shoes. Fashion itself, as Brevik-Zender writes, is a “transhistorical” 
depiction of now time (5), as it “draws from the past even as it looks to the future in 
its representation of the present” (3). According to Flores, fashion creates a rupture, 
“which frees individuality, replaces the primacy of past mythical times with an 
ephemeral present, and turns change into a social value” (614). Coppola’s use of 
fashion anachronisms embellishes this idea of the film as transhistorical, and also 
points to such social value. It also conjures the mental freedom of fancy in allowing 
a “new” view of the world through both “contemplation” and “construction” (Cane 
Robinson 21). This newness writes over the past as it looks with desire toward an 
ever-unfolding future. 
 
Figure 5.4 The “I Want Candy” montage sequence links pleasurable 
consumption to fleeting desire, historical anachronism, and the female body. 
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Other objects, including food, are integral to the film’s depictions of consumption. 
Ladies gorge themselves on ornate pastel cakes and pastries, some of which are so 
large they can barely fit in their mouths—Brevik-Zender references their visual 
similarity to breasts (24), linking them to a commodified and consumed female 
body. Even gambling chips resemble iced pink biscuits. Amidst the dizzying array 
of artfully composed still-life-in-action shots of desserts and shoes, the soundtrack 
becomes momentarily dissonant, as if signalling an increasing vertigo brought on by 
such sensory overabundance—it is too much to take in for the spectator, and even 
for the film itself. The sequence ends with Marie being fitted with a new 
outrageously ornate pouf wig complete with miniature artificial birds. She turns to 
her stylist, known simply as Léonard, and asks him guilelessly, “It’s not too much, is 
it?”  
 
Of course it is too much, and that is the point. In contrast to the glares and snickers 
she receives during long solitary walks down the palace corridors, where spiteful 
courtiers whisper nasty epithets and gossip about the queen within her earshot, in her 
fantasia of pleasurable consumption, ecstatic delight and positive feelings dominate. 
Members of the court call her frigid, an “Austrian spy”, and outright challenge her, 
“Give us an heir!” But her affective connections through consumption are another 
story. “I love your hair; what’s going on there?” Marie asks a lady-in-waiting. 
“Everything”, she replies with a friendly laugh.   
 
At first sartorial composure serves as a mode of ranking the ladies of the court—
exceeding the boundaries of good taste is proof you are a scandalous whore, such as 
in the case of the Louis XV’s consort, Madame Du Barry (Asia Argento). Her 
emerald- and ruby-hued dresses (in reality, much more historically accurate than 
Marie’s pastel-hued frocks) (Weber 149) and lack of general restraint are a cause for 
derision amongst Marie and her group. Marie even refuses to talk with her despite 
the urgings of Ambassador Mercy (Steve Coogan). “Do you think she’s wearing 
enough jewellery?” she snipes in Du Barry’s direction, in what seems a concerted 
attempt to blend in with the gossiping hordes. Later, when Mercy tells her Du Barry 
would like to present her with diamonds, she scoffs and tells him she has quite 
enough already.  
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Later, however, Marie grows to embrace a too-much-is-never-enough ethos. 
Caroline Weber describes how the real Marie-Antoinette used her sartorial choices 
to set fashion trends among the aristocracy and even the growing middle classes (5), 
using fashion to exert “an appearance of political credit” to make up for her failure 
to conceive (4). Coppola, however, does not appear interested in the idea of Marie 
cannily using her outrageous fashion choices to gain political credit—they are 
portrayed much more as motivated out of desire for decorative beauty, a cocoon of 
excess and pleasurable affirmation during her confinement.  
 
Her obsession with material excess becomes, in fact, a way for her to transport 
herself, a sublime experience that temporarily negates her earthly suffering. 
However, if ”deployments of power are directly connected to the body—to bodies, 
functions, physiological processes, sensations and pleasures” (Foucault 151–152), 
these sartorial excesses are connected to Marie’s unconscious attempts to wield 
power in the only way afforded to her. In effect, her bad taste and breaches of 
aesthetic decorum though choices Weber notes were “better suited to a king’s 
mistress than to a king’s wife” become a symbol of “unbridled female 
acquisitiveness” (Weber 119). In this way they can be seen as a subversive political 
act, however unconsciously portrayed.  
 
Lamia, fearing the revelation of her inhumanity, fashions a “barely containable […] 
opulent jumble” of materiality in the small space of her wedding banquet as a form 
of psychic armour (Winakur Tontplaphol 55–6). Many of the film’s depictions of 
materialist excess take place in Marie’s rooms, away from the public eye, which 
function as a space where she is free to create herself in her own image. While Keats 
embraces “materio-sensory engorgement” as the “purest” form of pleasure, he also 
acknowledges it as the most difficult form to sustain (43). According to Winakur 
Tontplaphol, “Keats questions the pleasure of limitlessness—and, as a result, the 
value of limitless pleasure” (49). The sublimity of Versailles is rooted in this sense 
of limitlessness—not necessarily in the edifice itself, but in the supposedly divine 
institution it represents, the monarchy and the state. Marie’s sublimity is rooted in 
her attempts to achieve transcendence based in something far less ideal, by carving 
out smaller spaces within which to express her desire for pleasurable, sensuous 
excess. 
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When Marie’s pleasurable sugar rush begins to give her headaches, she usually 
retreats to her private apartments. At times these smaller spaces also represent a 
desire for picturesque unity, betraying a subconscious recognition that sublime 
limitlessness conveys as much pain as pleasure. Coppola frames Marie ensconced in 
the womblike comfort of her daybed in the small sitting room off her bedroom 
(complete with “secret” door, which imbues it with a certain mystery that would 
intrigue most any adolescent girl). In one brief scene she is dressed only in a post-
bath towel, her hair loose and natural and her legs tucked underneath her as she lies 
in the foetal position. The room’s accent colour is the same icy blue from the 
opening scene, a colour that becomes something of Marie’s signature from the time 
she leaves Austria behind and exchanges her pale yellow frock for an ornate blue 
gown. It comes to represent a shoring up of her defences, just as pink signifies her 
desire for pleasure and sensuous abandon. (Not coincidentally, perhaps, Fraser 
reveals that Coppola’s personal stationery is of the same pale blue, a “good Marie 
Antoinette color!”) This cocooning fosters a sense of psychological wellbeing within 
Marie, but it is also insidiously anesthetising. 
 
In a letter to J.H. Reynolds from 1818, Keats compares the totality of a human life to 
a “Mansion of Many Apartments” (Keats, Letters 95). (Coppola reconfigures this 
idea into the aforementioned “big hotel or palace”.) Applying Keats’s metaphor to 
Versailles specifically, Marie’s “small private apartments, surrounded by her fabrics 
and trinkets" (Coppola) represent an intoxicating “Chamber of Maiden Thought” in 
which “we see nothing but pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever in 
delight” (Letters 95). Literally a maiden chamber at the point when Marie has yet to 
consummate her marriage, this is the realm of the fanciful dreamer, an initial, 
unsophisticated phase that comes before “convincing ones’ nerves that the World is 
full of misery and heartbreak, pain, sickness and oppression” (95).   
 
Coppola purposefully depicts these rooms as the site of Marie’s daydreaming. When 
she is overcome by heroic battlefield fantasies of her soldier lover, Count Fersen 
(Jamie Dornan), in full “proto-Napoleonic” pose on his steed (Bradshaw), she 
excuses herself from her husband and members of the court to flee down the cold, 
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imposing palace hallways, a literal depiction of Keats’s “dark passages”, which 
function as a recurring motif of isolation and loneliness in the film (figure 5.5). 
Running quickly and daintily with staccato baby steps through these passages, 
escaping what they represent, she enters her bedroom and collapses onto the bed, 
smiling wanly as if in a narcotic stupor as she fantasises about her lover. Such 
daydreaming also relates to fancy—it is no coincidence that in the nineteenth 
century, the word fancier was synonymous with dreamer (Cane Robinson 10). 
 
 
Figure 5.5 The palace’s grand hallways are a visual symbol of Marie’s isolation 
and societal alienation, which she seeks to escape via daydream. 
 
The “Romantic Ethic”, Daydreaming, and Modern Consumption  
 
Marie is an archetypal Romantic daydreamer, epitomising what Colin Campbell 
refers to as “modern autonomous imaginative hedonism” (77). Campbell asserts that 
modern hedonistic practices, inspired by Romantic ideas, are directly linked to 
daydreaming, which makes “desiring itself a pleasurable activity” (86). In other 
words, pleasure does not derive so much from the fulfilment of one’s desire, but 
from the imaginative depiction of that fulfilment. In this way, the modern 
imaginative hedonist lives in the realm of anticipation, which results in a 
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“permanent unfocused dissatisfaction” and generalised “longing” that often in itself 
has no object (87).  
 
This longing combines pleasure and pain in a way indicative of the Romantic 
persona as it “maximizes the opportunities for indulging in emotions of grief, 
sorrow, nostalgia, and, of course, self-pity” (88). It also results in the constant desire 
for the pleasures of the new and novel (86), rather than a traditional hedonistic 
pattern of pleasure seeking found in those experiences already known to guarantee 
pleasurable satisfaction (85). This is the “spirit of modern consumerism” that Marie 
personifies: she is constantly looking for new ways to reinvent herself and her 
surroundings through experimentation, one driven by her “self-illusory” (89) 
idealisations and imaginings.  
 
While Coppola only depicts this one act of daydreaming in the film, the tone she 
creates—one of soft-focus dreaminess combined with outrageous fantasy depictions 
in the general mise-en-scène—contribute to the idea of idealised materiality and 
desire, a combination of the pleasures of the material and the fantasy that enables 
them. Early on in the film a sense of anticipatory desire is established when Marie 
and her young friends giggle girlishly over a locket image of her soon-to-be-husband 
(Jason Schwartzman) before they ever meet. This is paralleled with a similar scene, 
in long shot, of Louis and his brothers discussing Marie’s reported beauty, but 
Coppola foregrounds Marie’s desire much more so than Louis’s in these two 
moments.  
 
The entire film can even be characterised as the depiction of the daydream, directed 
at the spectator. Campbell writes, “imaginative enjoyment of products and services 
is a crucial part of contemporary consumerism […] revealed by the important place 
occupied in our culture by representations of products rather than products 
themselves (92). This is what is being emphasised by many of those critical of the 
film: the fantastical depictions of consumption and the fetishistic nature of products 
on display contributes to the seemingly shallow, “materialistic” cultural emphasis on 
excess and avarice.  
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However, Marie is not only depicted as a greedy consumer of goods and services; 
she is also loosely depicted as a Romantic artist. Coppola has remarked that she 
finds her protagonist to be “a very creative person” (Fraser, Kennedy). Her 
spontaneity and the intensity of her emotions recall the Romantic self, just as her 
“embodied imaginings” (Campbell 193) (her costumes and cosmetics) share her 
pleasure with those around her. At the same time, her breaches of court etiquette, her 
excess and vulgarity, draw scorn and political fire. But the more scorn she receives, 
the more Marie doubles down on her pleasurable image creation. 
 
In accordance with self-illusory hedonism, she is “an artist of the imagination” (78). 
Her joie di vivre and creative impulse speak to the “high moral purpose” the 
Romantics found in pleasure—a so-called “radical pleasure” for its own sake that 
could be considered the “defining attribute of life” (191–192). While Wordsworth 
located pleasure in feelings of “virtue”, the later Romantics widened ideas of 
pleasure to include even those typically associated with pain and vice, including 
“pride, fear, horror, jealousy and hatred” (192). Coppola depicts Marie’s wide-
ranging capacity to experience pleasure in her evident delight at mistreating Du 
Barry, and even her mischievous giggles over her sexual portrayals in revolutionary 
pamphlets. The later Romantics also recognised the essentially fleeting nature of 
pleasure, its “elusive and self-extinguishing character” (192). Coppola’s narrative 
explores the darker side of Romantic longing and desire. It depicts the relentless 
grasping of the new as a mode of diminishing returns and ultimately an idealistic 
trap in the ever-present illusory web of desire.  
 
Caroline Weber characterises Count Fersen as the “great love” of Marie-
Antoinette’s life (136), but Coppola’s film depicts him more as the object of girlish 
infatuation, an example of Marie’s obsession with novelty, fantasy, and desire itself. 
He becomes fuel for her on-going fantasies of sexual intrigue, but Coppola’s 
narrative drops this romantic subplot abruptly and without fanfare. According to 
Campbell, “The cycle of desire-acquisition-use-disillusionment-renewed-desire is a 
general feature of modern hedonism, and applies to romantic interpersonal 
relationships” (90). Once again, fancy plays a role in its “projection of an idealized 
beloved” (Cane Robinson 12) and its ability to move beyond ordinary consciousness 
in order to embrace love’s “extravagance” (12). The beginning of Marie and 
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Fersen’s relationship is portrayed as one of sexual fervour. When Marie meets the 
soldier for the first time at the masked ball, where she is “disguised” by semi-
transparent black lace over her eyes, he represents a specular object of desire for 
both her and the audience. Coppola shoots from Marie’s point of view as she spies 
the handsome count from across the room. Her early-morning return home after 
their meeting is scored to an almost frantic version of “Fool Rush In” (with its lyrics 
“When we met/ I felt my life begin”), signifying her newfound enchantment. 
 
According to Irving Singer, in the eighteenth century the idea of Romantic love as 
representing a “merging” becomes increasingly crucial (290). This merging is 
defined as “a metaphysical craving for unity, for oneness that eliminates all sense of 
separation between man and his environment, between one person and another, and 
within each individual” (288). In a sense, it is an attempt at ego obliteration, but it is 
also, ironically, narcissistic. The Romantic lover also found “the experience of love 
meant more to him than the attributes of any specific object” (292). As Marie had 
yet to experience love and sex in her celibate marriage, in the film Fersen represents 
little more than a Romantic fixation, a craving for the new experience, and is 
ultimately depicted as a component of Marie’s imaginative narcissism. The nature of 
the object of desire is one of diminishing returns to the modern hedonist. It 
“becomes less and less imperfect as we progressively, and successfully, merge with 
it” (295). Coppola discards Fersen from the narrative not out of malice or contempt, 
but simply because his disposability is paramount to the idea of illusory 
consumption. 
 
Coppola’s depiction of Marie during her daydream is suitably ambiguous. Despite 
her pleasurable, imaginative reverie, she still appears artificially positioned for the 
camera. She gives a look that almost imperceptibly fails to make a direct camera 
address, as she lies with her mouth slightly open, her hands resting limp-wristed on 
her chest in a pose of supplication. The scene implies both pleasure and suffering, 
and the incongruity between her subjective fantasies and objective reality expresses 
Marie’s inability to escape a bodily commodification even in isolation. As Flores 
writes, she is “conscious of being always observed” (610), and that even applies to 
when she is alone, being observed by the camera. Marie’s daydream of Fersen is 
curiously violent and hyper-masculine—his face dirtied in battle amidst a fiery 
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backdrop of war—and hints at something darker than mere childish infatuation. 
While it implies the notion of sexual power, it also hints at the “merging” of 
Romantic love as a danger to personal identity.   
 
Rushton suggests that the foregrounding of “those processes of disconnection 
between the subjective and the social” asserts Marie Antoinette’s ethical stakes and 
their relation to democracy and self-determination (124). “[M]odern democracy 
goes hand-in-hand with the invention of modern subjectivity and the quest for self-
reliance”, he writes (126). Rather than a purely narcissistic pursuit, this quest leads 
to a “constant questioning of the self” which goes “hand-in-hand with, and cannot be 
dissociated from, the questioning of the society one finds oneself in and the ‘place’ 
where one finds oneself in that society” (126). Just as the Romantics’ response to 
being “dulled by their experience of modern living” was “to redouble their efforts as 
artists” (Campbell 186, 187), so Marie’s various attempts to “discover” herself 
through creative expression align with her desire to more fully enter the social 
world, even though she has little true understanding of that world or her place in it. 
 
Claude Lefort cautions that self-determination within democracy can by its very 
essence lead to indeterminacy (303). In a society that has become a “theatre of an 
uncontrollable adventure” with the removal of the head of the body politic (that of 
the king), this “dis-incorporation” (303) (in the case of Marie-Antoinette, a literal 
beheading) leads to a grasping for meaning when identity is “constantly open to 
question” (304). This is not a picture of the “bourgeois subject strong and bounded, 
defined by strict forms and a notion of ‘internal’ integrity” that the Romantic lyric is 
meant to represent (Cane Robinson 15). Campbell describes the “two most critical” 
political events of the Romantic period as the twin revolutions, first in America and 
then France, which represent one “single upheaval by which the middle classes 
displaced the aristocracy as the leading socio-economic grouping of modern society” 
(178). Greeted initially with excitement and zeal by the Romantics, a period of 
“disillusionment” follows the French Revolution, as well as burgeoning divisions 
within the bourgeoisie itself (178).   
 
Second-generation Romantic poets such as Keats could not escape such class 
divisions, which also occurred in Britain, and were in part responsible for the 
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denigrations of his more radical politics and fanciful poetics—in the August 1818 
issue of Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, for instance, conservative John Gibson 
Lockhart (writing under the pseudonym “Z”) decried “Johnny” Keats’s work as 
“worthless and affected” and lamented the “purest, the loftiest, and […] most 
classical living English poets joined together in the same compliment with the 
meanest, the filthiest, and the most vulgar of Cockney poetasters” (519). Despite the 
revolution, or perhaps because of it, questions of taste became complicated by and 
inextricable with class. Instead of the middle class being pitted against nobility, it 
became pitted against itself. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Marie’s desire for a more natural, picturesque existence puts her at 
odds with her need for more “radical” pleasures, as evidenced by her pink hair. 
 
Marie embodies this notion of ever-changing identity and a precarious position 
within society. Indeed, this indeterminacy goes hand in hand with the elision of 
historical time in Coppola’s film and speaks to Marie’s modern obsession with the 
consumption of the new and novel. She is as much a victim of modernity as she is a 
victim of the increasingly outmoded ideology of the monarchy. If “grasping the 
latest little thing […] guarantees the death of the past and the fullness or splendour 
of the present” (Lefort 234), its enjoyment is perfunctory because it is attached to a 
desire for more newness in an anticipated future. Keats himself encapsulates the idea 
of pain in fleeting pleasure in “Ode to Melancholy” when he writes, “And Joy, 
whose hand is ever at his lips / Bidding adieu” (Poems 349). Marie’s on-going 
	 225	
exploration of identity, restlessness, and desire is further described by the film’s 
sequence at the Petit Trianon “country” estate, which in reality is located only a 
short distance away from the main palace.   
 
The film does not shy away from depicting Petit Trianon as an artificial construct 
even as it sympathetically acknowledges the ethical project of “the discovery of a 
life aris[ing] from the determination to ‘explore oneself’” (Rushton 122). Marie 
instructs her dressmakers to construct costumes that are “more natural”, but soon she 
appears with her hair coloured Easter-egg pink (figure 5.6). Lionel Trilling divides 
two distinct “moral ambiances” of the Romantic pleasure-seeking movement of the 
eighteenth century, the first being the “unexceptional”, “innocent”, and “domestic” 
pleasure, and the second of a more “radical aspect” (Trilling 63–64), that of the 
morally suspect voluptuary. Try as she might to align herself with the simple 
picturesque pleasures of hearth and home, Marie prefers “unfavourable” pleasure: 
“sensuous enjoyment as a chief object of life, or end, in itself” (63). This is indeed 
the revolutionary late-Romantic conception, where such a “primitive” and “radical” 
pleasure is “directly associated with virtue” (Campbell 191). 
 
According to Campbell, a failure to experience pleasure of such a kind indicates an 
“alienation from nature […] aris[ing] from the fact that ‘the world’ is too much” 
(191). Marie’s imaginative hedonism, in fact, exemplifies her lack of alienation from 
the material world. Despite her desire to delight guests with “pastoral charm” and 
“neoclassical restraint” (Weber 134), her desire for personal creative inscription on 
her own body and for the more “radical” elements of pleasure seeking cannot be 
contained.  
 
The delight Marie feels in material pleasures extends to her entire clique of fellow 
proto-Bohemian sensualists. During one dinner party, the Duchesse de Polignac 
(Rose Byrne) shows the other guests how to play a musical game on their glasses. 
“Lick your finger and rub it around the rim of the glass”, she instructs, and they are 
all charmed by the resulting tones. In many such scenes, Coppola emphasises touch, 
both of the material (Fersen grabs Marie’s bare arm at the masked ball when they 
first meet; Marie drags her hand slowly through the water as she floats lazily on a 
small boat in a placid pond) and the more ideal.  
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As Marie rides home from the masked ball at sunrise, she extends her arm outside 
the coach and moves it with the motion of a gentle wave, as if grasping for, or 
creating in her mind, something pleasurable to touch. 50  Here Coppola renders 
concrete “the eternally forward-flung, and always inaccessible, nature of desire” 
(Downing 138). As Keats “all[ied] his sensory images more closely with the sense 
of touch” to make them “stronger and more concrete” (Bate, Negative Capability 
50), Coppola often conforms her concrete filmic imagery to the ephemeral and 
imaginary, to what is not there or cannot be seen, only daydreamed.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Coppola emphasises the power of touch in much of her imagery, 
which alludes to both sensual interconnection and the eternal grasping 
emanating from desire. 
 
Keats’s close friend, the poet Leigh Hunt, describes Lamia’s couplets as “tak[ing] 
pleasure in the progress of their own beauty, like sea-nymphs luxuriating through 
the water” (Hunt xxxviii). In the film a literal body of water represents this 
luxurious, wandering consciousness (figure 5.7). If “there also appears to be 
something intrinsically rhythmic or wave-like about the patterns which yield 
pleasure” (Campbell 64), the wave-like motion of Marie’s outstretched arm conjures 
the idea of the endless waxing and waning cycles of desire. Desire is not just 
																																																								
50 Coppola uses the same imagery in The Virgin Suicides, when Lux (also played by Dunst) reaches 
her hand outside an open car window in a fantasy sequence, enjoying the moving breeze. Lux is also 
tellingly characterised by her therapist as being a “dreamer” and “completely out of touch with 
reality”, criticisms that could certainly be applied to Marie-Antoinette. 
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depicted by Marie’s idealised grasping, however, it is also inscribed on her body in 
the way it is presented and perceived by others and used as a political pawn. 
 
“Like a Little Piece of Cake”: The Body, Consumption, and Moral Utility 
As in Keats’s Lamia, material sublimity in Coppola’s film is depicted not just in its 
titular figure’s surroundings, but also on her very body. Denise Gigante explains that 
in the Romantic era, linking the body with sublime excess created a new conception 
of “monstrosity” as “too much life”: 
 
Such monstrosity does not remain at the level of theory but 
becomes the motivation for a new kind of monster in the 
literature of the Romantic period, one whose life force is too 
big for the matter containing it (“Monster in the Rainbow” 
434).  
 
Winakur Tontplaphol continues this line of thought when she asserts, “Lamia’s body 
is not balanced, proportionate, or decorous […] she embodies the congestion 
intrinsic to Keats’s material sublime” (50). At various points in the narrative, 
Marie’s body is seen as the site of similar “monstrous” excess. Her pouf wigs, which 
are indeed historically accurate (Weber 5), recall the iconic hairstyle of the titular 
victim-monster in James Whale’s 1935 film Bride of Frankenstein. (The real Marie-
Antoinette’s wigs perhaps even helped inspire Whale’s character design.) The pouf 
was not only an infinitely customisable way to assert individuality, “as part of Marie 
Antoinette’s subjective strategy, the pouf was another device to recuperate her own 
body” (Flores 617). In Coppola’s film, Marie’s hair takes on a disruptive, phallic 
power as it reaches ever-newer heights. This Frankenstein-like “monstrous” excess 
is alluded to in the film during its climax, when Marie emerges onto her balcony in 
front of a protesting mob, which literally wields pitchforks and fiery torches as the 
angry villagers do in Whale’s film.  
 
Depictions of Marie as monster are exclusively portrayed from the perspective of the 
body politic: from the pamphlets claiming she is sexually immoral (either she is a 
voracious lesbian or has sexual designs on Thomas Jefferson) to the non-diegetic 
image of her luxuriating in a bath, pouf ascending, while scoffing “Let them eat 
cake” through an incongruous slash of black lipstick (figure 5.8). Absurdly, in this 
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scene she also wears a diamond necklace, which alludes to the infamous “affair of 
the diamond necklace” scandal that negatively impacted the queen in the court of 
public opinion and even helped sow the seeds of revolution (Ferriss and Young 
107). This scene represents the wearing of masks, as the costume ball scene does 
literally, and her conscription into the role of “an object for the other in a play of 
Symbolic and Imaginary forces” (Downing 136), a sort of femme fatale in the eyes 
of the people.  
 
 
Figure 5.8 The infamous (and apocryphal) line “Let them eat cake” is delivered 
as a horror-fantasy of the body politic, with Marie as its femme fatale. 
 
In Lamia, Keats creates a tragic-comic excessiveness that renders the text 
“generically unstable” with an “aesthetic defined by mismatch, in a narrative driven 
by its heroine’s indecorous desire to cultivate gargantuan sensations in tiny 
pastures” (Winakur Tontplaphol 57). Coppola creates a similar tragi-comic effect 
with a tonal mix of straight-faced satire, soporific interludes, and depictions of 
outright suffering. “To suggest that Lamia’s story is a series of bulges, tears, and 
attempted repairs, is, perhaps, to highlight potentially comic elements”, writes 
Winakur Tontplaphol (57), and such elements are all over Coppola’s film. Excess is 
lampooned in many scenes: during a party, wigmaker Léonard discreetly 
extinguishes a candle to keep Marie’s pouf from catching on fire; her partner in 
crime Duchesse de Polignac appears, in a comic anachronism, to snort cocaine off 
the back of her own hand; and when Mercy briefs Marie about an important foreign 
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policy issue, she is too absorbed in whether her sleeve should be made with ruffles 
or without to pay attention. When she is informed her overspending has left little 
funds for charity, she resolutely proclaims that only the “smaller” trees be installed 
on a garden path, as if this gesture will somehow mitigate the poverty of the French 
people.  
 
On a personal level, Marie’s very existence could be considered a series of 
“attempted repairs” of the miserable state in which she finds herself. As in Lamia’s 
attempts to “retain integrity” by preserving “both corporeal and psychic wholeness” 
(58), these attempts are ultimately tragically unsustainable (57). Direct depictions of 
tragedy or violence are rare in the film, resulting in the feeling of anticipatory dread. 
The death of Marie’s youngest child is portrayed by its removal from a family 
portrait; the angry mob is heard primarily off-screen; and the raid on the palace is 
exemplified by a simple shot of the ruined royal bedroom, furniture and broken glass 
strewn about. A bird is heard fluttering its wings but is not seen within the frame, 
emphasising the static, painterly quality of the shot as it alludes to nature’s 
reclamation of the artificial (figure 5.9). 
 
 
Figure 5.9 The film’s sole post-revolution image is static and empty, but 
suggests a barely contained power. 
 
Walter Jackson Bate notes that Keats’s imagery, often considered essentially 
“statical”, actually expressed a “highly dynamical power momentarily caught at rest 
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and concentrated and imprisoned within an otherwise static image” (Negative 
Capability 58). Coppola’s imagery suggests a similar barely contained power, a 
potential energy existing within a delimited container, one embodied by both the 
mise-en-scène and by Marie. Depictions of excess are almost always tempered by 
picturesque restraint, which speaks to a “hidden intention and movement which 
Keats called ‘electric fire’” (71) and underscores their indecorousness.  
 
Lamia refuses a “neoclassical disposition toward balance” (Winakur Tontplaphol 
50), something she shares in common with Marie-Antoinette, no matter how hard 
the latter may try to achieve decorous unity with her environments. Lamia’s power 
is not only evident in her status as a demi-goddess, it is written aesthetically on her 
very body: 
[C]onstrained in nearly every sense, [she] debuts and remains the 
antithesis of pallor. She is, in other words, colourful in the most 
literal sense of that term: tint-saturated, color-full […] with a 
barely contained aesthetic energy (49).  
 
Marie is often similarly “tint-saturated” with heavy makeup, particularly rouge, a 
frosting of silver in her hair. Her costumes are always the most colourful and 
striking amongst those of the ladies of the court—something that serves to focus the 
spectator’s visual attention in the frame, but also to highlight her particular “life 
force” and “barely contained aesthetic energy”.  
 
But Coppola does not only choose to depict Marie’s bodily excessiveness. She also 
portrays her as physically diminutive, vulnerable, and fragile—a beautiful 
commodity fetish. The tiny ribbons wrapped in her natural hair and around her neck 
(a foreshadowing of the guillotine, but also a symbol of her delicacy), together with 
multiple scenes featuring the girl stripped amidst large groups of fully dressed 
people (figure 5.10), counteract the public’s fantasy image of a vampire queen in 
black lipstick. With her childlike dimples, protruding canine teeth, baby-fine flaxen 
hair, and womanly “hourglass” physique, Dunst conjures notions of both adolescent 
innocence and ripe sexuality (a combination Coppola uses to similar effect in The 
Virgin Suicides). Her beauty is meant to bring prestige to the court and the king in a 
very public, ceremonial way. This is similar to Lamia’s beauty enhancing the 
prestige of Lycius (Trilling, “The Fate of Pleasure” 68). Early on in the film, when 
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she is spied from a distance by the eternally snide and simpering “aunts” for the first 
time, one of them remarks, “She looks like a little piece of cake”. It is meant as a 
compliment, but it summarises Marie’s aesthetic problem: she is an elite, prettified 
object ripe for human consumption, but she is essentially disposable. 
 
In her journey from foreign innocent to worldly queen, Marie’s sartorial and 
lifestyle excesses function as a kind of psychic armour covering this bodily 
vulnerability. They are not so much intrinsic to her nature, as they are for the 
“electric” (Gigante 439) body of Lamia, but a personal refashioning perpetuated to 
serve the purpose of delight in the pleasures, and power, of the pretty. Still, Coppola 
generally chooses to downplay the traditional sense of the “power” factor of Marie’s 
costumes; their inviolably pastel colour schemes—inspired by the macarons from 
the director’s favourite Parisian patisserie, Ladurée—are not just historically 
inaccurate but remove the masculine from the equation. The historical Marie-
Antoinette was known for her propensity for cross-dressing (mostly in male riding 
attire) (Weber 149), but you would never guess this from Coppola’s highly 
feminised queen. However, two key scenes outside of her period of mourning do 
feature Marie in uncharacteristic black: her initial, and only, exchange with Du 
Barry, and her impromptu excursion to the masked ball. In these scenes Marie 
wilfully decides to express her power and desire for rebellion, at first by supposedly 
acquiescing to a direct order in the most perfunctory way possible, and then by 
refusing outright to follow court protocol.  
 
Denise Gigante connects the idea of bodily monstrosity in Lamia to a “radically new 
aesthetic” beginning in the late eighteenth century (“Monster in the Rainbow” 434). 
This theory sought to abandon the purely mechanistic outlook of Newtonian science 
that “reduces life to its bodily functions”—what Keats decried in Lamia as 
“unweav[ing] a rainbow” (Poems 431), robbing the life force of its beauty, mystery, 
and power. (Lamia herself is referred to as “rainbow-sided”) (415). For Kant, 
monstrosity was something which “exceeds representation” (Gigante 434), linked to 
a sublime life force that is “too big for the matter containing it” (434). This is a 
materialist view, but crucially not mechanistic; the notion of a “self-propagating 
vital power” is an organic one (435).  
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Figure 5.10 Coppola focuses on Marie-Antoinette’s fragility almost as much as 
she does her specular power, such as in this dressing ceremony scene. 
 
If beauty is a decorous state achieved through harmony, “monstrosity emerges as a 
principle opposed to their harmonious convergence in form” (436). While Gigante 
argues that Lamia’s “excessive vitality” is too much for Lycius’ “feeble” human 
frame (434), in Coppola’s film, Marie-Antoinette serves the dual role of Lamia and 
Lycius. Her own fragility and instability of body—a body that is, as Galt writes, 
“owned first by the state and then violently by the people” (Pretty 22)—cannot 
adequately contain her own vitality, one that is forcefully inducted into a world that 
seeks to control its very biological functions.   
 
For Kant, "an object is monstrous where by its size defeats the end that forms its 
concept" (Kant 83). Marie’s “concept”, her purpose, is to be a deferential wife, 
devoted and attractive member of the court, and most critically, mother to one or 
more male heirs to the throne. Her social roles are ones defined by others. In 
exceeding those roles, she exhibits, as Gigante writes of Lamia, an “aesthetic 
magnitude that nullifies its own purpose” and consequentially “defeats […] her 
status as beautiful” (Gigante 438, 440). Despite the mortal frame she temporarily 
inhabits, Lamia “refuses to sacrifice her signature excess” (Winakur Tontplaphol 
50–51); Marie asserts her will against the structures of the court, however 
unconsciously, by asserting her signature excess as well. Such a will to pleasure 
Rushton calls a form of Emersonian “self-reliance”, a “sense of being able to build 
one’s own life in one’s own way based on one’s own decisions” (Rushton 124).  
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Considering how the real-life queen’s costumes “triggered severe socio-political 
disorder” (Weber 3), one could even argue that this will to pleasure (if not power) 
ignites a political revolution almost by design, monstrously extending beyond 
Marie’s own body into the body politic. As such, she wills revolution through her 
own excess. In Coppola’s film, the revolution forces Marie-Antoinette out of her 
self-willed “cocoon” and into the stark reality of death and the suffering of those on 
the other side of the palace gates. 
 
“Dying into Life”: Embracing the Romantic “Depth” Model? 
 
The progenitors of Romantic theories about life force, most notably physiologist 
John Hunter, considered monstrosity as “something gone awry during 
‘recapitulation,’ or ‘self-repetition’” (Gigante 437). Anna Backman Rogers 
highlights the visual theme of repetition through ritual in Coppola’s film (Backman 
Rogers 85), such as the montages of endless similar meals, attendance of mass, and 
dressing ceremonies. This repetition not only emphasises the drudgery and pointless 
pageantry of court existence, it also encapsulates Marie’s personal history, a 
constant recapitulation and repetition through an endless struggle to reinvent herself.   
 
Coppola chooses to emphasise this cycle of attempted growth and recapitulation 
through the last full scene of her narrative, which ends not with the queen’s head 
being severed but with her “saying goodbye” to the palace she called home, just as 
she said goodbye to her Austrian birthplace at the film’s beginning. This not only 
links Marie to the materiality of an earthly location, but foreshadows her ability to 
“grow”, to break free of an endless cycle of false starts, which will eventually only 
come through her death. As Rushton writes, the only way the queen can deal with 
such an unjust world “is to say ‘good-bye’ to it” (Rushton 115). Marie’s final, 
dignified acceptance of her fate (her recognition that she is “out of place” in a 
“world of moral catastrophe”) (115) is akin, not unlike the wilful acts of the Lisbon 
girls in The Virgin Suicides, to passing judgment on that world. 
 
Marie’s “soul-making” journey from narcissism to sympathetic union represents an 
ethical turn toward society, and mirrors the journey of several of Keats’s mythical 
heroes. When an angry crowd whipped into revolutionary fervour starts to descend 
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on the palace, a sober-faced Marie insists multiple times, “My place is here with my 
husband”. After sending the servants and her friends away with tearful goodbyes, 
she stands in the foyer, a solitary figure looking up towards the light as if 
summoning strength from the depths of her being. The balcony scene in the film, in 
which she silently bows toward the mob as if acquiescing to defeat and offers her 
neck in supplication, functions as a synecdoche of the death scene.  
 
But it also represents a Keatsian notion of “d[ying] into life” from his poem 
Hyperion (Poems 306). In this mythological epic, Apollo is shown the “knowledge 
of human suffering”; combined with sympathy, this knowledge makes him 
“godlike” and immortal (Weston 106), just as it also brings him profound anguish. 
Walter Jackson Bate describes this dying into life as an “instinctive working towards 
a purpose, the beauty of man, his particular identity, his truth” (Negative Capability 
69). This suffering and sympathy is what creates a soul; for Keats it is the “vale of 
Soul-making”: “Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to 
school an Intelligence and make it a soul?” he writes in an 1819 letter (Letters 250). 
Like Apollo, Marie feels but cannot understand her sadness, trapped in pursuit of her 
self-absorbed daydreams. The revolution frees her from the contained limits of her 
narcissism.  
 
In Keats’s Endymion, the titular hero gains the ability “to recognize that he is not 
alone in his suffering” (Schapiro 48), and with that “recognition and acceptance of 
the pain and loss comes the birth of compassion” (59) and a loss of “narcissistic 
isolation” (43). Marie offers herself up as a sacrificial object, but her value is now 
not inscribed in her body, but her consciousness. She will soon die, but in dying into 
life, she has conjured the “immortal Self within” (Benton 40), a Keatsian loss of 
personal identity that arises from an awareness of the interconnectedness of all life 
and all suffering. While she passes judgment upon the world, she also feels its pain.   
 
Barbara Schapiro contrasts the Keatsian “dreamer” with the Keatsian poet; while the 
former is a “narcissist, hopelessly fixated on his own idealizations and fantasies”, 
the poet “speaks always for a relationship with the real world outside the self” (53). 
In the film, Marie-Antoinette functions as a sort of Keatsian dreamer who becomes a 
poet, just as “Keats the poet triumphs over Keats the dreamer […] by his acceptance 
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of the pain, change, and loss that inevitably accompany growth” (60). Coppola 
speaks to her character’s growth when she acknowledges that the other protagonists 
in her trilogy remained “on the verge” of growing up, but that this is her first film 
“about a girl becoming a woman” (Hohenadel). That this pain and growth 
inexorably leads to Marie’s own demise is a necessary function of the ethical 
vacuum of the society of which she is a part.   
Schapiro’s Freudian reading of Keats adopts a psychological depth model, and as a 
result, she derides the elements of fancy in Keats’s writing, referring to the 
“excesses and lack of judgment”, “florid diction”, and “emotional overindulgence” 
of his work as “reflect[ing] the immaturity of vision itself” (Schapiro 47). In 
contrast, she lauds Keats’s “greater restraint and concentration” in works such as 
Endymion as evidence of the “increasing ability to surmount his obsession with an 
infantile fusing love and to integrate his ambivalently split internal relationships” 
(47). She even writes that Keats’s poem To Autumn “realizes a similar success in its 
integration of the regressive, feminine, and melancholic feelings with assertive, 
masculine, and affirmative ones” (60). The message here is clear: for Schapiro, 
when Keats’s work exists in the realm of fancy rather than imagination and the lyric 
“I”, it is degraded, shallow, and “feminine”, operating without reason or a masculine 
sense of moral utility and sublime transcendence. 
Given the traditional modes of value placed on high canonical Romantic poetry and 
its rejection of fancy, it is tempting to validate the film’s eventual turn to both 
aesthetic and narrative bleakness as evidence of its acceptance of a “proper” ethical 
code and a rejection of its former luxurious excess. Richard Rushton downplays 
Coppola’s depictions of this feminine excess as non-integral to the film, or 
indicative of the moral rot of Versailles society. In some ways this misses the point. 
Coppola’s dark turn (necessitated, of course, by history) does operate in the vein of 
Schapiro’s assertion of Keats’s turn away from “florid” excess, but this does not 
negate the film’s reliance on ornament, jouissance, the fanciful, and indecorous 
materiality. It should be noted that Lionel Trilling describes Lamia, one of Keats’s 
later, “mature” works, as “vulgar […] in extreme form” (“The Fate of Pleasure” 68).  
Rather, the interludes of consumption, sensuous excess, and material communion 
throughout the film are all representative of Marie-Antoinette’s repeated attempts at 
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soul-making, a reiteration of the search for self-identity in the face of abjection. I 
argue they are more ethical within the context of the film than her “acceptance” of 
all human suffering because they continue to allow her subjecthood—not to mention 
joy—rather than resignation and annihilation. That Coppola's protagonists 
sometimes have to pay the ultimate price for their feminine desire is not a good 
thing, nor do her films posit it as such. 
Depictions of the queen in the film’s final act portray her as a different kind of 
monster: an emotionally hollowed-out zombie, who shuffles around in mourning 
black, sleepwalking through her own life. It is as if the flames of her “electric fire”, 
or her life force, have been doused. Marie Antoinette’s ending, in some ways, 
detracts from the sense of subversion that scenes venerating the fancy and the pretty 
portray, but it does not erase it. The queen’s “growing up”, for Coppola, is not 
necessarily a celebratory event—it has rarely seemed quite so unappealing, so 
unsatisfying—and it is also not a form of chastising those who delight in the “chick 
culture” elements of her films, which Ferriss and Young describe as a “feminist 
aesthetic focused on youth, fashion, sexuality, celebrity, and consumerism” (99). 
Judging by their preponderance in her films, she clearly delights in them as well. 
The abrupt change in tone registers as a minor shock with the spectator. But this 
shock is not a result of the violently sublime heroics of revolution; it is, rather, the 
shock of acquiescence, the pain of surrendering a raison d’etre, a passion and desire 
for the world in all its material sensuality. It robs Marie of her vitality. While 
Coppola fashions herself as a filmmaker preoccupied by materiality and 
sensuousness, operating through non-judgmental fellow feeling and benevolent 
objectivity, her film does question the stifling of creativity and fancy by masculine 
“reason” and historical “progress” and its rejection of alterity altogether. 
The film’s final full scene—Marie’s “bidding adieu” to Versailles—does not only 
encompass wistful nostalgia and the relief of letting go. This curious and even 
childlike character detail actually suggests that Marie’s defiance, her commitment to 
fancy, remains intact. It is a purely fanciful expression: in saying “goodbye” to the 
palace (a “Mansion of Many Apartments” which represents the totality of her soon-
to-be-ended life) she “animates” and “personifies” her world (Cane Robinson 42). In 
such a way she retains a commitment to the fancy and its recuperative effects until 
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the very end. That is not to say that the film does not question excess, more 
specifically excess of pleasure. Just as in Keats’s poetry, it exhibits a so-called 
“dialectic of pleasure”, a combination of its intense affirmation and scepticism 
toward it (Trilling, “The Fate of Pleasure” 68). 
For Marie, pleasure in luxury is a way to protect against the effects of a 
dehumanising political and social system. Such pleasure suggests the “the idea of 
dignity in all man” (67). According to Lionel Trilling, pleasure can conform both to 
“the principle of reality” or that of illusion (69). He points to Keats’s description of 
lines from Lamia, which the poet refers to as “a doubtful tale from faery land”. This 
“faery land”, Trilling insists, is “the scene of erotic pleasure which leads to 
devastation” (69), a description that could aptly be applied to Marie-Antoinette’s 
own world. The “self-negating” aspects of pleasure are exemplified by the film’s 
depictions of modern autonomous imaginative hedonism. Both Keats and Coppola 




Marie Antoinette engages in what can be defined as a postmodern view of ethics in 
its questioning of an established acceptance of the greater moral good of 
“masculine” reason and realism. It does this through an ambivalent response to 
pleasure, specifically pleasure in excess and voracious consumption, the 
indeterminacy created by the birth of modernity and the bourgeoisie, and the ego-
obliteration and surface exploration of fancy and the material sublime versus the 
suffering and “soul-making” of the Romantic depth model of personal growth, 
which relies upon the shaping powers of imagination. The film’s approach toward 
its protagonist, which combines sympathetic communion with a more objective 
point of view, underscores its commitment to this ambivalence. 
Coppola’s fleeting focus on Romantic love paints a portrait of illusory desire, while 
her depictions of narcissistic pursuits of pleasure and the ornamental within the 
film’s mise-en-scène flirt with sublimity in Keats’s material sense. Like the sister 
protagonists of The Virgin Suicides, Coppola’s queen embodies the bifurcation of 
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the sublime and beautiful. But unlike the Lisbon girls, she is not a simple depiction 
of the commodity value of the female in the marketplace. Her story also represents 
the personal “growth” of the “greater Romantic lyric” (Cane Robinson 38). The 
“shearing away of excess” that the film exhibits in its final scenes has been viewed 
as the proper course of the absorption of fancy along the path toward “the more 
mature shaping spirit of imagination” (38) in Romantic poetry, a process in which 
“the experiential excesses of passion and sexuality give way before the ‘flint-and-
iron’ heroism of a poetry of the completely realized subject” (37). However, it is 
difficult to view Marie-Antoinette purely under these terms of newfound heroism; in 
her “heroic” hour, she is stripped not only of her excess, but of her assertion of 
subjectivity through that excess. 
According to Cane Robinson, the Romantic lyric’s “drama of maturation is precisely 
the drama in which the Fancy, with its sensuousness and participatory energies, 
gives way to the disinterested tragic attitude” (36). In the film, this new attitude, and 
the removal of ornamental excess it necessitates, is a painful break for both audience 
and protagonist, tantamount to a ripping away of the sensuous pleasures of the 
pretty, the fancy, and life itself. It may be “soul-making”, but it is also a literal 
destruction. Coppola’s film challenges us to question our belief in “progress” at the 
expense of personal desire and creative freedom. Growing up need not necessitate 
giving up. “The Fancy”, writes Cane Robinson, is “not simply a self-contained 
psychological efflorescence but a social event” (43). Robbing Marie-Antoinette of 















































Conclusion: On Endings and New Beginnings 
 
 
In his post-mortem of the brief period of New Hollywood rebellion comprising 
1960s and 1970s American film, Robert Phillip Kolker defines what he calls a 
“cinema of loneliness” (Kolker x). According to Kolker, a sense of isolation 
permeates not only the films of the era, but the milieu in which they were made: 
 
These are films made in isolation and, with few exceptions, about 
isolation […] they only perpetuate the passivity and aloneness 
that has become their central image […] [F]or all the challenge 
and adventure, their films speak to a continual impotence in the 
world, an inability to change and create change (Kolker 10). 
 
Kolker’s conclusion is debatable—his contention that these films do not challenge 
cultural norms he clearly admits they signal as “abhorrent” (10) seems antithetical. 
(A lack of providing answers to problems certainly does not imply an endorsement 
of them.) But in many ways, his assessment of these older films is similar to the 
ideas I have engaged with in the discussion of my own corpus. The films I analyse 
all contain characters, particularly protagonists, who seem stuck in their own 
isolation, unable to reach beyond themselves to create meaningful connections with 
other selves—it is as if Emerson’s “circles” have been replaced by wheels that 
simply spin in place, unsure of the direction they should go.  
 
The difference between these newer films and those of their predecessors is in their 
characters’ continual attempts to bridge gaps between themselves and the world in 
order to regenerate the degraded connections between persons. If New Hollywood is 
the “cinema of loneliness”, this new cycle of neo-Romantic films can be 
characterised as the “cinema of tentative connections”. Unlike those of a previous 
generation, these films are comprised of characters who implicitly signal a desire to 
rely on others for comfort and recognition—their humanism 51  is rooted in a 
																																																								
51
	For the purposes of this study, humanism is defined as a general philosophy that “gives special 
importance to human concerns, values, and dignity” (Law 264). I do mean to relate it to any kind of 
“atheistic world view” (263), and I especially do not mean to suggest that humanism in this context 
denotes rationalism or “scientism”, “the view that every meaningful question can in principle be 
answered by application of the scientific method” (265). 
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Romantic attempt to expand both inner and outer vision in order to create a larger 
community of selves.  
 
Sometimes these efforts are thwarted or even negated, such as in the tragic outcomes 
of The Virgin Suicides (199), Marie Antoinette (2006), and Synecdoche, New York 
(2008). However, just as often these imperfectly executed connections result in 
hopeful change and a continued belief in the power of that change, if only by 
increments. The films I discuss posit the dialectic of “self vs. world” (Mayshark 
11)—they acknowledge a fundamental chasm between subjectivities, one perhaps 
exacerbated by our current age. But from the Fox family’s ecstatic supermarket 
reverie at the conclusion of Fantastic Mr Fox to Theodore and Amy’s rooftop 
reunion in Her, they also implicitly or explicitly affirm that only a community of 
selves will be able to successfully navigate such a world, even if those selves will 
never be able to fully understand each other.  
 
The Romantic suffering of Weltschmerz—that egocentric, self-conscious 
introspection that becomes so all-consuming it takes on “cosmic significance” for 
those experiencing it (Thorslev 42)—potentially can be cured (or at least treated), as 
these films suggest. But it can only be done so in fits and starts via hopeful, tentative 
connections made through imaginative sympathy and emotional vulnerability, and a 
questioning of absolutes. Peter Thorslev summarises this potential for change 
through intersubjective connection: 
 
If any escape from this tragic dilemma is possible […] I suppose 
it must lie in the solution of modern humanism: a realization of 
the limits of the human mind and a cultivation of one’s own 
values in an assertion of a community of selves in an ultimately 
unknown and unknowable universe (89). 
 
For the Romantics, freedom is found not in reason, but through imaginative 
capability; imagination represents not only the freedom to create art as “a central 
place in the organisation of human experience” (Waugh 19) but also to co-create a 
radically fictional space in a community that is “constantly engaged in endless 
reinterpretation” (22). The collaborative medium of the cinema certainly represents 
such a “community of selves”. Unlike Wordsworth or Keats, working in isolation or 
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while communing with nature, a filmmaker (at least in the conventional sense) must 
create such a community, however makeshift, in order to realise imaginative vision 
amidst the chaos of life. The cinema of these filmmakers celebrates its fictionality as 
imaginative power, a “radically fictional sense of truth” (33), as much as an anxious 
relation to indeterminacy. 
 
According to Kaufman, “there are no grand conclusions” (Tobias) to be drawn from 
life, but it is less difficult to draw them from art. I have attempted to do so by 
relating these works to both Romantic philosophy and literature, critical responses to 
Romanticism, and contemporary ideas of “metamodernism” (Vermeulen and van 
den Akker) based on a linkage of Romantic characteristics along a modernist and 
postmodern continuum. “To live and think in a constant state of negotiation (perhaps 
more commonly, agitation) with the world, others, and oneself” (LaRocca 9) is the 
state of Romantic irony, a state of perpetual change.   
 
Such a state requires “a kind of bravery in the midst of indeterminacy, and a form of 
compassion for what lies beyond comprehension” (9). I argue that these films 
fundamentally express compassion both for their characters and their audiences in 
the midst of such often-incomprehensible chaos, and a commitment to a highly 
Romantic longing for connection and meaning via shared emotion and sympathy. 
That these connections are never completely realised is simply indicative of the 
overwhelming worldview of this cinema: the attempt is always more important than 
the execution, because their humanity lies in the attempt, in the doing and the 
becoming.  
 
If the films’ characters, and their creators, are not necessarily “brave”, they are at 
least willing to acknowledge how little they understand about life, and are capable of 
leaving questions unanswered. In these final pages I briefly summarise my 
arguments as they relate to the key Romantic principles identified in the 
introduction: the emphasis on personal imagination and authenticity, subjectivity 





The Romantic Relationship to Reality: A Questioning of Absolutes 
 
The films discussed all speak to the idea that “truth” is a relative term, one coloured 
by the relation between a subject’s highly idiosyncratic and personal point of view 
and the world that subject inhabits. As Derek Hill writes in his discussion of The 
Royal Tenenbaums, these films are “dream[s] which oscillate between the vibrantly 
‘real’ and completely artificial” (Hill 101). Their fictional, artificial worlds serve as 
the landscape to explore emotional truth. According to Andrea K. Henderson, 
Romanticism “is a creature of surfaces, of context, and of varying forms; and when 
it appears most self-consistent, it may be least so” (Henderson 5). This lack of 
consistency, or warring impulses between the opposing forces of the Romantic 
personality—a longing to see oneself as part of a meaningful whole, and a desire to 
make an individual mark via a “passionate assertion of oneself” (Thorslev 88, 89)—
establishes the fundamental dialectic of a Romantic engagement with life. It is this 
dialectic, reinvigorated through Vermeulen and van den Akker’s conception of 
“metamodernism”, that characterises the idiosyncratic displays of passion and 
resignation, hope and despair, and connection and isolation in these films. 
 
Through explorations of memory, expressions of affect both dampened and sincere, 
and bursts of imaginative creativity that eschew pure filmic realism in favour of a 
deeper emotional reality, Coppola, Jonze, Anderson, and Kaufman all create highly 
personal cinema that bears the indelible mark of its creators, even as it is the product 
of collaborative effort. That mark does not exist in a cultural or historical vacuum. 
These films are as much a product of their own era as they are the result of 
individual mental wellspring. Influenced and shaped by more than two hundred 
years of Romantic thought, they arrive at a time when Francis Fukuyama’s famous 
pronouncement of the potential “end of history” (Fukuyama 4) has had a generation 
to reverberate through the political and cultural climate. The word ending, of course, 
has a stark finality to it—whether it is a happy one or not.  But for the true 
Romantic, an ending represents more than the end of one thing; it also marks the 
beginning of something else. 
 
In his essay relating the Romantic and postmodern senses of endings, J. Drummond 
Bone writes, “Reality, with a small ‘r’, is open-ended” (73). Bone admits that such a 
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grand statement of truth about the nature of reality is in itself not open-ended, and 
therein lies a paradox, another irony (74). Despite their engagement with the 
dialectic of Romantic irony, almost all of these films have conclusive endings to 
their narratives. Their various plots and subplots are all wrapped up fairly neatly. 
Many feature the great exemplar of finality: death. Synecdoche, New York, The 
Virgin Suicides, The Royal Tenenbaums, and The Life Aquatic all feature major 
character deaths in their final acts, while the implied death of the protagonist in 
Marie Antoinette is obvious. Some end simply with their characters achieving a 
form of resolution to their problems, as in Fantastic Mr Fox. Jonze’s Her is perhaps 
the least conclusive ending, although we do know that the relationship between its 
two central characters is inexorably over—Samantha leaving Theodore represents 
another important kind of death: the death of a relationship. 
 
Bone contends that endings that achieve such a feeling of finality actually 
(ironically) result in an important dialectic of their own: “The metaphysical 
underpinnings of absolute structures of thought tend to inscribe ending as the 
beginning of that which lies beyond their text” (74). Such endings “are thus more 
‘open’ in one sense than ends which are accidental” (74). While an open ending just 
“sits” there, waiting for resolution that never comes, a closed ending indicates that, 
when the last act concludes, a new one is waiting in the wings. The end of one thing 
is always the beginning of another, just as, in Schlegelian terms, a thing is just 
another thing in the act of becoming (Mellor, English Romantic Irony 5). 
 
These films, then, demonstrate both a mournful sense of loss due to endings, and a 
hope for the perpetual renewal of the beginnings born of those endings. The death of 
“grand narratives” (Lyotard xxiii) does not mean the death of individual stories that 
contain a search for meaning. Whereas in the early 1980s, the term 
“postmodernism” began to signal a “pervasive cynicism about the progressivist 
ideals of modernity” (Waugh 5), by the mid-1990s, that given cynicism became a 
jumping-off point for a commentary on cynicism itself. The “new sincerity” 
externalises an ideological struggle between sincerity and cynicism by making that 
struggle, in part, an imaginative but sobering game. For the Romantic, art becomes 
“an intensely serious kind of play which defines mankind in terms of freedom” 
(Boreham and Heath 45). Such a freedom lies within the limitless world of the 
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human mind, the imagination. But the reliance upon imagination to bridge the gap 
between self and world can have an unintentional consequence: an increasing 
withdrawal from the world itself. 
 
The Battle Between Self-consciousness and Solipsism 
 
While the “Romantic era saw the production of a diversity of models for 
understanding subjectivity” (Henderson 3), the challenge to the “depth model” led to 
a crisis in the conception of self (3). The danger of the pendulum swinging so wide 
meant it often would swing back with unassailable force—resulting in the “poet’s 
anxious need for self-assurance” (Rzepka 9). The resultant “visionary solipsism” (9) 
produces a subject that radically turns back in toward herself, intent on securing 
subjectivity in the face of indeterminacy. The indeterminacy of postmodernism 
threatens to exacerbate this tendency, one that is evident in all the films I discuss.  
 
It is found in the Tenenbaum children’s quest to reassert their long-past status as a 
“family of geniuses”; in Steve Zissou’s similar attempt to reclaim the highs of his 
glory days by avenging the death of his partner; in Caden Cotard’s desire to make 
meaningful and authentic art that will solidify his legacy; in the Lisbon girls’ 
assertion of subjectivity through Weltschmerz-fuelled “self-oblivion” (Thorslev 
170); in Theodore Twombly’s need for the self-affirmation found in love; in Mr 
Fox’s plan to realise his “true” self through his farm raids; and in Marie-Antoinette’s 
constant struggle to “find herself” amidst her various passions. 
 
Waugh writes of two separate strains of subjectivity she sees in Romantic thought: 
“radical fictionality” and “radical situatedness” (19). The former she attributes to 
Coleridge and his concept of a self that “exists in its ability to work with the 
fragments available to it and from them to project on to the world new fictions by 
which to live” so that “the self can potentially shape its own world” (19). Such “new 
fictions” correspond to the self that creates them: “The self is always a creation out 
of available materials, never an archaeological discovery at a fixed point of origin” 
(22). I place Kaufman and Coppola within this Romantic tradition. The selves they 
create constantly search for self-actualising moments that will define their existence 
as an “infinite I AM” (Coleridge 167), but more often than not they exist within 
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radically decentred worlds where their selfhood is being relentlessly questioned or 
even invalidated. Their lives are fragmentary, and they often fight against this idea. 
Their creators, however, invariably embrace the chaos and fragmentary nature of 
existence. The aesthetic emphasis on destabilising and decentring depictions of time 
and space (Kaufman) or an insistence on focusing on surfaces and sensations 
(Coppola) suggest an ironic relation to subjectivity as it “dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates in order to recreate” (Coleridge, Biographia 167) new selves that are just 
as fictional as the previous ones.  
 
Waugh sees the Wordsworthian view of subjecthood as “radical situatedness”, 
which affirms the body’s place within a nature that is “always in motion” (22). 
Modernity becomes “a characteristic denial or disavowal” of such a “being-in-the-
world” (23) that renders the subject detached, a manipulator of a nature that has 
become “inert” (23). Anderson’s and Jonze’s films best exemplify this fundamental 
break of the subject’s relation to the chaos of nature. Their protagonists spend their 
time “looking, speculating and judging” (23) often without participating (or 
participating half-heartedly). Their subjectivity is less fractured than those 
populating Kaufman’s and Coppola’s films, but they suffer crises of self 
nonetheless. Trapped by their own imaginative subjectivity, they are unable to 
renounce the idea of their “fixed point of origin” (22). Anderson’s and Jonze’s mise-
en-scène depict the picturesque detachment of their characters (and, perhaps, their 
authors as well), gazing upon life, frozen in contemplation, unable to live. The 
freedom to create and destroy, in Romantic ironic fashion, is impeded by such self-
consciousness (45). While overcoming it completely is beyond the scope of human 
power, the struggle to do so still comprises these films’ Romantic core. 
 
Despite their differences in portrayal, egocentric self-assertion leaves all of these 
characters, at one point or another, detached from life. Preoccupied by their own 
obsessions with self, they despair at their inability to reach out to others in any 
meaningful way. In the Romantic age, such a visionary solipsism “tended to 
produce, as its repressed double, a gothic sense of the insubstantiality of selves” 
(Henderson 38). In this Gothic world, “Life in general appears ‘theatrical’, a ‘death-
in-life’, and embodied selves become mere actors or caricatures, or in more severe 
cases, insensate things altogether, like automata or walking corpses” (Rzepka 26). 
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This idea is felt most strongly in Kaufman’s film. Caden Cotard represents both 
visionary solipsism and Gothic insubstantiality. He is a self-obsessed artist who 
becomes an actor in his own play, both an automaton—given direct orders on what 
movements to make and when to die—and a wandering corpse, not yet dead but 
afraid to live. Coppola’s heroines are equally indicative of the Gothic sense of the 
theatrical; they are portrayed as their own shadow selves, viewed from the outside 
by egocentric spectators as if on stage. Cecilia Lisbon is not so much a walking 
corpse as she is a lounging one, and Marie-Antoinette wields her theatricality as a 
shield against those who seek to diminish her selfhood. 
 
While Kaufman and Coppola most obviously engage with this Gothic flipside of 
subjectivity, Anderson and Jonze do as well. But their perhaps more optimistic 
works tend to display it more subtly: In Jonze’s film, Theodore Twombly’s soft-
spoken timidity sometimes borders on the somnambulant, and Anderson has been 
accused of making his actors into mere objects of his highly orchestrated mise-en-
scène (Hill 99)—his obsession with uniforms and theatrical character quirks often 
delimits subjectivity as mere caricature. This is actually an alternative form of the 
Gothic: a kitsch, highly idiosyncratic way to address the eternally duelling dialectic 
of asserting the self while questioning its very being. The films all constantly 
renegotiate self-assertion and self-negation as part of their questioning of definitive 
endings. 
 
“Bravery in the Midst of Indeterminacy”: Emotion as a Form of 
Revolution 
 
If the need for self-assurance cannot be met, alternatives must be sought. Perhaps 
the transcendence found within the sublime can achieve a greater sense of 
wellbeing: a connection to the larger world combined with the elevation of personal 
power. If “we feel difficulty in believing in a grand narrative founded in the 
transcendent” (Larrissy 7) within the postmodern, we should not necessarily give up 
on it, for “the question of how far one can completely cut such a Postmodernism 
adrift from the transcendent persists, if its techniques and impulses have in fact 
emerged from a Romantic matrix” (7). For Waugh, the fundamental mode of 
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transcendence exists in the artist’s relationship to her art: “We still play God 
imaginatively, but ironically and provisionally” (11). In this sense, any relation to 
the transcendence found in sublimity is one based on an ironic questioning of 
sublime transcendence itself. 
 
The films I discuss have renegotiated a relationship to the transcendent through an 
aesthetic engagement with the sublime: they attempt to assert sublimity (for their 
characters) while portraying aesthetic projects that most strongly rely on ideas of the 
beautiful and the picturesque. Their engagement with various modes of the 
sublime—the Burkean, the Kantian, the egotistical, the feminine—are primarily an 
intellectual exercise. In The Life Aquatic, Anderson undercuts the sublime of the 
ocean’s expanse with kitschy practical effects. In The Virgin Suicides, Coppola 
mocks the assertion of male power found within the egotistical sublime, although 
her images often conjure feelings of transcendence through ecstatic surface 
sensation, in the vein of the “material sublime”. Only Kaufman goes so far as to 
attempt to engender true feelings of sublimity in the spectator through disorienting 
aesthetic effects, but his protagonist does not achieve a feeling of transcendence due 
to acknowledgement of his power of reason—to the contrary, he is perhaps literally 
mad.  
 
Within modernity, Jean-François Lyotard finds sublimity in the indeterminacy of 
endings functioning as new beginnings, linking the sublime to the anxiety felt in the 
question “and what now?” (Lyotard 246). Indeed, he considers Burke’s “major 
stake” in his conception of the sublime is “to show that the sublime is kindled by the 
threat of nothing further happening” (250). For Waugh, the sense of endings is 
especially pronounced within postmodernism: 
 
Though there are many forms of Postmodernism, they all 
express the sense that our inherited forms of knowledge and 
representation are undergoing some fundamental shift: 
modernity is coming to an end, strangled by its own 
contradictory logic, born astride of the grave which is now its 
abyss (7). 
 
If the idea of modernity itself “coming to an end” does not incite sublime terror, it is 
difficult to think of what could. But as is true of all sublime feeling, it rests not only 
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in terror, but also delight. If the sublime, within the postmodern and the Romantic, 
can be considered a form of “resistance to the banal and automatizing effects of 
modern life” (Waugh 31), these films’ intellectual engagement with it, at the very 
least, represents a questioning of such automatisation.  
 
The films offer no solutions, but the idea of solutions is itself hardly a Romantic 
one. As Waugh suggests, in both Romanticism and postmodernism, “the aesthetic 
becomes the only possible means of redemption” from the totalitarian reason of 
Enlightenment (15). Reasonable solutions are too didactic for a view toward art 
“refurbishing the interior” rather than insisting on “systemic ‘truth’” (6). Instead, the 
films’ form of “bravery” is found in their engagement with sincere emotion, even as 
they represent the anxiety of indeterminacy. If change is the only true constant, 
establishing even tenuous emotional connections with other selves, or attempting to 
create emotional connections with spectators, can seem like a revolutionary act.  
 
Historical influence remains a key to unlocking the films’ relation to the here and 
now. According to Jurgen Habermas, in the late nineteenth century, “there emerged 
out of th[e] romantic spirit that radicalized consciousness of modernity which freed 
itself from all historical ties” (99). Rather than being freed from their ties to history, 
however, these films—even as they exist as fantastical, ahistorical creations—are 
very much situated within a historical trajectory. They do not represent history as the 
unassailable march of progress, however, but of a return to origins. As circles of 
imaginative recreation expand, they also cycle back. Focused on memory and the 
past in order to discover selves in the forever “ongoing incompleted process” of 
their creation (Waugh 25, her emphasis), their spirits in solitude attempt to forge 
hopeful connections amidst the endless potential of new beginnings.  
 
After the era of 1990s American cinema, which often celebrated a pessimistic form 
of nihilism with the disillusioned sheen of “dampened affect” (Sconce 359), the 
cinema of the twenty-first century has managed to bring feeling, a desire for 
intimacy, and emotional vulnerability to the forefront even as it resists an outright 
ideological agenda. Derek Hill acknowledges the lack of a “conscious” movement in 
this “American No Wave”: 
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It’s as if the idea of a group of filmmakers intentionally 
attempting to spark a revolution with their cameras is too 
dated, too romantic and too ridiculous even to ponder. It 
appeals to the ambitious 14-year-old within, even though the 
older, wiser, more cynical adult knows better (Hill 11). 
 
Hill has managed to capture the entire raison d’etre of this non-movement 
movement in a single brief quotation. The idea is too romantic, and decidedly 
dated—dated back to the birth of the modern era itself. Regardless of conscious 
intention (and likely the result more of unconscious reaction), in this cycle of films 
Romantic idealism, which Hill considers the subject of ridicule, is met with world-
weary postmodern cynicism, which he equates with wisdom. One gets the sense that 
these filmmakers would reverse his pronouncements of value. Regardless, to the 
victor goes the spoils whenever the dialectic game ends—but the true Romantic 
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